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The original plan for Skirmishes was drawn up some years ago, 
though for various reasons it fell through the cracks of expand-
ing professional obligations. My first idea for the book was to 
respond in alphabetical order to nearly everyone who, by that 
point, had written a critique of Speculative Realism (SR) or 
Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO). That plan is no longer fea-
sible, given the now sizable literature — both positive and nega-
tive — on these closely related philosophical currents. What I 
will do instead is spend Part One on a quartet of books devoted 
in whole or in part to OOO, and Part Two on a series of shorter 
engagements with critics. The ordering of sections in Part Two 
is neither chronological nor random, but arranged in a way I 
hope will be useful to the reader.
Let’s speak first about Part One. The year 2014 was as a mile-
stone of sorts for my colleagues and me. In that year, the first 
four monographs on SR and OOO were published. From most to 
least favorable in tone, they are as follows:
• Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and 
the New Realism
• Steven Shaviro, The Universe of Things: On Speculative Real-
ism 
• Peter Gratton, Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects
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• Peter Wolfendale, Object-Oriented Philosophy: The Noume-
non’s New Clothes 
As subway officials might say, this map is not to scale. Shaviro is 
barely more negative than Sparrow, while Wolfendale’s ISIS-like 
assault is far more openly hostile than Gratton’s smirking and 
eye-rolling account. The first three books on the list are slim 
volumes and quick reads, but the fourth is a tome so massive, 
and so awkward in typeface and physical form, that I would 
never dream of taking it to a coffee shop with the others. Yet 
considered together, they offer a good sampling of the range of 
attitudes towards SR and OOO found among those contemporary 
philosophers who have paid some attention to these trends. Ide-
ally, I would have written a quick response to all of these books 
shortly after publication, so as to maintain the rapid pace of de-
bate once found in the now-dormant blogosphere; against all 
expectations, it took longer than expected to sit down and finish 
these pages.
In Part Two, I have added briefer accounts of other critics of 
OOO. To name them in order of appearance, I will cover Alberto 
Toscano, Christopher Norris, Dan Zahavi, and Stephen Mulhall. 
There are others who could also have fit but were excluded for 
one reason or another. Of these, I especially appreciate the ef-
forts of Ian James in The Technique of Thought; maybe I will have 
the chance to respond to him elsewhere.1 The critiques of OOO 
by Elizabeth Povinelli and Adrian J. Ivakhiv have also been on 
my radar, and I will try to deal with them in the near future if 
the opportunity arises.2 
If we provisionally accept the claim of José Ortega y Gasset 
that a generation lasts exactly fifteen years, then the explosion of 
critical responses in 2014 came a full generation after the birth 
1 Ian James, “The Relational Universe,” in The Technique of Thought: Nancy, 
Laruelle, Malabou, and Stiegler after Naturalism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2019), 55–120.
2 Elizabeth Povinelli, Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2016); Adrian Ivakhiv, Shadowing the Anthropocene: 
Eco-Realism for Turbulent Times (Earth: punctum books, 2018).
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of Object-Oriented Philosophy in my Chicago apartment and 
roughly a half-generation after the Speculative Realists first met 
in London.3 We are no longer outsiders who hope for a hearing, 
but recognized enemies of those who prefer the settled older 
discourse of 1990s Anglophone continental philosophy, with 
its ceaseless prayers to Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and a 
handful of related authors — nearly all of them native speakers 
of French or German. Further evidence of the ripening public 
discourse about OOO and SR can be seen in the fact that the four 
book authors of 2014 all basically know what they are talking 
about, even in those moments when I find them off the mark. 
By contrast with our worst-informed critics, even the caustic 
Wolfendale shows a praiseworthy diligence.
Warm thanks are due to Eileen A. Joy for recruiting me to 
write this book for punctum and for patiently enduring the 
unforeseen delays in completing it. And while I’m at it, I am 
grateful to Lily Brewer for giving the manuscript a remarkably 
thorough edit, and to Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei for produc-
ing this beautiful object.
3 José Ortega y Gasset, “Preface for Germans,” in Phenomenology and Art, 
trans. P.W. Silver (New York: Norton, 1975), 24–70; Ray Brassier, Iain Ham-
ilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux, “Speculative Real-








The End of Phenomenology
The End of Phenomenology is the second of three courageous 
books already published by Tom Sparrow, the others being Levi-
nas Unhinged (2013) and Plastic Bodies (2015). By “courageous” I 
mean that none of these books has been greeted warmly in those 
circles most capable of benefitting the next decade of Sparrow’s 
career. He speaks what he considers to be the truth and refuses 
to flatter academic magnificoes of any stripe. The End of Phe-
nomenology has already received a stern printed rebuke from 
Dan Zahavi, the chief gatekeeper of phenomenology in Genera-
tion X, who is also a target of riposte in chapter 7 below.1 Plastic 
Bodies was abused in shoddy fashion by a number of anonymous 
mainstream phenomenologists before finding a suitable pub-
lishing home. Sparrow’s head and backbone are strong enough 
that he has no need of my encouragement; I mention these in-
cidents only for the sake of younger readers who may someday 
find themselves obstructed in similar fashion.
For disclosure purposes, I should note that The End of Phe-
nomenology was published by Edinburgh University Press in the 
Speculative Realism series that I edit myself. Certainly, we have 
made a point to include quality volumes in that series by authors 
1 Dan Zahavi, “The End of What? Phenomenology vs. Speculative Realism,” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24, no. 3 (2016): 289–309.
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with whom I have significant philosophical disagreement, such 
as Markus Gabriel and especially Adrian Johnston.2 Sparrow’s 
book is a different sort of case. Other than my own volume on 
Quentin Meillassoux, there is perhaps no work in the series with 
which I agree more wholeheartedly.3 The End of Phenomenology 
makes the argument that phenomenology is haunted by a disa-
vowed anti-realism, that it is ill-equipped to deliver us “to the 
things themselves” despite its habitual claim to do so, and that 
Speculative Realism has raised the banner of reality in a manner 
of which phenomenology is inherently incapable. I agree with all 
of this, as well as with Sparrow’s skepticism toward the supposed 
showcase moments of “realism” in phenomenology: above all in 
the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose recent influence 
in the philosophy of mind has made him arguably more influen-
tial than Edmund Husserl himself.4 On the whole, my disagree-
ments with Sparrow range from minor to moderate. One such 
disagreement is that I am less enthusiastic than Sparrow about 
Lee Braver’s “transgressive realism,” a supposed third way that 
blends the advantages of realism and anti-realism while avoid-
ing the defects of both.5 Another is that whereas Sparrow doubts 
whether phenomenology has a clear method at all, I am con-
vinced that it does.
Some who read Sparrow’s words about my philosophy in 
The End of Phenomenology might be misled into thinking that 
he is a fellow practitioner of object-oriented ontology (OOO) in 
2 Markus Gabriel, Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology (Edinburgh: Ed-
inburgh University Press, 2015); Adrian Johnston, Adventures in Transcen-
dental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
3 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making, 2nd edn. 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015).
4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith 
(London: Routledge, 2002); Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968); 
Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., ed. Dermot Moran, trans. 
J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001).
5 Lee Braver, “On Not Settling the Issue of Realism,” in Speculations IV, eds. 
Michael Austin et al. (Earth: punctum books, 2013), 9–14.
19
sparrow
the manner of Ian Bogost, Levi R. Bryant, or Timothy Morton.6 
That is not the case. The intellectual bond that unites Sparrow 
and me is looser than this, though perhaps it will prove just as 
durable — namely, we both spent our formative years with phe-
nomenology and treasure its greatest insights while remaining 
frustrated by its limitations. There is a basic sympathy between 
us, then, in our agreement that phenomenology is something to 
cherish, then vigorously critique, then leave behind for some-
thing else. This peculiar relation to phenomenology may also 
explain why Sparrow and I are both drawn so strongly to the 
work and person of Alphonso Lingis, whose attitude toward the 
school is similar.7
By contrast, consider the case of my one-time colleagues in 
Speculative Realism. Among them is Ray Brassier, whose viscer-
al loathing for phenomenology — primarily due to its “brack-
eting” of the natural world — is rarely concealed whenever he 
mentions Husserl’s way of thinking.8 Iain Hamilton Grant seems 
mostly indifferent to phenomenology, and his most passionate 
concerns lie in a totally different sector of the history of phi-
losophy: German Idealism and Gilles Deleuze. As for Quentin 
Meillassoux, though he sometimes insists on his admiration for 
the school, his praise for phenomenology is notably vague and 
faint. As he once put it in an interview, “I am a diligent reader 
of the great phenomenologists […] phenomenology remains for 
me a formidable descriptive enterprise of the complexities of the 
given.”9 The first problem with this is that phenomenology is not 
6 Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press, 2011); Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a 
Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Timothy Mor-
ton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).
7 Tom Sparrow, ed., The Alphonso Lingis Reader (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2018).
8 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (New York: Pal-
grave, 2007).
9 Quentin Meillassoux, qtd. in Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Phi-




solely, or even primarily, about “description.” In Sparrow’s criti-
cal words: “Today, anything is called phenomenology so long as 
it involves some kind of subjective description of experience.”10 
But if this were all it took, Sparrow notes, it would lead to the 
baffling conclusion that “Melville [is] a phenomenologist of 
whaling, Thoreau a phenomenologist of walking, or Foucault a 
phenomenologist of power” (5). The second problem with Meil-
lassoux’s praise of phenomenology is that he by no means grants 
high philosophical status to description, which he treats with rel-
ative disdain by contrast with deduction. Thus, his compliment 
for phenomenology’s descriptive skills is backhanded at best.11
OOO is the only strand of Speculative Realism to make room 
for Husserlian phenomenology at the core of its approach, and 
not even the whole of OOO. Among my object-oriented col-
leagues, Bryant is a Deleuzean who draws nothing from Husserl 
for his own position, since the phenomenological tension be-
tween intentional objects and their adumbrations disappears for 
him in favor of the single term “local manifestations.”12 Bogost 
did write a book called Alien Phenomenology, but it is certainly 
not phenomenology in the Husserlian sense of the term.13 Mor-
ton’s philosophical background was initially shaped by Derrida, 
and though he has a deep respect for Husserl, he is not emo-
tionally invested in phenomenology in the same way as Lingis, 
Sparrow, or I. When Sparrow says in his book that “Harman 
has no patience for curt dismissals of Husserl” (116), the same 
can be said of Sparrow himself, even if this proves insufficient 
for an enforcer like Zahavi. This is the nature of my intellectual 
alliance with Sparrow, and our admiration for phenomenology 
10 Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 9. Subsequent page refer-
ences are given between parentheses in the main text.
11 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 38.
12 Levi R. Bryant, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiri-
cism and the Ontology of Immanence (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2008); Bryant, The Democracy of Objects.
13 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology.
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survives our shared critique. It would be a good thing if our phe-
nomenological critics would at least acknowledge this point.
Realism and Anti-Realism in Continental Philosophy
The central argument of Sparrow’s book is that phenomenology 
is guilty of a “disavowed antirealism” (ix), and that by avoiding 
this peculiar defect, Speculative Realism is the true heir to phe-
nomenology’s purported turn to the things themselves. Need-
less to say, I agree with this assessment. But in order to explain 
why I agree, we should begin with some general reflections on 
philosophical realism before returning to Sparrow’s book.
“Realism” is a flexible term that has numerous and some-
times opposite meanings in different fields. Political, mathemat-
ical, literary, and pictorial realism are not automatic philosophi-
cal allies; indeed, they often lead us in opposite directions. For 
example, mathematical realism is committed to the existence 
of an ideal realm of perfect numbers and shapes, while politi-
cal (Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt) and literary realism (Émile 
Zola, Theodore Dreiser) mock all hope of perfection, asking in-
stead that we face up to brute material existence in all its ugli-
ness. A different case is pictorial realism, which need not exhibit 
outright ugliness but only a commitment to the illusionism of a 
plausible three-dimensional scene, as opposed to Byzantine or 
cubist abstraction or the outlandish figures of surrealist paint-
ing. Even within philosophy there is room for confusion about 
the word. George Berkeley, despite being the most anti-realist 
major philosopher in Western history, is sometimes called a “di-
rect realist” in the sense that he holds that the images viewed by 
the mind are all the reality we can hope for and are not just “rep-
resentations” of something more real outside the mind, as John 
Locke would have it.14 But this is a derivative use of the term. 
14 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 
ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982); 




What most people understand philosophical realism to mean is 
the view that reality has an existence independent of the human 
mind. Though I will claim that this definition is still inadequate, 
it is a reasonable starting point for discussion; any remaining 
problems can be dealt with as we go along. 
Some years ago, Bogost was visiting the archives of the newly 
deceased Richard Rorty. He reported an amusing remark from 
Rorty’s unpublished papers, which I quote haphazardly from 
memory: “Every ten years or so,” the philosopher began, “some-
one writes a book with a title something like Beyond Realism 
and Idealism. And it always turns out that what’s beyond realism 
and idealism is — idealism!” Rorty was presumably speaking of 
intermittent claims within analytic philosophy to have passed 
beyond the classic realism/anti-realism dispute. But the situa-
tion in continental philosophy is much worse, since this entire 
subfield has long been tacitly committed to the claim that we 
stand “beyond” both alternatives. In part this can be traced to 
G.W.F. Hegel, whose claim to have domesticated Kant’s hidden 
noumenon as a special case of what appears is often accepted by 
continentals without further comment.15 But even more of the 
blame must go to the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, 
Heidegger, and their lesser allies, since here it is customary to 
treat the realism question as a “pseudo-problem”: after all, we 
are “always already outside ourselves” in intending objects or 
handling equipment. Although counterexamples are sometimes 
given of realist trends in earlier continental philosophy (Nico-
lai Hartmann, or the Munich phenomenologists) these partial 
exceptions prove the rule, since Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger 
have influenced hundreds of thousands of readers, while the 
others are generally read by a small number of specialists. Nei-
ther realism nor anti-realism has ever gained much traction in 
continental philosophy, since the whole point was to view these 
two options as naïve and already surpassed. In more recent con-
tinental thought, there was an initial realist surge in the early 




1990s thanks to Maurizio Ferraris in Turin.16 In Anglophone 
continental circles, realism returned to the forefront in 2002 
with Manuel DeLanda’s Intensive Science and Virtual Philoso-
phy as well as my own Tool-Being.17 The controversy provoked 
by these two books has sometimes led to mockery by analytic 
philosophers, in whose own subfield the realism/anti-realism 
dispute has been an openly discussed topic from the start. But 
we could easily play the ridicule game in reverse, laughing at the 
shock to analytic philosophy provided by Saul Kripke’s theory 
of reference, given that Husserl’s own treatment of “nominal 
acts” in the Logical Investigations more than foreshadowed the 
insight that led to the vicious priority dispute between Kripke, 
Ruth Barcan Marcus, and one or more thinkers from Finland.18 
One can always attempt to devalue philosophers by finding pre-
decessors to their insights, yet only in rare cases of outright ig-
norance or robbery does the second occurrence add nothing to 
the first. Today’s continental realism is a different bird from the 
realisms of yesteryear, as the present book will show in several 
distinct ways.
A significant contribution to the theme was made by Braver 
in 2007, in his outstanding work A Thing of This World: A His-
tory of Continental Anti-Realism, one of the signal achievements 
of its decade in continental thought. While Braver’s book has 
numerous merits, two in particular stand out. First, he no long-
er permits continental philosophy to present itself evasively as 
somehow standing beyond the realism/anti-realism dispute. For 
the first time in memory, and perhaps the first time in history, 
he candidly describes continental philosophy as an anti-realist 
movement (the mysterious absence of Husserl from Braver’s 
16 Maurizio Ferraris, Manifesto of New Realism, trans. Sarah De Sanctis (Al-
bany: SUNY Press, 2014).
17 Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London: Con-
tinuum, 2002); Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphys-
ics of Objects (Chicago: Open Court, 2002).
18 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2:169; Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Ruth Barcan Markus, “Mo-
dalities and Intensional Languages,” Synthese 13, no. 4 (1961): 303–22.
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story is the one unfortunate lacuna). More than this, he sees the 
continentals as having been rather successful along their anti-
realist path: “Overall, I think the continental thinkers carry out 
the implications of anti-realism further and more consistently 
than do their analytic counterparts.”19 Second, Braver shows 
exemplary awareness of the ambiguities of the term “realism.” 
Thus, he begins his book with a scrupulous glossary that lists 
six different meanings of realism (R 1–6), paired with their cor-
responding anti-realist inversions (A 1–6). In an early review 
of Braver’s book I argued that he was missing a seventh pair, 
and DeLanda later added an eighth and a ninth.20 Whatever one 
makes of our disputes with his list, Braver’s initial project re-
mains of crucial importance for the future of continental philos-
ophy, that professionally marginalized but influential subfield. 
Continental thought needs to face up to the realism question 
more directly, and should also be more aware of the different in-
flections of the term “realism” itself. Although Braver does this 
on behalf of anti-realism, and Speculative Realism on behalf of 
the opposite term, the two trends share much in common. At 
the end of this chapter, I will address the apparent shift in Brav-
er’s position, since 2007, from overt anti-realism to what looks 
like a more qualified stance.
While mainstream continental philosophers are generally 
dismissive of realism — which they usually call “naïve” realism, 
with no demonstration of why it is naïve — it is just as hard to 
find a full-blown continental idealist. It is usually Hegelians who 
come the closest, though even they are quick to insist that He-
gel is an “objective” idealist, meaning that he is not trapped in 
some merely subjective standpoint. In short, nearly everyone 
in continental circles is confidently “beyond” the realism/anti-
realism dispute; in practice, what this means is that thought and 
19 Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 514.
20 Graham Harman, “A Festival of Anti-Realism: Braver’s History of Conti-
nental Thought,” Philosophy Today 52, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 197–210. Ma-




the world are treated as existing only in correlation with each 
other rather than independently. Meillassoux once told me that 
he coined the term “correlationism” in 2002 or 2003 precisely 
because he was so tired of people telling him that they were 
not idealists, on the grounds that Kant provides a “refutation of 
idealism” and Husserl knows that we are always already outside 
ourselves in intending objects. Though I had earlier used the 
term “philosophy of access” to mean much the same thing, I was 
quick to recognize the superior flexibility and relevance of Meil-
lassoux’s term, and it strikes me as a permanent contribution to 
the philosophical lexicon.21 (However, I should note that Niki 
Young has recently made a strong case that the two terms ought 
to be kept distinct.22) That said, numerous critics have refused to 
accept the term “correlationism,” for reasons I generally regard 
as caviling and flimsy.23 My aim for now is only to set the table for 
Sparrow’s discussion of phenomenology, and thus it is sufficient 
to repeat what I have written elsewhere about Meillassoux’s own 
attempt, which one can only regard as failed, to escape correla-
tionism.24 We note first that he distinguishes between “weak” 
and “strong” varieties of this doctrine. Weak correlationism is 
exemplified by the Kantian thesis that we can think of a thing-
in-itself beyond thought but cannot know it, though at least it 
is possible to speak meaningfully about the Ding an sich. Strong 
correlationism, by contrast, holds that even this is impossible. 
If we speak of a thing-in-itself outside thought, this is itself a 
thought, and hence there is no escape from what Meillassoux 
calls the correlational circle. To summarize, weak correlation-
ism is a philosophy of finitude, while strong correlationism is 
strongly anti-finitude, just like Meillassoux himself. OOO pro-
ceeds differently. Beginning with Kant’s weak correlationism, we 
radicalize it not by denying finitude but by claiming that it char-
21 Harman, Tool-Being; Meillassoux, After Finitude. 
22 Niki Young, “On Correlationism and the Philosophy of (Human) Access: 
Meillassoux and Harman,” Open Philosophy 2 (2020): 42–52.
23 See for instance David Golumbia, “‘Correlationism’: The Dogma That Never 
Was,” boundary 2 43, no. 2 (May 2016): 1–25.
24 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 14–23.
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acterizes all objects, not just humans. This shows additionally 
that while correlationism is usually treated as an “agnostic” po-
sition on reality, it is inherently unstable. The strong correlation-
ist is someone who says, “to think a thing outside thought is to 
think it, and therefore it is automatically a thing inside thought.” 
The thing-in-itself is therefore rendered meaningless, and hence 
the strong correlationist is already an idealist. But Meillassoux 
attempts to finesse the point by saying roughly that just because 
we cannot think the in-itself does not mean that it necessarily 
does not exist. Yet this argument fails, since Meillassoux is saved 
from idealism only by the supposed difference between (a) our 
inability to think the in-itself and (b) its inability to exist. But 
by his own assumptions we cannot even conceive of option (b), 
given that the possibly unthinkable in-itself outside thought was 
converted in advance — by the correlational circle — into an in-
itself for thought. For this reason, both strong correlationism 
and Meillassoux’s own proposed speculative materialism are re-
ally just forms of idealism, however “materialist” they may claim 
to be. Meanwhile, the weak correlationist is indeed a sort of re-
alist, since the thing-in-itself is held to exist even though we are 
unable to access it directly.
If we adopt this realist alternative, as I propose, then it must 
be distinguished from the realism of knowledge: which holds 
not only that there is a reality outside the mind, but also that 
we are capable of grasping it. This type of realism nearly always 
flatters the natural sciences as our exemplary means of grasp-
ing the real, as in Paul Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge, which 
is primarily concerned with attacking relativism.25 By contrast, 
philosophies that give priority to mathematics (such as those 
of Meillassoux and Alain Badiou) veer instead towards ideal-
ism, usually clothed in the alibi of “materialism.”26 Another typi-
25 Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). For a critique of this book, see 
Graham Harman, “Fear of Reality: Realism and Infra-Realism,” The Monist 
98, no. 2 (April 2015): 126–44.




cal example of a realist confident in his ability to obtain direct 
knowledge is the analytic philosopher Michael Devitt, who de-
fines “strong scientific realism” as the view that there not only 
exists a reality outside the mind, but that it “(approximately) 
obey[s] the laws of science.”27 This differs from what he deri-
sively terms “Weak, or Fig-Leaf Realism. Something objectively 
exists independently of the mental.”28 As to what is wrong with 
this “Fig-Leaf ” brand of realism, Devitt tells us that it “is so 
weak as to be uninteresting; but it is worth stating, because it 
is all that many so-called realists are committed to.”29 Presum-
ably the “uninteresting” character of Fig-Leaf Realism for him 
is that it merely proclaims realism as an alibi against falling into 
anti-realism, when, as Devitt sees it, a true realist ought to be 
committed to the natural sciences as our eminent route of access 
to the “something [that] objectively exists independently of the 
mental.” In other words, the point seems to be that we can either 
speak of reality in the terms of natural science, or we must pass 
over it in silence, with the Fig-Leaf Realist confined to the latter 
option. Continental idealists sometimes make the similar objec-
tion that OOO becomes mired in little more than a “negative the-
ology.” Elsewhere I have responded to Adrian Johnston’s charge 
along these lines. The gist of my response is that our discussion 
of the outside world is not “science or bust,” nor even “prose 
discursive propositions or bust.”30 For in fact, much human cog-
nition occurs at a level that has nothing to do with the discursive 
capture of reality by concepts. Art is one good example of this, 
and Socratic philosophia another.31 The fact that so many people 
are happy to turn philosophy into the handmaid of natural sci-
27 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1997), 347.
28 Ibid., 23.
29 Ibid.
30 Adrian Johnston, “Points of Forced Freedom: Eleven (More) Theses on Ma-
terialism,” in Speculations IV, eds. Michael Austin et al. (Earth: punctum 
books, 2013), 91–98; Graham Harman, Immaterialism: Objects and Social 
Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), 29–32.
31 Graham Harman, “The Third Table,” in The Book of Books, ed. Carolyn 
Christov-Bakargiev (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2012), 540–42.
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ence is evidence of how much they have forgotten the lessons 
of the Meno concerning the difference between philosophy and 
knowledge, as attested by Socrates’ repeated and unironic pro-
fessions of ignorance.32
An alternative model of realism is the sort devoted to some-
thing like the inaccessible thing-in-itself, which is probably the 
unluckiest concept in the history of Western philosophy. The 
vast majority of philosophers today would agree that Kantian 
philosophy marked a revolutionary change in our discipline. 
The thing-in-itself, unattainable to finite human cognition, is 
surely the centerpiece of his system, insofar as it renders the old 
“dogmatic” metaphysics impossible. Nonetheless, there is vir-
tually no one today willing to defend the Ding an sich, under 
penalty of being called either a “Fig-Leaf Realist” or a “negative 
theologian.” One distinctive trait of OOO is its insistence on the 
noumenon, which can never be made directly present through 
knowledge or by any other means, though it showers us con-
stantly with effects that are detectable indirectly. The fact that a 
black hole is not directly visible does not prevent us from saying 
and learning many things about it, and the same holds for the 
thing-in-itself. We simply need to hold in check those scientistic 
tendencies that want philosophy to have no other role than com-
menting, after the fact, on the most up-to-date achievements of 
science. As a corollary, aesthetic phenomena and metaphorical 
and rhetorical discourse must have a stronger place in our phi-
losophy than they usually do in our time.
But what is our reason for insisting on the thing-in-itself in 
the first place? There are several grounds for doing so, some of 
them involving an explication of Heidegger’s philosophy that 
need not be repeated here. Perhaps the simplest way to ex-
plain the need for realism is as follows. Anyone other than a 
full-blown Berkeleyan idealist will surely agree that knowledge 
is not the same thing as that which it knows — our knowledge 
of the sun, however extensive, is not itself the sun. While this 
32 Plato, Meno, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 870–97.
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may sound like a triviality, it becomes more interesting if we 
ask ourselves why any entity and our knowledge of it are differ-
ent. The practitioner of “Strong Scientific Realism” (or “Strong 
Mathematical Materialism,” as Meillassoux’s position might be 
called) has no other choice than to say that our knowledge of the 
sun consists of certain formal properties that are “the same” in 
both the sun and my knowledge of it, but that in the sun’s case 
those forms somehow inhere in something called “dead physical 
matter.” (We will return to this issue in chapter 4 in connection 
with Wolfendale.) But since no one has ever discovered formless 
matter — nor will it ever be discovered — this idea of matter is 
itself little more than a “fig leaf ” to prevent the full-blown ideal-
ist doctrine that the sun and my knowledge of it are one and the 
same. In fact, let’s call this position “Fig-Leaf Materialism.” The 
alternative, which OOO recommends, is that the form in the sun 
and the form in my knowledge of the sun are two very different 
things, and that the sun’s form cannot possibly enter my mind 
without translation. In a sense this revives the Jesuit thinker 
Francisco Suárez’s rejection of the Thomist conception of ma-
teria signata, though the most proximate influence for OOO on 
this point is Bruno Latour.33
Thus, we are not committed to an “uninteresting” existence 
of noumena, but to the view that there is much to be said about 
them, even if not in the way of direct propositional discourse. 
This, I repeat, merely places us back in the honorable lineage of 
Socrates. It also differentiates OOO from what might be called 
“realisms of the remainder,” which merely accept some sort of 
residue lying outside human access without letting it play any 
constructive role in the world itself. Some of these theories of 
excess or residue involve appeal to the shock, trauma, or resist-
ance of the outside world as proof of a “realism” that they then 
do little to develop, as in the discussions of “resistance” by Wil-
33 Francis Suarez, On Individuation: Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual 
Unity and Its Principle, trans. Jorge J.E. Gracia (Milwaukee: Marquette Uni-
versity Press, 1982); Bruno Latour, “Irreductions,” trans. John Law, in The 
Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), 153–238.
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helm Dilthey and Max Scheler that Sparrow mentions himself 
(43). The Real of Jacques Lacan, though intriguing in purely 
psychoanalytic terms, is also a fig-leaf realism, since it cannot 
exist except through being interlaced with the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary, both of which require a human subject.34 I would 
say the same of Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of “givenness” and 
the “saturated phenomenon,” Jacques Derrida’s trace-structure, 
and even of “alterity” in one of my favorite philosophers, Em-
manuel Levinas.35 What differentiates OOO from realisms of the 
remainder is that for us, the real does not exist only to surprise 
and exceed humans. This is why the usual formulation of philo-
sophical realism — “there is a reality outside the mind” — is in-
adequate. For the mind is not the only thing with an outside; the 
relation between the mind and a real thing is just one of many 
different kinds of relation. In many relations the human mind 
is not present at all, as with the interaction between comets and 
moons, or raindrops and tar. What realism truly refers to is the 
autonomous reality of each and every object in its own right, its 
untranslatability or inexhaustibility by the effects it happens to 
have on minds or on anything else. In short, the phenomenal/
noumenal distinction is not primarily one between people and 
non-people, but between any reality in its own right and its rela-
tion with anything else. Having clarified how several different 
approaches to realism and anti-realism bear on Speculative Re-
alism and OOO, we turn to Sparrow’s fine discussion of phenom-
enology itself.
34 Jacques Lacan, The Sinthome: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. A.R. Price (Malden: Polity, 2016).
35 Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, 
trans. J.L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Jacques Der-
rida, Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Hus-
serl’s Phenomenology, trans. Leonard Lawlor (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 2010); Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on 




Phenomenology and Speculative Realism
Sparrow’s book loses no time in identifying phenomenology 
with correlationism. His exclamation point is not in vain when, 
in the preface, he asks us to “think of how much effort phenom-
enology has put into fending off the language of realism and 
antirealism!” (xiii). In more positive terms, “phenomenology 
[…] is exclusively committed to investigating only those di-
mensions of human experience that take shape within the cor-
relation between thought and being” (2). Sparrow cites Zahavi’s 
praise of the correlation between subjectivity and world as es-
sential for phenomenology (15) and plausibly depicts Merleau-
Ponty as a correlationist ally (35).36 But which of the two sorts of 
correlationism do we find in phenomenology, weak or strong? 
Weak correlationism, with its acceptance of an unknowable 
thing-in-itself, would surely be a poor fit for Husserl, who re-
garded the Kantian an sich as an absurdity. Yet for the very same 
reason, Karl Ameriks argues that Husserl is already as realist as 
one can possibly be. Sparrow summarizes the issue as follows: 
“Meillassoux specifies that the kind of correlationism defended 
by phenomenology is strong correlationism, by which he means 
the view that the in itself is neither knowable nor thinkable. If 
Ameriks is right about Husserl, however, then the latter repre-
sents a weak form of correlationism.” (35). But there are genu-
ine problems with Ameriks’s reading, and Sparrow reminds us 
why: “[according to Ameriks] neither Husserl’s rejection of the 
thing in itself nor his claim that a ‘world outside our own’ is 
absurd force him […] to abandon realism. It is simply necessary 
for us to see that his transcendental idealism does not end in 
subjectivism” (33; italics added). Here again we have the favorite 
trick of Hegelians, who often change the topic of conversation 
from idealism to subjectivism, knowing as they do that the latter 
is an easier hurdle for Hegel to clear: just consider the subtitle 
of Frederick Beiser’s influential book on German Idealism, The 




Struggle against Subjectivism.37 As Sparrow notes, “If it is true 
that Husserl’s position is not metaphysically neutral, it does not, 
however, lean towards realism. It leans toward idealism, even 
absolute idealism, in its steadfast commitment to the inescap-
ability of correlationism” (34).
A critical reader might now ask whether Sparrow himself 
is guilty of shifting the goalposts to his own benefit. He first 
claimed that phenomenology was a form of correlationism, but 
now seems to go further and call it a form of outright idealism. 
Indeed, the same critic might also note that Meillassoux himself 
is guilty of the same slippage, sometimes defining correlation-
ism in a way that includes Kantian weak correlationism, while 
at others requiring correlationism to be the strong form which 
holds that we cannot talk meaningfully about a thing-in-itself at 
all. But there is no contradiction here, even though Meillassoux 
later wished aloud that he had been more precise with his termi-
nology in After Finitude.38 For we have seen that the “weak” and 
“strong” versions are two different and equally legitimate ways 
that one can speak of correlationism. The weak version defines it 
as a philosophy which holds that we cannot speak of thought or 
world independently of each other, but only in their primal cor-
relation or rapport. This obviously includes Kant. But the strong 
version defines correlationism, as Meillassoux himself seems to 
prefer, as resulting from the correlational circle — the argument 
that we cannot think a thing outside thought without turning 
it into a thought, thereby bringing it back into the circle. This 
version does not include Kant, but does include Husserl and his 
rejection of the Ding an sich. But is Husserl a “strong correla-
tionist” as Sparrow said earlier in the book, or an “idealist” as 
he says now? As I see it this is no problem for Sparrow, because 
37 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 
1781–1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
38 Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” trans. Robin Mackay and M. Gansen, 
in Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity Since Structural-




there is no ontological distinction between strong correlation-
ism and idealism in the first place, despite Meillassoux’s urgent 
need to drive a wedge between them. In fact, strong correlation-
ism is really just idealism with an added fig leaf. To say that we 
cannot even speak meaningfully about a thing outside thought 
is tantamount to saying that nothing exists outside thought, no 
matter what Meillassoux claims on the matter. If Husserl were 
really just a weak correlationist, as Ameriks holds, then we 
could insulate Husserl from charges of idealism just as this is 
done for Kant: that is, by calling attention to his postulation of 
the thing-in-itself. But not only does Husserl postulate no such 
thing, he explicitly rejects it. This means he is actually a strong 
correlationist, and therefore slips into idealism as quickly as the 
German Idealists — or as Meillassoux, for that matter. It is re-
ally rather simple: if you accept the notion that it is “absurd” to 
speak of a thing outside thought, then you are an idealist. This 
is why a number of contemporary Continental idealists — Meil-
lassoux, Slavoj Žižek — prefer to change the subject and speak 
about materialism instead.
Sparrow is correct in saying that “the evidence of phenom-
enology is complicit with the antirealist streak of post-Kantian 
philosophy,” at least in the continental tradition (80). He rightly 
notes that when a phenomenologist starts speaking about “ext-
raphenomenal, transphenomenal, or nonphenomenal entities,” 
they are transgressing the rules of phenomenology itself (80). 
Stated differently, the point is not whether Husserl knows that 
the world exists when we are not looking at it, but whether Hus-
serl’s philosophy knows it. This is why token proclamations of 
faith in “the existence of the outside world” do nothing to al-
leviate the rampant forms of idealism that are too often prof-
fered by those who proclaim such faith. Thus, we need not 
look to the later career of Husserl to find idealism, though it 
certainly becomes more pronounced as time passes. As for Hei-
degger, Sparrow puts it best: “[although] already in Being and 
Time [he] seems only nominally committed to phenomenology, 
when he is, it sounds like antirealism” (26; punctuation modi-
fied). In the case of Merleau-Ponty, who is often portrayed as a 
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futuristic, quasi-realist innovator, the atmosphere of idealism is 
overwhelming for anyone who reads him with a clear sense of 
what realism means. In Sparrow’s words, “one of Merleau-Pon-
ty’s chief lessons [is that] when it comes to perception, the very 
ground of all knowledge, it is possible to perceive the in itself, but 
this in itself is always only the in itself for us” (89). As Sparrow 
comments further, in response to Ted Toadvine’s work, “even if 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature does not issue from a fun-
damentally anthropocentric stance, it nevertheless situates the 
ground of nature, or what he calls ‘wild’ or ‘brute’ being, at the 
center of the human/nature chiasm” (154). These factors prompt 
Sparrow to offer some radical advice: “phenomenology should 
give up on realism and package itself instead as a formidable 
idealism” (12). More specifically, he suggests Hegelian Idealism 
as a promising new ally for phenomenologists (188–89).
Throughout Sparrow’s book, I agree with nearly everything 
he says about the weaknesses of phenomenology. Yet I am not so 
sure it is easy to radicalize Husserlian phenomenology into He-
gelian idealism. Although both of these philosophies are often 
portrayed as being “beyond” idealism even while embracing it, 
I find the realist alibis of Husserlian phenomenology more in-
triguing than Hegel’s. Although Sparrow does a fine job of chas-
ing down Husserl’s alibis and exposing them as shams, I still 
find them charming for reasons to be explained shortly. From 
the opening of his book, Sparrow is suitably ruthless in insist-
ing that phenomenology “can only underwrite a rhetoric of real-
ism, not a metaphysical realism” (xiv). He pulls no punches with 
his examples: “just because Merleau-Ponty provides us with a 
characteristically rich and evocative description of the day’s 
weather, then adds that he sincerely believes in the autonomous, 
mind-independent reality of meteorological events, this does 
not entail that phenomenology authorizes him to make realist 
commitments” (xiv). In metaphysical terms, “phenomenology 
appears as a dead-end that leaves its practitioners gesturing to-
ward the outside without ever actually stepping out of the house” 
(1). While much of phenomenology’s rhetoric of concreteness is 
tied up with “embodiment” (13), DeLanda is right when he calls 
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“the body” a realist alibi for otherwise non-realist philosophies, 
like a token minority member of an otherwise lily-white corpo-
rate board.39 Yes, Merleau-Ponty can always be summoned to 
testify about the “opacity” of perception (30) and the permanent 
bondedness of subject and object in the cosmic “flesh” that joins 
them (49). But Sparrow shows the weaknesses of such claims 
when he adds that “phenomenal contestation is no proof of the 
noumenal” (82).
By contrast with these anti-realist failings of phenomenol-
ogy, Sparrow is sanguine, I am pleased to note, about the cre-
dentials of Speculative Realism and especially about OOO. Some 
of his kind words need to be quoted here simply because they 
were later denied so vehemently by Zahavi. In his preface, Spar-
row claims that “it is ultimately necessary to close the door on 
phenomenology as an approach to realism. […] Speculative re-
alism signals the end of phenomenology” (xi). Moreover, “only 
speculative realism can actually get us out of Kant’s shadow” (1), 
and Speculative Realism is “a new, better-equipped vanguard” 
(12) for the task of returning to the things themselves. The final, 
short paragraph of Sparrow’s book reads as follows: “For too 
long we have believed that phenomenology is the philosophy 
best equipped to deliver the things themselves. In the wake of 
speculative realism this belief seems more and more unbeliev-
able” (190).
To repeat, I find Sparrow’s case concerning the “disavowed 
antirealism” of phenomenology to be conclusive. But as already 
mentioned, I am not convinced by his view that phenomenol-
ogy ought to be radicalized into a form of Hegelian Idealism. 
For there is an important difference between the respective ways 
that Husserl and Hegel deploy their idealisms. While defenders 
of Hegel frequently play the “objective idealism” card to soften 
accusations of idealism against their hero, it is worth noting 
that no one ever calls Hegel a realist. But while the defenders 
of phenomenology also do not frequently call Husserl a real-
ist, I mentioned that the realist alibis for phenomenology have 
39 DeLanda and Harman, The Rise of Realism, 116.
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an undeniable charm and surface plausibility to them. The rea-
son is that even though phenomenology is an idealism, it is an 
object-oriented idealism nonetheless. The same cannot be said 
for Hegel, despite the efforts of Robert Stern to portray him as 
a philosopher of objects.40 In the phenomenological tradition, 
however idealist its chief thinkers inevitably turn out to be, there 
is the constant temptation to think we are in the presence of red-
blooded forms of realism. Levinas may not secure genuine real-
ism with his discussions of alterity, but his pages are filled with 
such examples as bread, cigarette lighters, and fine new automo-
biles. Merleau-Ponty’s “opacity” and “flesh” turn out to be mere 
covers for an ongoing idealist project, and his “house viewed 
from everywhere” is not the realist house we might have hoped 
to find in his work.41 Yet there is a good reason these authors 
are able to give mesmerizing descriptions of specific everyday 
objects in a way we would never expect from Hegel. The same 
is already true of Husserl, even though as a stylist he is not the 
equal of Levinas or Merleau-Ponty. Specific objects populate 
the pages of phenomenological writings in a way that would 
never have interested earlier idealists. And however inadequate 
Merleau-Ponty’s talk of “opacity” may be, it seems to have real-
ist overtones utterly foreign to Hegel, for whom we could never 
imagine opacity as a central topic.
What is the reason for this phenomenological allegiance to 
the play of profiles and shadows? We have seen that Husserl has 
little to recommend him on the question of how the noume-
nal relates to the phenomenal, since he merely denies the exist-
ence of the former in much the same way as Hegel. But within 
the phenomenal realm, Husserl discovers a great deal that was 
missed by philosophy before him. Recall that the empiricist tra-
dition tried to eliminate objects from the phenomenal by reduc-
ing them to “bundles of qualities.” Locke is typical of this group:
40 Robert Stern, Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1990).
41 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 149.
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The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great 
number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as 
they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own 
operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these 
simple ideas go constantly together [… and thus] we accus-
tom our selves to suppose some substratum, wherein they do 
subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we 
call substance.42
For empiricism, there is no evidence of an “object” over and 
above the qualities immediately present to the mind, no case 
for an empty substratum holding the qualities together. In-
stead, the name of the object is merely a collective nickname 
for qualities that appear together frequently enough to deserve 
a proper name: “banana,” “gas lamp,” “fox terrier.” It is Husserl 
himself who reverses this empiricist notion, by alerting us to 
the fact that one and the same object supports shifting sets of 
qualities (“adumbrations”) at different times while still remain-
ing the same object. To be sure, Aristotle had already noticed 
that substances support different qualities at different times, but 
these substances were located in a real world outside the mind, 
whereas Husserl’s intentional objects are newfound “intentional 
objects” in the realm of phenomenal experience. In this way he 
introduces us to a new tension, found solely in experience, be-
tween intentional objects capable of enduring for a while and 
their constantly shifting adumbrations. More than this, along 
with the shifting accidental adumbrations, Husserl noticed that 
his intentional objects also have essential qualities that they need 
in order to remain what they are from one moment to the next. 
These are what we obtain through the famous eidetic reduction, 
in which the phenomenologist strips away the accidental fea-
tures of an intentional object to arrive, ultimately, at its eidos. 
This is supposed to occur through a direct “intuition of essence,” 
said moreover to be an intellectual intuition and never a sensu-
ous one.
42 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1:390–91.
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In this way, Husserl’s extreme idealism turned out to be salu-
tary for his philosophical development. Unconcerned by the re-
lation between real and phenomenal that has obsessed so many 
modern philosophers, Husserl was able to find new levels of tex-
ture and complexity within the phenomenal sphere itself — with 
intentional objects torn between eidetic qualities intuitable by 
the intellect and accidental adumbrations grasped by the senses. 
This is why I cannot join Sparrow when he goes so far as to 
claim that “phenomenology really began and ended with Hus-
serl” (xi) and that “the idea of phenomenology lacks a coher-
ent center” (xiii). It may be true that there has been “a failure 
on the part of phenomenology to adequately clarify its method, 
scope, and metaphysical commitments” (xiii) and that “no con-
sensus exists” (4) as to the meaning of phenomenological meth-
od, even to the point that “‘phenomenology’ is on the verge of 
empty signification, if it has not already crossed that threshold” 
(189). And indeed, Sparrow cites a number of attempts to define 
phenomenology in ways that are much too inclusive, as when 
Dermot Moran calls Hannah Arendt a phenomenologist de-
spite little trace of the phenomenological method in her work43 
(4–5). Yet I would counter that most schools of philosophy, art, 
and literature are subject to numerous rival definitions, most of 
them insufficiently precise. More than this, it is often the case 
that the originator of any movement, struggling full-time with 
the demands of founding it, is less skilled at defining it than are 
later heirs. In the case at hand, Husserl is actually better than 
most at explaining the meaning of phenomenology, which he 
at least attempts to do in countless passages. Even so, it is pos-
sible that a better way to understand phenomenology is to read 
the first hundred or so pages of Heidegger’s History of the Con-
cept of Time. Although orthodox Husserlians dislike Heidegger’s 
claim that phenomenology is caught up in the notion of being as 
“presence for consciousness,” and that Husserl fails to raise the 
question of the meaning of being, Heidegger’s account of Hus-




serl in that lucid lecture course is basically sympathetic. He does 
a good job analyzing phenomenology into what he considers its 
three basic concepts: intentionality, categorial intuition, and the 
original sense of the a priori (as an ontological rather than an 
epistemological concept). Heidegger also gets the phenomeno-
logical method right, defining it as “the analytic description of 
intentionality in its a priori” (79). Yet even Heidegger misses the 
truly central discovery, a fourth basic concept more important 
than the three he records: intentional objects. Luckily Sparrow 
himself does not miss it, but realizes it is the key to the OOO 
interpretation of Husserl (116–23).
Much of the discussion of intentional objects — whether by 
Husserl, his rivals, allies, or scholars — is focused on whether 
they exist internal to the mind, external to the mind, or some-
where else altogether. Restated in Speculative Realist terms, it 
is a never-ending dispute over whether Husserl was an idealist, 
a realist, or a correlationist. Put differently, it is an argument 
about whether there is some sort of gap between an intentional 
object such as a cat and a real cat that exists in some other place 
than the intentional one. Husserl obviously regards such a gap as 
nonsensical or absurd, while I side with Kant on the question of 
the noumenal. But in an important sense, this perennial dispute 
merely distracts us from two other gaps that are demonstrably 
found in Husserl: (a) The gap between an intentional object and 
its countless adumbrations, its various appearances in sense 
perception, as when the cat is seen from many different angles 
and distances; (b) the gap between an intentional object and the 
qualities it essentially needs in order to be what it is — which is 
not the case with adumbrations, since in that case all are purely 
accidental or inessential. Whereas the realist/anti-realist argu-
ment over Husserl concerns the gap that OOO names space, the 
latter two gaps or tensions are the ones we call time and eidos.44
We can approach this from another direction. It is well known 
that the notion of intentional objects — meaning objects imma-
nent in the mind — was revived in the nineteenth century by 
44 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011).
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Husserl’s teacher Franz Brentano.45 The intentional acts aimed 
at these objects come in three basic types — presentations, judg-
ments, and valuations. Brentano treats presentation as the most 
basic type, since nothing can be judged, loved, or hated unless it 
is first present to the mind, whether in perception or in memory. 
While this seems logical enough at first glance, Husserl rejects 
Brentano’s core idea that intentional experience is grounded in 
presentation. While seldom discussed, this rejection is so cen-
tral for Husserl’s philosophy that in it we find the whole of his 
advance beyond not only Brentano but the empiricist tradition 
as well. The problem with finding the essence of intentionality 
in presentation is as follows. If we are interested in the essen-
tial features of an object of experience, as phenomenology cer-
tainly is, then presentation always distracts us with too much 
information. If we intend a cat, for instance, we not only see 
the cat but see it as sitting on a specific piece of furniture from 
a definite angle and distance in a specific quality of light. Quite 
obviously, none of these overly specific details are necessary for 
us to intend the cat, and Husserl will ask us to strip away these 
accidental qualities in the course of the eidetic reduction. To 
intend the cat, we simply need to intend the intentional object 
that is this cat rather than any specific detailed presentation of 
it. This is why Husserl tells us in the Logical Investigations that 
Brentano is wrong — intentionality is not about “experienced 
contents” but about “object-giving acts.”46 Stated more simply, 
we intend objects rather than all the excessive perceptual detail 
that inevitably comes bundled with them. We have seen that this 
central teaching of Husserl has a surprisingly Aristotelian flavor 
to it and is not unlike the classical distinction between essence 
and accident, though it occurs in an idealist register foreign to 
Aristotle himself.
45 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, ed. Linda L. 
McAlister, trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister 
(London: Routledge, 1995).
46 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1:276.
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This is why I disagree with Sparrow that the meaning of phe-
nomenology is not sufficiently clear, and also disagree with Hei-
degger that phenomenology is about “the analytic description 
of intentionality in its a priori.” What phenomenology is really 
about is the way in which intentional objects differ from the nu-
merous qualities or adumbrations with which they appear, as 
well as how such objects differ from the crucial eidetic qualities 
that can never be encountered by the senses but which make 
an intentional object what it is. Sparrow is aware of my view, 
but rather than evaluate it as a candidate for an integral defini-
tion of phenomenology, he focuses instead on the widespread 
inability of phenomenologists to define what they do in any but 
the vaguest of terms. In OOO we call the intentional object the 
sensual object, which — let the reader beware! — is the collateral 
adjective for “sensuality” rather than “sensibility.” We do not ac-
cept Husserl’s claim of a crucial distinction between the senses 
and the intellect. We also hold that Husserl discovered the ex-
istence of a tense relationship between intentional objects and 
their sensual qualities on one side and their real ones on the 
other. We steadfastly maintain that Husserl is an idealist who re-
fuses to concede the existence of real objects over and above his 
intentional — i.e. sensual — ones. Yet there is still enough to be 
learned from Husserl that his idealism is often beside the point.
Braver’s Transgressive Realism
Few authors in contemporary continental philosophy have writ-
ten more important things than Lee Braver. His debut book A 
Thing of This World displays formidable powers of scholarly 
synthesis and a talent for philosophical speculation beyond the 
narrow bounds of scholarship. If this were a fair world, Anglo-
phone continental thought would have shifted soon after the 
publication of his book from the pretension of being “beyond” 
realism and idealism to a more candid variant of anti-realism. 
Instead, though his book has been widely read and cited, it 
seems not to have spawned much added ontological candor 
in its readers. Despite my admiration for Braver’s work, I have 
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found — through his publications and our personal correspond-
ence — that we almost always disagree on philosophical issues. 
This is true not only of his first book, but also of two important 
articles published in later years in which he significantly softens 
his anti-realist position, quite possibly as a result of his encoun-
ter with Speculative Realism.
A Thing of This World was a remorseless defense of anti-real-
ism, which Braver presented both as the most legitimate line of 
development in continental philosophy and as the source of its 
relative superiority to the analytic tradition. If we glance at the 
titles of his later articles, “A Brief History of Continental Real-
ism” (2012) and “On Not Settling the Issue of Realism” (2013), 
we might be inclined to think that after his first, explicitly anti-
realist book, Braver shifted positions. The chronology of these 
articles might suggest that he was first led to consider an omit-
ted realist strand in continental thought before settling in the 
second article into a more agnostic position. This is not actu-
ally the case. Instead, both articles appeal to a new position that 
Braver calls “transgressive realism,” so that neither is any closer 
to classical realism than the other.
Given Sparrow’s generally positive reaction to Braver’s trans-
gressive realism, we might ask how different it is from the overt 
idealism of A Thing of This World. The answer? Not as much as 
one would think. For instance, in the 2013 article Braver speaks 
as follows: “I’m still too much of an Anti-Realist to embrace 
Speculative Realism whole-heartedly. It seems right to me that 
we always bring our thoughts to any consideration of the world 
as it is independently of us which automatically compromises 
any absolute independence.”47 Yet immediately thereafter, he 
makes what sounds like an important concession:
But the Speculative Realists are right to point out that the 
Anti-Realists may have exaggerated the comprehensiveness 
of our pre-forming of experience. If experience were so fully 
47 Braver, “On Not Settling the Issue of Realism,” 12. Subsequent page refer-
ences are given between parentheses in the main text preceded by NSI.
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pre-digested by the ways our minds process information, we 
could never experience surprise. Specific, ontic surprises, 
sure, but not radical surprises that violate and transform our 
very notions of what is. (NSI 12)
He goes on to say that “lately, I’ve become interested in these 
moments of revolutionary experience, when our whole sense of 
what the world is like gets turned inside out” (NSI 12; italics add-
ed). The word “lately” rings true for this reader, at least. Braver’s 
more recent articles do show heightened attention to surprises 
that uproot the very structure of how our world seems to be 
constituted. We should also note that — if memory serves — the 
term “transgressive realism” does not appear at all in A Thing of 
This World, and hence we must assume it was coined at a later 
date. Even Søren Kierkegaard, now depicted by Braver as the 
founding father of transgressive realism, is hardly mentioned 
in his earlier book, and even then only to explain why he was 
largely excluded. To summarize, even though the Braver of 2013 
says “I’m still […] an Anti-Realist,” his position has certainly 
shifted somewhat; he does try to make room for a radical out-
side that would meet what he sees as the partially valid demands 
of realism.
Sparrow is not entirely uncritical of this step. As he wisely 
notes, “Just because something surprises us does not necessar-
ily indicate an ontological rupture in immanence” (59). What 
Sparrow apparently senses here is that a realism of “surprise” is 
on roughly the same footing as a realism of “resistance,” which 
he already criticized in the cases of Dilthey and Scheler. Any 
philosophy of resistance is still guilty of domesticating the out-
side by reducing it to an obstacle for humans, just as when J.G. 
Fichte confronts the I with an Anstoß that checks or limits it 
or when Lacan — as we have seen — posits a Real that exists as 
nothing more than an impasse or trauma for the human sub-
ject.48 Yet elsewhere in Sparrow’s book, he is more optimistic 
48 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John 
Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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about Braver’s efforts: “I think Braver uncovers something im-
portant for the future of continental philosophy: a middle path 
between antirealism and realism, but one that does not bear the 
name of phenomenology” (52). And this is my final point of 
disagreement with Sparrow’s book. For while I share his posi-
tive assessment of Braver as a scholar, I do not think there is any 
such thing as a “middle path” between antirealism and realism, 
and thus cannot see Braver as anything other than a hardline 
anti-realist, despite the conciliatory spirit of his recent articles.
One oddity about “On Not Settling the Issue of Realism” 
is that, while Meillassoux is the only Speculative Realist men-
tioned by name, and I am entirely omitted, this article actually 
has more in common with my own philosophy. Whereas Meil-
lassoux holds that the primary qualities of the real can be ad-
equately known through mathematization, this is clearly not the 
sort of realism that Braver has in mind. Instead, Braver talks 
about surprises, the horror fiction of H.P. Lovecraft, and aes-
thetics as a privileged mode of access to the real, all of which 
are important issues for OOO, but — with the exception of Love-
craft — not for Meillassoux. The article also ends with Braver 
pleading for “openness” about realism, which sounds exactly 
like one of my own appeals to Socratic philosophia over against 
knowledge: “Couldn’t we learn from questions without trying to 
settle them, resolve ourselves to not resolving them? Couldn’t 
wisdom be found in reconciling ourselves to its perpetual love, 
and never to its possession?” (NSI 14). The problem is that Brav-
er’s transgressive realist position does not really allow for the 
openness he appears to demand. Like Meillassoux, he agrees 
with the idealist that whatever is thought is thought by us, so 
that in principle nothing can be placed outside the correlational 
circle of thought and world. Braver, again like Meillassoux, is 
also convinced that we cannot talk about the collision of two 
inanimate objects but only about our thinking about that colli-
sion. He merely adds the additional claim that we are sometimes 
surprised in shocking ways that undercut our very sense of real-
ity. But as an ontology this is not especially “open,” since Braver 
asserts that there must always be a human on the scene to be 
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surprised. To summarize, I do not agree with Braver’s claim that 
object-oriented realism is less open than his own mélange of 
idealism and existentialism. I also hold that in order to be genu-
ine realism, a philosophy needs to be open to something beyond 
the human–world correlate, since otherwise we end up with 
nothing more than yet another realism of the remainder. When 
Braver tells us that “noumena represent the vestigial remains of 
traditional metaphysics in Kant’s system,” he conveniently omits 
that the noumena, through their very inaccessibility, are what 
allowed Kant to annihilate traditional metaphysics (NSI 10). In 
this way, Braver again shows his true anti-realist colors. His re-
cent tactical shift toward claiming to be beyond the realist/anti-
realist dispute altogether actually weakens the chief virtue of his 
first book — its unremitting frankness in support of idealism.
Let’s turn now to his 2012 article, “A Brief History of Conti-
nental Realism.” We recall that A Thing of This World treated the 
history of continental philosophy as more or less co-extensive 
with the history of anti-realist thought. He did find numerous 
subtle examples of lingering realism in major continental think-
ers, but these were treated as symptoms of retrograde compro-
mise rather than evidence of a fruitful realist tradition. So, why 
his sudden interest in continental realism? It seems fairly obvi-
ous that this article was motivated by Braver’s recent encounter 
with Speculative Realism. But in an even more puzzling odd-
ity, this school is mentioned nowhere in Braver’s article, other 
than a strange passing reference in footnote 51 to “Speculative 
Realists and Quentin Meillassoux,” in which the disjunction be-
tween Meillassoux and the rest of the group is left unexplained. 
A more generous way of proceeding would have been to name 
us and take issue with us, rather than pretending that we had 
nothing to do with Braver turning his attention to a previously 
unacknowledged strain of continental realism.
In any event, the point of the 2012 piece is to provide a his-
torical basis for transgressive realism. As stated in the abstract, 
“Kierkegaard created the position by merging Hegel’s insistence 
that we must have some kind of contact with anything we can 
call real (thus rejecting noumena), with Kant’s belief that real-
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ity fundamentally exceeds our understanding; human reason 
should not be the criterion of the real.”49 This is, in fact, an ac-
curate summary of Braver’s case. He is fully on board with Hegel 
against Kant when it comes to the thing-in-itself: “By jettisoning 
the very idea of noumena, Hegel’s Objective Idealism takes the 
scare quotes off of Kant’s phenomenal ‘knowledge,’ and it does 
so without resorting to a God’s-eye view” (HCR 266). The sup-
posed contribution of Kierkegaard to a germinal form of real-
ism is also convincing enough: “Whereas Kant and Hegel place 
morality entirely within our reach, Kierkegaard insists that we 
dare not claim to know all that morality is and can be. In short, 
ethics and reason acquire an outside. Not only is there an out-
side, as Hegel denies, but we can encounter it, as Kant denies” 
(HCR 270). And further, “Kierkegaard’s transcendence does 
not repose in undisturbed isolation but makes contact with us. 
This experience is not squeezed into our mental structures but 
violates them, overloading and reshaping our categories” (HCR 
271). There is also an unexpected moment when the formerly 
rabid anti-realist Braver praises Kierkegaard for avoiding He-
gel’s “arrogant anti-realism” (HCR 272).
Now, what is the supposed virtue of transgressive realism as 
opposed to the various brands of Speculative Realism? Since 
Braver never considers this question in his article, we can only 
guess, though I will try to limit my guesses to direct textual evi-
dence. Here is one such piece of evidence: “Transgressive Real-
ism, I am arguing, offers a via media, a way to have our ineffable 
cake and eff it too. It gives us a reality that transcends our ways 
of thinking, but not all access to it” (HCR 272). But which sort of 
realism posits an ineffable that transcends all access to it? One 
might make this argument against Kant, though in his case there 
is still a sort of indirect access to the noumenal side of humans 
through the assumption of our ethical freedom, and even an in-
direct access to artworks and biological creatures through the 
49 Lee Braver, “A History of Continental Realism,” Continental Philosophy 
Review 45, no 2 (2012): 261. Subsequent page references are given between 
parentheses in the main text preceded by hcr.
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faculty of judgment.50 But does Braver’s critique work against 
OOO? Not at all, since OOO does not deny all access to the sup-
posedly ineffable real but simply denies that knowledge (whether 
reducing an object downward to its components or upward to 
its effects) is able to exhaust the real.51 This is why I agree with 
Braver that art has a different sort of access to the real that does 
not reduce it to its givenness, though I also extend the argument 
to philosophy itself, which must be understood in the sense of 
the Socratic philosophia rather than the sophia of those who 
wish it to be a critical appendage to natural science.
Among his transgressive realist allies, Braver names Hei-
degger and Levinas, who are favorite authors of mine as well. 
And indeed, there is a sense in which both philosophers end 
up with a realism of the remainder in which the real has lit-
tle role other than to haunt human cognition with its opacity. 
Even so, I do not think Braver gets everything right about these 
two figures. For example, he has this to say about Heidegger: 
“His background in phenomenology, which equates beings with 
phenomena and being with appearing or manifesting, places 
him squarely among the enemies of noumena” (HCR 273). While 
there is a certain degree of truth in this characterization, as seen 
from Heidegger’s frequent dismissive accounts of the realism/
anti-realism dispute, Braver follows most Heidegger scholars 
in ignoring at least one striking counter-instance. I speak of a 
badly neglected passage from late in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, where Heidegger boldly declares: “What is the sig-
nificance of the struggle initiated in German Idealism against 
the ‘thing-in-itself ’ except a growing forgetfulness of what Kant 
had won, namely […] the original development and searching 
50 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor, 2nd edn. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Immanuel Kant, Critique 
of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1987).
51 Graham Harman, “Undermining, Overmining, and Duomining: A Cri-
tique,” in ADD Metaphysics, ed. Jenna Sutela (Aalto: Aalto University Design 
Research Laboratory, 2013), 40–51.
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study of the problem of human finitude?”52 True enough, Hei-
degger’s real emphasis in this passage is on human finitude; he 
never escaped the basically Kantian correlationism for which 
Being is of little interest aside from how it reveals itself to Da-
sein. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that Being for Heidegger 
is exhausted in its manifestation to Dasein, despite Derrida’s 
baseless assertion to the contrary, and thus Heidegger’s posi-
tive mention of noumena deserves our attention.53 To my mind, 
Braver also places too much stress on Heidegger’s “altering 
our attitude from absorbed coping to disengaged observation” 
(HCR 273), since it is unclear that the difference between human 
practical and theoretical comportment is of much philosophi-
cal significance at all.54 At times, Braver even seems to lose all 
remembrance of Heidegger’s break with Husserl: “Phenomenol-
ogy’s implicit ontology, which Heidegger considers the only le-
gitimate ontology, agrees with Objective Idealism in restricting 
reality to what we can encounter” (HCR 273).
As for Levinas, there is indeed something of the transgressive 
realist about him, given his fascination with absolute Otherness. 
Braver cites the following, highly relevant passage from Levinas: 
“Husserl’s idealism is the affirmation that every object, the pole 
of a synthesis of identifications, is permeable to the mind; or, 
conversely, that the mind can encounter nothing without com-
prehending it. Being can never shock the mind. […] Nothing 
in the world could be absolutely foreign to the subject.”55 And 
further, “When the Other enters into the horizon of knowledge, 
it already renounces alterity. […] It infinitely overflows the 
52 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. 
Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 251–52.
53 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 22–23. 
54 Harman, Tool-Being; Graham Harman, Heidegger Explained: From Phe-
nomenon to Thing (Chicago: Open Court, 2007).
55 Emmanuel Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. Richard A. 




bounds of knowledge.”56 But while this argument for “radical 
alterity” is the most famous aspect of Levinas, I would contest 
the idea that it is his most important contribution. For precisely 
due to its “infinity,” the Other in Levinas shares one of the big-
gest problems with Kant’s notion of the sublime — namely, if all 
sublime experiences are taken to be absolutely large, it becomes 
difficult to distinguish one from another. If my brother is one 
infinite otherness and a menacing stranger in an alley anoth-
er, then in this infinity they are the same, and any differentia-
tion between them will be a mere surface-effect concealing an 
apeiron of ethical otherness that swallows them both. Lest this 
sound too extreme, I would note that the problem is more than 
foreshadowed in the early Levinasian text Existence and Exist-
ents, in which being itself is treated as a shapeless il y a or “there 
is,” with all specific beings resulting from a “hypostasis” per-
formed solely by the human mind.57 I am unmoved by Braver’s 
pre-emptive strike against this critique: “Transgressive thinkers 
are not positing an inchoate chaos howling outside the borders 
of thought or rumbling beneath the floorboards of experience 
[…] Rather, that which exceeds our grasp strikes us precisely by 
exceeding it, stretching previous categories until they rip, leav-
ing us with conceptual tatters which get sewn into motley para-
doxical categories of the uncategorizable” (HCR 284–85). Insofar 
as I can make sense of this, his point seems to be that the excess 
of alterity is to be judged not by its own amorphous surplus but 
by the way it transforms our own immanent understanding of 
the world, so that my brother differs from the stranger in the 
alley only through the different effects they have on me and 
others. But in that case, we must wonder how they are able to 
have different effects in the first place, if they are both chunks 
of the same apeiron. This simply means that Braver’s Levinas 
is less a “realist” in any meaningful sense than he is a modern-
56 Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, eds. Adriaan Peperzak, 
Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), 12.
57 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001).
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day Anaximander. In other words, to the extent that Levinas is 
a realist, he is also a monist unable to articulate the various in-
carnations of infinite alterity in the world. For this reason, I find 
him much stronger as a thinker of the surface of reality, as in his 
remarkable discussions of the enjoyment of individual things.
Ultimately, why is Braver so concerned to cut off philosophi-
cal discussion of object–object relations and limit himself to the 
inscrutable traumas faced by human beings? His clearest justifi-
cation can be found in the previously discussed article, “On Not 
Settling the Issue of Realism.” There he tells us as follows:
[A]gainst the Speculative Realists, I still think that reality 
has to make some kind of contact with us for us to be able 
to talk about it. I don’t see how discussion of the ways that 
inanimate objects “experience” or “encounter” each other in 
the dark after we’ve all gone to bed could ever be more than 
mere speculation. It’s just that this contact doesn’t always fit 
neatly into our concepts, [in] the way the Anti-Realists had 
it. (NSI 12)
This nicely encapsulates the feature of modernism that, in Part 
Two of this book, I will call Onto-Taxonomy. A brief criticism 
is already in order. Braver’s point seems to be that because we 
humans are inevitably limited to human experience, as Kant fa-
mously argued, it is impossible to speculate on what the experi-
ence of some other entity might be like. But this conflates two 
separate issues, and here Braver is far from alone. It is certainly 
true that I cannot know exactly what it is like to be a bat or dog 
or slime mold, and to a lesser extent I cannot even know what 
it is like to be a woman, African-American, or a billionaire in 
twenty-first-century America. But this expectation sets too high 
a hurdle, for I do not need to be a woman, an African-American, 
or a billionaire to argue that such people are every bit as finite 
as I am. Stated differently, I do not gain the sense of my own 
finitude from more than fifty years experience of living my own 
life, so that I would somehow have to leave it open as to whether 
my fellow humans and other creatures are also finite. Instead, 
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finitude is the result of a philosophical argument by Kant, to the 
effect that we did not create the thing-in-itself and therefore 
(unlike God) cannot know it. This is not the form taken by my 
own argument for finitude, which simply appeals to the inability 
of any relation to exhaust its terms, including relations in which 
no human or other living creature participates. We can deduce 
the finitude of billionaires, dogs, and slime molds just as easily 
as we deduce it in our own case. We need not step into their 
shoes to do it; it is not the kind of lesson that requires any de-
gree of empathy. By closing off this possibility, Braver joins the 
mainstream of modern philosophy (including Meillassoux) in 
taking the human–world relation to be the philosophical root of 
all the others. For this reason, I cannot follow Sparrow in seeing 





The Universe of Things
Steven Shaviro has a colorful range of interests running from 
cinema, to Marxism, to science fiction, to the philosophies of 
Whitehead and Deleuze. The Universe of Things ostensibly owes 
more to Whitehead than to the other items on the list, though 
we will encounter a key point where Deleuze seems to be the 
dominant influence. Shaviro is such a fair and generous critic 
that I cannot imagine anyone disliking him; at the very least, I 
would be suspicious of anyone who did. While he is not some-
one who goes out of his way to agree for the sake of artificial 
harmony, the blunt New Yorker in him somehow delivers the 
bluntness in inoffensive fashion. I do not recall having ever been 
annoyed with him for even a fraction of a second.
Shaviro and I agree on any number of things, and The Uni-
verse of Things offers numerous examples of intellectual overlap. 
Otherwise, there are perhaps three points of serious disagree-
ment, and these are likely to be of greater interest to the reader:
1. Although we both stress the importance of aesthetics, Shaviro 
favors the beautiful over the sublime, since the latter strikes 
him as a worn-out modernist trope. He follows Whitehead 
in treating the nature of beauty as “patterned contrasts” and 
critiques OOO for overinvesting in the sublime. The root of 
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our disagreement here is that OOO actually does not take the 
side of the sublime against beauty.
2. What Shaviro admires in both Whitehead and Deleuze is 
their apparently shared focus on process and becoming. By 
contrast, he sees OOO as providing a hopelessly static model 
of the world.
3. When it comes to cognition, Shaviro proceeds in decidedly 
non-modernist fashion, endorsing a panpsychist theory of 
Whiteheadian inspiration. He also treats cognition in rela-
tional terms and criticizes OOO for its insistence on a non-
relational model of beings.
Each of these points deserves a section of its own, though they 
will not be of equal length. Since the objection concerning the 
beautiful and the sublime is one I have addressed twice in print 
already, a brief rejoinder should suffice.1
The Beautiful and the Sublime
Let’s begin on the final page of Shaviro’s book: “The primordial 
form of all experience, and thereby of all action and relation, is 
an aesthetic one. This is why Harman is right to proclaim that 
aesthetics is not ‘a local phenomenon of human experience,’ but 
rather ‘the root of all relations […] including causal relations’.”2 
We do agree on this point, which is enough to make us black 
sheep in a philosophy world still ruled by the Modernist Onto-
1 Graham Harman, “Response to Shaviro,” in The Speculative Turn: Continen-
tal Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham 
Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 279–90; Graham Harman, Art and 
Objects (Cambridge: Polity, 2020), 45–47.
2 Steven Shaviro, The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism (Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 156. Subsequent page references 
are given between parentheses in the main text. The reference here to my 
own work is to Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” in Collapse II, 
ed. Robin Mackay (Falstaff: Urbanomic, 2007), 221.
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Taxonomy that treats human thought as one sphere and nature 
as another that only the sciences are permitted to enter, while 
throwing animals and plants onto whichever side is convenient 
at the moment. However freely Meillassoux may speculate on 
the virtual God, he will always be spared ultimate ridicule giv-
en his patient observance of the standard modern rift between 
thought on one side and “dead matter” on the other.3 Shaviro and 
I are more likely to be on the receiving end of punch-the-hippie 
attacks by rationalists, due to our shared concern with “how 
nonhuman agents, no less than human ones, perform actions 
and express needs and values” (5). We also agree that Whitehead 
“is one of those rare philosophers who […] dares to venture be-
yond the human sphere” (6), although this is not a virtue for 
those who assume that humans are trapped in a prison of self-
reflexivity, unable to think anything outside thought without 
immediately turning it into a thought. In Shaviro’s own words, 
“No particular entity — not even the human subject — can claim 
metaphysical preeminence or serve as a favored mediator. All 
entities, of all sizes and scales, have the same degree of reality. 
They all interact with each other in the same ways, and they all 
exhibit the same sorts of properties” (29). This is not something 
one would hear from the likes of Badiou, Meillassoux, or Slavoj 
Žižek, who represent the main speculative branch of Modernist 
Onto-Taxonomy in our time.
Stated differently, Shaviro and I join Whitehead in affirming 
a “flat ontology” in which all entities are placed on the same 
footing, unlike the medievals (God) and moderns (thought) 
who take one kind of entity to be ontologically the most impor-
tant. We also join Whitehead in treating aesthetic experience as 
more primary than the intellectual sort, which we both see as an 
especially complex version of experience that occurs only rarely 
in the cosmos. Yet we now diverge sharply, though not in exactly 
the way Shaviro thinks. In his own words:
3 Quentin Meillassoux, “Appendix: Excerpts from L’Inexistence divine,” in 
Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 175–238.
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The difference between Whitehead and Harman is best un-
derstood, I think, as a difference between the aesthetics of 
beauty and the aesthetics of the sublime. Whitehead defines 
beauty as a matter of differences that are conciliated, adapted 
to one another, and “interwoven in patterned contrasts,” in 
order to make for “intense experience.” Harman, for his part, 
appeals to notions of the sublime: although he never uses this 
word, he refers instead to what he calls allure, or the attrac-
tion of something that has retreated into its own depths. […] 
Allure is properly a sublime experience because it stretches 
the observer to the point where it reaches the limits of its 
power or where its apprehensions break down.4 (42)
Shaviro’s alternative to allure and its hidden depth is the term 
“metamorphosis,” admittedly a better match for Whiteheadian 
process philosophy. As he puts it,
In metamorphosis, it is not the thing itself that attracts me, 
over and above its qualities; it is rather the very unsteadiness 
of the thing that draws me onward, as it ripples and shifts 
in a kind of protean wavering. […] Metamorphosis thus re-
flects the way that, as Whitehead puts it, “every actual entity 
is present in every other actual entity.” In the movement of 
allure, the web of meaning is ruptured as the thing emerges 
violently from its context; but in the movement of meta-
morphosis, the web of meaning is multiplied and extended, 
echoed and distorted, and propagated to infinity as the thing 
loses itself in the network of its ramifying traces.5 (54)
This beautiful description draws the following distinction: allure 
is about hiddenness, or the gulf between a real object and its ac-
cessibility, while metamorphosis is centered in the rift between 
4 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Free Press, 1967), 
252, 263; Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the 
Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 141–44.




an entity and its own shifting kaleidoscopic patterns, which 
do not retreat into any sort of depth at all. Although Shaviro 
kindly states that his preference for Whitehead’s theory over 
mine comes down to a matter of taste (41), it is more than that, 
since he happens to think that Whitehead is on the right side of 
history here. Since my theory of allure so closely resembles the 
Kantian sublime — or so Shaviro claims — it “fits very well into 
what is now an extended modernist tradition” (43). By contrast, 
the Whitehead-inspired theory of metamorphosis is said to be a 
better match for twenty-first century culture: “We live in a world 
where all manners of cultural expression are digitally transcod-
ed and electronically disseminated, where genetic material is 
freely recombined, and where matter is becoming open to direct 
manipulation on the atomic and subatomic scales. Nothing is 
hidden; there are no more concealed depths” (43).
Let me now explain why I think Shaviro’s contrast between 
Whiteheadian and OOO aesthetics is not quite on target. First, 
there is a striking insufficiency in Whitehead’s definition of 
beauty as “patterned contrasts,” which I cannot regard as one of 
his strongest moments as a thinker. It is a flowery approxima-
tion too easily subverted with counterexamples, as also happens 
with many theories of humor such as “sudden incongruity,” “be-
nign violation,” “defense mechanism,” “economy of energy,” and 
the like. For it is not hard to think of examples of patterned con-
trasts that are not beautiful in the least. Allure, however, offers 
a precise theory of beauty that does not hide behind vagueness: 
for OOO, allure results from a rift between a real object and its 
sensual qualities. While this theory can be opposed just like any 
other, there are no obvious counterinstances to it.
Second, Shaviro is wrong to identify allure with the Kantian 
sublime by saying that “allure is properly a sublime experience 
because it stretches the observer to the point where it reaches the 
limits of its power or where its apprehensions break down” (42). 
This equation fails for two reasons. One is that we need not turn 
to the sublime in Kant to find a place where the observer reaches 
the limits of their power. This is already true for Kant’s notion of 
beauty, which by definition is unparaphrasable and unconcep-
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tualizable, approachable only by means of taste. On this point I 
enjoy the unexpected alliance of Jacques Rancière, who also re-
grets the excessive focus on the sublime in recent decades.6 But 
there is another, more decisive point. For while Shaviro rightly 
emphasizes the depth and inscrutability of the sublime — while 
missing that the same is true of beauty — he fails to note that the 
sublime is also defined in absolute terms. As Kant puts it in Book 
II of the Critique of Judgment, “we call sublime what is absolutely 
large [… meaning that which is] large beyond all comparison.”7 
He goes on to distinguish between absolute magnitude (the 
mathematical sublime) and absolute power (the dynamical sub-
lime), but both exemplify something that is absolutely beyond 
the human scale. This is why the Kantian sublime has nothing 
to do with OOO’s allure, which I identify instead with beauty. 
The best way to see this is to consider Timothy Morton’s no-
tion of “hyperobjects,” a term coined primarily for ecological 
purposes, though it can also be deployed as a pointed critique of 
the Kantian sublime. Morton is not interested in absolutes and 
infinities, which he takes to be covertly anthropocentric terms. 
Instead, hyperobjects pertain to extremely large finite quanti-
ties. As he puts it, “Infinity is far easier to cope with. Infinity 
brings to mind our cognitive powers. […] But hyperobjects are 
not forever. What they offer instead is very large finitude. I can 
think infinity. But I can’t count up to one hundred thousand.”8 
In short, Morton is interested in the hyperobjective rather than 
the sublime, and so am I: the “absolutely” large or powerful are 
simply the night in which all black holes and tsunamis equally 
eclipse the tiny human form.
What Shaviro calls “metamorphosis” is already accounted for 
by OOO under the name of time (or the SO–SQ tension) and by 
Kant under the name of charm. It has to do with the delightful 
6 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliott (Lon-
don: Verso, 2011), 64.
7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapo-
lis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 103.
8 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the 
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 60.
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rippling play between a thing and its various shifting configura-
tions over time, as with the flickering flames in the stove of a 
snowbound cabin.9 Kant views this as a subsidiary form of beau-
ty, incapable of rising to great aesthetic heights. As for OOO, this 
SO–SQ tension is counted as one of the four basic kinds of aes-
thetics in the broadest sense.10 But it cannot account for beauty, 
which requires the withdrawal of a real object and the beholder’s 
own theatrical replacement of it.11 Since I have already dealt with 
this topic in other publications, we should move on to other dis-
agreements.12
Becoming and Stasis
Shaviro is not the first to have charged OOO with offering an 
excessively static conception of reality. He places himself instead 
in the Whiteheadian camp of novelty and becoming:
Whitehead […] envisions a dynamic world of entities that 
make decisions — or more precisely, of entities whose very 
being consists in the decisions they make. Harman’s entities, 
in contrast, do not spontaneously act or decide; they simply 
are. For Harman, the qualities of an entity somehow already 
preexist; for Whitehead, these qualities are generated on the 
fly. (40)
For Shaviro, the preference for becoming over stasis links di-
rectly with his favoring of a relational ontology over the non-
relational sort embodied by OOO. My philosophy, he holds, “[af-
firms] the actuality of the volcano only at the price of isolating 
9 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 95.
10 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011).
11 Graham Harman, “A New Sense of Mimesis,” in Aesthetics Equals Politics: 
New Discourses across Art, Architecture, and Philosophy, ed. Mark Foster 
Gage (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2019), 49–64.
12 The most concise argument is probably in Graham Harman, “Materialism 
Is Not the Solution: On Matter, Form, and Mimesis,” The Nordic Journal of 
Aesthetics 47 (2016): 94–110.
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it from the world and reducing its dynamism to a sort of sterile 
display — which is all that it can be, in the absence of its direct 
effects on other entities” (41). As mentioned, Shaviro is far from 
alone in this sentiment. For more than a century we have heard 
the refrain that a theory of constant flux is truer to reality than 
one of static independent substances that engage in relations af-
ter the fact. I too can recall my excitement as an undergraduate 
when reading Benjamin Lee Whorf ’s argument that the Hopi 
language was more suited for up-to-date quantum theory than 
our sadly static Indo-European noun/verb grammar.13 More re-
cently, the revival of Bergsonian currents by Deleuze and Gil-
bert Simondon has led to increased emphasis on the process of 
individuation while instilling suspicion about the OOO concern 
with “fully-formed individuals.”14 Michael Austin and Miguel 
Penas López are just two of the younger authors who have ap-
proached my work critically from this direction.15 But perhaps 
Shaviro’s own words are the most damning: “where Whitehead 
is concerned with both transience and futurity (which he calls 
‘creative advance’), Harman shows little interest in either of 
these” (40).
Shaviro himself shows plenty of interest in the inherent 
instability of things, and in the opening pages of the book he 
praises Whitehead for doing the same: “The world, [White-
head] says, is composed of processes, not things” (2). For him 
the ultimate atoms of experience, known as “actual entities,” are 
13 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality, ed. John B. Carroll 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956).
14 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Con-
sciousness, trans. F.L. Pogson (Mineola: Dover, 2001); Gilles Deleuze, Berg-
sonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991); Gilbert Simondon, L’Individuation à la lumière des notions de 
forme et d’information (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2005).
15 Michael Austin, “To Exist Is to Change: A Friendly Disagreement with Gra-
ham Harman on Why Things Happen,” in Speculations I, ed. Paul J. Ennis 
(Brooklyn: punctum books, 2010), 66–83; Miguel Peñas López, “Speculative 
Experiments: What If Harman and Simondon Individuate Together?” in 




“active and articulated processes — experiences, or moments of 
feeling — rather than simple, self-identical substances” (3). And 
finally, “the world is never static, never closed, never complet-
ed. Each process of becoming gives rise to novelty: it produces 
something new and unique, something that has never existed 
before. Things do not ‘persist in being’ (the definition of Spi-
noza’s conatus) so much as they continually alter and transform 
themselves” (4). There is also my own purported failure to do 
Whitehead justice: “Because he insists on enduring substances, 
as opposed to relations among ‘perpetually perishing’ occasions, 
Harman underestimates Whitehead’s account of change” (38).
Shaviro’s next step is to assemble a list of allies for his pro-
cess-oriented view of the world, beginning with a crowd fa-
vorite: “the recent revival of interest in Whitehead has also been 
spurred by an increasing recognition of the affinities between 
Whitehead’s process-oriented thought and that of the French 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze” (4). While conceding my own re-
semblance to Whitehead on one point, he distinguishes us on 
another: “even as Whitehead’s actualism links him to Harman, 
so his insistence on processes and becoming — which is to say, 
on relations — links him to Deleuze and to [Iain Hamilton] 
Grant”16 (35). Shaviro also admires the book on Whitehead by 
Isabelle Stengers (9), which at least two scholars have called 
“the book to beat” in recent Whitehead studies, and Stengers 
too sees an intimate link between Whitehead and Deleuze.17 But 
even as Shaviro holds that Whitehead is the master of creative, 
relational novelty whereas I am trapped in static substancehood, 
he simultaneously argues that Whitehead is also the thinker 
who balances the opposed claims of relation and individual-
ity. Shaviro can only wish, he tells us, that ontological isolation 
were as normal as OOO claims. Instead, he reports that “our 
16 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London: Con-
tinuum, 2008).
17 Isabelle Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of 
Concepts, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011); Randall E. Auxier and Gary L. Herstein, The Quantum of Explana-
tion: Whitehead’s Radical Empiricism (London: Routledge, 2017), 18.
62
skirmishes
fundamental condition is one of ubiquitous and inescapable 
connections. We are continually beset by relations, smothered 
and suffocated by them” (33). And further, “To my mind, rela-
tion and causal determination are our common conditions and 
maladies, and self-creation or independence is the rare, frag-
ile, and extraordinary achievement that needs to be cultivated 
and cherished” (34). I always appreciate those moments when 
philosophers share the background experiences that shape their 
arguments, and certainly appreciate Shaviro’s words here. If he 
feels so oppressed by the swarm of relations in contemporary 
life, one might wonder why his “taste” leads him to Whitehead 
rather than OOO. The reason, I take it, is that Whitehead’s re-
lationism foregrounds the perilous over-connected situation in 
which Shaviro feels trapped, and that he works his way out of 
it rather than simply positing its non-existence in the manner 
of object-oriented thinkers. In any case, he thinks I do not suf-
ficiently honor Whitehead’s twofold achievement:
Whitehead refers to the “‘really real’ things” that “constitute 
the universe” both as “actual entities” and “actual occasions.” 
They are alternatively things or happenings. These two 
modes of being are different, yet they can be identified with 
one another, in much the same way that “matter has been 
identified with energy” in modern physics. When Harman 
rejects Whitehead’s claims about relations, he is not being 
sufficiently attentive to the dual-aspect nature of Whitehead’s 
ontology. This can also be expressed in another way. Harman 
skips over the dimension of privacy in Whitehead’s account 
of objects.18 (35)
The consequences are said to be serious, for “[Whitehead] also 
has a sense of the cosmic irony of transition and transience. And 
this latter sense is something that I do not find in Harman” (36).
18 The quoted phrases in this passage are from Alfred North Whitehead, 
Modes of Thought (New York: Free Press, 1938), 137.
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Shaviro’s root claim in these matters is that philosophies of 
individual substance inevitably lead to stasis and fixity. This does 
ally him with Whitehead, who famously dismissed the concept 
of substance as an example of “vacuous actuality,” which in his 
view “haunts realist philosophy” with the untenable notion of 
essentially non-relational things.19 We can leave this particular 
dispute for the discussion of relations in the next section. But 
one thing that cannot straightforwardly be said about Aristo-
tle’s theory of substance is that it is insensitive to transience and 
change. The point is relevant because OOO, like all theories that 
highlight individual things capable of enduring for more than 
an instant, ultimately traces its ancestry to Aristotle. Seen in the 
context of his era, Aristotle actually looks like a wild advocate of 
dynamic change. It is not just his proverbial opposition to Pla-
to’s eternal perfect forms, his pathbreaking study of corruptible 
biological things, and his physics so heavily devoted to change 
and motion. More than this, it would be fair to say that Aristo-
tle was the first philosopher to place destructible entities at the 
center of his philosophy. We recall that the pre-Socratic think-
ers competed to deliver the best version of the root element of 
the world: water, air, the four elements mixed together, atoms, 
being, or the formless apeiron. But note that all of these options 
exist eternally. Even the two pre-Socratics who believed in an 
ancient destruction of the apeiron found its successor in some-
thing that was eternal: number for Pythagoras, and the tiny ho-
moiomereiai for Anaxagoras. By contrast, the ranks of Aristotle’s 
substances consist largely of mortal living creatures. This is the 
first point I want to make about Aristotle, that he is primarily 
a philosopher of change and movement, not of fixity and sta-
sis. The fact that an Aristotelian primary substance might en-
dure for hours, weeks, or decades before dying hardly puts him 
in the same camp as Platonic or Christian theories of eternity. 
Only because Whitehead sets such a high bar for becoming — a 
“perpetual perishing” in which nothing lasts more than a single 
instant — can Aristotle look like a static old grump by compari-
19 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 29.
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son. To summarize, we should acknowledge that the Aristote-
lian tradition generally does a pretty good job of accounting for 
change, and if someone insists that a philosophy of change re-
quires the abolition of any temporal endurance whatsoever, then 
we ought to ask them why. This holds not only for Shaviro and 
Whitehead but also for my favorite living philosopher, Bruno 
Latour, who tells us that “everything happens only once, and at 
one place,” which precludes the endurance of an actor for more 
than an instant.20 But there is something else that needs to be 
said about Aristotle, though it works against Shaviro less di-
rectly. Namely, one of the most important dualisms in Aristotle 
is his distinction between the continuous and the discrete. We 
know this because two of his greatest works, the Physics and the 
Metaphysics, each deal primarily with one of them.21 Perhaps the 
central topic of the Physics is the continuum. Considering the 
room in which you are now reading, how many parts does it 
have? We can divide it arbitrarily into two, seven, nine hundred, 
or perhaps a billion segments. Some divisions of a given space 
might make more practical sense than others, but in absolute 
terms, we can potentially divide space into any number of pieces 
we like, which does not mean it is actually thus divided in its 
own right. A given space is always a single continuum, not the 
aggregate product of a definite number of tiny spatial elements. 
What about the time you need to read this chapter on Shaviro? 
How many pieces does this stretch of time have? Again, it is a 
continuum — it has no definite number of parts but can be split 
up according to our convenience into three spans of time, five 
spans, one hundred forty-seven, or however many we please. 
The same holds if we ask how many numbers there are between 
zero and one thousand, since we can count by integers, halves, 
tens, or hundreds, with equal justice in each case. Among other 
20 Bruno Latour, “Irreductions,” trans. John Law, in The Pasteurization of 
France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1988), 162.
21 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: World’s Classics, 1996); 




consequences of this thesis, Aristotle uses it to refute some of 
Zeno’s famous paradoxes, which are shown to rely on a mis-
conception of time and space as made up of discrete units. But 
what about the Metaphysics? Here, the focus shifts away from 
continua and toward the discrete. How many individual sub-
stances are there in the room with you right now? Assuming we 
agree on our definition of what counts as a substance, then there 
is some exact number of substances in the room, one that in 
principle can be tabulated. There are either ten, or seventy-five, 
or nine hundred substances in the room, or some other number. 
For Aristotle this is not subject to arbitrary whim, unlike when 
we slice up a continuum. We thus see that the Physics and the 
Metaphysics establish a division of labor, with some aspects of 
reality definable as continua and others as made up of discrete 
units.
Now, the difference between the continuous and the discrete 
happens to be one of the central dualisms of human thought 
in every field; anyone who thinks about anything must reach 
some decision as to how to integrate these two opposites. But 
of course, Aristotle’s division of labor is not the only way to do 
it. Thus it should be no surprise that various extremist positions 
have also arisen over the centuries, seeking either to reduce the 
continuous to the discrete or vice versa. The clearest extremists 
of the discrete are surely the occasionalists, who first appeared 
in medieval Islam and re-appeared — for somewhat different 
reasons — in early-modern Europe.22 There are actually two dif-
ferent occasionalist theses, which we might call “spatial” and 
“temporal,” and not all occasionalist thinkers have defended 
both.23 “Spatial” occasionalism is the notion that no two enti-
22 Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroës and Aqui-
nas (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, 
Occasionalismus: Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im 
europäischen Denken (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000); Steven 
Nadler, Occasionalism: Causation among the Cartesians (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
23 Graham Harman, “A New Occasionalism?” in Reset Modernity!, eds. Bruno 
Latour and Christophe Leclercq (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 129–38.
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ties can influence each other directly, so that God must be the 
universal causal agent for everything that happens. “Temporal” 
occasionalism refers to the view that the world does not exist 
automatically from one moment to the next but must be con-
tinuously recreated by God. But there are also extremists of the 
continuous, far more popular today. Deleuze and Simondon are 
two of the leading figures in this tribe, and Grant belongs in this 
group as well, given his view that what seem to be individual 
entities are simply “retardations” of a more primal, unified flow 
of production.
For obvious reasons, it is difficult to unify the opposed ex-
tremists of the discrete and the continuous, since each group 
tries to reduce the central concern of the other to its own ob-
session.24 This poses a grave difficulty for Shaviro, as well as 
Stengers, in their wish to place Whitehead on the same philo-
sophical team as another of their joint favorites, Deleuze.25 
Shaviro is well aware that Whitehead is at least a temporal oc-
casionalist for whom the world does not automatically endure 
from one moment to the next: “For Whitehead, even death and 
resurrection are commonplace occurrences. Objects endure by 
refreshing themselves continually. Everything is subject to a rule 
of ‘perpetual perishing,’ for ‘no thinker thinks twice; and, to put 
the matter more generally, no subject experiences twice’”26 (23). 
I am also inclined to view Whitehead as a spatial occasionalist, 
for reasons to be mentioned shortly. By contrast, Shaviro thinks 
Whitehead manages to avoid this second topic completely: 
“there is […] no gap to bridge between any one […] entity and 
another” (39). The problem with this claim is that just like the 
occasionalists of earlier centuries, Whitehead invokes God as a 
universal causal mediator, with entities prehending each other 
by way of the “eternal objects” (roughly, universal qualities) con-
24 Graham Harman, “Whitehead and Schools X, Y, and Z,” in The Lure of 
Whitehead, eds. Nicholas Gaskill and A.J. Nocek (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2014), 231–48.
25 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).
26 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 29.
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tained in God. This entails that Whitehead is a spatial occasion-
alist as well, since he acknowledges that relations occur only by 
way of a mediator.
Now, it would simply be false to say there is a doctrine of “per-
petual perishing” anywhere in the writings of Bergson, Deleuze, 
or Simondon. These three are extremists at one end of the spec-
trum, on the opposite side of the occasionalists, who include 
Whitehead — along with Latour — as one of their more recent 
leading members. Shaviro concedes this in the case of time, and 
ought to admit it for space as well. The hasty rallying of present-
day authors to the flag of “process philosophy” goes astray when 
it tries to unite continuum extremists such as Bergson, Deleuze, 
and Simondon with latter-day occasionalists such as Whitehead 
and Latour. As for the last-mentioned figure, we need not even 
hark back to his 1981 remark about everything happening only 
once and in one place. More recent, and perhaps more compel-
ling, is the explicitly anti-Bergsonian note in Latour’s 2012 work 
on the modes of existence: among the fifteen modes catalogued 
in that book, we find reproduction.27 The purpose fulfilled by 
this mode is none other than the old occasionalist function of 
continuous creation.
Let’s conclude this section with a brief outline of how I see 
the cosmology of OOO, since it has nothing to do with the stasis 
or fixity that Shaviro and others see in it. In the first place, it is 
not a question for me of whether “everything communicates” or 
“nothing communicates”; some things affect us, and others do 
not. The singing finches in our Long Beach courtyard make me 
happy, and writing this book Skirmishes makes me feel resolute. 
The finches and the book are not me, but things outside me with 
which I am currently in relation, but under other circumstances 
might not be. It does not follow that everything in the universe 
is affecting me right now, even if only in a derivative or “nega-
tive” sense, as Whitehead imagines with his doctrine of prehen-
27 Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the 




sions. The question at hand is this: if the universe is taken to be 
in total ontological flux, then why is it not changing constantly? 
Meillassoux addresses this question in his own offbeat Cantori-
an way, with appeal to the non-totalizability of possible worlds.28 
For my own part, I would say that a thing is what it is, and since 
there is no reason to reify “time” as an independent destruc-
tive force — as Meillassoux and others do — then change is what 
needs to be explained rather than presupposed. It is intermittent 
rather than constant, and arises from the vicarious combina-
tion of two separate entities into one, which then has retroac-
tive effects on its components.29 Sometimes these effects cascade 
through different levels of reality and have profound ramifica-
tions: as in a major earthquake, for instance, which destroys 
numerous structures and changes lives hundreds of miles from 
the epicenter. But for such major events to be possible, it cannot 
be the case that every instant experiences a major earthquake. 
Some teachers, friends, or lovers change us profoundly and oth-
ers hardly at all. Some books haunt us for a lifetime while others 
leave us unmoved. Unlike Shaviro, I do not see our lives as op-
pressed by a constant swarm of relations, but see us and all other 
objects as in partial retreat from the theater of the world, drawn 
into it only in a small number of fateful encounters that change 
us.30 In Whitehead’s ultra-relational philosophy — as in Latou-
rian Actor–Network Theory — I see no way to account for the 
difference between important and unimportant relations; for 
Whitehead too, every tiniest event shakes an entity to its core, 
and every instant is equally catastrophic.
28 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008).
29 Graham Harman, “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos: A New Theory of Cau-
sation,” Cosmos and History 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–17





We now turn to the key philosophical difference between me 
and Shaviro: the quarrel between relational and non-relational 
ontology. Shaviro’s relational position unites him not only with 
Whitehead but also with Latour, the greatest living relational 
ontologist we have. For Latour entities are essentially actors, 
and actors are nothing more than whatever they “modify, trans-
form, perturb, or create.”31 By contrast, my non-relational posi-
tion derives from Heidegger and his one-time Basque student, 
Xavier Zubíri.32 I am well aware that many or most devotees of 
Heidegger and Zubíri do not accept that they are non-relational 
ontologists in the first place. This comes from my own inter-
pretation of their philosophies, and we should remember that a 
philosophy is not the same as what the philosopher happens to 
think is entailed by it. For example, Heidegger would be the first 
to accept a relational interpretation of his tool-analysis, in which 
all items of equipment are woven together in a total system that 
ultimately takes its meaning from Dasein’s care for its own be-
ing, and in which independent or autonomous items are deriva-
tive “present-at-hand” instantiations of the system as a whole. 
What Heidegger and his disciples miss here is that tools also 
break or malfunction, and that they cannot do this unless they 
are already something more than the tool-system makes use of 
in them. If it is true that human thought or perception of things 
reduces them to a limited caricature of their innermost being, 
the same holds for their interaction with other tools or indeed 
with anything else. In this sense, Heidegger’s system requires 
that all entities are a surplus over and above their appearances 
or interactions. As for Zubíri, while it is true that he is interested 
in the dynamic activity of things, his central idea is that things 
should not be taken as “respective” to other things but as having 
31 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 122.
32 Xavier Zubíri, On Essence, trans. A. Robert Caponigri (Washington, dc: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1980).
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an existence de suyo, or “in their own right.”33 It is not that things 
cannot relate, but that their relations are derivative of a being 
that is never fully expressed in any relation. This is what Shaviro 
denies, even while claiming that he like Whitehead can account 
for the “privacy” of things in a different manner.
Nonetheless, Shaviro’s basic fairness as a critic leads him to 
admit that there is something as worthy in my position as in 
Whitehead’s own. As he sees it, we both proceed from valid 
intuitions: “There is a deep sense in which I remain the same 
person, no matter what happens to me. But there is an equally 
deep sense in which I am changed irrevocably by my experi-
ences, by the ‘historic route of living occasions’ through which I 
pass”34 (32). He presents this dispute between two “equally deep” 
truths as a speculative antinomy, difficult or even impossible to 
resolve. We have seen that he opts for Whitehead’s vision large-
ly for personal reasons, given his own view that we are largely 
oppressed by a swarm of relations, “of relentless implications 
and involvements” (33). He opts, in short, for Whitehead’s no-
tion of the world as “one system of relations”35 (114), and finds 
additional support in the “paranoia of holism” that Marshall 
McLuhan diagnoses in both traditional tribal culture and the 
new tribal culture of electronic media, in which “‘terror is the 
normal state’ [… because] ‘everything affects everything all the 
time’”36 (59). Needless to say, it is not our everyday experience 
that everything effects everything all the time but that some 
things affect some things while not affecting others. To move to 
the Shaviro/Whitehead/McLuhan “paranoid” position requires 
extra backing in the form of an assumption that everything af-
fects everything else. And even if someone adopts such a view, it 
would only lead to an “antinomy” if I were making the opposite 
33 Xavier Zubíri, Dynamic Structure of Reality, trans. Nelson R. Orringer (Ur-
bana: University of Illinois Press, 2003).
34 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 119.
35 Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 1920), 32.
36 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 32.
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claim that nothing affects anything else. But in fact it is OOO that 
strikes a proper balance between these false opposites, with its 
idea that however ubiquitous relations may seem, it is relatively 
rare for effects to matter to any given thing. Although it is trivi-
ally true that even buying a new shirt or drinking a glass of wa-
ter affects me in some fashion, these actions usually do not affect 
who I am at any important level. Actor–Network Theory already 
has a hard time distinguishing between important and unim-
portant actions, and Shaviro faces the same difficulty. In Imma-
terialism, I tried to show how one specific historical entity — the 
Dutch East India Company — cannot be read as a swirling set of 
constant relations, even if it looks that way at first glance. There 
turn out to be only a half-dozen or so events for any entity that 
transform it in any significant way across its lifespan. Borrow-
ing a term from the evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis, I call 
these “symbioses” as opposed to mere relations, which do occur 
very frequently.37 
Needless to say, Shaviro does not follow me here: “Harman, as 
we have seen, discounts relations as inessential” (40). Drawing 
on the distinguished support of William James, he asserts that 
“[r]elations are too various and come in too many ‘different de-
grees of intimacy’ to be reducible to Harman’s characterization 
of them as reductive determinations”38 (40). I have dealt with 
James’s essay elsewhere.39 Suffice it to say, I do not disagree that 
relations come in many different kinds and “different degrees of 
intimacy.” But Shaviro is no less guilty of the univocal view of 
relations that he ascribes to me, insofar as he states baldly that 
“[i]n the realm of causal efficacy, we have rather to do with a 
sort of total contact, a promiscuous interchange among objects” 
(56). If there is total contact, then by definition there are no “de-
37 Harman, Immaterialism; Lynn Margulis, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at 
Evolution (New York: Basic Books, 1998).
38 William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press, 1996), 44.
39 Graham Harman, “Object-Oriented Philosophy vs. Radical Empiricism,” 




grees” of promiscuity, since everything is equally promiscuous 
from the start. How, then, does Shaviro account for the fact that 
we do not seem to be in contact with everything at all times? 
Like Whitehead, he treats this as an artifact of the relatively rare 
and high-grade form of relation found in conscious life: “only in 
the realm of presentational immediacy, with its inevitable limi-
tations and failures [… are we] faced with Harman’s paradoxes 
of ‘sensual objects’ that must be distinguished from ‘real’ ones 
and of occasionalism or vicarious causation” (56). If we consider 
causal relation itself, rather than its advanced late form as found 
in conscious life, we will find that there are no “deep essential 
properties” in things as I claim (141). Here Shaviro is led, like 
James, Whitehead, and Latour, to deny what Meillassoux and 
I both uphold for different reasons — the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities. For Locke, this was the differ-
ence between the material properties of things (primary) and 
the properties that arise only when these things are encountered 
by other, sensing things (secondary).40 Whereas Locke finds the 
primary qualities in underlying matter, Meillassoux finds them 
in what can be mathematized, and I find them in the intrinsic, 
non-relational properties of things: the properties things have 
whether anything else encounters them or not. For Shaviro, 
however, such nuance is irrelevant. As he sees it, the primary/
secondary rift “is an epistemological matter, not an ontological 
one” (116). Strangely enough, he relies in this verdict on an ap-
peal to something very much like the “correlational circle,” even 
though he is usually allied with me — against Meillassoux — in 
denying that we cannot think a thing outside thought without 
turning it into a thought. After all, Shaviro thinks “we do not 
have unmediated access to […] properties, and this is equally 
the case for those we call ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’” (117).
Shaviro’s view entails that on the level of presentational im-
mediacy there is no escaping the correlational circle, but that as 
soon as we shift to the Whiteheadian cosmic level of unnoticed 
prehensions, we have escaped the circle in advance thanks to the 
40 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 178.
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direct and promiscuous causal relation of everything with eve-
rything else. Since Shaviro knows that I do not limit my theory 
of interaction to the realm of conscious thought and percep-
tion, he can only turn this point against me by claiming that 
I wrongly reduce inanimate interaction to the conscious sort, 
whether I know it or not. This is a rather tall order, given that 
he is not only aware of my constant efforts to show the univer-
sal character of relation as caricature, but even cites the most 
prominent instance himself: the case of fire burning cotton. He 
starts by agreeing with me that the fire cannot make contact 
with all properties of the cotton any more than a human ob-
server can. This is the sense in which we are both Whitehead-
ians, after all, a beleaguered minority opposed to the Kantian 
placement of the human–world relation at the basis of all others. 
But for Shaviro, this limited encounter of fire with cotton still 
counts as “epistemological” (106), a term I prefer to reserve for 
the dominant modern human–world rift. But if the meeting of 
fire with cotton is merely “epistemological” in an extended sense 
of the term, then where is the “ontological” level that underpins 
it? For Shaviro it is found on the level of fire-effects that the fire 
itself cannot apprehend. As he puts it, “As the cotton is burned, 
even those properties to which the fire is wholly insensitive are 
themselves also altered or destroyed — that is, fire affects even 
those aspects of the cotton that it cannot come to ‘know’” (106). 
On this basis Shaviro argues that “knowledge” has an excessively 
large place in my theory, keeping in mind that he means knowl-
edge in a broader-than-human sense. For example, “Harman 
gives too much weight to the informational and epistemological 
limits of contact between entities” (118), and “errs in conceiving 
finitude — just as Kant does in the first critique — as primarily 
a matter of the limits of knowledge” (136). And furthermore, 
“whereas [Harman] says that no amount of ‘information’ about 
a thing can ‘replicate’ or ‘add up to’ that thing, I find it more ac-
curate to say that no amount of information can ever exhaust 
the thing” (117), apparently forgetting that I use the term “ex-
haust” quite often myself. 
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The difficulty with Shaviro’s argument is as follows. While 
accepting my expansion of the finitude of interaction well be-
yond the Kantian human sphere, Shaviro points to the realm of 
causal effects that occur outside the fire-cotton confrontation it-
self. For instance, the cotton is destroyed, and this is something 
completely different from the fire’s immediate “contact” with 
the sensual object, cotton. The first problem with this is that the 
causal impact of fire and cotton is not infinite, even though it 
results in destruction. The destruction of a cotton ball need not 
have any effect on the tides in Long Beach or the political system 
of Germany; in fact, there is no reason to suppose it has any at 
all. Whitehead tries to account for this by stipulating that many 
prehensions are “negative,” but it is unclear why he wants to call 
fire–tides or fire–Germany “prehensions” at all; the need to call 
them “negative prehensions” is simply a consequence of the 
self-imposed danger of global prehension becoming an ultra-
holistic excess.
The second problem for Shaviro is that, although Whitehead 
does lay great stress on the difference between presentational 
immediacy and more rudimentary forms of prehension, the 
point of this is to shake us from our modernist slumber and urge 
us to include more in our philosophy than the modern human-
world correlate. Contra Shaviro’s argument, it is not in order to 
establish a dualism between “epistemological” and “ontological” 
interactions, each governed by different relational rules: on the 
contrary, one of Whitehead’s greatest philosophical achieve-
ments is his deliberate flattening of this distinction. Though 
I am well aware that Whitehead speaks of separate “mental” 
and “physical” poles in reality (63), all his prehensions work in 
the same way: one actual entity prehends another by means of 
“eternal objects” (which never appear in Shaviro’s book) that 
are contained in God and ensure that no entity ever prehends 
the entirety of another. The way causality works for OOO, unlike 
for Shaviro, is not through total contact on the causal level that 
is left undetected by either fire or humans due to their relative 
obtuseness. Instead, causation occurs because fire and cotton 
combine into a single new entity that then has retroactive effects 
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on both of its elements. The fact that such effects occur at a level 
beneath the threshhold of explicit perception does not entail a 
causal free-for-all at the undetected level. By way of analogy, the 
city of New York has retroactive effects on its residents, perhaps 
making them more stressed-out, aggressive, and cynical, but 
also more sophisticated and cosmopolitan than if they were liv-
ing in rural Iowa where I grew up. We would not expect the city 
of New York as a whole to come into contact with these indi-
vidual effects, but that is because they are not relevant to the city 
as a system, in a sense familiar to readers of Niklas Luhmann.41 
It is certainly not the case that both New York City and its Io-
wa-born transplants are finite, limited entities while the whole 
of causation is without such limits. In short, what Shaviro calls 
“the epistemological” and “ontological” levels really belong to 
one and the same level, on which everything is limited in what 
it can and cannot encounter. Here Shaviro’s theory sounds less 
like Whitehead than like Deleuze in The Fold, or like some of 
Bryant’s recent work, in which everything is connected on the 
primal story of being and is split apart only on some derivative 
upper floor.42 
Interlude on Levi Bryant
As it happens, a further word about Bryant is in order, since 
there are important overlaps and differences between his po-
sition and Shaviro’s. After all, Shaviro openly upholds a level 
of direct causal interaction — though at the cost of ignoring 
Whitehead’s “eternal objects” — and claims that the inherent 
limitation of sensual objects is a mere byproduct of presenta-
tional immediacy, with human thought and perception being 
obvious examples. His possible difference from Bryant appears 
41 Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, 2 vols., trans. Rhodes Barrett (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012–13).
42 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Levi R. Bryant, “The Interior 




in the latter’s 2015 interview with Kevin MacDonnell. There Bry-
ant states as follows: “Despite our differences, Harman’s work 
has been a tremendous impetus for my thought. While I don’t 
share his distinction between real and sensual qualities and ob-
jects nor his theory of vicarious causation, I do nonetheless hold 
that objects can be severed from their relations.”43 In this re-
spect, Bryant sides with me against Shaviro. For although Shavi-
ro holds that Whitehead allows perfectly well for the “privacy” 
of entities, this purported privacy is merely the unified sum total 
of its prehensions from the previous instant, and therefore is not 
really private at all: except by comparison with the numerous 
possible relations it might have in the instant to come. It seems 
to me that Bryant’s “virtual proper being” is a good deal more 
private than this, and thus in some sense Bryant remains an 
object-oriented ontologist, while this cannot be said of Shaviro 
despite his broadly sympathetic view of my work.
As seen in the passage just cited from Bryant’s interview, he 
rejects both the real/sensual distinction I draw from Husserl 
and vicarious causation itself. He does this by way of a position 
he calls “interactivism,” one that is well worth considering.44 
Bryant begins by citing a question I pose in the same journal 
issue as his interview, concerning my state of perplexity as to 
whether his concept of “local manifestation” pertains to a single 
adumbration of an object, or instead to what Husserl would call 
an enduring intentional object.45 Bryant’s response is intricate 
and puzzling:
A local manifestation is not a view of an object, but rather 
is an event that takes place within an object. For example, 
the manner in which an elephant encounters an apple in a 
tree from the west is not a local manifestation of the apple. 
43 Kevin MacDonnell, “Interview: Some Differences Between Object-Orient-
ed Philosophy and Onticology,” interview by Levi R. Bryant, St. John’s Uni-
versity Humanities Review 12, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 69.
44 Ibid.
45 Graham Harman, “Strange Realism: On Behalf of Objects,” St. John’s Uni-
versity Humanities Review 12, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 17–18.
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Indeed, this is a local manifestation of the elephant […]. The 
apple is what it is regardless of whether it’s encountered by 
another entity from east, west, north, south, above, or below. 
Rather, a local manifestation of the apple would be some-
thing like qualitative changes that take place as a result of 
biochemical processes the apple undergoes in interaction 
with its environment as it ripens. The softness of a very ripe 
apple is not a manifestation to anyone else. It would be there 
regardless of whether or not any other being regarded the 
apple. Rather, it is a qualitative feature of the object itself re-
sulting from the becoming it has undergone.46 
Reading this passage was useful to me in understanding Bry-
ant’s model. Previously, I had thought of his “virtual proper be-
ing” as equivalent to my own “real object,” but equipped with 
powers rather than qualities. And I had also thought that his 
“local manifestations” were equivalent to my sensual realm, but 
with an insufficient distinction between the sensual object and 
its various qualitative adumbrations. I now get the sense that he 
is doing something completely different, though as a result my 
puzzlement simply changes form.
For it now seems as if Bryant’s virtual proper being and lo-
cal manifestation both belong to what I call the real rather than 
the sensual. After all, “the softness of a very ripe apple is not 
a manifestation to anyone else,” and I presume Bryant would 
extend “anyone” to “anything” as well, since he does not limit 
himself to human manifestation in the manner of philosophi-
cal modernists. It is a question of ripeness as a manifestation 
that is not seen — as the word “manifestation” would normally 
suggest — but a ripeness inherent in the apple whether encoun-
tered by anything else or not. Although Bryant is leery of the 
world “qualities,” this sounds very much like a primary qual-
ity to me. What then becomes of the sorts of qualities usually 
called “secondary,” such as Husserl’s adumbrations or my sen-
sual qualities: as with the exact appearance of the apple to some-
46 MacDonnell, “Interview,” 69.
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thing from a specific direction? This seems to vanish altogether, 
along with my sensual objects or Husserl’s intentional ones. It 
certainly looks as if everything secondary or sensual (or their 
Bryantian equivalent) is on the same footing, which means that 
for him there is no rift within the sensual realm. Yet what is truly 
strange is that these secondary qualities of the apple — Bryant 
does not use the term, but we can do so in his stead — do not 
belong to the apple at all but are a local manifestation of the 
elephant who views it. Stated differently, while I had previously 
interpreted Bryant’s “local manifestation” as his version of the 
sensual realm, he seems to allow for no sensual realm at all. The 
apple is locked up in its own ripening and softening, and the 
elephant is locked up in its own perception of the apple. What 
we have, in short, looks like an even more monadological model 
than my own. My position is that even though the real object 
can never be accessed directly, there is still a certain minimal 
otherness in the sensual realm. The profile of an apple from the 
west is not “in the elephant,” but on the interior of the larger ob-
ject formed from the elephant and the apple, so that the profile 
owes its exact features to both. Yet even though Bryant calls his 
position “interactivism,” it is hard to see much interaction going 
on, given that the various profiles of the apple are said to be just 
local manifestations — of the elephant! The elephant is trapped 
in a monad of its own, without even Leibniz’s pre-established 
harmony able to give it access to an apple it is apparently unable 
to touch even indirectly. Presumably Bryant and I will need fur-
ther rounds of dialogue to make sure I am getting it right, but as 
I see it, this is the plain meaning of the blockquote cited above.
To repeat, Bryant’s equally monadological conception of vir-
tual proper being and local manifestation, each of them locked 
up inside the apple, elephant, or human being to which they 
belong, sounds more occasionalist than anything found in my 
pages. After all, I do allow for intermittent transgression of the 
boundaries between real beings through allure. For his part, 
Bryant offers no explanation of how the elephant and apple 
could ever come into contact. But given this apparent inclina-
tion towards the mutual exteriority of entities, it is all the stran-
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ger that he rejects my concept of vicarious causation. As he put 
it earlier in the same interview,
Harman argues that real objects never touch nor relate to one 
another, but rather are “vacuum sealed” and forever behind 
firewalls. I confess that this is not a thesis I really understand. 
He seems to argue that real objects never touch one another, 
yet only encounter one another in the interior of their sen-
sual objects. However, it seems to me that this amounts to 
saying that they relate without relating, in which case I’m led 
to think that they do relate.47 
What would be wrong with such a model? It cannot be a matter 
of contradiction, since I say that they relate without directly re-
lating, which is not contradictory; Bryant knows me well enough 
to be aware of this. Thus, I think he is left with two possible op-
tions. He could say that I am wrong either because (a) objects do 
not relate at all or because (b) direct relations between objects 
are so common and easy that they are hardly worth the fuss of 
a complex theory of vicarious causation. Obviously, most critics 
of my work will choose (b) at this juncture, especially those of 
a scientistic bent who assume that physics already tells us eve-
rything we need to know on the matter. But as we have seen, 
Bryant’s theory of an apple and an elephant each enclosed in its 
own local manifestations suggests option (a), in which objects 
do not relate at all.
Along with the difficulty of seeing how such a theory would 
work in the absence of a Leibnizian pre-established harmony, 
there is the further problem that on the very same page Bry-
ant chooses option (b) just like most of my critics. He helpfully 
diagrams two triangles that touch at a single point, then com-
ments as follows: “Clearly [the triangles] are not relating directly 
at all points, but why should that lead us to conclude that there’s 




something I don’t understand.”48 There now seem to be two dif-
ferent Bryants on the loose, and I have a hard time putting them 
together. Let’s call them Elephant Bryant and Triangle Bryant. 
Elephant Bryant looks like a radical monadologist who holds 
that the elephant never perceives the apple but only its own lo-
cal manifestations, and vice versa. But Triangle Bryant thinks 
contact between things is as easy as pressing two triangles to-
gether at a single point. The contradiction seems so flagrant that 
it cannot have escaped Bryant’s notice, which means that there 
must be a hidden premise making the two sides compatible in 
his mind. Before saying what I think that premise is, allow me 
to explain why the contact of two triangles does not invalidate 
vicarious causation.
As we have seen, Bryant concedes that “clearly [the trian-
gles] are not relating directly at all points, but why should that 
lead us to conclude that there’s no real relation between them 
or that they don’t touch?” This is a variant of the view, often 
wielded against me in the blogosphere, that contact is “direct 
but partial” rather than indirect. In order to avoid possible com-
plications specific to mathematics, let’s shift our example from 
a triangle to a handshake. Obviously, in shaking Bryant’s hand 
I do not touch the whole of his being; we would agree on that 
much. Nonetheless, Bryant seems to regard shaking his hand as 
touching him directly, whereas I do not; after all, Bryant’s hand 
is not Bryant himself. More than this: it is not even part of Bry-
ant himself, even though in the anatomical sense his hand is one 
of his body parts. We moderns have become so averse to meta-
physical problems that we immediately think of contact in the 
obvious physical sense of one thing bumping into another. Why 
is it impossible to touch Bryant directly through one part called 
his “hand,” you ask? Because it is not even possible to touch Bry-
ant’s hand directly — the hand is a real object in its own right, 
and perhaps at most we only make contact with the epidermis. 
You will then say that I make direct contact with the epidermis, 




get me to admit that eventually we will reach some ultimate mi-
nuscule layer of direct contact. Yet there are two problems with 
this. First, even if you are right that there comes a point of direct 
physical contact, you will still need to explain the connection 
between this point and the epidermis, or the epidermis and the 
hand, or the hand and Bryant. But in doing so you cannot have 
recourse to the “folk contiguity” of these parts, since contigu-
ity and contact are precisely what is under dispute. This brings 
us to the second and more important problem. If touching a 
thing merely means touching the surface of a thing, then this is 
not merely a physical truism about the impossibility of hands 
deeply penetrating each other to their anatomical cores.49 In-
stead, it points to a more sophisticated problem with contact: to 
touch a thing is to touch a caricature of it, since you are a finite 
creature whose hands are simply incapable of directly touching 
another hand or anything else. You cannot touch someone else’s 
hand, not because of physical limitations pertaining specifically 
to hands, but because a hand — like any other object — is not 
directly open to everything else in the cosmos. It is open to sen-
sual reality alone, and this means indirect contact with the real 
at best. 
I said earlier that Bryant cannot simply be offering the fla-
grant contradiction of a monadology and a theory of easy direct 
contact simultaneously, so that there must be a hidden premise 
in his argument that allows for both. That premise, as I see it, 
is the same one that Shaviro seemed to draw from the Deleuze 
of The Fold: a twofold model in which there is causal directness 
in the initial relation between entities, followed by closure at a 
more complex level of presentational immediacy. This is easier 
to see if we combine the two Bryants (the Elephant and Trian-
gle versions) and imagine that he had drawn not two triangles 
touching at a single point but an elephant and an apple touch-
ing at a single point. From this combined example we can see 
49 Manuel DeLanda seems to have misunderstood my argument in this sense 




that Bryant is saying the following two things simultaneously: 
(a) “look, the elephant and the apple are touching. What’s so 
hard about that?” and (b) “although the elephant seems to touch 
the apple, it is really only touching its own local manifestations, 
and the same for the apple when it seems to touch the elephant. 
The two entities are really just touching themselves.” Bryant, like 
Shaviro, happens to be a highly intelligent person. He is not fall-
ing into childlike logical contradiction, but offering a twofold 
theory of relation as opposed to my own onefold theory. In that 
theory there is a level of causal contact on which relation is not 
difficult, coupled with an upper story of perception on which re-
lation is so difficult that only sensual manifestations ever occur. 
It is similar to how Deleuze tries to unify the continuous with 
the heterogeneous, and how Shaviro limits finitude to presenta-
tional immediacy while permitting an orgy of direct causation 
on the ground floor. Bryant’s monadological elephant and ap-
ple are “without windows” only in terms of what they experi-
ence, not in terms of their causal interactions. What Bryant and 
Shaviro both miss thereby is that indirect relation is not just a 
result, but also a starting point. We cannot say that the apple and 
elephant touch at some point and only then are locked inside 
themselves. This is a duplicitous solution to a unified problem, 
one that equally effects both the initial contact of elephant with 
apple and their ability to perceive one another.
From Bryant Back to Shaviro
Returning to Shaviro, the situation becomes somewhat more 
confusing when he tries to turn my own terminology against 
me. While deeply skeptical of my non-relational real objects, 
Shaviro contends that “what Harman dismisses as the merely 
‘sensual’ realm of carnality, causality, and aesthetics is in fact 
the only realm there is” (146). But there are at least three things 
wrong with this attempt to hoist me by my own petard. The first 
is that there is nothing “mere” about OOO’s sensual realm, which 
among other things is the only place where causal interactions 
can be triggered, given the mutual withdrawal of real objects. 
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For example, what distinguishes my interpretation of Levinas 
from the usual tiresome focus on ethics and absolutely alterity 
is my attention to his brilliant account of enjoyment: a sensual 
immediacy of things that Levinas rightly finds missing in Hei-
degger.50 I would also note my strong interest in Jean Baudril-
lard, despite his being possibly the most anti-realist thinker 
since Berkeley, given the importance I place on his notion of 
how the object seduces us or draws us into a new sort of reality.51 
Second, the sensual realm in my philosophy is not characterized 
by the sort of unfettered causal interaction that Shaviro finds so 
desirable; rather, sensual objects lead a buffered existence on the 
interior of a larger real one, meaning that they too are walled 
off from automatic interaction with each other. Third and most 
importantly, the key feature of my sensual objects has no ana-
logue in Shaviro’s thinking at all, or in Bryant’s for that matter. 
This is the Husserlian point that even within the realm of direct 
sensual accessibility, there is a permanent duel between sensual 
objects and their sensual qualities. A watermelon or mailbox 
remains the same sensual object for us, no matter how much 
it changes from one instant to the next — unless and until it 
changes to such an extent that we no longer recognize it as the 
same thing, but decide either that it has changed into something 
else or that we have been deceived by it all along. In fairness to 
Shaviro, it should be added that he rejects this Husserlian model 
consciously rather than unknowingly, as we will see when he 
contests the very notion of intentionality.
For the same reason as with fire and cotton, Shaviro con-
tests my further example of the moon, again finding fault with 
my “epistemological” account of its limited effects on us. In 
so doing, he makes the unsurprising claim — for a Whitehe-
50 Graham Harman, “Levinas and the Triple Critique of Heidegger,” Philoso-
phy Today 53, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 407–13.
51 Jean Baudrillard, Seduction, trans. Brian Singer (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 1991); Graham Harman, “Object-Oriented Seduction: Baudrillard Re-
considered,” in The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance, 




adian — that the moon is equivalent to all its influences (137). 
While he is certainly right to say that “there are limits to our 
independence from the moon” (137), he is wrong to omit the 
counter-principle that there are also limits to our dependence 
on it. Even those who listen to a New Age celebrity claiming that 
the moon affects moods more than we moderns would like to 
admit, or to an astrologer who derives aspects of their personal-
ity from the position of that great satellite at birth, would rightly 
be alarmed by someone who blames absolutely everything on 
the moon: from lottery numbers, to police shootings, to elec-
tion results, to their own school examination failures. The fact 
that the moon has large effects on our planet does not prove the 
nonexistence of the moon as a withdrawn real object, but only 
requires that we account for why the moon affects some things 
without affecting everything. Relations are formed through 
work, even if much of this labor done in advance by other enti-
ties. Work may involve engineers and construction teams build-
ing bridges and dredging canals on which we rely every day, or 
it may be the slow labor of gravitational pull from the center of 
the galaxy. One aspect of my theory is that there can be “dor-
mant” objects that exist without currently being in relation with 
anything else52 (83). Shaviro notes the relation of this term to 
sleep as a way of withdrawing ourselves from relations and clos-
ing back into ourselves, and I still think this is a productive way 
to understand what sleeping is. But Shaviro overdetermines the 
role of this metaphor in my theory, claiming that since no sleep 
is perfect and sleeping humans are always involved in dreams 
and subconscious awareness of what is going on in the room 
around them, “dormancy” is impossible on the ontological level 
as well, and only death brings about a non-relational state (147). 
Yet all this really proves is that living creatures might be inca-
pable of pure dormancy: not that everything that exists, such as 
the moon, must exist in relation to everything else.
Earlier I made brief mention of autopoiesis theory and of 
some of its leading figures, Luhmann, Humberto Maturana, and 
52 Harman, “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos.”
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Francisco Varela.53 It is easy to see why Shaviro (like his fellow 
relational ontologist Latour) is suspicious of this line of think-
ing, while OOO thinkers tend to appreciate it. Shaviro has a fair 
amount to say on the matter. According to autopoiesis theory, 
a system is fundamentally closed off from its environment and 
tends to process this environment only in terms that make sense 
for the system itself. For Maturana and Varela, both of them im-
munologists interested in the behavior of biological cells, the 
cell aims at “homeostasis,” or preserving its interior in the same 
condition from moment to moment. Thus it follows that the 
cell for them, like the “system” for Luhmann, has only a limited 
ability to be changed by what lies beyond its walls. The political 
consequences of this theory are obviously pessimistic, since for 
Luhmann the actions of radical protestors are generally just co-
opted by whatever system they oppose. This has even led some 
critics to charge autopoiesis with a form of solipsism.54 Shaviro’s 
charge is not quite this extreme, though it is still relevant to our 
discussion. As he puts it, “[The] active persistence [of enduring 
objects] is more or less what Spinoza calls conatus, or what Levi 
Bryant calls the ‘ongoing autopoiesis’ of objects. I am not en-
tirely happy with these terms, however. Conatus and autopoie-
sis seem to me to put too exclusive an emphasis on the entity’s 
self-reproduction and maintenance of its identity, or on what 
Bryant calls its ‘endo-consistency’.”55 Shaviro justifiably coun-
ters that objects can also change, expand, contract, and other-
wise shift their traits or undergo differing fortunes. In a way, 
this might begin to look like just another speculative antinomy. 
For example, Luhmann and Latour can probably be faulted for 
an insufficient and an excessive focus on relations, respectively. 
53 Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. John Bednarz, Jr. with Dirk Baecker 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Humberto Maturana, Autopoie-
sis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1980).
54 Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson, Idealism: The His-
tory of a Philosophy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 86.
55 Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press, 2011), 143, 141.
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Again it seems that a balance must be struck, one allowing for 
objects to engage in relations but not in too many relations. Ear-
lier I argued that OOO is better equipped than Shaviro to strike 
a balance between stasis and becoming, given his excessive al-
legiance to an ontology of constant and unremitting change, 
one that has a hard time explaining stability, and which is too 
quick to consign it to the derivative realm of “epistemology” and 
“presentational immediacy.” Shaviro makes the same move here, 
claiming that pre-presentational causality is practically unlim-
ited in a way that even sub-human cognition is not. Yet he also 
takes the unexpected step of distancing himself from Bryant on 
the topic of aesthetics:
Bryant seeks to explain away what I am calling “aesthetic 
contact” as a “perturbation or irritation” to the system […]. 
But this wrongly assumes that encounters between entities 
can be fully described in terms of “information” (which is 
to say, in terms of [George] Spencer-Brown’s and Luhmann’s 
“distinctions” or Gregory Bateson’s “difference which makes 
a difference”). To the contrary, transfers and dissipations of 
energy, provoked by forces external to a system, can never be 
adequately coded in such informational terms. (145)
Stated differently, Shaviro accuses of Bryant of reducing aes-
thetics to an “epistemological” level of self-containment, while 
pointing to an external realm of free causation that aesthetics 
is somehow able to access. He portrays aesthetics as a form of 
“contact at a distance” (147), borrowing from Timothy Morton’s 
account in Realist Magic. In this way, he tries to join up with 
Morton and me against our fellow OOO theorist Bryant.
Yet it is not so clear that I belong on Morton’s side against Bry-
ant here; my position is better described as somewhere between 
the two. With Morton and Shaviro, I agree that aesthetics is the 
way we occasionally escape our correlation with sensual objects, 
breaking free into an indirect relation with the withdrawn real 
object. As noted earlier, my term for such events is “allure.” Like 
Shaviro I see aesthetic allure as operative at a far more primitive 
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level than the human, and like Morton I see brute inanimate 
causation as another form of aesthetics. Also like Shaviro, I hold 
that the “allusive, external reference is irreducible to myself and 
resists assimilation to ‘myself ’ as a coherent system [… so that] 
my own actions or ‘operations’ never ‘refer only to themselves’; 
they always relate directly to things and forces that are outside 
their power and beyond their reach” (145). Furthermore, I also 
agree that while Kant’s aesthetics does not give us access to the 
beyond or au-delà of the thing-in-itself, it does station us in the 
hither side of the correlation of subject and object (148). What I 
cannot see is how this “en déçu” could ever bring us into contact 
with Shaviro’s desired realm, which for me does not exist, of a 
boundless playing field of global interaction between entities. 
My view, instead, is that the aesthetic contact with an outside 
occurs through my becoming the missing real object, by step-
ping in as a real object in place of the one that is never acces-
sible. Whereas I merely perceive sensual objects, in aesthetics 
I perform real ones. But far from allowing me to step out of 
“epistemological” systems into an unrestricted causal plane, it 
simply establishes me in a new restricted system. When reading 
Homer’s famous metaphor, I am no longer just the perceiver of 
the Mediterranean Sea but a thespian enacting the wine-dark 
sea that cannot have a literal, sensual meaning. But I am not 
thereby in contact with all possible metaphors. I limit myself to 
this one, and at most to a handful of others simultaneously.
The bigger difference between Shaviro and me can be seen in 
his view that “aesthetic feelings with regard to an object cannot 
be correlated to that object. An aesthetic encounter takes place 
without recognition or possession and without phenomenologi-
cal intentionality or ‘aboutness’” (153). This is his critique of phe-
nomenology’s intentional model of consciousness. The modern 
use of “intentionality” appeared, famously, in Brentano’s effort to 
distinguish the psychological from the physical sphere.56 What 
56 Franz Brentano, Pyschology from an Empirical Standpoint, ed. Linda L. 




we find in the former realm but not the latter, Brentano holds, 
is that all mental acts are directed at some object: to perceive is 
to perceive something, to judge is to judge something, to love or 
hate is to feel these emotions about something in particular. The 
formula is often expanded to say that every intentional act aims 
at an object “beyond” itself, but this expansion is ambiguous and 
misleading. For it is clear that Brentano is referring to an im-
manent object, an object located within the mental sphere. In a 
sense it is true that the object is beyond me, insofar as I am not 
identical with what I intend. But if it is taken to mean that the 
object in my mind points at an object outside the mind, as many 
readers assume, then this reading not only goes beyond Bren-
tano’s own thought but turns it upside-down. In fact, Brentano 
gives surprisingly little guidance as to what relation there might 
be between the immanent object and an analogous object in the 
extra-mental world. This ambiguity led to considerable hand-
wringing among Brentano’s disciples, and in some ways even 
gave rise to the ingrained but unacknowledged idealism Spar-
row finds in phenomenology: given Husserl’s attempt to solve 
the problem by effacing the very distinction between immanent 
and transcendent objects.57 This can be seen from his fiery early 
dispute with the Polish thinker Kazimierz Twardowski, a strong 
advocate of two distinct levels, one outside the mind (object) and 
another inside it (content).58 In any case, we saw that Husserl lat-
er modified Brentano’s principle to say that intentionality con-
sists not of “experienced contents” but of “objectifiying acts.”59 
The difference is that in “experienced contents,” we experience 
an object such as an apple with a highly determinate set of quali-
57 Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1994).
58 Kazimierz Twardowski, On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psy-
chological Investigation, trans. R. Grossmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1977); Edmund Husserl, “Intentional Objects,” in Early Writings in the Phi-
losophy of Logic and Mathematics, trans. Dallas Willard (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1994), 345–87.
59 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., ed. Dermot Moran, trans. 
J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001), 1:276.
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ties; this is really no different from the British Empiricist model 
of a “bundle of qualities.” Husserl’s innovation was to say that 
our intentional acts point at a unified object that within certain 
limits endures even as the qualities shift. Whether it is the bright 
red apple in direct sunlight or the same apple in duller red when 
clouds cover the sun, in both cases we are dealing with one and 
the same apple. The heart of the phenomenological method is to 
scrape away the specific “adumbrations” of the apple and even-
tually “intuit its essence” by not being sidetracked with its vari-
able and inessential qualities. Husserl identified the difference 
between essential and merely adumbrative qualities — wrongly, 
in my view — with the difference between theoretical and sensu-
ous intuition. Heidegger preserves this Husserlian distinction, 
even while reversing it, when he treats the unconscious practical 
handling of things as deeper than our theoretical comportment 
toward them. For my part I hold — no doubt with Shaviro’s 
agreement — that there is no great difference between human 
handling, sensing, and theorizing, and indeed, all three of these 
count as relatively complex forms of presentational immediacy 
in Whitehead’s sense.
But Shaviro has a deeper objection to Husserl, one that I do 
not share, and it involves his outright rejection of intentional 
objects. For instance, “despite his opposition to phenomenol-
ogy, Meillassoux still takes for granted, and never questions, the 
phenomenological assumption that perception and sentience 
are fundamentally and necessarily intentional” (124). Now, I 
would not agree that Meillassoux is caught up in the discourse 
of intentional objects, though he certainly overlooks the aes-
thetic en deçà of sense-experience that Shaviro draws from 
Kant’s aesthetics. But it is obvious enough that I myself uphold 
intentional objects in Shaviro’s sense of the term. For when he 
tells us that “[i]n phenomenology, every act of thinking is di-
rected to an object beyond itself ” (124; italics mine), he seems to 
mean “beyond” only in the sense of immanent objectivity, and 
with that aspect of phenomenology I do concur. The evidence 
for this is the following statement by Shaviro: “A mental state 
always points to something. This remains the case regardless of 
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whether that ‘something’ is a thing that really exists in the world 
or whether it is fiction, or an abstraction, or a mental construc-
tion” (124). Yet despite his broad sense of “intentional object,” 
Shaviro rejects it is a necessary constituent of mental life. Why 
so? He quotes my passage about the moon, which describes our 
knowledge of it as a more or less accurate model, but one that is 
not equivalent to the moon itself.60 Shaviro adds that he agrees 
with this sentiment, but not entirely. He does not like my use of 
the word “model,” because he sees this again as a mere “episte-
mological” consideration that is too beholden to the concept of 
intentional objects. In Shaviro’s words,
I am uneasy with this claim for the same reason that I am un-
easy with Thomas Metzinger’s argument that consciousness 
is essentially representational and that conscious perception 
is really just a sort of virtual-reality simulation. For the no-
tion of a model, or a simulation, tends to oversimplify what 
is really a more complicated process. […] My prehension (to 
use Whitehead’s term) of the moon is not a model or a rep-
resentation of the moon but a kind of contact-at-a-distance. 
[… The notion of an “intentional object”] is [inadequate] to 
describe the way that the actual moon really and truly affects 
me.61 (118)
We have now seen two separate ways in which Shaviro tries to 
counter the role of the intentional object, which becomes the 
sensual object in OOO. One way is through the hither side of 
sub-objective experience, a realm presumably made up of not-
quite-objective colors, sounds, and the like. But this notion is 
less developed in Shaviro’s work than his truly pivotal commit-
ment to a space of causal interplay to which we always have 
direct non-mental access without realizing it. The actual moon 
60 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making, 2nd edn. 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 147.
61 Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-model Theory of Subjectivity 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 15ff and passim. See also Graham Harman, 
“The Problem with Metzinger,” Cosmos and History 7, no. 1 (2011): 7–36.
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“really and truly affects me,” regardless of how I encounter it as 
an intentional object. Here we see another crucial difference be-
tween Shaviro and OOO. In my philosophy, the sensual object 
plays a decisive role as a mediator between the real me and the 
real object, occasionally allowing for experiences of allure in 
which the sensual object disintegrates by aesthetic means and 
I am compelled to perform a new real object that replaces the 
sensual one. For Shaviro, by contrast, the real action always al-
ready happens in causal fashion between me and the outside 
world without my knowing it. 
The problem, as I see it, is that under Shaviro’s model there is 
no reason why our sensual experience of objects should occur at 
all. That is to say, if there is already a direct conduit between me 
and reality, why should organisms go through the needless labor 
of constructing a mediated version of the world consisting of 
cotton-balls-for-fires and cotton-balls-for-humans, whose ex-
istence Shaviro by no means denies? Here again Shaviro is closer 
to Deleuze than to Whitehead. Intentional objects, whose exist-
ence Shaviro does not deny, but merely seeks to limit to presenta-
tion, would be what Deleuze calls “sterile surface-effects,” while 
the real game of the world takes place on a sort of unobstructed 
“plane of consistency” where everything meets everything else 
without difficulty.62 As a reminder, Whitehead himself does not 
allow for that sort of causation without representation, as seen 
from his doctrine of “eternal objects,” so strangely absent from 
Shaviro’s account of his thought. Thus it is fitting that Shaviro’s 
main example of a non-intentional object comes from Deleuze 
instead: “Deleuze’s object of encounter is therefore not an ‘in-
tentional object’ in the phenomenological sense; rather, it is 
something that is not a correlate of my thought, something that 
thought cannot possibly correlate to itself ” (155). This makes it 
clear how Deleuze’s object of encounter is not OOO’s sensual one. 
62 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark 
Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 124; Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), 78.
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Yet we also know that the object of encounter is not a OOO real 
object, since it does not have “deep essential properties” with-
held from its neighbors. That being the case, it is unclear why 
thought would need to exist, given the apparent “epistemologi-
cal” incapacity of thought to do the world justice, even though 
it is said to do justice to itself through direct causation before-
hand. Entities could simply ride the waves of effect and influ-
ence, thereby making closer contact with the intensities of the 
world, without having to be conscious in the first place. Shaviro 
cites Eugene Thacker as holding that “we can only encounter the 
world-without-us obliquely, through the paradoxical movement 
of speculation.”63 Yet Shaviro himself endorses no such limits on 
contact with the world.
Since we are speaking of intentional objects, a word is in or-
der about George Molnar, the maverick Australian philosopher 
who died in 1999, and whose interesting book Powers was pub-
lished a few years later thanks to the editorial labors of Stephen 
Mumford.64 Shaviro states that “Molnar strikingly anticipates 
Harman’s argument against human exceptionalism,” by arguing 
that intentionality is not just a special human feature but one 
that belongs to objects in general (80). To this I would say both 
yes and no, for reasons Shaviro eventually acknowledges him-
self. For me, intentional objects are found everywhere simply 
because real objects cannot make direct contact, but encounter 
each other only as sensual caricatures. That is to say, I strongly 
uphold the Brentanean premise that intentionality requires im-
manent objectivity, while merely denying Brentano’s assumption 
that this requires a full-blown “mind.” Molnar by contrast inter-
prets the term “intentionality” in the lowest-common-denom-
inator sense of “directedness outward.” And given his view that 
dispositions are real properties of things, including “physical 
powers, such as solubility or electrical charge,”65 it is easy to see 
63 Here he is glossing Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: The Horror 
of Philosophy (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 5–6.
64 George Molnar, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, ed. Stephen Mumford (Ox-




why he thinks intentionality is spread far and wide beyond the 
human realm. Yet for Molnar there is no obvious sense in which 
physical entities would encounter each other as immanent or 
sensual objects, and in this respect the gulf between us is un-
bridgeable. As Shaviro notes, “in the process [of Molnar’s redefi-
nition of the term], intentionality also becomes a far weaker and 
vaguer concept than it was before” (81). He is right, however, 
that Molnar’s position is “at least not incompatible with Har-
man’s claim that objects have a substantial reality outside of, and 
anterior to, their relations” (142).
Nonetheless, no one would call Molnar a panpsychist, and 
this gets at the heart of Shaviro’s argument in his book — which, 
unlike the earlier Without Criteria, is an open celebration of 
panpsychist doctrine. As he puts it now, “Once we understand 
‘thought’ in Whitehead’s deflationary sense, rather than in Kant’s 
grandiose one, we discover that it is everywhere rather than no-
where” (82). He is untroubled by Colin McGinn’s dismissal of 
panpsychism as “a complete myth, a comforting piece of bal-
derdash” and as “vaguely hippieish, i.e. stoned.”66 Shaviro agrees 
instead with the view of McGinn’s target, Galen Strawson, that 
thought “is rather the inner, hidden dimension of everything” 
(101). Like me, Shaviro has had at least one change of heart as 
to whether or not panpsychism is something to embraced or 
avoided. He seems to have changed his mind sometime between 
2009 and 2014, in part due to David Skrbina’s eye-opening book 
that did much to mainstream the concept by showing its pres-
ence throughout Western history. One can see the clear influ-
ence of Skrbina’s later anthology on the pages of The Universe 
of Things.67 Shaviro tries to drag me into the clubhouse too, as 
when says that “vital materialism [as defended by Jane Bennett] 
and object-oriented ontology both entail some sort of panexpe-
66 Colin McGinn, “Hard Questions: Comments on Galen Strawson,” in Con-
sciousness and Its Places in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, 
ed. Anthony Freeman (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006), 93.
67 David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005); Da-
vid Skrbina, ed., Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009).
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rientialism or panpsychism”68 (63). Shaviro is also right to add 
that “[t]his is not a step to be taken lightly; it can easily get one 
branded as a crackpot” (63). The reason for this is the hegemon-
ic Modern Onto-Taxonomy that the present book opposes. But 
I would rather be called a “crackpot” by such people than join in 
their unadventurous credo of philosophy as a tarted-up theory 
of science that draws on science not as a source of surprise, but 
as a weapon to beat up the naïve and the gullible. 
No, there are two other reasons why I hesitate to enlist OOO 
in the ranks of panpsychism. One is that, despite Skrbina’s use-
ful observation about all the many different things that “psyche” 
might mean, to endorse panpsychism at least suggests that one 
endorses the ubiquity of the many specific features of human 
psyche. This I am not prepared to do. Among those factors not 
listed by Skrbina, as far as I can recall, is that when one hears 
“human experience,” vision and thought too often come to mind 
above everything else. Thus, when I claim that a rock encounters 
sensual objects every bit as much as a human does, it is often 
assumed that I imagine a rock somehow “seeing” a caricature 
of the dirt on which it sits and then “thinking” about this cari-
cature, even if it were allowed that I claim that this happens in 
some “privative” form. We still lack the tools to speculate very 
far about what sub-human or sub-animal experience might be 
like, despite Shaviro’s own pioneering efforts in his book Discog-
nition; for this reason, I am inclined to proceed with caution. 
But there are sufficient grounds to agree — with Shaviro — that 
Robert Brandom’s distinction between “sapient” humans and 
merely “sentient” animals is just neo-Cartesian wordplay mas-
querading as insight. On the same grounds it is also fair to sus-
pect that Heidegger’s efforts in 1929/30 to distinguish between 
world-forming humans, world-poor animals, and worldless 
stones is merely an abortive threefold version of the old mod-
ern duality between thought and dead matter, as embraced with 




disappointing fervor even by Meillassoux69 (87). The number of 
basic levels will no doubt be greater than two or three, and the 
success of twenty-first-century philosophy will be measured in 
part by how much progress it makes along this front.
Yet there are other points on which I am certainly not al-
lied with panpsychists, and that means not allied with Shaviro. 
Namely, he seems too sympathetic to Strawson’s idea that con-
sciousness alone cannot emerge, and with Chalmers’s assump-
tion that “the hard problem” pertains to consciousness and 
nothing else. But above all, there is Shaviro’s idea that the old 
dispute between “first-person introspection” and “third-per-
son scientific description” should be maintained but reversed, 
whereas I think it should be discarded altogether. Let’s discuss 
each of these issues, as I did in more detail a decade ago in “Ze-
ro-Person and the Psyche.”70
The younger Strawson has been one of the boldest voices 
defending panpsychism in the world of analytic philosophy, 
which (to say the least) is not a naturally welcoming environ-
ment for the doctrine. He starts from the reasonable position 
that eliminativism cannot be true, “because experience is itself 
the fundamental given natural fact […] there is nothing more 
certain than the existence of experience”71 (82). While Meillas-
soux argues for the ex nihilo emergence of thought from life for 
no reason — though he does think it has to emerge from life, 
rather than directly from inanimate matter — Strawson denies 
that “brute emergence” of this sort is possible. Therefore, there 
must be thinking all the way down. Of the original Specula-
69 Robert B. Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2009), 148; Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics: World — Finitude — Solitude, trans. William McNeill and 
Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Meillas-
soux, “Appendix,” 238–40.
70 Graham Harman, “Zero-Person and the Psyche,” in Mind That Abides: 
Panpsychism in the New Millennium, ed. David Skrbina (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 2009), 253–82.
71 Galen Strawson, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsy-
chism,” in Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail 
Panpsychism?, ed. Anthony Freeman (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006), 4.
96
skirmishes
tive Realists, Shaviro plausibly associates me and Grant with 
this view, and Meillassoux and Brassier with the contrary view 
that in most of the universe there is nothing like thought at all. 
Nonetheless, Shaviro also notices something that separates my 
position from Strawson’s in an absolute way. For unlike White-
head, Karen Barad, Bennett, and DeLanda, Strawson “is radical-
ly anti-systems theory and antiemergentist. He rejects the idea 
that anything nontrivial can emerge on a higher level that was 
not already present in and linearly caused by microconstituents 
at a lower level”72 (99). As Strawson has it, it is easy for science 
to explain how the chemical known as water causes wetness, 
and in principle — if not in fact — it is easy to do the same for 
the emergence of life but utterly impossible to do the same for 
the relation between sentience and non-sentient matter (100). 
This latter point matches Chalmers’s concern with the highly 
localized “hard problem” of knowing the relation between first-
person experience and third-person description. The main dif-
ference is that, even though Chalmers courts controversy by 
going so far as to propose that even a thermostat might be con-
scious, he never argues like Strawson that consciousness must 
be everywhere from the start73 (96). But while Chalmers sees a 
“hard problem” only in the mental realm, I see it in the physical 
sphere as well. Many have spoken of a “combination problem” 
for panpsychism, meaning that it is unclear how smaller minds 
can combine into a larger one at a higher level. For my part, I see 
such a problem on the physical level as well. It does not seem so 
easy to me that many boards would combine into a single table, 
or at least no easier to grasp than my own idea that the boards 
and the table as a whole would each confront their own set of 
intentional objects.
72 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the En-
tanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); 
Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual 
Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002).
73 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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Thomas Nagel’s seminal essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
proposes a famous test for consciousness.74 Namely, an entity 
is conscious if there is an answer in principle to the question 
of “what it is like” to be that entity. For instance, the common-
sense view would be that we can wonder what it is like to be a 
bat, dog, lion, or snake, and certainly another person. We may 
find it hard to imagine ever attaining such knowledge, but in 
some vague way we can think there is an answer to the question 
if only there were some means of finding out. The same com-
mon-sense view is likely to assume that there is nothing “that it 
is like” to be a rock or a star, though there may be some hesita-
tion about borderline cases such as slime molds, blood cells, or 
the novel coronavirus. Panpsychists, by this test, would be those 
who hold that for pretty much any entity, we can reasonably ask 
what it is like to be it.
Enter James Ladyman and Don Ross, who at one point were 
heroes in continental neo-rationalist circles for their attempted 
evisceration of individual objects, on the basis of a faulty argu-
ment I have addressed in detail elsewhere.75 For these ruthless 
eliminativists, there are no things except as correlates of the 
scientist who studies them: hence the clever title of their book, 
Every Thing Must Go.76 As Shaviro aptly puts it,
[For Ladyman and Ross] physical science can only describe 
relational properties. […] They conclude that since “intrinsic 
natures” are not known to science, they simply do not exist. 
As far as Ladyman is concerned, nothing has an irreducible 
inside; to posit one is to make an illegitimate inference […]. 
In Ladyman’s vision, physical science is exclusively relational; 
74 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in Mortal Questions (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165–80.
75 Graham Harman, “I Am Also of the Opinion That Materialism Must Be 
Destroyed,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28, no. 5 (2010): 
772–90.
76 James Ladyman and Don Ross, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Natural-
ized (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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anything not determined by these relations must be elimi-
nated. (103)
This seems to rule out anything like Nagel’s “what it is like” cri-
terion, since Ladyman and Ross leave no room for anything 
intrinsic in reality at all, much less an intrinsic character of psy-
che. Shaviro notes my objection to any purely relational theory 
of this sort. He then pairs my view with those of Sam Coleman 
and William Seager, who also require consciousness to be some-
thing intrinsic, against the usual functionalist duomining ma-
neuver of saying that consciousness means sub-personal neu-
ral facts plus observable outward behavior, with no room for 
anything in between. In particular, “Seager and Harman alike 
insist, rightly, that entities must have something like intrinsic 
properties, because relations cannot exist without relata”77 (104).
This brings us to a final point of disagreement between me 
and Shaviro, one that makes it impossible for me to embrace 
panpsychism as fully as he now does. Following his discussion 
of Seager, he poses the following question: “In just what does 
a thing’s intrinsic nature consist?” His answer follows immedi-
ately, “The answer, I believe, can only be that all entities have 
insides as well as outsides, or first-person experiences as well as 
observable, third-person properties. A thing’s internal qualities 
are objectively describable, but its interiority is neither a Some-
thing nor a Nothing” (104). The claim that the interiority of a 
thing is not a “Nothing” seems to be a deserved dig at the title of 
Metzinger’s book, Being No One. But in what sense is interiority 
“Something,” in view of Shaviro’s claim that the interior is “what 
it is intrinsically like” to be something? He answers by drawing 
a contrast with my own position:
77 William Seager, “The ‘Intrinsic Nature’ Argument for Panpsychism,” in Con-
sciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, ed. 
Anthony Freeman (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006), 140; Harman, “I Am 
Also of the Opinion that Materialism Must Be Destroyed,” 786.
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Everything in the universe is both public and private. […] 
Harman claims that all objects are “withdrawn” from ac-
cess. As far as I can tell, this withdrawal is nothing more (but 
nothing less) than the “what-it-is-likeness,” or private inte-
rior, of a thing that is also outwardly public and available. My 
problem with Harman is that he seems to underestimate this 
latter aspect. (104–5)
This does get at the heart of our disagreement, though I think 
Shaviro gets two points wrong. First, I would agree that every en-
tity has both a public and a private aspect, though unlike Shaviro 
I identify these with the relational and the non-relational. But 
when he says that the “private interior, of a thing that is also 
outwardly public and available,” I am not sure this makes the 
point he wishes to make. Granted, my inner experience is not 
a total mystery to other humans; for someone like my wife who 
knows me very well, facial expressions are often a perfect indica-
tor of my thoughts. But all legibility of faces aside, Shaviro would 
surely agree there is a big difference between the experience of 
thinking a thought and that of interpreting the face of the think-
er. For example, to realize that someone’s furrowed brow indi-
cates anxiety is obviously not the same thing as to feel anxious. 
Elsewhere in the book Shaviro seems to make this point himself, 
so I suspect he is once again claiming that intentional objects 
are the culprit that prevents us from realizing the free and inter-
rupted causal flow from one point of reality to another. I have 
argued more than once that this puts him closer to Deleuze than 
to Whitehead, and will not repeat the exercise here.
The bigger problem is this: I cannot agree with Shaviro that 
first-person experience is the intrinsic nature of things. It is true 
that the usual debate in philosophy of mind is between “tough” 
thinkers (like Dennett) who hold that third-person scientific 
descriptions are all we ever need and “tender” ones (like Chal-
mers) who insist that first-person introspection can never be 
reduced to any account given from outside. Although my sym-
pathies — like Shaviro’s — are more with the latter group, I also 
see a problem with the first-person standpoint. Namely, what 
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first- and third-person descriptions share is that both are de-
scriptions. But to describe is to relate, and to relate automatically 
means to translate or caricature. Throughout his book, Shaviro 
in The Universe of Things shows an awareness that our intro-
spection can go wrong just like our scientific descriptions, and 
he shows it even more vividly the following year in Discogni-
tion. This is the reason why I argue, in Skrbina’s aforementioned 
anthology, that both first- and third-person consciousness are 
derivative of a deeper zero-person reality.78 That is to say, there is 
a sense in which the difference between first- and third-person 
is ontologically trivial — not because science gets the last word 
on everything (so that third-person wins) or because science ul-
timately has to be done by sensitive human beings (so that first-
person wins). Instead, insofar as both are descriptions, both are 
the polar opposite of what it means for a thing to be intrinsically 
itself. I am not my thoughts. At best, my thoughts and experi-
ences are sketches from the outside of what I intrinsically am.





Having considered the views of my friendly acquaintances Tom 
Sparrow and Steven Shaviro, we now enter terrain occupied by 
critics who do not always wish me well. Peter Gratton was one of 
the first outside critics to pay attention to Speculative Realism, 
and on this basis he earned a not undeserved reputation as an 
authority on the movement.1 Productivity, curiosity, and alert-
ness to new trends have long been among his signature strengths, 
so it was little surprise that he arrived early on the scene. Yet 
this should not obscure a crucial difference between Gratton 
and the founding figures of Speculative Realism; although he 
is somewhat younger than all of us, his intellectual allegiance 
is to earlier currents of continental philosophy as embodied in 
the writings of such figures as Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Nancy. This is the context for his view, expressed repeatedly in 
his 2014 book Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects, that 
the Speculative Realists often merely repeat insights that were 
already clear to Derrideans. He compares our evident lack of 
interest in deconstruction to the latter’s own dismissal of Jean-
Paul Sartre and existentialism, before concluding as follows: 
1 Peter Gratton, “Interviews: Graham Harman, Jane Bennett, Tim Morton, 
Ian Bogost, Levi R. Bryant and Paul Ennis,” in Speculations I, ed. Paul Ennis 
(Earth: punctum books, 2010), 84–134.
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“Many generations of philosophers suffer from an anxiety of in-
fluence, and the speculative realists are no different.”2 We should 
first note that this is a misuse of Harold Bloom’s theory of how 
different generations of authors interact.3 The anxiety of influ-
ence, strictly speaking, occurs when a later author “deliberately 
misreads” a predecessor they regard as exceptionally strong, in 
an effort to carve out their own distinct space in the intellectual 
world. It does not follow that every critique of an older author 
by a younger one is a case of such anxiety; often enough, the 
new generation simply experiences the previous one as a stale 
ruling power whose ideas no longer sparkle. On this note, it is 
easy to see why the young deconstructionists would have re-
garded existentialism — if somewhat unfairly — as a tired form 
of modern humanism. But it would be rather odd to claim that 
the young Derrida’s anxiety of influence stemmed from Sartre, 
and far more plausible that it came from structuralism on one 
side and phenomenology on the other. As for the alleged Specu-
lative Realist anxiety in the face of deconstruction, there is no 
such thing. If one examines our writings collectively, Derrida 
is simply not one of the central figures with whom we grapple, 
my frustrations with his critique of Aristotle notwithstanding.4
In fact, it is Gratton himself who likely feels some anxiety of 
influence with respect to deconstruction, the most important 
school in forming his own outlook. Thus, we are dealing with 
a case of projection on his part. Rather than calmly identifying 
the authors who risked overpowering the various Speculative 
Realists in their youth — as Bloom would do — Gratton invents 
a theory of secret Derridean influence that suits his own agen-
da without fitting the case at hand. Elsewhere in the book, he 
makes the more interesting claim that I am heavily indebted to 
2 Peter Gratton, Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 5. Subsequent page references are given be-
tween parentheses in the main text. 
3 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, 2nd edn. (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
4 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry 
of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 110–16.
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the philosophy of Levinas in a way that some readers do not 
realize. This is both true and insightful, though I will show that 
Gratton misreads the nature of that influence, which has less to 
do with “alterity” and “the Other” than with Levinas’s insights 
into the sensual hither side of being.
More generally, Gratton’s jet drifts too easily into Airspace 
Snide-and-Cocky. His eleven-page introduction is mottled with 
so much regrettable shade that the book would have been better 
served by having no introduction at all. At the bottom of page 
three, we read the following: “But I’ve delayed long enough. 
What is speculative realism anyway?” (3). Under normal au-
thorial circumstances, “What is speculative realism anyway?” 
would have been the first sentence of the book, or close to it. 
So, we might ask, what was going on in the three full pages be-
fore Gratton finally got to the point? A good portion of those 
pages is filled with statements reminiscent of “many people are 
saying…” insinuations. A few examples are in order, starting 
with this one: “But to make it for real these days, the cynical will 
claim, you must have a system, and it better come with a ready-
made politics. Which, of course, you’ll say, it does, since it’s the 
subject of your forthcoming book; anyone can have a book 
forthcoming, and it is best to have several to have a trump card 
to throw into any conversation at conferences” (1). To whom, 
pray tell, is Gratton referring here? And what does any of it have 
to do with a book on Speculative Realism? While there is some 
ambiguity in the passage as to whether the author agrees with 
“the cynical,” anyone reading a few pages further will conclude 
that the introduction is designed primarily to generate alibis for 
such cynicism among readers ill-disposed toward Speculative 
Realism. Is there really a problem in our discipline, for instance, 
with people having too many book contracts? Normally, no one 
has multiple contracts unless they have reliably published ac-
tual books, so that publishers come knocking on their doors for 
more. Gratton would appear to be dog-whistling at someone, 
and there is little point speculating who. It is his job to lay his 
cards on the table, not mine.
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But perhaps Gratton is aiming his accusations instead at 
those who actually have published a good deal, despite his own 
relatively prolific track record. The cat would appear to have es-
caped the bag near the top of page one: “Philosophy, the fear is, 
has become even more of a bazaar of self-branding academics 
pumping out articles and books and pushing new systems of 
thought with clumsy titles” (1). “The fear is?” Whose fear, exact-
ly? We are never told, though apparently many people fear that 
“self-branding” academics are “pumping out” too many articles 
and books. But as a rule, it is a good sign when academics are 
productive rather than unproductive, and I have mentioned that 
Gratton himself very much belongs to the productive side of the 
profession. Nonetheless, he sees fit to consider — or perhaps 
many people are considering — whether it might be better to 
behave instead like “[Hans-Georg] Gadamer […] publish[ing] 
his first major book at age sixty”5 (2). Is there really a problem 
with Speculative Realists publishing too much too early? The 
evidence suggests not. At the time of the inaugural Goldsmiths 
workshop, the four participants were relatively obscure, dues-
paying veterans ranging in age from thirty-eight to forty-three, 
which is hardly a premature blossoming. Yet it is difficult to re-
spond to anything in the introduction with much precision; the 
smoke signals are always mixed, and Gratton never quite tells us 
where he stands on all this cynicism that many people are said 
to be feeling.
Unfortunately, the closest he comes to tipping his hand 
comes when his very first block-quote is original Speculative 
Realist Ray Brassier infamously referring to SR as an “online 
orgy of stupidity,”6 followed shortly thereafter by a false piece 
of objectivity: “Let us thus make Brassier’s analysis our start-
ing point” (3). Why make Brassier’s insult — hardly an “analy-
sis” — the “starting point” of the book, when Gratton is fully 
5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall, 2nd edn. (London: Continuum, 2004).
6 Ray Brassier, “I Am A Nihilist Because I Still Believe in Truth,” interview by 
Marcin Rychter, Kronos, March 4, 2011.
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aware that Brassier has a personal axe to grind against his for-
mer group, and also fully aware that Brassier’s primary target 
(the Object-Oriented Ontologists) are not primarily “online” 
figures but instead are “pumping out” articles and books by the 
dozens? Then again, amidst the fog of the introduction and its 
confusingly contrary hints as to what many cynical people are 
saying, who’s to say that “pumping out” articles and books is any 
better than having written nothing, but having “several” books 
“forthcoming” instead of written? So thick is the gloom of in-
sinuation that at times there is no way to parse the meaning of 
the book without interpreting the numerous tacit digs that lurk 
in the background.
Gratton does make a number of interesting arguments, and 
I will consider them, though it would have been preferable to 
meet them in less alloyed form. His claim that he “wouldn’t 
write at such length [… about] authors [he doesn’t] greatly re-
spect” (6) makes a strange fit with the rest of the introduction, 
which reads like an extended permission slip — written in invis-
ible ink — for mainstream continental philosophers to indulge 
in sarcastic remarks at Speculative Realism’s expense. For in-
stance, “A movement should have to prove its staying power and 
importance, not just get name-dropped in art catalogues and 
cloying treatises” (3). Is Gratton one of the many people who are 
saying this? Presumably not, since he went ahead and “pumped 
out” a 266-page book on Speculative Realism less than a decade 
after the movement began. Furthermore, what is wrong with art 
catalogues? And what on earth is a “cloying treatise”? There is 
no telling, for we are in the London of Bleak House:
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green 
aits and meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled 
among the tiers of shipping and the waterside pollutions of 
a great (and dirty) city. Fog on the Essex marshes, fog on the 
Kentish heights. Fog creeping into the cabooses of collier-
brigs; fog lying out on the yards and hovering in the rigging 
of great ships; fog drooping on the gunwales of barges and 
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small boats. Fog in the eyes and throats of ancient Greenwich 
pensioners, wheezing by the firesides of their wards.7
Gratton habitually belittles the originality of the Speculative 
Realists, claiming that Meillassoux’s philosophy was antici-
pated two years in advance by the analytic philosopher John 
Nolt (40), despite minuscule similarity between these authors. 
He claims that Meillassoux stole his theory of God from both 
Philo of Alexandria (66) and Richard Kearney (75) — or should 
I say he insinuates it, since Gratton rarely comes right out and 
says anything of the sort. Perhaps most foolishly, he tweaks my 
nose with a “[sic]” following a typographical verb-tense error 
in my translation of Meillassoux’s L’Inexistence divine: “be-
cause it cannot be understand [sic] how the lifeless […].” Such 
things happen when writing and editing books, but Gratton 
makes the decision to leave the typo and draw attention to it, 
rather than quietly fix it or put the correct word in brackets as 
well-mannered authors generally do. Unfortunately for him, 
the snark backfires when his own book turns out to be riddled 
with more typographical mistakes than any other I have seen 
under the Bloomsbury label. The errors include frequent cases 
of words missing from sentences, the oddly foreign tourist-like 
claim that the aforementioned Nolt teaches at the “University 
of Knoxville” rather than the University of Tennessee (40), the 
misstatement of my article subtitle “A New Theory of Causation” 
as “The New Causality” (105), the misspelling of the Polish jour-
nal Kronos as Chronos (217n1), and two different misspellings 
of Jean-Luc Boltanski’s surname just five lines apart (198–99). 
He also omits Steve Woolgar’s name as co-author from Bruno 
Latour’s Laboratory Life, while calling the subtitle of that book 
The Construction of Scientific Fast rather than Facts8 (90). In a 
crowning bizarrerie, he even ascribes some words I wrote my-
7 Charles Dickens, Bleak House, ed. Nicola Bradbury (London: Penguin 
Books, 2003), 13.
8 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Sci-
entific Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
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self to Leon Trotsky, though he should have known that “dusky 
underworld” sounds a lot more like me than like the goateed 
revolutionary (92). Gratton has what it takes to be a solid, adult 
critic of Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology 
from his holdout Derridean position. But one wastes so much 
time unravelling his smirky innuendoes that I occasionally find 
myself longing instead for Wolfendale’s open expressions of ha-
tred. Unfortunately, it will be necessary to call out more cases of 
this kind as we move forward, since there are times when Grat-
ton’s arguments are practically soaked in sub-verbal insinuation.
Amidst a surprising occurrence of the phrase “fuck and die” 
on page ten, the reader finally gains sight of a clear statement of 
Gratton’s own philosophical outlook: 
My hunch is this: speculative realism may stand the test of 
time, but only if takes the reality of time as a test to pass. 
[…] My view is that those critiqued by the speculative real-
ists, such as Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, and several 
others were not “correlationists,” but were after a realism of 
time — Being as time, as Heidegger put it, a claim that made 
his project and the later deconstruction possible. (10) 
This is, in fact, the intended lesson of Gratton’s book — philoso-
phy must be grounded in a specific theory of time, and Meillas-
soux and I both fail this test because we are too close to Plato. 
Coming from a Derridean like Gratton, the accusation of Plato-
nism is obviously not meant as a compliment. But at least it is 
a clear thesis, and like all clear theses, it is honorable enough to 
risk refutation. My response will be as follows: (a) Leaving Meil-
lassoux to defend himself if he wishes, I will show that Gratton 
is wrong to claim that my philosophy bears any significant re-
semblance to Plato’s, and (b) I will show that Gratton is wrong to 
link Heidegger’s philosophy of time with Derrida’s. For in fact, 
they are completely different.
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General Survey of Gratton’s Views on sr
Gratton’s book covers not only the four original Speculative 
Realists but also an interesting cross-section of neighboring 
thinkers — Jane Bennett, Elizabeth Grosz, Adrian Johnston, and 
Catherine Malabou. Nonetheless, I will focus here exclusively 
on his treatment of Meillassoux’s philosophy and my own. The 
reason is that the two of us are the primary targets in the closing 
argument of his book (201–16), as presaged in the introduction:
Meillassoux could not do his work […] without the math-
ematics of set theory. I began to wonder if we weren’t re-
turning to Platonism, the view that what is ultimately real 
is outside time. […] But Harman argues that objects as they 
are in themselves are not in time, since time is embedded in 
appearances, which seems to repeat Plato’s account. We will 
ask if this is a major problem with his work. (8) 
But “we” will do considerably more than “ask.” “We” will an-
swer that it is a major problem indeed. The book’s conclusion 
will give us Gratton’s argument for a “realism of time” (202). He 
urges that the Speculative Realists follow him down this path, 
“lest they give themselves over to the idealism of objects, math-
ematics, and so on” (202). The role played by “and so on” in this 
passage is unclear. But no matter, since objects and mathematics 
take the brunt of his criticism.
Before entering into his account of Meillassoux, allow me to 
point to two passages where Gratton overgeneralizes about the 
Speculative Realists. The first comes when he says, “it should be 
said that there has been a longstanding divide between Anglo-
American and Continental philosophy, and speculative realists 
promise a move beyond this divide” (40). Gratton does not back 
up this claim with citations, and as far as I know, Brassier is the 
only Speculative Realist who offers such a promise.9 Badiou also 
9 Ray Brassier, “Postscript: Speculative Autopsy,” in Peter Wolfendale, Object-
Oriented Philosophy (Falstaff: Urbanomic, 2014), 414. Brassier dismisses the 
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makes this promise, in the course of boasting about his personal 
prowess in both mathematics and literature, but I do not recall 
Meillassoux having said much at all about the analytic/conti-
nental divide.10 For my own part, I wish to widen the gap be-
tween the two traditions.11 The second overgeneralization comes 
when, after quoting a passage from The Quadruple Object in 
which I note that we humans are a relatively minor species or-
biting a mediocre sun, Gratton leaps to the assertion that “this 
apocalyptic affect pervades speculative realism, from Meillas-
soux’s depictions of the end of humanity to Brassier’s nihilism” 
(52). Not really. There is nothing inherently “apocalyptic” about 
saying that humans are not so important in the universe as a 
whole, which is all I say on the topic. Meillassoux does speak 
of the possible coming of a Messiah and then a God who will 
completely transform existence into a World of Justice, and I 
suppose this could be called “apocalyptic,” though “eschatologi-
cal” or “soteriological” would seem more to the point.12 Brassier 
is really the only Speculative Realist who revels in discussing the 
end of our species and the universe as a whole, and this remains 
a fetish of his personal project.13 Moreover, even the arguments 
Gratton cites against us on this score — from Adrian Johnston 
and Slavoj Žižek — are not so much anti-apocalyptic as outright 
idealist, through their shared claim that it can only be a “fan-
tasy” to imagine gazing upon a world in which humans are no 
longer present, since we would still have to be there gazing at 
the fantasy (52). Alain Weisman’s bestseller The World without 
Us was based on an interesting concept, a consideration of what 
would happen to various buildings and facilities if humans were 
divide as a mere “sociological fact.”
10 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 
2005), xiii–xiv.
11 Graham Harman, “The Enduring Importance of the Analytic/Continental 
Split,” Gavagai 3 (2017): 158–60.
12 Quentin Meillassoux, “Appendix: Excerpts from L’Inexistence divine,” in 
Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 175–238.




suddenly to disappear. And it is true that Brassier and Meill-
assoux both make extensive realist use of the trope of a world 
devoid of humans. But this is not what OOO is about, since for 
us the thing-in-itself is not attained by removing humans from 
the scene, but by stressing that objects remain mysterious even 
when humans are right there staring at them.
In any case, after “praising” Speculative Realism (with the 
word “luckily”) for having oversimplified a 200-year period of 
philosophy by dismissing it as anti-realist (14), Gratton eventu-
ally gets down to business with an opening-chapter summary of 
correlationism. That summary is actually quite good, beginning 
with a brutally anti-realist epigraph from Maurice Merleau-Pon-
ty, a thinker who too often provides cover for phenomenological 
idealists masquerading as realists (13). Whereas the Speculative 
Realists themselves tend to explain correlationism by refer-
ring to Immanuel Kant, Gratton usefully expands the map by 
also incorporating the analytic philosopher Michael Dummett 
(22–26). Late in the chapter, he also reaches a genuine insight 
about Meillassoux: “What’s striking about After Finitude is that 
Meillassoux, frankly, has little to combat idealism as such. He 
expends a lot of energy on correlationisms but, as we’ll see, his 
method has nothing to say about idealisms that simply deny any 
correlation at all” (37). No one who reads Meillassoux carefully 
could argue that he is close to naïve realism; in chapter 6 we 
will see that Christopher Norris makes this claim about the early 
parts of Meillassoux’s first book, though this is merely a product 
of Norris not reading very carefully. Yet I myself have argued, 
and Gratton rightly implies, that there is no sufficient remedy 
for outright idealism in After Finitude, a charge that might be 
extended to Meillassoux’s teacher Badiou as well as their fellow 
traveler Žižek, given his minimal Lacanian sense of the Real as 
nothing but a traumatic wound to the symbolic order.
Before getting to the most interesting parts of Gratton’s read-
ing of Meillassoux, there is no escaping the burden of what he 
gets wrong, starting from the least important errors and work-
ing our way to the more serious lapses. First, there is the fol-
lowing: “This is perhaps why Meillassoux differentiates between 
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‘refutation’ and ‘disqualification,’ […] though frankly it’s impos-
sible to make out” (41), in connection with Meillassoux’s presen-
tation at Goldsmiths.14 In fact, it is very easy to understand this 
particular distinction. In the passage in question, Meillassoux is 
looking for a rational argument to “refute” the correlationist, as 
opposed to a mere “disqualification” such as casting aspersions 
on the correlationist’s psychological motives or calling him bor-
ing. Second, Gratton spends a bit too much time dwelling on the 
“ridiculousness” of Meillassoux’s theory of a virtual God who 
does not now exist but may exist in the future, though he lets 
Adam Kotsko shoulder the burden of mocking it for him (65). 
While it is no doubt true that Meillassoux will convert few read-
ers to his strange theology, one should not just admire those 
philosophies with whose content one happens to agree; this is 
the dogmatic flaw found in Brassier, Wolfendale, and others, not 
a good general model for philosophical behavior.  
There are other problems with Gratton’s account of Meil-
lassoux. As mentioned earlier, he reports that “[i]t so happens 
that two years before the publication of After Finitude, John 
Nolt, a University of Knoxville [sic] philosopher, published a 
similar argument confronting anti-realism” (40; italics added). 
This looks very much like a trial balloon for questioning Meil-
lassoux’s originality. The real problem with this strategy is that 
Meillassoux’s discussion of ancestrality and the arche-fossil is 
not meant to be original, and is not even meant as an “argu-
ment.” Nolt’s article is a perfectly lucid piece of analytic philos-
ophy which proceeds through several steps to the conclusion 
that “the cosmos has structure that is independent of our cogni-
tion — i.e., intrinsic structure.”15 While this may sound similar 
to Meillassoux’s discussion of the arche-fossil, the difference is 
that Nolt is a straightforward scientific realist who considers the 
existence of an intrinsic structure of the universe to be the final 
14 Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meil-
lassoux, “Speculative Realism,” in Collapse III, ed. Robin Mackay (Falstaff: 
Urbanomic, 2007), 429.
15 John Nolt, “An Argument for Metaphysical Realism,” Journal for General 
Philosophy of Science 35 (2004): 72.
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lesson of the story. Nowhere does Nolt defend the equal rights of 
the correlationist side of the argument that “the universe has an 
intrinsic structure — for us.” Now as always, those who overlook 
this side of Meillassoux are advised to reread his portion of the 
Goldsmiths transcript. Those crucial pages are all about how the 
correlationist has a point, and needs to be defeated by oblique 
means rather than the direct ones used by Nolt, Paul Boghos-
sian, and others.16
A more serious difficulty, in which Gratton is not alone and 
Meillassoux not blameless, stems from the false claim — ex-
pressed rather triumphantly, I might add — that Meillassoux is 
merely confusing epistemology and ontology:
Is his refutation of the correlationist as knockdown as Meil-
lassoux argues? In a word, no. First Meillassoux is in danger 
of portraying Kant et al. as particularly daft philosophers 
who can’t distinguish between ontological and epistemologi-
cal claims. Kant isn’t asserting that the in-itself doesn’t exist, 
but rather that what we know can’t simply be accounted for 
by some unmediated access to the in-itself. [… And] as Pe-
ter Hallward points out, one can say such and such are the 
epistemological or linguistic conditions for knowledge […] 
without ever believing that the things in the world “depend” 
on thinking for existence.17 (46–47)
Along with Hallward, David Golumbia makes a similar point 
in his article, which claims that correlationism never really ex-
isted.18 But in fact, Meillassoux is guilty of no such conflation 
16 Ray Brassier et al., “Speculative Realism,” 408–49; Paul Boghossian, Fear of 
Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2006).
17 The reference is to Peter Hallward, “Anything Is Possible: A Reading of 
Quentin Meillassoux’s ‘After Finitude’,” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham 
Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 130–41.
18 David Golumbia, “‘Correlationism’: The Dogma That Never Was,” boundary 
2 43, no. 2 (May 2016): 1–25.
113
gratton
between the epistemological and ontological registers. Nowhere 
does he claim that Kant says the thing-in-itself depends on the 
human mind for existence. Instead, he draws a distinction be-
tween “weak” and “strong” correlationists, with Kant a textbook 
example of the “weak” type who holds that something does exist 
outside thought, though we simply cannot know it. Although 
Meillassoux is not guilty of misreading Kant, he is nonetheless 
guilty in After Finitude of an ambiguous use of the word “cor-
relationism,” as he later admitted in his 2012 Berlin lecture.19 The 
ambiguity is as follows. On the one hand, Meillassoux usually 
treats Kant as the shining exemplar of correlationism. But on 
the other, he defines the “correlational circle” in terms that do 
not apply to Kant, namely, “to think a thing outside thought is 
itself a thought, and therefore to think anything outside thought 
is impossible.” This view is of course not held by Kant, but only 
by the strong correlationist, as well as the idealist, and therefore 
should have been called the “strong correlational circle” instead. 
We should emphasize once more that, far from being a scien-
tific realist in the manner of Nolt, Meillassoux holds that even 
Kant makes too many concessions to the thing-in-itself outside 
thought, and much prefers the strong correlationist to the weak 
one. He reaches his own philosophical position by radicalizing 
the strong correlational circle, just as OOO can be interpreted 
as a radicalization of Kantian weak correlationism beyond the 
human sphere.
There is a final point on which I am not sure whether Grat-
ton gets Meillassoux right or not, because the textual evidence 
is murky. In the course of comparing Meillassoux with Philo, 
Gratton makes the following statement: “Meillassoux is clear 
that matter was created ex nihilo” (67). This was once my view 
as well, though I no longer think it is so clear. The reason for 
doubt stems from Meillassoux’s argument, in After Finitude, 
19 Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” trans. Robin Mackay and M. Gansen, 
in Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity Since Structural-




that his “principle of unreason” should be accepted in a strong 
sense rather than a weak one. The weak sense would be that if 
something exists, then it must be contingent, while insisting that 
this in no way entails that something must exist (73). The strong 
sense, on the other hand, would say that it is necessary that 
something exist, because it is necessary that contingent things 
exist (74). We need not go into Meillassoux’s attempted proof 
of the strong reading here, and only mention in passing that he 
does support it. But this runs counter to the sense one gets from 
The Divine Inexistence that matter was created ex nihilo, just as 
later happened with life and thought, and as might happen one 
day with justice and the Virtual God. For if the strong reading of 
the principle of unreason is correct that something must exist, it 
is hard to see what that could be for Meillassoux other than mat-
ter, which provides the indispensable bedrock in his philosophy 
for the later contingent emergence of life and later thought. But 
it is time to turn to Gratton’s account of OOO.
Gratton deals with me primarily in chapter 4 of his book, 
though numerous other references are sprinkled throughout, 
including in the all-important conclusion of the book. Chap-
ter 4 contains a few misleading remarks that need to be dealt 
with before getting to the substance of Gratton’s critique. Un-
like Wolfendale, he judges that my work is “clear and schematic” 
(85), which frankly is the reaction most readers have. We will 
see that Gratton has plenty of criticisms to make of my philos-
ophy, though he thankfully avoids the affectation of claiming 
that I am so unclear that he had to work oh so very hard just to 
make my writings intelligible, a pretense with which Wolfen-
dale’s book is irredeemably saturated. Gratton also claims that 
although I write extensively about my differences from Edmund 
Husserl and Heidegger, “a better passkey to [Harman’s] work is 
through the writings of Levinas” (85), Naturally, “this is not to 
say that Harman’s account is not original” (85), though in fact 
there are numerous insinuations throughout the book that it 
is not original. In any event, Gratton shows insight in point-
ing to the impact of Levinas on my thinking, which occurred 
primarily in my early twenties, an age at which influences leave 
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a deeper and more primordial stamp than affinities discovered 
later. By contrast, I was nearly thirty years old before starting to 
read Latour, meaning that he helped refine my position rather 
than shape its basic suppositions.
There are two possible ways in which the link Gratton draws 
between me and Levinas could be misleading. First, he over-
stresses the importance of Levinasian “alterity” for my work 
(87). For one thing, this is historically false. It is true that I was 
first reading Levinas in 1991, at twenty-three years old, under 
the guidance of his translator Alphonso Lingis. It was Lingis’s 
critique of my holistic reading of Heidegger, along with my 
readings of Levinas, which helped set the stage for what is now 
my decidedly non-holistic interpretation of Heidegger’s tool-
analysis. Lingis’s own version of this critique can be found today 
in his under-read article on Levinas and substance.20 But this 
movement toward substance is already enough to show that ab-
solute alterity was not what interested me about Levinas. In his 
wonderful short work Time and the Other Levinas links alterity 
with the futuricity of time, as contrasted with what he regards as 
Heidegger’s mere “future of the present,” in which the so-called 
future is merely collapsed into the threefold present of Dasein’s 
“thrown projection.” I still admire Levinas’s argument about fu-
turicity today, despite the paradox that he seems to draw it from 
Bergson, who is not a thinker of alterity in Levinas’s sense. In 
any case, what I found interesting in Levinas (and still do today) 
was not so much his famous notion of alterity as his discussions 
of the hither side of being, referring both to the enjoyment of 
such entities as cigarettes and apples and the elemental medium 
in which they occur. My concept of withdrawn real objects dates 
instead to 1997 and my long summer readings of Xavier Zubíri, 
whose notion of individuals has a more Aristotelian flavor and 
which subtracts them from their relations to such a degree that 
he (wrongly) denies that a knife or a farm can be real, given that 
they exist only in their “respectivity” to other things. Zubíri also 
20 Alphonso Lingis, “A Phenomenology of Substances,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 71, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 505–22.
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strikes a disappointingly naturalist note in locating the reality 
of things in their “atomic-cortical structure,” so reminiscent of 
Saul Kripke falling back on the number of protons in gold as be-
ing the core of its reality.
Second, it is hard to follow Gratton’s argument when he iden-
tifies my “object in withdrawal” with Levinas’s “elemental” (86). 
Rather, the elemental in Levinas is the sensual, sub-objective 
medium in which sensual objects first take form. Although I 
ultimately call this elemental medium “black noise,” meaning 
that it emanates from objects which become objects as soon as 
we turn our attention to them, there is indeed something to be 
gained from a phenomenology of the non-objective element. 
The growing interest in Gernot Böhme’s theory of “atmospheres” 
shows that many others are intrigued by this topic as well.21 But 
I cannot endorse Gratton’s claim that the interpretation of the 
elemental by John Sallis is a good fit with my work. Sallis writes 
as follows: “the recession of the elemental, its withdrawal into 
fathomless depth, its withdrawal that is neither simply revelation 
nor concealment.”22 When I speak of withdrawal in a OOO con-
text, I do not mean a withdrawal “that is neither simply revela-
tion nor concealment” (the old Derridean tap dance of neither/
nor), but a withdrawal that is simply concealment. But this is 
clearly not what Levinas means by the element, and the discrep-
ancy is explained simply by the fact that Sallis uses the word 
“withdrawal” in a less hardcore sense than my own.
Next Gratton gives, as an example of my term “undermin-
ing,” the philosophy of British Empiricism and its bundles of 
qualities (89). But for me this is a textbook case of overmin-
ing — the empiricists hold that a bundle of qualities is all we 
need, and any notion of a distinct object holding them all to-
gether is a needless fiction. In short, they think the “object” 
is simply the sum total of content to which we have access in 
21 Gernot Böhme, The Aesthetics of Atmospheres, ed. Jean-Paul Thibaud (New 
York: Routledge, 2017).




sense-experience, not something that remains unified despite 
its shifting, kaleidoscopic figures, as phenomenology holds. On 
a related note, Gratton glosses my rejection of materialism as a 
duomining move with the following sentence: “For Harman, sci-
entific materialism ‘jeers’ objects from below, while a ‘German 
Idealist’ ‘dialectical materialism’ ‘jeers’ from above” (92). This 
may be the least felicitous use of scare-quotes I have ever seen; 
they are so numerous and disjunct that I lose track of which are 
direct quotes and which are intended as sarcastic putdowns of 
my argument. Accordingly, I cannot begin to respond. Surpris-
ingly, however, there is another point on which Gratton does me 
too much credit:
Spinoza’s point [when he claims that thought and extension 
are just two of infinitely many modes] is that there is no rea-
son there wouldn’t be infinite modes or means of accessing 
this world. Harman’s description of sensuous objects is simi-
lar: there may be indeed many ways objects, animals, and so 
on, have of relating or accessing the things of this world be-
yond the three noted [by Levinas]. (95)
This is a beautiful idea expressed in lovely prose, and one I agree 
with in principle. But most of my writing on this topic has been 
about the difference between real objects and any form of sen-
suousness, and I have not done enough as of yet to explore the 
variety of possible sensual worlds. It is Shaviro in Discognition 
who has gone some way towards opening up this topic, and even 
Metzinger with his account of various neuropathologies in Be-
ing No One.
We shift now to a topic where Gratton typically gives me 
too little credit instead, when he refers to the discussion of the 
“tension” between objects and qualities as “doing much of the 
conceptual heavy lifting in Harman’s accounts” (102). Given that 
“term X is doing a lot of heavy lifting for you” is established con-
tinentalese for “you’re just throwing that term around without 
even knowing what it means,” this is an especially ungenerous 
moment in his account. It would be more accurate to say that 
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the word “tension” is the result of a lot of heavy lifting. Years 
of work were needed to reach a simple understanding of how 
time and space can both be understood as different forms of 
the object–quality tension, and more years needed before it be-
came clear that the two other forms of such tension (RO–RQ and 
SO–RQ) could be identified as “essence” and “eidos.” I daresay 
this is one of the most original and productive results of OOO 
so far. Traditionally, philosophers have speculated on space and 
time as two peerless aspects of the cosmos, sitting on a pedestal 
by themselves, with discussion mostly limited as to whether or 
not they should be collapsed (as with Hermann Minkowski and 
sometimes Heidegger) into a single space-time. I am not aware 
of other efforts to expand the spatio-temporal schema to show 
that essence, eidos, or anything else belongs there as well. The 
fact that there is more to be said about the underlying “tensions” 
than I have said so far is simply how things go in philosophy. A 
placeholder term is never the final stage of an insight, but it does 
help make the ultimate insight possible.
A related deficit of generosity occurs when Gratton quotes a 
passage from The Quadruple Object which says that real objects 
must somehow be translated into sensual caricatures of them-
selves, must serve as the fuel that makes causal relations pos-
sible, and so forth. The italics are Gratton’s own, and he ham-
mers them repeatedly into the citation, as if to suggest that I am 
taking undue liberties in merely waving my arms and asserting 
something I cannot explain: though we will see later that his 
sainted Derrida does this himself at a key moment (103). Grat-
ton continues to hammer this point for several pages, eventually 
concluding as follows: “His use of ‘somehow’ and ‘must’ covers 
over an argument for causality, and previous antecedents in the 
history of philosophy using occasionalism could only offer mys-
ticism in place of explanation” (105). Here, like Norris who is 
discussed in chapter 6 below, Gratton openly invites the reader 
to imagine that I am mystically appealing to God as the univer-
sal causal agent. There is no trace here of my frequent emphasis 
that both my model of indirect causation and Latour’s differ not 
only from occasionalism but also from Hume and Kant, by re-
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fusing to permit any privileged super-entity (whether God or 
the mind) to be the sole locus of causation. Furthermore, OOO 
has nothing to do with “mysticism,” which claims direct access 
to the truth just like rationalism, though by different means, 
while the object-oriented position is that any such access must 
be indirect. In short, the case here is the same as with “tension.” 
The “musts” and the “somehows” are not invoked from thin air 
as an excuse for nothing to say, but are the provisional result of 
a process of narrowing down the place where causation must 
occur. We are not left with mere guesses about causation, but 
are partway down the path to a solution. In the famous words of 
Sherlock Holmes, “eliminate all other factors, and the one which 
remains must be the truth.”23 The passage above that Gratton 
mocks with extensive italics represents the stage of having elim-
inated the impossible, which, for me, is direct causation. The 
improbable option that remains is vicarious causation, in which 
real objects are mediated by sensual ones and sensual objects 
by real ones, and even Sherlock Holmes needs time to progress 
from one step to the next. This could certainly lead to what is 
called “the Holmesian Fallacy,” in which someone prematurely 
eliminates an option as impossible that is actually quite possible. 
But in that case, Gratton would need to show that direct causa-
tion is possible, or at least refute my argument that it is not. He 
does neither of these things.
There are a few more matters to deal with before getting to 
the core of Gratton’s temporal argument against OOO. One is his 
implication that, with the advent of the Anthropocene Era — in 
which human impact on the non-human world is more obvious 
than ever — it is somehow an irresponsible or shifty maneuver 
to switch to a discussion of inanimate things. He actually puts 
it in even less flattering terms, “To describe, then, the power of 
things at precisely this time could have the feel of an alibi for 
[avoiding] the human responsibility in the ecological strife in 
and around us — like an only child suddenly talking about the 
23 Arthur Conan Doyle, The Sign of Four (Scotts Valley: CreateSpace Inde-
pendent Publishing Platform, 2018), 6.
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powers of an imaginary friend when caught with a mess” (110). 
We cannot allow Gratton to get away with the word “could.” He 
must take full ownership of this passage: not only of its insulting 
comparison of OOO to a lying or deluded child, but more impor-
tantly of the implied — and bizarre — thesis that the Anthropo-
cene gives us even more reason to continue the human-centered 
emphasis of post-Kantian theory. This argument rests on a sim-
ple equivocation. The fact that humans have a very strong causal 
role in giving rise to the Anthropocene does not mean that the 
appearance of the Anthropocene to human thought must be our 
theoretical starting point now more than ever. It is the same 
equivocation noted by Manuel DeLanda on the first page of his 
book A New Philosophy of Society: the fact that humans are nec-
essary ingredients of human society does not entail that human 
society is equivalent to how it appears to humans.24 Instead, we 
are dealing with real causal forces — in the cases of both human 
society and the Anthropocene — that resist any precise thema-
tization by human theories. In Art and Objects I make a similar 
criticism of the modern formalist theories with which I other-
wise agree, namely, those of Clement Greenberg and Michael 
Fried.25 For art to be independent of the human beholder does 
not also require that art be devoid of a human ingredient, which 
is wrongly assumed in the Greenberg/Fried critique of much 
“postmodern” art. 
In the next passage I have in mind, Gratton refers to “Har-
man’s rhetoric on undermining and overmining” (116). Al-
though I personally view rhetoric in a positive sense, as the 
branch of philosophy that studies the power of unspoken syl-
logisms (see Marshall McLuhan’s treatment of media) it is clear 
that Gratton means “rhetoric” in the more recent, dismissive 
sense of the term.26 He could have just said I was wrong, but 
he chooses instead to farm out this task to my fellow Specu-
24 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and So-
cial Complexity (London: Continuum, 2006), 1.
25 Graham Harman, Art and Objects (Cambridge: Polity, 2020).
26 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1994).
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lative Realist and all-around good guy Iain Hamilton Grant. 
The occasion for my debate with Grant was his response to 
my essay faulting his anti-object-oriented theory for a form of 
“undermining.”27 He responded in his usual warm and friendly 
way, in an accompanying piece entitled “Mining Conditions: A 
Response to Harman.”28 Gratton captures the gist of that article 
when he writes,
Grant is arguing that his Idealism, contrary to the normal 
uses of that term, concerns horizontal formations of pow-
ers that would both produce and undo any particular be-
ing, and thus, unlike Harman, is fully temporal. One cannot 
discuss any given object without discussing its history and 
its becoming. This is what links all forms of Spinozism from 
(early) Schelling to Deleuze. (116)
Gilbert Simondon would be another name to throw into the mix. 
Yet there are at least two problems with this aspect of Grant’s 
position. The first, as Brassier and I both noted at Goldsmiths, 
is that as much as Grant wants to stress the productivity of na-
ture in his position and downplay its status as a one, individual 
objects are accounted for in his position only as the result of 
“retardations” of a more primordial productive force.29 It is hard 
to see where such retardations could come from if there are no 
preexistent obstacles to the free flow of production. And with-
out such obstacles, one is left with vague talk about “tendencies” 
or “virtual powers” that might exist quasi-independently of each 
other in nature without quite being fully-formed objects.
27 Graham Harman, “On the Undermining of Objects: Grant, Bruno, and 
Radical Philosophy,” in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and 
Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (Melbourne: 
re.press, 2011), 21–40.
28 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Mining Conditions: A Response to Harman,” in The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi R. Bryant, 
Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 41–46.
29 Brassier et al., “Speculative Realism,” 315, 352–53. 
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The next problem comes in the following statement by Grat-
ton, one with which Grant would presumably agree: “One can-
not discuss any given object without discussing its history and 
its becoming.” This is a statement that poses as a truism while 
barely concealing a falsity in its breast. It is similar in form to 
the argument that artworks cannot be understood apart from 
their socio-political contexts, or that all architecture must be 
“site-specific.” These arguments are fundamentally deceitful 
insofar as they give themselves a low hurdle to clear and their 
opponents a very high one. The low hurdle is cleared in approx-
imately the following fahion: “obviously everything must be 
understood in relation to its context, and therefore everything 
is defined by its context.” But there is a non sequitur after the 
comma, since there is no good reason to hold that all aspects 
of a thing’s context are relevant. By contrast, the high hurdle 
looks something like this: “our opponents say that things are 
completely unaffected by their context, which is obviously ri-
diculous.” I have repeatedly faced some form of this objection 
over the years, usually from people who play the Simondon card 
and claim that I am dealing only with fully-formed individuals 
rather than the deeper process of individuation. But this Game 
of Hurdles deceives for the following reason. The more plausible 
solution is that every object is affected by some aspects of its 
context but not others; a “site-specific” building may respond 
to the river nearby, to the specific type of sunlight found at the 
site, to the area’s rich Native American history, to the buildings 
currently located across the street, or to all these factors — and 
much more — simultaneously. But no building can possibly re-
late to all aspects of its context. Certain selections are always 
made as to the inclusion and exclusion of what belongs to the 
“site.” The same holds for the individuating history of an object. 
Some incidents in my life, as in Gratton’s no doubt, have had a 
powerful or even transformative impact on who I am today. But 
by no means does everything that happens leave a trace, unless 
we beg the question by positing some sort of universal cosmic 
memory that preserves everything at a level too minute for the 
human sensorium. In short, objects have firewalls and do not 
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reflect the sum total of everything that has happened to them. 
Even the evolution of animal species responds to certain specific 
environmental pressures, not to all of them. The only theory ca-
pable of addressing both the effectual and ineffectual aspects of 
history or environment is one that allows for things to be cut 
off from each other to some extent. The “everything is continu-
ous” option, such as Grant’s “retardation” model of individuals, 
leaves us with no explanation of why retardation should ever 
occur. As Brassier put it at Goldsmiths, “If you privilege pro-
ductivity, if these ideal generative dynamisms that structure and 
constitute material reality can be characterized in terms of the 
primacy of production over product, then the question is, how 
do we account for the interruption of the process? How do we 
account for discontinuity in the continuum of production?”30 
Gratton pulls out a different knife in the ensuing passage: 
“But Grant implicitly, I think, is making another suggestion: it 
is Harman who is a reductionist in his object-oriented ontol-
ogy, reducing being from its utter contingency and creativity 
to an order of given objects” (116). If so, this would be remi-
niscent of Brassier’s objections to Latour, which I considered in 
Speculative Realism: An Introduction, to the effect that Latour 
claims to oppose reduction but then reduces everything to act-
ants.31 This is actually a legitimate point, and not just a product 
of Brassier’s well-known animus against Latour, as can be seen 
from the fact that the same question was once put to me by the 
prominent Dutch Latourian Gerard de Vries. I have had differ-
ent thoughts about this question over the years, and will simply 
explain how I see the issue now. The grain of truth in Gratton’s 
and Brassier’s objections is that no philosophy can place equal 
valuation on everything. Latour’s theory entails that local ac-
tors are the ultimate reality, and there are losers in his theory as 
in any other. “Economy,” “society,” and “capitalism” cut a rather 
30 Ibid., 315.
31 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Object,” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham 
Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 51; Graham Harman, Speculative Real-
ism (Winchester: Zero Books, 2013), 46.
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sorry figure in the eyes of the Latourian, since all of these look 
like massive reifications that fail to account for the details. And 
speaking of capitalism, in Marx’s thinking most cultural forms 
are losers, since they look like mere ideological superstructure 
by comparison with the true, underlying economic forces. In 
Gratton’s work, we will see, time is the winner and enduring in-
dividual entities the big loser. Whatever your philosophy, there 
is no escaping this sort of result, though there are always ways 
of arguing for the primacy of one sort of reality over another. I 
do not think “reduction” is a good name for this process. An-
other name is needed, and that name would also describe what 
OOO — much like Latour and Whitehead — does when giving 
arguments that individual entities are the only game in town.
So, what does “reduction” mean? It already has an estab-
lished sense in much analytic philosophy, in distinction from 
the harsher activity known as “elimination.” But this is not quite 
the sense of reduction I use. For me, it means “wrongly ridding 
the world of things that actually exist.” The argument for a third 
term existing between the undermined and overmined versions 
of an object is as follows: (a) undermining cannot explain emer-
gence, and (b) overmining cannot explain change. This is not 
the place to repeat that argument, which can be found in liter-
ally any of my published accounts of mining.32 The anti-reduc-
tionist justification in this case is that the third term must exist 
in order to be able to explain emergence and change. Therefore, 
to remove the elusive real object from existence is to get rid of 
something that we know full well is an inhabitant of the world. 
Usually it is easy to spot the reducers in any quarrel, because 
they are the ones who want to move most quickly in removing 
as many things from existence as possible (as with Brassier’s dis-
turbing crusade against Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy) while 
the non-reducer is the one who proceeds more cautiously. Well 
then, Gratton might ask, is OOO not the overly hasty party in 
32 Graham Harman, “Undermining, Overmining, and Duomining: A Cri-
tique,” in ADD Metaphysics, ed. Jenna Sutela (Aalto: Aalto University Design 
Research Laboratory, 2013), 40–51.
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“reducing being in its utter contingency and creativity” to a set 
of fully formed objects? No, because I see no argument for the 
existence of any such thing as “being in its utter contingency 
and creativity,” and do not think Grant’s account of individuals 
as produced through the “retardation” of a primal productive 
force is a workable model. More than this, despite Grant’s argu-
ment against my reasoning in his “Mining Conditions,” I still 
see him as a champion of the One in the manner of Giordano 
Bruno, and am unaware of a way to get from that starting point 
to a theory that resembles anything like the world we know.33 
Before giving an exposition of Gratton’s main argument 
against me, it can be said that it goes wrong in three basic ways, 
two of them the result of his grossly exaggerating my similari-
ties with Plato, despite the far more obvious similarities between 
OOO and Aristotle. The first is his false claim that I consider time 
to be “illusory,” and the second is his ascription to me of a “two-
world theory” that I simply do not endorse. As for the first of 
these, Gratton says “If time is but the sensuous, it cannot touch 
the reality of the thing itself, and [Harman] himself notes there 
is no correspondence between the thing itself and its sensuous 
objecthood or qualities. Time would be, in the strictest sense, 
‘illusory’” (99, italics added). I have italicized “no correspond-
ence” because it does not mean the same thing as “no connec-
tion.” True enough, I do not uphold a correspondence theory 
of truth between sensual and real objects, because there is no 
identity of form between the two: as if the real object were sim-
ply the same thing as the sensual one but “inhering in matter,” or 
something else of that sort. At the heart of OOO is the idea that 
the real object undergoes translation into a sensual one, so that 
there is no isomorphy between the two; the form itself changes 
between one place and another. But this does not mean that the 
sensual interplay between object and qualities has no effect at all 
on reality. Unlike Plato, I have no theory of eternal forms. For 
me, forms can always be transmuted or utterly destroyed. More 
33 Giordano Bruno, Cause, Principle, and Unity, ed. and trans. Robert de Luc-
ca (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
126
skirmishes
importantly, real objects are only transformable or destructible 
by way of something that happens on the sensual level, which 
distinguishes this theory from Deleuze’s treatment of “sterile 
surface effects” atop a vibrant virtual realm where the real ac-
tion occurs. The real object does remain buried beneath the play 
of surfaces, but it remains perfectly vulnerable to happenings on 
the surface. A collision of cars, for example, can destroy the real 
cars, not just their appearances. By contrast, if Plato had ever 
allowed for the form of a car in his dialogues, he would have 
had to treat it as being just as indestructible as the others. Grat-
ton, who is overly committed to a Derridean notion of differ-
ence and more difference everywhere, sets an impossibly high 
bar for the avoidance of stasis. In this respect he bears some re-
semblance to Shaviro. It is not enough for either of them that my 
real objects are mortal and perishable. They demand in addition 
that these objects must not remain what they are for even the 
smallest fraction of an instant. Granted, in Shaviro’s case there 
is a Whiteheadian allowance for the momentary “privacy” of an 
individual, but for Gratton as for Derrida, any trace of identity 
whatsoever is a grave signal of “Platonism.” It is another case of 
the Game of Hurdles, a low hurdle for oneself to clear and an 
impossibly high hurdle for one’s opponent.
As for the second point, after quoting a passage from The 
Quadruple Object in which I explain that interaction only oc-
curs on the sensual level, Gratton writes as follows:
Pausing for [a] moment in this account, we are in danger of 
another Platonism. Recall that the vulgarized Plato posits 
a two-world theory — Harman argues that his is not “two 
worlds,” but “two faces” of objects — in which there was the 
world of becoming where time takes place, and an eternal 
realm in which the “form” of things is accessible only to 
thought. (102)
Gratton does go on to admit that I differ from Plato in certain 
respects, but none of them touch on the three major differences 
he elides in the passage above. First, there is no “eternal” realm 
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in OOO, and this is a difficult barrier indeed to any attempt to 
characterize it as Platonism. Second, I do not hold that the 
“form” of things is accessible only to thought, a point on which I 
explicitly criticize Husserl, given my view that both thought and 
sensation belong to one and the same sensual level. Third and 
finally, the phrase “Harman argues” implies that I make some 
sort of hair-splitting verbal distinction to distance myself from 
Plato. But the difference is perfectly obvious. There are not two 
worlds in OOO, but trillions of them. The interior of every object 
is a sensual world, or what Lingis calls a “level,” and there is no 
special, insuperable barrier between a unified world of forms 
and another of appearances.34 The OOO theory of real and sen-
sual is as different from Platonic doctrine as it is from Kant’s 
own two-world theory. The real and the sensual are everywhere 
intertwined, and the barriers between them are local and pro-
visional. This leads us to the heart of Gratton’s argument, which 
pertains to the supposed incoherence of the model of vicari-
ous causation. My general sense while reading along is that he 
makes my theory more complicated than it is, and that the sup-
posed errors he highlights are the result of his misreading how 
certain key terms are used. Let’s go through his argument and 
see what he gets right and what he gets wrong. There are some 
of both in his account.
For the most part, Gratton is right that I am closer to Husserl 
than to Levinas on time. We have seen that for Levinas, alterity 
gives us a real future of surprising otherness that is foreclosed 
by Heidegger’s theory of temporality (and I agree more with this 
critique of Heidegger than does Gratton himself). There is noth-
ing like alterity in Heideggerian temporality, and in Tool-Being 
I made an argument to this effect, to be reprised in a moment 
when Gratton tries to wield Heidegger against me. But it is true 
that The Quadruple Object, in treating time as a tension purely 
between sensual objects and sensual qualities, puts alterity to 
the side. This does make me closer to Husserl, insofar as no in-
34 Alphonso Lingis, “The Levels,” in The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998), 25–38.
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itself plays a role in either of our accounts of time — the differ-
ence being that Husserl does not accept even the existence of a 
withdrawn in-itself, while for me the in-itself does exist, though 
at a level submerged between the sensual-temporal play of sur-
faces. But immediately after linking me with Husserl, Gratton 
claims that I have nonetheless misread that philosopher’s theory 
of time: “for Husserl, there is no such thing in intentionality as a 
static entity,” he claims (98). At first it is unclear how to read this 
statement, since obviously there are static entities in Husserl; 
the adumbrations of an intentional object shift constantly, but if 
the object itself did not remain constant during this process, we 
would be back in the world of British Empiricism that Husserl 
refutes. Instead of a “static” apple remaining the same beneath 
its shifting sensory profiles, we would have a series of loosely 
related apple-manifestations. But I sense that this is not Grat-
ton’s central point. Instead, he immediately shifts to Husserl’s 
phenomenology of internal time-consciousness and says that 
“Harman, to his loss, makes little use of Husserl’s discussions of 
time, though they bear directly on the discussion of adumbra-
tions in all of Husserl’s texts”35 (98). Later in this chapter, I will 
consider what Husserl actually says about time. But it is hardly 
to the point when Gratton adds that time itself is needed for the 
construction of immanent objectivity, since without it we would 
have nothing but “a frozen moment attached to one adumbra-
tion or another” (98). Yes, but this is precisely how I define time: 
as the tension between an enduring (not eternal) immanent ob-
ject and its shifting adumbrations. It does not follow, as Grat-
ton seems to argue, that “time” is an overarching category that 
subsumes both the stable immanence of an object and its adum-
brations. My argument, rather, is that the experience of time is 
itself generated by this duality. For his part, Gratton wants to 
posit time as some sort of non-momentary force that makes the 
duality possible in the first place. But there is a genuine tension 
35 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. 




between objects and qualities in Husserl, and no reason to claim 
that change is more primordial than stasis in his work.
Drawing on my essay “The Road to Objects,” Gratton italiciz-
es a number of phrases in order to emphasize my purported but 
non-existent Platonism: for me “only the present exists,” “time 
does not exist because only the present exists,” “seem to feel,” ap-
parent endurance”36 (99). Yet he quotes enough from my essay 
that its meaning should be clear enough. The point is to strike 
a balance between our lived experience of time, the endurance 
of sensual objects within the flow of time we do experience, and 
the further endurance of real objects that are affected by shifting 
adumbrations even less than sensual objects are. What Gratton 
is really trying to do is argue against any possible identity of any-
thing over any stretch of time at all. But this is merely a prod-
uct of his own Derridean anti-identity agenda. Indeed, a typical 
Derridean accusation is not long in coming down the pipe: 
[Harman’s theory] is precisely what Heidegger and Derrida 
critique as the “metaphysics of presence” — the view that 
there is an eternal present beyond or behind the appearance 
of things, whether the forms in Plato, the cogito in Descartes, 
the transcendental ego in Husserl, or indeed, the non-mate-
rial, transcendental objects in Harman. (99)
This passage suffers from two small problems and two big ones. 
Small Problem 1: my real objects are not “transcendental” but 
closer to what he should have called “transcendent,” while 
keeping in mind that they do not transcend in some perfect, 
eternal world but just slightly beyond the temporal interplay of 
sensual objects and sensual qualities. Small Problem 2: OOO up-
holds neither eternal forms like Plato, nor an idealist cogito like 
Descartes, nor a transcendental ego like Husserl. Big Problem 
1: Gratton blurs the distinction between the relational and tem-
poral senses of “presence.” Big Problem 2: Gratton blurs the dis-
tinction between Heidegger’s and Derrida’s very different senses 
36 Graham Harman, “The Road to Objects,” continent 1, no. 3 (2011): 176.
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of the “metaphysics of presence.” Let’s ignore the small problems 
and turn immediately to the big ones.
Heidegger’s concept of the metaphysics of presence is best 
understood through his hundred-page critique of Husserl at the 
opening of his brilliant Marburg Lecture Course, History of the 
Concept of Time.37 The problem with “presence,” Heidegger tells 
us there, is that phenomenology ultimately thinks that whatever 
is real can be made present to consciousness. It is on this basis 
that Heidegger accuses Husserl — rightly — of missing out on 
the Seinsfrage, with its implication that being is what withdraws 
from any direct presence. It is the most basic of Heidegger’s 
characteristic insights, and one that will be linked with his name 
forever. In the context of OOO, this is incorporated explicitly into 
the notion of real objects, which cannot be made present to con-
sciousness or indeed to anything else whatsoever. When Grat-
ton claims that the metaphysics of presence means belief in “an 
eternal present beyond or behind the appearance of things,” he 
misses the point in a couple of ways. First, we have seen that 
there is nothing “eternal” in object-oriented philosophy, which 
is a thoroughly earthly theory of the creation, endurance, and 
destruction of individual things. Second, “beyond or behind the 
appearance of things” is a phrase that refers not to the metaphys-
ics of presence but to Heidegger’s remedy for it. Among other 
things, Being is not identical with appearance — that would be 
Husserl — but “beyond or behind it.”
Gratton has little choice but to agree with me on this point: 
there is no feasible sense in which we can say that Heidegger 
thinks everything must be present to the mind, unless one wish-
es to make the claim — as some Husserlians and even Wolfend-
ale do — that Heidegger’s Sein is really just another Husserlian 
“horizon,” still present to conscious thought as a tacit back-
ground rather than as something explicitly present.38 Yet I doubt 
37 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. The-
odore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).
38 One such case is Burt Hopkins, Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: 
The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993).
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Gratton would do this, given his own tendency to put Heidegger 
and Derrida on the same side against Husserl’s idealism. What 
makes the situation more perilous is that Gratton — like Derri-
da — blurs “present” in the sense of “presence before the mind” 
with the temporal sense of “present” as “a single instantaneous 
now.” If we assume that Gratton concedes my point that Heideg-
gerian Sein is not something that can be present to the mind, 
he can still shift equivocally to the second sense of time as a 
present instant. Here, he has backing from most mainstream 
readings of Heidegger, which treat the philosopher as an enemy 
of “isolated now-points.” Since Gratton has read Tool-Being, he 
knows that I reverse this usual understanding of the issue. As I 
have argued, the reason Heidegger opposes now-points is not 
because — in the manner of Bergson — he thinks of time as a 
continuous flux without isolated nows, but because he argues 
that even in any “now,” there is already a threefold structure of 
thrown projection. This structure is a hybrid mixture of the situ-
ation in which I find myself, the possibilities I project upon it, 
and the unification of these in a single moment, which, when 
confronted “authentically,” becomes the Augenblick or moment 
of vision. It is Bergson rather than Heidegger who argues that 
time is a continuum that cannot possibly be thought as com-
posed of isolated cinematic frames. Far from making a Bergso-
nian critique, Heidegger conceives of temporality in a way that 
can easily be confined to a single instant. In fact, this is the very 
critique made by Levinas when he says that Heidegger’s future 
is just a “future of the now,” one that must be complemented by 
the radical future of surprising alterity.
In a word, Heidegger has much in common with the oc-
casionalist tradition of time as a series of vanishing instants, 
whereas this is the polar opposite of Bergson. Gratton’s depic-
tion is different. He claims — rightly — that Heidegger was op-
posed to “vulgar clock-time” and also holds — wrongly — that 
this opposition is eventually consummated in the move from 
the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein to the Temporalität of being itself, as 
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in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology39 (100). While main-
stream enough, this view is incorrect. Dasein’s temporality is 
only comparable to vulgar clock-time in what Heidegger calls 
the mode of inauthentic everydayness. And even there, the 
structure of thrown projection is already visible, meaning that 
Dasein in any instant already finds itself in a situation and pro-
jects possibilities upon it. Awareness of this is heightened in the 
authentic moments Heidegger calls “anticipatory resoluteness,” 
and we need no supposed transition to the Temporalität of Be-
ing. This is just Gratton’s back-door way of claiming that Hei-
degger joins Derrida in a joint rejection of any present instant of 
time, though this merely reflects Derrida’s own obsession with 
getting rid of anything like identity. In Heidegger’s own phi-
losophy there is no hostility to the present instant, but simply 
a brilliant analysis of how any present moment is already more 
textured and layered than we realize. The fact that he calls cer-
tain dimensions of a moment “past” and “future” has nothing to 
do with any view of time as a continuous and non-identical flux, 
though admittedly most readers of Being and Time do jump to 
that conclusion. When Gratton asserts that “Heidegger argues 
for the reality of time implicit and prior to any correlation of 
Dasein and Sein, humans and world; it is the condition of pos-
sibility for our ‘thrownness’ towards the future itself ” (99–100), 
this is simply another instance of the mistake seen above, when 
he claimed that time must be prior to Husserl’s distinction be-
tween enduring intentional objects and their adumbrations. 
Time in Heidegger is not some disembodied condition of pos-
sibility for the thrown projection of Dasein, but first emerges 
from this structure itself. The great German thinker never really 
gets beyond this brilliant analysis to account for what we might 
call the “flow” of time.
As mentioned, Gratton also blurs the line between Heidegger 
and Derrida. We have seen that for Heidegger, the metaphysics 
of presence is avoided primarily through the withdrawal of Be-
39 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hof-
stadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
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ing from any presence to consciousness, a withdrawal that is not 
incompatible with the identity of Being. There is a further apei-
ronish tendency in Heidegger to allow only Being to withdraw, 
while individual beings tend to be stranded in the realm of pres-
ence. The partial exceptions we find in works like “The Thing” 
remain only partial because Dasein always stays on the scene as 
the user of jugs and temples, and thus we never really catch sight 
of object–object relations with no Dasein in the vicinity (this is 
Heidegger’s strong correlationist side).40 In Tool-Being I tried to 
show how a theory of individuals can be drawn from Heidegger, 
despite his likely reluctance to go along with it were he alive 
today. But more importantly, withdrawal of an identical Being 
is unacceptable to Derrida, because he thinks the rejection of 
presence must also extend to cases of “self-presence.” By this he 
means what we usually call “identity,” since “the thing itself is a 
collection of things or a chain of differences” or “an economic 
concept designating the production of differing/deferring.”41 
This is why difference is an important positive resource for Der-
rida in a way that identity simply is not, whereas for Heidegger 
both concepts are very much still in play.42 Yet it must be asked 
by what right Derrida — and with him, Gratton — redefines 
identity as “self-presence,” thereby automatically exposing it to 
the blows that he and Heidegger direct against the metaphys-
ics of presence. The most flagrant case of this sort comes when 
Derrida praises, without evidence, “Heidegger’s insistence on 
noting that being is produced as history only through the logos, 
and is nothing outside of it.”43 But this is his own agenda, not 
Heidegger’s, and it will not do to invent — as Gratton does — a 
40 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Al-
bert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Martin Heidegger, “In-
sight into That Which Is,” in Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight into 
That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).
41 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 90.
42 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002).
43 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 22. Italics added.
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doctrine that falsely places time prior to its actual emergence 
from either the duel between an intentional object and its ad-
umbrations (Husserl) or Dasein’s thrownness into a situation 
and its projection of possibilities upon it (Heidegger). Such a 
dogma derives solely from an anti-identity research program 
that today is still a hip academic position, though it lacks philo-
sophical grounding and impoverishes our ability to explore the 
workings of time, since it decides them by fiat in advance.
There are only a few more points to consider in Gratton’s 
reading of my theory. After misreading OOO space as being “in-
side” an object, he adds the Derridean warning that “we should 
be wary of the metaphor of ‘inside’” (100), and claims that I 
am unable to think the space between different objects. But my 
theory of space inteprets it as the tension between real objects 
and sensual qualities, and Gratton forgets that this a case of “fu-
sion,” meaning that the real object has no sensual qualities un-
til it receives them in cases of allure. Strictly speaking, the only 
thing that exists inside an object for me is the interplay of sen-
sual objects and sensual qualities, though there are also the real 
qualities that belong (as OOO learned from Husserl) to a sensual 
object as its eidos. The real object plays no role except as an ob-
server of all this, and that is why no real object can ever be said 
to exist inside another real one. More to the point, space is noth-
ing but the space between different objects. When allure builds 
a bridge to the real, it is a real that is not part of the current sen-
sual interior. Thus, the whole OOO theory of space — and of vi-
carious causation — is about how the inside of one object bonds 
with a different object, despite Gratton’s claim that it occurs only 
“inside” a single one. For this reason, he is also wrong to claim 
that “tensions are hidden or invisible” (100), since the aesthetic 
cases covered by allure are just one example of a highly visible 
tension. Among other things, this marks an absolute difference 
between metaphorical and literal language of the sort that Der-
rida forbids, given his disallowance of real objects (the core of 
all metaphor) in the first place. For similar reasons, Gratton is 
wrong to link OOO’s allure with Husserl’s eidetic variation, since 
the latter can occur within a purely sensual framework, which 
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is all Husserl has, after all, while allure, by definition, cannot. In 
OOO terminology, allure is RO–SQ and eidetic variation leads to 
SO–RQ, so that they actually have nothing in common. Later, we 
will see Wolfendale repeat this mistake.
This touches on Gratton’s further rejection of my claim that 
OOO can be understand in mereological (i.e., part/whole) terms. 
As he puts it, 
I’m skeptical there can be a mereology of objects in Harman, 
for the simple fact that objects (even great and smaller ones, 
even “parts” and wholes) only gets as far as the sensuous, that 
is, can’t be a part of anything. (What would it mean to think 
that a part that is not really, but only “sensuously” a part of 
something?) And if the “interior” of one object is the “sen-
suous” one of another — the obvious way out of this whole 
maze — then the “interior” is not in the depths but surfing 
along the surface, which means it was never interior in the 
first place. (106)
Here I appreciate Gratton’s efforts to work through the technical 
details of OOO, and I can see why he is puzzled. But the root of 
the problem is that he is reading “interior” in two different sens-
es while supposing that I am the confused party. It is certainly 
true that for me, an object is cut off not only from external ob-
jects but even from its own parts: which are themselves objects, 
after all, and thus are not exempted from the global problem of 
real object–real object interaction. An object has indirect rela-
tions with its own parts too, but these parts are real objects, not 
sensual ones, which Gratton rightly notes would be ridiculous. 
The real parts of an object do need sensual mediation in order to 
combine into the larger real object — real water is made of real 
hydrogen and real oxygen, but these atoms in turn make con-
tact only through sensual mediation. But the parts of an object 
are not “inside it”; remember, only sensual objects and sensual 
qualities — plus the real qualities of the sensual object’s own ei-
dos — are “inside” another object. The term “inside” does not 
pertain to the part/whole relationships that create a real object 
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in the first place. Ian Bogost expresses this nicely, in words cited 
by Gratton himself,
The thing that needs to be remembered here is that Harman’s 
sensual object only exists in the experience of another ob-
ject in the first place; it’s not some persistent abstraction. […] 
[W]e must remind ourselves that objects have different sens-
es of presence, both in themselves and in relation to other 
units. Time is on the inside of objects.44 (106) 
Gratton responds, “But this is not Harman’s model” (106). Yes, 
it is! Bogost knows my thinking well. Even so, Gratton sees an 
additional difficulty, “this [just] inverts the problem: if time is 
on the inside of an object, then the sensuous part would be for-
ever frozen in the present, which at least to this object that I am 
appears not to be the case — things in the world appear to be 
very much in motion and changing, which is generally taken to 
be an index of time” (106). I am not entirely sure that I under-
stand Gratton’s objection, but there is nothing “frozen” about 
the interior of an object, since it is precisely here that the ten-
sion between sensual object and sensual qualities occurs, and 
this — as Gratton knows — is the tension I call time. “Finally,” 
he tells us, “if time is only at the layer of the sensuous, even 
for its parts, there can be no change, since they are ‘ever in the 
present’– the true dictum of Harman’s view of objects” (106). 
But there can be change, because what happens on the interior 
of objects occasionally leads to allure, in which the interior of 
one real object makes contact with another real object external 
to it, and this is the root of change in my model. To draw an 
analogy from evolutionary theory, there is neither eternal stasis 
nor constant flux, but something closer to what Niles Eldredge 
and Stephen Jay Gould call “punctuated equilibrium.”45 Most of 
44 Ian Bogost, “Time, Relation, Ethics, Experience: Some Responses to the Al-
ien Phenomenology Reading Group,” July 4, 2012, http://bogost.com/blog/
time_relation_ethics_experienc/.
45 Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, “Punctuated Equilibria: An Alterna-
tive to Phyletic Gradualism,” in Models in Paleobiology, ed. Thomas J.M. 
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the sensual interplay between objects and qualities has no effect 
on the outside world at all, but once in a while: boom! On this 
basis, I reject Gratton’s conclusion that “object-oriented ontol-
ogy […] has hit an impasse” (106). He has not shown this by 
any means, and thus I reject his view that his own “realism of 
time” (202) is needed to escape the supposed but non-existent 
impasse of OOO.
One other issue is worth mentioning. Gratton claims in pass-
ing that my theory is simply arbitrary, no more justified than 
any other. After claiming that “each philosopher has a depiction 
of the absolute, or a method that begins with a given starting 
point” (100), he goes on to list a number of historical examples. 
It seems at first as if he were about to assert that all philosophi-
cal theories are equally right and wrong and there is no way to 
choose between them. But that is not what he does. Using the 
example of Levinas, he says that (unlike OOO) 
Levinas had a method, which was to take phenomenology 
to its limits, as he lays out in Totality and Infinity and Other-
wise than Being. [… A]t the least Levinas uses a well-known 
method to show where that method would fail, namely in 
trying to make the Other correlate back to the ego of tran-
scendental phenomenology. (101). 
Though he never quite says so, Gratton’s point seems to be that 
OOO has no method justifying its conclusions. Yet I do not see 
that Levinas is any more methodical than I am, even if Gratton 
prefers his philosophy to mine. As is clear from many publica-
tions, the OOO method is to interpret Heidegger’s tool-analysis, 
which I take to be the most insightful moment of twentieth-
century philosophy, and show that it cannot work on its own 
terms. Heidegger counters the presence-at-hand of entities with 
a ready-to-hand system of equipment, reading the former as 
falsely non-relational and the latter as the true relational root 
from which present-at-hand beings emerge. My method is to 
Scopf (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 82–115.
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show that this opposition cannot account for another key Hei-
degger insight: the broken tool. If an entity were purely relation-
al, then it would hold no surplus in reserve that would enable 
it to be out of joint with the tool-system in any way, let alone 
break. On this basis, I argue that the usual distinction readers 
draw from Heidegger — implicit practical dealings with things 
vs. explicit encounters with them — is superficial, since both 
must be read in relational terms. In order to account for the 
broken tool, we need a submerged entity that is never fully ex-
pressed in any of its practical or theoretical appearances and is 
ultimately unexpressed even in its brute causal relations with 
non-human things.
Although controversy has surrounded this reading from the 
start, it would be hard to argue that I have not even attempted 
to ground OOO by working through the failings of a well-known 
method — namely, Heidegger’s own. Gratton takes a more spe-
cific stab at claiming some arbitrariness in the theory, one that 
Wolfendale also attempts: how do we know that there is not just 
one object behind everything (101)? How do we know that there 
is not just one Platonic form (103)? Interesting questions, but it 
cannot be claimed that I have not tried to answer them. For ex-
ample, in my critique of James Ladyman and Don Ross, I offered 
an argument against their view that there is really just a single 
mathematical structure behind everything, while what we call 
“objects” are simply the correlate of the humans who try to come 
to grips with them scientifically, whether it be quarks, chemi-
cals, or even traffic jams.46 In the first place, Ladyman and Ross 
have to assume the existence of an observer who is sufficiently 
distinct from the underlying mathematical structure to be able 
to encounter derivative objects that are less real than their hy-
pothesized structure. So, their ontology already contains at least 
three terms: mathematical structure, apparent entities, and an 
observer who correlates with them. Why not just remain content 
46 Graham Harman, “I Am Also of the Opinion that Materialism Must Be 




with this situation, then? Because in that case we are left with a 
theory like that of Parmenides, in which reason tells us that eve-
rything is one, while the senses deceive us with apparent multi-
plicity. Deleuze improves considerably on this model by popu-
lating his “virtual” with varying intensities along a continuum, 
but in either case it is unclear why the primordial continuum 
should bother erupting into local appearances in the first place. 
If you say that this is merely an artifact of sensing or thinking 
subjects — as Shaviro and Bryant seem to do — it is still unclear 
why such subjects would ever emerge from the continuum. We 
can always be wrong about the specific links between sensual 
objects and their supposed substrata in real ones — that’s what 
fallibilism in science is all about. But there are no grounds for 
holding that multiplicity as such is a mere surface effect gener-
ated by a specific entity — the subject — whose very existence al-
ready proves a real multiplicity. Object to this argument all you 
like, but please stop pretending I have never made it.
Before his concluding remarks on his own philosophy, Grat-
ton sees fit to take a few more digs at Speculative Realism. For 
instance, “[Speculative Realism’s] turn to realism often means 
stomping at times inelegantly across subfields long covered in 
analytic philosophy” (201). There is much to celebrate in recent 
analytic metaphysics, and I look forward to more interaction 
between that tradition and ours. But on what grounds does 
Gratton claim that we are “stomping inelegantly” in our pro-
gress toward that goal? I do not recall him attempting to link 
OOO with analytic philosophy at all. His primary effort is to 
claim that Meillassoux was beaten to the punch two years in ad-
vance by Nolt, though we have seen that the latter is a straight-
forward scientific realist and Meillassoux is not. This argument 
is certainly not Gratton at his most “elegant.” It is also strange, 
to say the least, for a Derridean to call upon analytic philoso-
phers to beat up Speculative Realists as copycats; it would be 
an understatement to say that Derrida is not part of the canon 
of great thinkers recognized by analytic philosophy, so perhaps 
Gratton ought to have sided with us. Instead, he sends mixed 
messages about his own future intentions, saying in the same 
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sentence “such a movement as I call for here” and “we declare 
no new brands or movements here” (202). Brands, schmands. 
The reference to “brands” is just a decaffeinated version of the 
same insult — directed primarily at OOO — that we will see is 
cherished by Wolfendale and Brassier. Gratton accuses me of 
“dismissing” Heidegger just because I say he has “‘nothing to 
teach’ us about time” (202). But it would be hard to look at my 
career and characterize my attitude toward Heidegger as “dis-
missal,” and equally hard to claim there is anything contemp-
tuous about interpreting his theory of time as a theory of the 
collapsed threefold instant rather than one of time in the usual 
sense. Such sentiments are not limited to Gratton’s conclusion. 
Elsewhere, he sees fit to lecture Speculative Realism about prop-
er humility before the history of philosophy:
The speculative realists hold […] that there is something 
outdated about [Heidegger, Derrida, and Irigaray], trapped 
constantly spinning yarns about a tradition now being sur-
passed. […] But while I think Heidegger’s grip on the history 
of philosophy is a grip that almost strangles it, the insistence 
that movements are wholly new and the word “tradition” is 
a synonym for “naïve” leads me to speak up to point out the 
repetitions of a past we can’t easily escape. (202)
Since to my knowledge none of the original Speculative Real-
ists has written about Luce Irigaray, I am not sure why she was 
listed among the offended parties. More importantly, the pas-
sage above is a field filled with straw men. What Speculative 
Realist has ever referred to the “tradition” as “naïve”? Gratton 
well knows that I spent years of work developing my reading 
of Heidegger, that I constantly credit Aristotle and Leibniz as 
inspirations for my position, and always do my best to give his-
torical precedents for any idea I introduce. His insinuation that 
he is somehow more respectful of the “tradition” than OOO is an 
injustice not supported by even a cursory examination of our 
respective writings. Worse yet, it is a form of what magicians call 
“misdirection.” After all, Gratton does not really believe that the 
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Speculative Realists are disrespectful to “the tradition.” What 
bothers him is our collective lack of reverence for continental 
philosophy as it was up through the mid-1990s, in which Der-
rida ruled the roost. This was no doubt a world in which Grat-
ton would have felt more at home, and he is perfectly free to 
fight for its return using whatever arguments he can muster. Yet 
in doing so, he need not pretend that he is fighting for the “tradi-
tion” in some more general sense. What he champions is simply 
a further extension of the priorities of early 1990s Anglophone 
continental thought, which was as limited a period as any other, 
and one that simply left no room for either the “speculative” or 
“realist” aspects of Speculative Realism, as Gratton also knows. 
The issue is one to be settled on the intellectual battlefield, not 
by insinuations of arrogant disregard for precedent by those 
with whom he happens to disagree. After declaring his “humil-
ity” in the book’s final paragraph, Gratton expresses his humble 
sentiments by ending as follows: “This is my speculative gambit, 
and unlike speculative realists returning to a certain Platonism, 
time is on my side” (216). But the supposed Platonism has not 
been demonstrated, nor has a convincing case been made that 
“time is on his side,” except in a punning sense of the phrase.
The Role of Levinas
A good rule of thumb: whenever a Derridean links you with 
Levinas, you had best be on your guard. You may find your-
self dragged to the swamp and beaten by thugs driving a pickup 
truck with the words “Violence and Metaphysics” stenciled on 
the side.47 This is not to say that Derrida does nothing interest-
ing with Levinas, only that the latter has too often been treated 
in recent decades as if he were a wholly owned subsidiary of 
deconstruction. My view is different. I see Levinas as the more 
redoubtable figure in the long term, and as the post-war figure 
47 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), 79–158.
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who pushed Heidegger further than anyone else. To show why, 
we need to explore what Derrida misses in his often powerful 
critique.
I am not among those who consider Derrida a sophist or 
charlatan, a view found among many analytic philosophers and 
even some continentals. But yes, I do experience considerable 
frustration with his prose style, which even Gratton concedes 
can be “infuriating.”48 To see what I mean, one need only read 
the first sentence of his “Violence and Metaphysics,” which takes 
up sixteen lines of text and bears no resemblance to the ways 
that James Joyce or Marcel Proust make such outbursts work 
effectively.49 Above all, these lines are nowhere near the point 
of Derrida’s essay; as too often happens in his work, an argu-
ment meriting ten or so pages is encrusted with uncouth pir-
ouettes for dozens more. Thus I will be forgiven for not giving 
a blow-by-blow account of this piece, which contains too many 
passages like the following: “A community of the question, 
therefore, within that fragile moment when the question is not 
yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of an answer to have 
already initiated itself beneath the mask of the question, and 
not yet determined enough for its voice to have been already 
and fraudulently articulated within the very syntax of the ques-
tion” (VM 80). We are too quick to blame “Derrida’s second-rate 
imitators” for crimes against good prose, when the philosopher 
himself deserves significant blame. After reading seventy-three 
pages of this sort of river sludge, any commentator deserves an 
iced tea and a recliner.
Yet there is another sense in which Derrida’s prose has a style 
to which one grows perfectly well accustomed, one that does 
not hide the sheer emptiness that many of his foes imagine. 
In Guerrilla Metaphysics, I complained about his essay “White 
Mythology” that “as in many other cases [in Derrida], we find 
a hard-hitting ten-page core surrounded by an additional fifty 
48 Gratton, Speculative Realism, 215.
49 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 79. Subsequent page references are 
given between parentheses in the main text, preceded by vm.
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pages of highly mannered intellectual collage.”50 But I would say 
that “Violence and Metaphysics” is considerably less annoying 
than “White Mythology.” In the present case a more apt meta-
phor would be that of a foam mattress standing eight inches tall, 
but compressible — with some work — to its true height of two 
inches of material. In the essay now to be discussed, it only takes 
Derrida three pages to get to the point, and he then stays on top-
ic all the way to the end, though without being very economical 
in arriving there. 
In a sense, the whole point of “Violence and Metaphysics” 
can be grasped from its final words, drawn from Joyce’s Ulyss-
es, “Jewgreek is greekjew. Extremes meet.”51 After all, it would 
be perfectly fair to say that Levinas opposes Greek philosophy 
with the Judaic ethical and prophetic tradition, largely to the 
disadvantage of the former. Amidst a spirited defense of Hus-
serl, Heidegger, and the Western philosophical tradition against 
the Levinasian claim that they are “violent,” Derrida shows, 
among other things, that there is no simple way to read “vio-
lence” and “nonviolence” such that the first would belong to 
philosophy and the second to ethics or religion. This is what he 
means by “Jewgreek is greekjew.” Many of his points are good 
ones, though I will also say that Derrida misses something im-
portant in Levinas. Gratton’s presumed point in linking me with 
the notion of “alterity” is to imply that OOO becomes committed 
to the same impossible pure otherness that Derrida exposes in 
Levinas. This, I will show, is not quite right.
Derrida begins by setting the parameters for his analysis of 
Levinas, whose work he clearly knows well: “The entirety of phi-
losophy is conceived on the basis of its Greek source. As is well 
known, this amounts neither to an occidentalism, nor to a his-
toricism. It is simply that the founding concepts of philosophy 
50 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of 
Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 111; Jacques Derrida, “White Mythol-
ogy: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 207–71.




are primarily Greek” (VM 81). He will soon make the important 
point that Levinas himself is also a philosopher working within 
the Greek tradition, not some sort of Jewish mystic: “In the last 
analysis, [Levinas’ work] never bases its authority on Hebraic 
theses or texts. It seeks to be understood from within a recourse 
to experience itself” (VM 83). In other words, Levinas is primar-
ily a phenomenologist, despite his religious-sounding way of 
turning against this tradition. Nonetheless, “the category of 
the ethical is not only dissociated from metaphysics but coor-
dinated with something other than itself, a previous and more 
radical function” (VM 81). And indeed, “it is at this level that the 
thought of Emmanuel Levinas can make us tremble” (VM 82). 
Despite its phenomenological underpinnings Levinas’s thinking 
“seeks to liberate itself from the Greek domination of the Same 
and the One […] as if from oppression itself — an oppression 
certainly comparable to none other in the world, an ontologi-
cal or transcendental oppression, but also the origin or alibi of 
all oppression in the world” (VM 83). And further, “this thought 
calls upon the ethical relationship — a nonviolent relationship 
to the infinite as infinitely other, to the Other — as the only one 
capable of opening the space of transcendence and of liberating 
metaphysics” (VM 83). As for Derrida’s own stance on these mat-
ters, he claims a certain neutrality: “We will not choose between 
the opening and the totality” (VM 84). While this is arguably true 
of Derrida’s career as a whole, it is fair to say that his “Violence 
and Metaphysics” falls more on the side of Greek philosophy 
than on that of the ethical opening proposed by Levinas, who 
comes off primarily as an unfair critic of Husserl and Heidegger. 
Bear in mind that this is also what Gratton wants to say about 
OOO — that it unfairly critiques Husserl and Heidegger despite 
taking these figures as its basis.
The first signs of Derrida’s preference for phenomenology 
now begin to appear: “it is difficult to overlook the fact that 
Husserl so little predetermined Being as an object that in Ide-
as I absolute existence is accorded only to consciousness” (VM 
85), though he nearly concedes that Levinas has a point about 
Husserl’s confinement to the subject–object correlate. Derrida 
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is far from accusing him of being a sloppy interpreter of phe-
nomenology, since “Levinas is certainly quite attentive to eve-
rything in Husserl’s analyses which tempers or complicates the 
primordiality of consciousness” (VM 86). Nonetheless, “despite 
all these precautions, despite a constant oscillation between the 
letter and the spirit of Husserlianism […], a break not to be re-
considered is signified” (VM 86). Namely, in Levinas’s eyes, “one 
cannot simultaneously maintain the primacy of the objectifying 
act and the irreducible originality of nontheoretical conscious-
ness” (VM 86). This seems to push Levinas more in the direction 
of Heidegger, with his greater awareness of pre-theoretical com-
portment and the historical situatedness of Dasein, far from any 
theoretical mastery. But the same charge Levinas makes against 
Husserl will also be made against Heidegger, “and made with 
a violence that will not cease to grow” (VM 88). Despite Hei-
degger’s apparent overcoming of the Western priority of theory 
and light, “Heidegger still would have questioned and reduced 
theoretism from within, and in the name of, the Greco-Platonic 
tradition” (VM 88). One example is his concept of Mitsein, be-
ing-with. This might look at first like an anticipatory Levinasian 
moment in Being and Time, but “the structure of Mitsein itself 
will be interpreted [by Levinas] as a Platonic inheritance, be-
longing to the world of light” (VM 89). By contrast with this, 
Levinas seeks “only the other, the totally other, [which] can be 
manifested as what it is before the shared truth, within a certain 
nonmanifestation and a certain absence” (VM 91). For, “incapa-
ble of respecting the Being and meaning of the other, phenom-
enology and [Heideggerian] ontology would be philosophies of 
violence” (VM 91).
The only possible escape from this situation is an encounter 
with the absolutely other, that textbook Levinasian theme: “there 
is no way to conceptualize [this] encounter: it is made possible 
by the other, the unforeseeable, ‘resistant to all categories.’ […] 
The infinitely other cannot be bound by a concept, cannot be 
thought on the basis of a horizon; for a horizon is always the ho-
rizon of the same, the elementary unity within which eruptions 
and surprises are always welcomed by understanding and recog-
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nized” (VM 95). This is why for Levinas ethics is first philosophy, 
and he also speaks of metaphysics in opposition to ontology. Yet 
Derrida is suspicious as to whether Levinas really escapes total-
ity in this way: “Levinas is very close to Hegel […] at the very 
moment when he is apparently opposed to Hegel in the most 
radical fashion. This is a situation he must share with all anti-
Hegelian thinkers” (VM 99; italics added). The Hegelian path, of 
course, would be to say that the other is the negation of the same, 
thereby drawing it into a dialectical process, with the accessible 
always recuperating the inaccessible in the manner of Meillas-
soux’s correlational circle. After all, the infinitely other does ap-
pear in the form of a face. And “Levinas also often says kath’auto 
and ‘substance’ in speaking of the other as face. The face is pres-
ence, ousia” (VM 101). And furthermore, “for the Other not to 
be overlooked, He must present himself as absence, and must 
appear as nonphenomenal” (VM 103). A nonphenomenality that 
appears is not the only paradox in play, since the Other is simul-
taneously both the only being I can wish to murder and the one 
I am forbidden to murder (VM 104). This leads to the surpris-
ing realization that “asymmetry, non-light, and commandment 
then would be violence and injustice themselves” (VM 106), even 
though “infinity [… supposedly] cannot be violent as totality is” 
(VM 107). Similarly, God is both the infinity that speaks against 
war and the very possibility of the offending otherness that sum-
mons us to war. “God, therefore, is implicated in war,” but as 
linked with ethical infinity He is its opposite, so that “war [both] 
supposes and excludes God” (VM 107). And speaking of God, 
since He hides his face from Moses in Exodus 33, it is “at once 
more and less a face than other faces” (VM 108).
A related paradox is that Levinasian ethics is beyond any eth-
ics in the sense of a specific set of rules: “Ethics, in Levinas’ sense, 
is an Ethics without law and without concept, which maintains 
its non-violent purity only before being determined as concepts 
and laws [… I]t is perhaps serious that this Ethics of Ethics can 
occasion neither a determined ethics nor determined laws with-
out negating and forgetting itself ” (VM 111). Levinas thus finds 
himself trapped in “the necessity of lodging oneself within tra-
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ditional conceptuality in order to destroy it” (VM 111). Even as 
he claims that “true” exteriority is not spatial, he is nonetheless 
forced to have recourse to the spatial sense of the term (VM 112). 
Anticipating one of OOO’s own criticisms, Derrida notes that de-
spite the infinite taking shape in the face, “the infinitely Other 
would not be what it is, other, if it was a positive infinity, and if it 
did not maintain within itself the negativity of the indefinite, of 
the apeiron” (VM 114). There is a related problem with language, 
for although Levinas is faced with the “problems [of speaking 
positively] which were equally the problems of negative theol-
ogy and [intuition-based] Bergsonism, he does not give himself 
the right to speak, as they did, in a language resigned to its own 
failure” VM (116). Namely, both negative theology and Bergson 
permit themselves “to travel through philosophical discourse as 
through a foreign medium” (VM 116), but Levinas cannot do this 
because of his view that “only discourse (and not intuitive con-
tact) is righteous” (VM 116), even though discourse is also the 
very possibility of violence. Finally, the same fate befalls history; 
for Levinas “history [is] the very movement of transcendence, 
of the excess over the totality without which no totality would 
appear as such,” but at the same time, “history is violence.” Thus, 
Levinasian metaphysics is itself “violence against violence, light 
against light” (VM 117).
Derrida follows up with a lengthy defense of Husserl, a de-
fense relevant to us here because OOO mostly takes Levinas’s 
side against the founder of phenomenology. First there is the 
familiar critique that “[Levinasian] metaphysics […] always 
supposes a phenomenology in its very critique of phenomenol-
ogy” (VM 118). Whereas Levinas accuses intentionality of being 
governed by the model of adequation between thought and ob-
ject, Derrida claims that Husserl was already beyond this, “by 
demonstrating the irreducibility of intentional incompleteness, 
and therefore of alterity” (VM 120). He asks rhetorically whether 
there is “a more rigorously and, especially, a more literally Hus-
serlian theme than the theme of inadequation” (VM 120)? An-
other rhetorical question follows, when Derrida asks “whether 
Husserl finally summarized inadequation, and reduced the infi-
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nite horizons of experience to the condition of available objects” 
(VM 120). Like contemporary Husserlians when they challenge 
Heidegger’s supposed step beyond his teacher, Derrida seems 
to think the “horizon” in phenomenology is already enough 
to overflow totality: “The horizon itself cannot become an ob-
ject because it is the unobjectifiable wellspring of every object 
in general. […] The importance of the concept of horizon lies 
precisely in its ability to make any constitutive act into an ob-
ject, and in that it opens the work of objectification to infinity” 
(VM 120). This is enough, Derrida holds, to show that Husserl 
respected infinity and exteriority perfectly well. Indeed, “phe-
nomenology is respect itself, the developing and becoming-
language of respect itself ” (VM 121). In this sense, phenomenol-
ogy is ethics, however phenomenal it remains, since “ethics […] 
must have a meaning for concrete consciousness in general, or 
no discourse and no thought would be possible” (VM 121–22). 
Against Levinas’s complaint that in the Cartesian Meditations 
Husserl only allows the other to be an alter ego, another me, 
Derrida states bluntly that “this is exactly what Husserl does 
not do” (VM 125). And anyway, the only means to avoid violence 
is to see the other as an ego; this is “the most peaceful gesture 
possible” (VM 128). Even God “has meaning only for an ego in 
general. Which means that before all atheism or all faith, before 
all theology, before all language about God or with God, God’s 
divinity (the infinite alterity of the infinite other, for example) 
must have a meaning for an ego in general” (VM 132).
From here Derrida turns to a similar defense of Heidegger, 
who is also criticized by Levinas despite his evidently greater 
departure from totality thanks to his ever-withdrawn Sein: “If 
the meaning of Being always has been determined by presence, 
then the question of Being, posed on the basis of the transcen-
dental horizon of time […] is the first tremor of philosophical 
security, as it is of self-confident presence” (VM 134). Nonethe-
less, Levinas is quoted as accusing Heidegger of subordinating 
the relation to the other to the ontological difference between a 
being and its being (VM 135). Derrida defends Heidegger from 
this charge in two different ways. The first is to deny that Being 
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“precedes” beings in the ontological difference: “Being, since it 
is nothing outside the existent […] could in no way precede the 
existent, whether in time, or in dignity, etc. […] Being is not 
a principle, is not a principial existent, an archia which would 
permit Levinas to insert the face of a faceless tyrant under the 
name of Being” (VM 136). This eventually leads Derrida to one 
of my least favorite Derridean themes, the misleading claim that 
“since Being is nothing (determinate), it is necessarily produced 
in difference (as difference)” (VM 150). The other way he defends 
Heidegger from Levinas is by invoking the classic late Heideg-
gerian theme of sein lassen or “letting-be.” Letting-be turns out 
to be the condition of possibility for ethics itself, since without 
it, “violence would reign to such a degree that it would no longer 
even be able to appear and to be named” (VM 138). Thus, Levi-
nas cannot be right that anyone’s relation with a person could 
be “dominated” by Being (VM 139). While Levinas holds that all 
violence is a violence of the concept, Heidegger bans from the 
outset any notion that Being is equivalent to the concept of Be-
ing. As for Levinas’s beloved Greek phrase epekeina tēs ousias, 
referring to the Platonic Good beyond Being, Derrida does not 
interpret this epekeina as beyond Heidegger’s Being, but rather 
as “beyond ontic history,” which pertains only to specific beings 
(VM 141–42). In defending Heidegger’s ontological difference 
from Levinas’s critique, Derrida makes the somewhat alarm-
ing statement that “the difference between the implicit and the 
explicit is the entirety of thought” (VM 142), a statement less 
harmless than it looks, since it implies — like hermeneutics it-
self — that thought is primarily about what is implicit or explicit 
for humans. Another alarming moment comes when Derrida 
tries to affirm that Heidegger is beyond Levinas’s critique inso-
far as he already beyond all “humanism” (VM 143). But just as 
Hegelians like to attack “subjectivism” to distract readers from 
their own idealism, Heideggerians attack “humanism” in order 
to distract us from their own inability to think relations not in-
volving humans — and please do not tell me that Dasein is not 
human. Derrida is another such Heideggerian, though at bot-
tom he is really more of a Husserlian.
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So goes the most influential interpretation of Levinas ever 
written, so influential that in certain quarters Levinas has never 
recovered. Although “Violence and Metaphysics” surpasses its 
self-imposed stylistic burdens to become yet another intelligent 
reading by Derrida of a contemporary, we should not overlook 
the narrowness of his concerns. For as we will see shortly, there 
are actually three central themes in Levinasian philosophy, of 
which ethics and its non-totalizable infinity is merely the most 
famous. The second, barely mentioned by Derrida, is the enjoy-
ment that occurs on the hither side of being, which always deals 
with specific things even as it bathes in an amorphous “elemen-
tal” realm. Derrida could and should have paid more attention 
to this aspect of Levinas. The same may not be true of the third 
aspect of Levinas, since perhaps only Alphonso Lingis has paid 
it sufficient attention: the Levinasian philosophy of individual 
substance.52 We will see that Levinas sometimes verges on aban-
doning this theory, ascribing the inexhaustible depth of things 
to their “matter” alone. But eventually he is unable to escape 
substantiality, though this is not an issue Derrida can touch, 
given his obsession with the idea that nothing is produced ex-
cept as difference. Substance, after all, is always a positive term 
its own right, not something primarily differential or relational. 
But let’s return briefly to the one aspect of Levinas that Derrida 
does discuss: metaphysics, infinity, ethics, non-violence. What 
does Derrida give us here, if anything? I would say that he gives 
us little more than a return to the old correlational circle; the 
inapparent must somehow appear, and therefore alterity fails to 
be a pure alterity, since it must always have a face. Let’s return 
to this issue later, since I first need to counter Gratton’s suspi-
ciously Derridean link between OOO and alterity by showing 
that otherness is just one part of my interpretation of Levinas.
If memory serves, there are four places where I have written 
extensively about Levinas, all of them more than a decade old. 
It had been years since I reread any of them, and the greatest 
pleasure of responding to Gratton’s book was the spur it pro-
52 Lingis, “A Phenomenology of Substances.”
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vided to revisiting my earlier thoughts on this crucial French 
thinker. The first passage is §21 of Tool-Being, “Contributions 
of Levinas” (2002).53 The second is the whole of chapter 3 of 
Guerrilla Metaphysics, entitled “Bathing in the Ether” (2005). 
The third is an article published in the British cultural magazine 
Naked Punch, entitled “Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas 
and the Non-Human,” which focused on Otherwise Than Be-
ing (2007).54 The fourth is my article on Totality and Infinity, 
published in Philosophy Today under the title “Levinas and the 
Triple Critique of Heidegger” (2009). In its original form, this 
article was delivered as a 2006 conference paper in Sofia, Bul-
garia under the title “Bread, Tobacco, and Silk: Levinas on Indi-
vidual Substance.”55 Let’s revisit these publications briefly, so as 
to contrast the main points of my own interest in Levinas with 
Derrida’s and Gratton’s.
The pages on Levinas from Tool-Being make it immediately 
clear that they are not very concerned with otherness: “Most 
discussions of Levinasian philosophy quickly zero in on his no-
tion of ‘the Other’; it is here that both his friends and his en-
emies reach a final verdict as to his legacy. But for the moment, I 
ask readers to forget all of the ongoing disputes over ‘alterity’.”56 I 
suggest there instead that we focus on the reading of Heidegger 
found in Levinas’s important early works Existence and Existents 
and Time and the Other, the first of them written in a prisoner 
of war camp near Hannover during World War II. The phrase 
“existence and existents” is the Levinasian way of writing “being 
and beings,” Heidegger’s famous ontological difference. As Levi-
nas puts it, “Heidegger distinguishes subjects and objects — the 
beings that are, existents — from their very work of being […] 
53 Harman, Tool-Being, 235–43.
54 Graham Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-
Human,” Naked Punch 9 (Summer/Fall 2007): 21–30.
55 Graham Harman, “Levinas and the Triple Critique of Heidegger,” Philoso-
phy Today 53, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 407–13. The fascinating conference in 
Sofia, Bulgaria, entitled “Levinas’ Metaphysics: Right of the Other,” was held 
on October 27, 2006.
56 Harman, Tool-Being, 235.
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The most profound thing about Being and Time for me is this 
Heideggerian distinction.”57 And further, “a thing is always a 
volume whose exterior surfaces hold back a depth and make it 
appear.”58 Against Gratton’s constant refrain that time must be 
presupposed for any analysis of specific beings to be possible, 
in Tool-Being I agree with Levinas that the opposite is the case. 
As that great master puts it, in one of his finest passages, “Is [the 
relation of being and beings] not rather accomplished by the 
very stance of an instant? […] An instant is not one lump; it is 
articulated” (EE 17–18). Here I wonder why Gratton does not ex-
plicitly address this point. Instead, he immediately changes the 
subject to alterity, which I openly downplay as an issue of much 
importance to my work. According to my reading of Levinas, 
he acknowledges Heidegger’s analysis of the articulated single 
instant; only then does he break free of it by recourse to Bergson 
and the surprises of novelty, and eventually through an appeal 
to alterity itself. But I also cite an important difference between 
Heidegger and Levinas in their respective views of the ontologi-
cal difference: “while Heidegger situates this duel [of a being 
and its work of existing] between being and beings […] Levinas 
says that beings are the between. The philosophical implications 
of this delicate shift are enormous […] The famous ontological 
Zwischen [between] now occurs within the things rather than 
above or beneath them; the difference between almonds and 
rivers is no longer simply ‘ontic’.”59 I add later that “[Heideggeri-
ans] remain so fixated on the step beyond present-at-hand enti-
ties […] that they assume that entities can be interpreted in no 
other way than ontically [… But] the reality of objects does not 
unfold in some sort of ontic junkyard.”60 In fact, despite Levi-
nas’s step beyond Heidegger in elevating the status of specific 
beings, there is a sense in which he continues to dismiss them 
as “ontic” too. As discussed in Tool-Being, the Levinas of Exist-
57 Levinas, Time and the Other, 44–45.
58 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 47.




ence and Existents is too devoted to the notion of a formless il 
y a or “there is,” encountered in insomnia just as Heidegger’s 
formless Being is said to be met with in Angst. For Levinas, it is 
only through a hypostasis performed by the human mind that 
individual beings first take form.61 Nonetheless, individuals play 
a central role for Levinas in a way they normally do not for Hei-
degger. As Levinas says, “We breathe for the sake of breathing, 
eat and drink for the sake of eating and drinking, we take shelter 
for the sake of taking shelter, we study to satisfy our curiosity, we 
take a walk for the walk. All that is not for the sake of living; it is 
living. Life is a sincerity.”62 In chapter 7 below we will encounter 
Dan Zahavi’s mockery of the term “sincerity,” which suggests a 
surprising lack of familiarity on his part with the importance of 
this term for Levinas. At the moment we are more concerned 
with Gratton, who fails to mention any of these central aspects 
of my interpretation. His apparent goal, as suggested earlier, is 
simply to maneuver me into the usual Derridean Kill Box for 
Levinasians that is set up by “Violence and Metaphysics.” 
In Guerrilla Metaphysics, I am once again not concerned with 
Levinas as a thinker of “alterity,” and thus escape the Derridean 
death zone once more. Levinas, like Merleau-Ponty and Lingis, 
is treated instead as a “carnal phenomenologist” concerned with 
“the translucent mist of qualities and signals in which our lives 
are stationed.”63 Here I openly assert that phenomenology still 
has much to teach us, though we will see that Zahavi is in such a 
rush to deny that I know what phenomenology is about that he 
never pauses long enough to see that we agree. I cite Levinas as 
saying that “I eat bread, listen to music, follow the course of my 
ideas.”64 But I also defend Husserl against Levinas in one impor-
tant respect. Levinas holds that “the thesis that every intention-
ality is either a representation or founded on a representation or 
is founded on a representation dominates the [Logical Investiga-
61 Ibid., 239–40.
62 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 44.
63 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 34.
64 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Al-
phonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 122.
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tions] and returns as an obsession in all of Husserl’s subsequent 
work.”65 We have seen that this is a half-truth, and that it applies 
more to Brentano than to Husserl; in the fifth of the Logical In-
vestigations, Husserl makes it perfectly clear that he views inten-
tionality as primarily object-giving rather than representational, 
due to the rift he discerns between the intentional object and 
its adumbrations. In this respect, Levinas is wrong to say that 
Husserlian intentionality is merely a luminous presence of the 
given. For Husserl, it takes a great deal of phenomenological 
labor to perform the eidetic reduction that gives us the object 
in its own right, rather than the object as encrusted with super-
fluous sensory detail.66 But Levinas misses this side of Husserl, 
and sees an escape route only in an immediate turn to alterity 
in the form of passivity: “to assume exteriority is to enter into 
a relation in which the same determines the other while [also] 
being determined by it.”67 Such passivity is not enough as long as 
the Other is treated as a place foreign to all individuality (as in 
the Levinasian il y a and his formless alterity), instead of allow-
ing it a home in advance. Much like Gratton and Sallis, Levinas 
sometimes equivocates between an alterity beyond experience 
and a medium within it, their common feature being that nei-
ther is made up of specific things: “In enjoyment the things are 
not absorbed in the technical finality that organizes them into a 
system.”68 Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that enjoyment 
is beyond and alterity is on the hither side; the first is on the 
near side of being while the latter is beyond it. But true enough, 
Levinas sometimes mixes these two registers: “In enjoyment, 
the things revert to their elemental qualities [… O]ne is steeped 
in it; I am always within the element [… T]he adequate relation 
with the element is always bathing [… A]s though we were in 
the bowels of being.”69 Yet for Levinas the bowels of being must 
surely be found in alterity, while enjoyment takes place not in its 
65 Ibid., 122.
66 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 34–35.
67 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 128. Punctuation and italics modified.
68 Ibid., 130.
69 Ibid., 134, 131, 132 (italics modified), 132.
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bowels but on its outermost layer. These are two completely dif-
ferent places — I certainly do not “enjoy” the Other in the sense 
of immediate bathing. The only point in common between the 
beyond and the hither side of being is that together these di-
mensions sandwich the Heideggerian tool-system. As Levinas 
writes, “The element has no forms containing it; it is content 
without form […] The pure quality of the element does not cling 
to a substance that would support it […] Quality manifests itself 
in the element as determining nothing.”70 It follows that whether 
we enjoy bread, cigarettes, or something else entirely, the role of 
the element in both cases is the same. It is a flowing liquid, so 
that there is no elemental bread or elemental cigarette, but sim-
ply a disembodied element that flows on the hither side of both.
There are other passages where Levinas seems to register the 
opposite intuition: “in fact the sensible quality already clings to a 
substance. And we shall have to analyze further the signification 
of the sensible object qua thing.”71 It is a contradiction he never 
quite resolves, given his tendency to distinguish — more sharply 
than Husserl — between an elemental sensibility on one side 
and a praxis and thought that carve up the element — and the il 
y a and “mythical” realm of alterity — into pieces on the other. 
It is here that I depart from the Levinasian element by calling it 
“black noise,” by analogy with the cybernetic term “black boxes,” 
since the supposedly shapeless element is really made of objecti-
fied units that come into focus as soon as we pay attention to 
them. Even the wind and waves have definite contours if we take 
care to notice, and are not some sort of sensible apeiron. But 
neither is the realm beyond being just an ethical apeiron, a view 
Levinas unfortunately seems to hold when, replacing the il y a 
of the early works with the “mythical” in Totality and Infinity, he 
tells us that the mythical is “an existence without existents, the 
impersonal par excellence.”72 In OOO terms, Levinas undermines 
at two different levels, that of alterity and that of the element. He 





makes this point easy for us when he openly admits it: “the ele-
ment extends into the il y a.”73 This line of thought concludes in 
Levinas’s passage about the Kantian Ding an sich, which is sim-
ply a projection of his own anti-realist side onto Kant himself: 
“in postulating things in themselves so as to avoid the absurdity 
of apparitions without there being anything that appears, Kant 
does indeed go beyond the phenomenology of the sensible. But 
at least he does recognize thereby that of itself the sensible is an 
apparition without there being anything that appears.”74 In clos-
ing, I suggest that this disallowance of real individual objects 
leads Levinas in the wrong direction when it comes to aesthetic 
phenomena. In his own words: “The aesthetic orientation man 
gives to the whole of his world represents a return to enjoyment 
and to the elemental on a higher plane. The world of things calls 
for art, in which intellectual accession to being moves into enjoy-
ment, in which the Infinity of the idea is idolized in the finite, but 
sufficient, image.”75 But this movement from the idea to the aes-
thetic is not the same thing as the one from the objective to the 
non-objective, as Levinas wrongly holds. Just as every enjoyment 
is a specific enjoyment, every artwork has a specific effect, and is 
neither an ethical nor a sensible apeiron. Here again we see that 
Gratton misses my rejection of the formlessness of Levinasian 
alterity, which is so reminiscent of Kant’s own formless sublime.
In “Aesthetics as First Philosophy” I lay out my full critique of 
Levinas, which treats him as overcoming the oppressive “total-
ity” of things not through the sole avenue of “alterity,” as Grat-
ton wrongly implies. Instead, there is a threefold overcoming, 
of which alterity is only one of the folds. We have seen that the 
second occurs through the elemental, which Levinas mistreats 
as formless in the same way he mistreats alterity. The third way, 
whose recognition I owe to Lingis, is through the treatment of 
entities as individual substances. As I put it in my 2007 article, 
“What best resists the sleek power struggle of totality is the iden-
73 Ibid., 142. Translation modified.




tity of individual things. The world is filled with concrete re-
alities never fully grasped by any handling, bathing, or biting.”76 
Hence my claim that, contra Levinas, “ethics cannot be first 
philosophy”77 Instead, aesthetics is first philosophy. Totality, be-
ing, and war are different names Levinas gives to the oppressive 
system of being that — like Heidegger when crusading against 
the “ontic” — he too often identifies with the realm of specific 
beings. These three terms are interchangeable for Levinas, but 
cannot be taken in their literal meaning. To give just one exam-
ple, what Levinas means by “war” is not the opposite of “peace.” 
As he tells us, “rational peace […] is calculation, mediation, and 
politics. The struggle of each against all becomes […] reciprocal 
determination and limitation, like that of matter.”78 In this re-
spect, Derrida’s supposedly liberating claim that “the thing itself 
is a collection of things or a chain of differences” is really just 
a reprisal of the Levinasian model of war, despite the typically 
ineffectual Derridean proviso that “in this play of representa-
tion, the point of origin becomes ungraspable.”79 Such a play 
of inter-relationality is another name for totality, and Levinas 
aims to go beyond it, though we must criticize his way of doing 
so. Unfortunately, he identifies what is beyond relationality as 
both the “One” of Plotinus and as a rather un-Cantorian unified 
“infinity,” both of them simply latter-day forms of the shape-
less pre-Socratic apeiron.80 To make matters worse, by also call-
ing it the Good he denies that it has any “quiddity,” any specific 
character that an individual object would have.81 As I put it in 
the article, “Just as Levinas exaggerates the Infinite Other into a 
single rumbling mass of Goodness, he exaggerates the realm of 
enjoyment into a flickering chaos of nonsense.”82 
76 Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy,” 21.
77 Ibid. Italics removed.
78 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, trans. Al-
phonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 2.
79 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 90, 36.
80 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 95, 147.
81 Ibid., 182.
82 Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy,” 23.
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In what follows, I go on to show that sincerity is the term 
that unifies all three aspects of his philosophy: the ethical, the 
elemental, and the substantial. And ultimately, the substantial-
ity of individual things is the place where sincerity is best un-
derstood, “Nails, screwdrivers, cages, and drums are not merely 
devices enslaved to a wider system of tools: each reposes in it-
self, busy being itself and not just passing into relation with the 
others.”83 In other words, “sincerity is the Levinasian version of 
the classical principle of identity,” though we know that iden-
tity is dismissed by Derrideans as belonging to a naïve and op-
pressive metaphysics of presence.84 It is what Levinas famously 
calls illeity, which “indicates a way of concerning me without 
entering into conjunction with me.”85 Levinas treats language as 
one important way of touching things without fusing into them, 
though language in his view “remains a localized power belong 
to humans, or at most to sentient creatures more generally.”86 
Most importantly, he distinguishes in language between the said 
and the saying. Whereas the said is a literal content of communi-
cation, saying “signifies to the other […] with a signification that 
has to be distinguished from that borne by words in the said. 
The signification to the other occurs in proximity. Proximity is 
quite distinct from every other relationship.”87 While this might 
seem to link ethical proximity to language, we should remember 
that proximity is a broader category referring to contact with-
out fusion, including such cases as the enjoyment of bread or 
tobacco, and that human ethics therefore cannot take the lead. 
Instead, proximity — also known as sincerity and illeity — oc-
curs whenever two things are closed off from each other but still 
make contact, which is precisely what is meant by the OOO idea 
of vicarious causation. For “sincerity is everywhere: in surface, 
in depth, and in the substance that straddles them both.”88 But 
83 Ibid., 24.
84 Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy,” 24.
85 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 12.





Levinas falls into the usual modern error that Whitehead was 
the first to challenge openly, by placing sincerity primarily in 
the human subject: “the subject is […] too tight for its skin. Cut-
ting across every relation, it is an individual unlike an entity that 
can be designated as tode ti […] The ego is an incomparable 
unicity.”89 Here we are too close to Badiou and Žižek, with their 
shared neo-modernist notion of a unique thinking subject alone 
in its placement outside the world, even if Žižek grants this abil-
ity to all humans while Badiou is highly restrictive as to who 
counts as a genuine subject.90 
Like all phenomenologists, Levinas plays a double game, 
claiming that his concept of language is neither subjective nor 
objective but combines the best aspects of both: “the implication 
of the subject in signification […] is equivalent neither to the 
shifting of signification over to the objective side […] nor to its 
reduction to a subjective lived experience,” though we have seen 
that this game — in Merleau-Ponty as well — ultimately collapses 
into idealism with a realist alibi.91 This is nothing but correlation-
ism, although correlationism is a specific form of relationism, 
and relation is precisely the totality or war that Levinas needs 
to escape. But in attempting to do so, he focuses too intensely 
on human ethics, despite the wider sense of proximity he has 
established, and thus falls back into the Cartesian rift between 
what I call “full-fledged humans and robotic causal pawns.”92 Af-
ter considering Levinas’s marvelous analysis of the “fission” of 
the subject, in which the asymmetrical relation between me and 
the other leads me to “substitute” myself for the other and take 
responsibility for them, I argue that his conception of aesthet-
ics leads in a direction far broader than this narrowly human 
one, before concluding that “Levinas is the accidental mentor of 
a new theory of causation.”93 Once again, it is clear that my inter-
89 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 106, 8.
90 Badiou, Being and Event; Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the 
Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012).
91 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 131.




est in Levinas has nothing to do with the “alterity” that Gratton 
highlights, since I dispense with both the anthropocentric and 
apeiron-like aspects of the Levinasian other.
That brings us to my final extended piece of work on Levinas, 
the Sofia lecture that eventually became “Levinas and the Triple 
Critique of Heidegger” in the pages of Philosophy Today. As the 
title suggests, this article reprises the threefold consideration 
in “Aesthetics as First Philosophy,” and again draws on Lingis’s 
important inquiry into the Levinasian conception of individual 
substance. Here I will simply draw out a few complementary 
topics that this article handles better than the publications al-
ready covered. My case is that Heidegger misses not one but 
three aspects of reality that Levinas highlights like never before: 
the alterity of ethics, the enjoyment of the elemental, and the 
closed-off character of individual things against the Heideggeri-
an tool-system with its global and mutual referentiality. Yet as we 
have just seen, there is still a major problem with how Levinas 
does this, one resulting from his ingrained modernism: “While 
Heidegger is quick to dismiss drums, houses, and tea planta-
tions as ‘ontic,’ Levinas glimpses the metaphysical dimension of 
particular things. My one criticism of the Levinasian approach is 
that it remains too human-centered, too much in the shadow of 
Kant’s Copernican Revolution,” though here Descartes deserves 
blame as well.94 As I add, “only in this way do we make a clean 
break with the Heideggerian climate, where being and Dasein 
always come as a pair.”95 Much like Chalmers and Strawson in 
recent philosophy of mind, Levinas sees first-person experience 
as the one place where the global war of relations is halted. This 
was already clear in Existence and Existents, when only human 
thought was allowed to “hypostatize” a rumbling unified being 
into pieces, and this notion remains operative in Totality and 
Infinity: “The separation of the Same is produced in the form of 
an inner life, a psychism. The psychism constitutes an event in 




being […] it is already a way of being, resistance to the totality.”96 
Yet it is not only a way of resistance, as if there were others. For 
Levinas it is the only one. 
Here he makes two different errors. The first is the sort op-
posed — perhaps excessively — by panpsychists when they claim 
that “psychism” is found not only in humans. We have seen that 
Chalmers extends it as far as thermostats, while Strawson (like 
Shaviro and Whitehead) finds it absolutely everywhere. A big-
ger issue is that, even if we were to uphold the existence of full-
blown panpsychism extended to every existing entity, we are 
still left with the old distinction between direct first-person ex-
perience and third-person scientific description, although both 
involve a view from the outside. My experience of myself does 
not exhaust myself, which is why the deeper, zero-person real-
ity of the self must be taken into account, despite its withdrawal 
from direct access by introspection and science alike. In short, 
the self is also a substance, and thus it sets up shop in the world 
in a way that neither the psychologist nor the neuroscientist can 
master. Levinas is aware, perhaps too aware — given his afore-
mentioned tendency to conflate them — that even the things of 
enjoyment are saturated with something of the beyond. Speak-
ing of our enjoyment of the sensuous, he states that “what is 
essential to created existence is its separation with regard to 
the Infinite [which is why he describes enjoyment as an “athe-
ism” (GH)]. This separation is not simply a negation [… but] 
precisely opens upon the idea of infinity.”97 Lingis has argued 
further, in The Imperative, that this penetration of the sensual 
by ethical considerations also holds for individual things, each 
of which generates the rules for perceiving or enjoying it prop-
erly.98 This takes Lingis some way beyond Levinas, given that 
for the latter, both ethics and the elemental are meant to resist 
the particularity of individuals, while for Lingis it is individu-
als themselves that simultaneously incarnate our specific enjoy-
96 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 54.
97 Ibid., 150.
98 Lingis, The Imperative.
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ment of them and a specific secular form of the moral law; it is 
ethically wrong, Lingis holds, to listen to recorded music on a 
snowy day in a temple in Kyoto.99 By contrast, Levinas seems to 
think that infinity itself is produced by the human psyche: “In-
finity does not first exist, and then reveal itself. Its infinition is 
produced as revelation, as a positing of its idea in me.”100 This is 
every bit as correlationist as Heidegger’s positing of the Sein/Da-
sein couple, and his adoption of it from Heidegger shows why 
Levinas remains subsumed by it, even if he partly succeeds in 
leaving the “climate” of Heidegger’s philosophy. If there is one 
way that Levinas truly gets us beyond Heidegger, it is neither in 
his alterity of the infinitely other nor in his enjoyment of the el-
emental but through the combination of the two in his theory of 
substance, though he never fully rises to the level of his insight.
Nonetheless, against Heidegger’s tool-analysis, he tells us 
that things “are not entirely absorbed in their form; they […] 
stand out in themselves, breaking through, rending their forms, 
are not resolved in the relations that link them up to the totality 
[…] The thing is always an opacity, a resistance, an ugliness.”101 
This is not only the object-oriented side of Levinas; it is Levinas 
at his best, freed from his apeironish commitments to a shape-
less other and equally shapeless element. Even as he discovers 
the innate substantiality of things in the selfsame palace of Ver-
sailles, the stone that remains the same stone even as it crum-
bles, the same pen and armchair to which I return each day, 
he shrinks back from this insight by ascribing it to the realm 
of human experience alone: “the world of perception is thus a 
world where things have identity,” and “an earth inhabited by 
men endowed with language is peopled with stable things.”102 
Though he shifts back quickly to the intuition that things have 
a depth in their own right, he ascribes this to “matter,” implying 
that form is produced by humans alone.103 Even so, he joins OOO 
99 Ibid., 21.
100 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 26.
101 Ibid., 74.




in rejecting a two-world theory of shapeless matter and visible 
form, when he offers the following wonderful gesture towards a 
mereology of things: “But a part of a thing is in turn a thing: the 
back, the leg of a chair, for example. But also any fragment of 
the leg is a thing, even if it does not constitute one of its articula-
tions — everything one can detach and remove from it.”104 This 
is actually closer to Tristan Garcia than to OOO, since Garcia’s 
ontology is much flatter than mine. He allows for any fragment 
of anything to be equally a thing, while OOO places some restric-
tions on this.105 But unlike Garcia, Levinas seems to imagine that 
a fragment of the leg must actually be broken off by a human 
to become a thing, which treats the reality of parts as nothing 
more than a correlate of human action. What Levinas fails to 
consider is the crumbling of an abandoned chair in the absence 
of any human witness, or even after the outright extinction of 
our species. In the end, he is too much a phenomenologist to 
take such a possibility seriously. In any case, we see for a final 
time that Gratton’s manner of linking me to Levinas through 
alterity is a gross misreading, and primarily the symptom of a 
Derridean wish to maneuver me into the ambush site of “Vio-
lence and Metaphysics.” But I was never there, and it is not clear 
that Levinas was ever there.
Let’s summarize what we have seen in this chapter about 
Levinas, his flaws according to Derrida, and the link Gratton 
implies between those flaws and OOO’s own. Despite being a 
phenomenologist himself, Levinas critiques Western philoso-
phy for its over-reliance on “light,” its bias in favor of the given. 
Derrida essentially makes a twofold response to this critique, 
(a) there is no way to deal with non-light in a philosophical reg-
ister, since the hidden must somehow appear in a face, and (b) 
Husserl and Heidegger already do a fine job of getting as close 
to the hidden darkness as a philosopher can, and in this respect 
Levinas is unfair.
104 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 160.
105 Tristan Garcia, Form and Object: A Treatise on Things, trans. Mark Allan 
Ohm and Jon Cogburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
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We begin with the second point. Derrida’s strategy for de-
fending Husserl against Levinas is roughly threefold. First, de-
spite Levinas’s claim to the contrary, Husserl is the great theorist 
of inadequation, given that the fulfillment of intentionality al-
ways remains an unreachable ideal. Second, Husserl’s concept of 
“horizon” is as “other” as we will ever need, since the horizon is 
not an object but the permanent wellspring of any new objecti-
fication that might occur. Third, even Husserl’s supposed ideal-
ism is not as bad as it seems, since — we have seen — even the 
inapparent must first have meaning for an ego in order to strike 
us as inapparent in the first place. What is remarkable about all 
these points is that they are the same things a conservative phe-
nomenologist would say, thereby causing a clash with Derrida’s 
image as a cutting-edge innovator. Inadequation is certainly an 
interesting theme in Husserl, but it merely concerns the difficul-
ty of overlap between sensual and intellectual access to things. 
Try as we might to intuit the essence of a pineapple, it is impos-
sible not to be waylaid by its numerous adumbrations. Yet for 
Husserl both the essence and the adumbrations are still corre-
lates of a possible intentional act, even if that act remains elu-
sive. And for all his calls for a return to “the things themselves,” 
this phrase is the very opposite of “the thing-in-itself,” an object 
not only beyond adequation but beyond correlation altogether, 
which is what Levinas rather than Husserl seeks. The same holds 
for the supposed wonders of the “horizon,” which Husserlians 
often claim beats Heidegger to the punch on Sein. But there is 
a difference between the two. The fact that the horizon is a pre-
objective wellspring for objects does not mean that it is not the 
vague correlate of an intentional act, which of course it always is 
for classical phenomenology. Heidegger’s Being, by contrast, is 
supposed to be that which withdraws from any presence, even 
though in practice he treats it as always the correlate of Dasein. 
Finally, the notion that the other must first “mean” something 
and thereby appear to the ego is flat-out correlationism, and we 
will address it shortly. Those like Gratton who contrast Specu-
lative Realism badly with Derrida should at least concede that 
Derrida never really argued this point thoroughly, and that he 
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would have been forced to sharpen his arguments had he been 
with us at Goldsmiths and in the years that followed.
What about Heidegger’s supposed pre-emptings of the Levi-
nasian critique? One would expect these to be stronger chal-
lenges, given Heidegger’s own frequently expressed worries 
about presence. But Derrida cannot quite say this, given his 
commitment to the notion that Husserl already had sufficient 
resources — with inadequation and horizon — to address the 
alterity with which Levinas reproaches him. While I largely 
agree with Derrida that Heidegger was well on his way to some-
thing like what Levinas wanted, Levinas already knows this. He 
is second to none in his admiration for what Heidegger brings 
to philosophy. Derrida also rightly notes that Heidegger put the 
meaning of being in question, thereby showing that all philo-
sophical light is haunted by shadow. Finally, I would also side 
with Derrida in saying that Heidegger’s ontological difference 
cannot “subordinate” my relationship with the other, since un-
graspable otherness is already entailed by the “Being” side of the 
difference. There is also something to be said for Heidegger’s 
“letting-be,” though I do not follow Late Heidegger Exceptional-
ism in taking this to be some sort of clean break with the early 
concept of resoluteness. I also suspect that Heidegger’s Being is 
in fact already epekeina tēs ousias, and that Derrida is right in 
thinking it is primarily beyond the present-at-hand beings of 
the ontic realm. To summarize, I think that Heidegger (but not 
Husserl) has much to say in advance about what Levinas calls 
alterity, and that is why alterity is not the most interesting part 
of Levinas. What can be found in Zubíri but never found in ei-
ther Heidegger or Levinas was the notion of the specific alterity 
of individual things; the latter two thinkers are too beholden to 
the conception of Being or Infinity as something like a formless 
apeiron, as Derrida notes himself.
What I love about Levinas that Derrida does not even see is 
the former’s shift to a new conception of individual substance. 
We enjoy this bread, this cigarette, this car, the ideas playing in 
our minds right now. Unlike for Husserl, these entities are not 
just the correlates of an intentional act, but objects closed off in 
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themselves and not amenable to presence, not even as a telos 
somewhere down the road. And unlike for Heidegger, they do 
not simply fuse into a holistic tool-system, since each forms an 
end in itself. Finally, unlike for Derrida, these individual sub-
stances are perfectly determinate — this bread is this bread and 
nothing else — and hence it is untrue that bread “is necessarily 
produced in difference (as difference).”106 To say that the bread 
is produced in difference is the same as to hold that it is noth-
ing outside its context (i.e., outside the text) but simply emerges 
from its context via differentiation from it. What this shows is 
that Derrida had more to learn from both Levinasian alterity 
and Heideggerian Sein than he realized. What Derrida misses, 
and what is missed by the correlational circle he affirms no less 
than Meillassoux, is the specific non-apeironish alterity of things 
that exist before entering into the drama of mutual differentia-
tion, which happens only on the relational level.
How Gratton Is Wrong about Time
We have seen that Gratton is critical of me for saying that only 
the “now” exists. For this reason he sends me to the library to 
consult Husserl’s Phenomenology of Internal Time-Conscious-
ness, which in his view establishes that everything is immersed 
in time, leading to a refutation of my supposedly “static” sensual 
entities. That is not actually what Husserl shows in the work in 
question, and we will get to that shortly. But I want to begin 
with two points about the use of Husserl by OOO. One is that 
Husserl’s intentional object enables him to differentiate his own 
position from two distinct and even opposite competitors. The 
one closer in age was Kazimierz Twardowski, whose theory of 
an object “outside” the mind struck Husserl as a road to skepti-
cism; this is why he kept his own intentional objects immanent 
enough that they could always be, in principle, the correlate of 
some intentional act. In OOO terminology, this enables Husserl 
to distinguish SO from RO, and he also made the explicit deci-
106 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 150.
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sion to reject the very existence of RO. The other, much older 
competitor was his teacher Franz Brentano. For Brentano, as we 
learn again in Husserl’s writings on time, experience is all about 
content.107 Yet for Husserl the content of an experience is never 
enough, since an intentional object — like the act that correlates 
with it — can remain the same despite shifting content, as when 
an apple remains the same apple despite oscillating surface-
features (PIT 36). Again resorting to OOO terminology, this is 
enough for Husserl to be able to distinguish SO from SQ, while 
for Brentano — as for the empiricists — there is only SQ with no 
underlying SO. Insofar as Husserl does utilize SO as the very core 
of his philosophy, he is in fact committed to the identity of stable 
intentional objects, which does not mean eternal ones.
The second point is one where Gratton misreads my inten-
tions, though it is probably my own fault since I have not written 
very much about this topic. The fact that I say only the “now” 
exists does not mean I think that the now is a single point of 
time; quite the contrary. Here is what I really mean. Every read-
er of OOO knows of my fondness for the Islamic and later the 
European occasionalists, who posed the important problem of 
how two things can interact at all. I reject their solution that 
God is the universal mediator, and for the same reason reject 
the related Hume/Kant solution that the mind is the mediator of 
all causation. Like Latour, I hold that the mediator must always 
be a secularized and local one, though unlike Latour I approach 
the problem with a duality of real and sensual objects, each able 
to touch the opposite kind directly. Yet there is another point 
to consider about the occasionalists, which is that they come 
in two basic forms that are often combined.108 Namely, we can 
speak here, as in the chapter on Shaviro, of “spatial” and “tem-
poral” occasionalisms. Spatial occasionalists are those who raise 
the problem about causal interaction between separate beings. 
107 Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 29ff. Subse-
quent page references are given between parentheses in the main text, pre-
ceded by PIT.
108 Graham Harman, “A New Occasionalism?” in Reset Modernity!, eds. Bruno 
Latour and Christophe Leclercq (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 129–38.
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Temporal occasionalists, who push things further, are those 
who hold that even the present moment cannot endure by itself, 
but is constantly annihilated and therefore in need of a continu-
ous creation. (Note that this is not the same thing as holding 
that God “sustains” the world, as in Philo of Alexandria and 
Thomas Aquinas, since in this model things can still touch each 
other directly. God is simply a background energy source on 
which they rely when making contact.) Now, I am on record as 
supporting “spatial” occasionalism, since I hold that real objects 
cannot make direct contact. But in no way do I support “tem-
poral” occasionalism. Here I am with Aristotle as viewing time 
(in the SO–SQ sense) as a continuum, not a sequence of distinct 
instants. At times Gratton seems to think that when I say only 
the “now” exists, what I mean is that it exists only in punctiform 
fashion, with no bridge to previous or upcoming instants. But 
that is not my position.
Let’s begin by showing that Husserl’s analysis of time is by 
no means incompatible with the treatment of this topic in OOO. 
He begins his discussion in the most Husserlian possible fash-
ion: “Involved in this [analysis …] is the complete exclusion, 
stipulation, or conviction concerning Objective time (of all 
transcendent presuppositions concerning existents)” (PIT 23). 
He then adds that “one cannot discover the least trace of Ob-
jective time through phenomenological analysis” (PIT 23). In a 
word, he is bracketing the existence of any real time outside its 
presence to us. Normally OOO has a bone to pick with phenom-
enological bracketing, since it leads directly to idealism. But in 
the present case that hardly matters; for OOO, time arises from 
the SO–SQ rift, which unfolds entirely within the sensual realm 
and has nothing to do with withdrawn reality. Thus, if there is 
any topic on which Husserl and OOO are likely to agree most, it 
is time. Although Gratton wants to imply that Husserl is more 
oriented toward flux and alteration than is static old OOO, we 
will see that this complaint is hollow. The reason is that Husserl 
is the absolute champion of objects capable of enduring through 
time. After all, this is the whole point of his disagreement with 
Brentano’s theory of it. As Husserl puts it,
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Let us look at a piece of chalk. We close and open our eyes. 
We have two perceptions, but we say of them that we see 
the same piece of chalk twice. We have, thereby, contents 
which are separated temporally […] The object, however, is 
not merely the sum or complexion of this “content” [that we 
perceive in it], which does not enter into the object at all. 
The Object is more than the content and other than it. […] 
Phenomenologically speaking, Objectivity is not even con-
stituted through “primary” content but through characters 
of apprehension and the regularities which pertain to the es-
sence of these characters. (PIT 27)
The regularities of intentional objects are not just a primordial 
fact for Husserlian phenomenology, but are the central fact that 
differentiates phenomenology from empiricism and its bundles 
of qualities, as well as from Brentano. To claim that such objects 
are rooted in a priority of temporal change gets it backwards: 
instead, we notice change only because all the changing apples 
and blackbirds remain the same objects. And furthermore, “we 
are concerned with reality only insofar as it is intended, repre-
sented, intuited, or conceptually thought. With reference to the 
problem of time, this implies that we are interested in lived expe-
riences of time” (PIT 28). As for Gratton’s complaint about OOO 
confining itself to the “now,” I should note that Husserl deliber-
ately confines himself in just the same way, as when he speaks 
of such “self-evident laws” as these: “that two different times can 
never be conjoint; that their relation is a non-simultaneous one” 
(PIT 29). In short, OOO and Husserl agree on the following basic 
principles when it comes to time, despite Gratton’s stated wish 
to drive a wedge between us: (a) There is a now that is not simul-
taneous with other nows; (b) The now is not punctiform, mean-
ing that it does not occur in a single temporal instant; (c) The 
intentional/sensual object remains undivided despite its wildly 
fluctuating surface-qualities.
It is Brentano rather than OOO who can be criticized for 
thinking of time in terms of an excessively narrow “now,” and 
Husserl does precisely this. He tells us that Brentano developed 
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his theory of time in lectures, and that it was only partially re-
ported in the writings of his prominent students Anton Marty 
(1847–1914) and Carl Stumpf (1848–1936) (PIT 22). For Brentano, 
when we hear the sounding of a musical note, it neither disap-
pears nor remains when the stimulus to the ear is gone. If it 
disappeared, we would simply experience a sequence of isolated 
notes with no connection between them; if it remained, the op-
posite problem would occur, “a chord of simultaneous notes or 
rather a disharmonious jumble of sounds” (PIT 30). The solution 
is obviously somewhere between these two extremes. But Hus-
serl does not accept Brentano’s own solution; quite apart from 
his dislike for Brentano’s mixing of physical and psychological 
elements in his discussion of time, he rejects even the phenom-
enological core of his teacher’s theory. According to that theory, 
the sound does cease once the stimulus is gone, but the present 
moment is filled with what Brentano calls “primordial associa-
tions” with notes now past and even the anticipated notes of the 
future (PIT 33). The real present is always the present of what-
ever the current physical stimuli to the sense-organs may be. 
Thus, for Brentano, our lived experience of time is really just 
the product of phantasy. Husserl notes that “as a consequence of 
this theory, Brentano came to disavow the perception of succes-
sion and alteration. We believe that we hear a melody, that we 
still hear something that is certainly past. However, [for Bren-
tano] this is only an illusion which proceeds from the vivacity 
of primordial presentation” (PIT 32). A strange side-effect of this 
fixation on the present is that our real intuition of the present is 
combined with non-real “primordial associations” with absent 
past and possible future experiences. As Husserl comments, 
“This involves something remarkable, namely, that non-real 
temporal determinations can belong in a continuous series with 
a unique, actual, real determinateness to which they are joined 
by infinitesimal differences [… T]emporal determinations of 
every kind are joined in a certain way as necessary consequenc-
es to every instance of coming to be and passing away that takes 
place in the present” (PIT 34). A few pages later, he speaks even 
more harshly: “This implies […] that the past […] must also 
171
gratton
be present, and that the temporal moment ‘past’ must, in the 
same sense as the element ‘red’ that we actually experience, be 
a present moment of lived experience — which, of course, is an 
obvious absurdity” (PIT 38).
Something decisive occurs as Husserl critically sifts through 
the problems with Brentano’s theory of time. He notes that what 
leads Brentano to append “primordial associations” to time is 
his prejudice that all intentionality consists of represented con-
tent, and thus the only way to make room for the past is through 
modifying such present content. Thus, “to the primary content 
of perception are joined phantasms and more phantasms, quali-
tatively alike and differing, let us say, only in decreasing rich-
ness and intensity of content” (PIT 37). For Husserl, whose initial 
break with Brentano hinged largely on his emphasis of inten-
tional objects over experienced content, this sounds like a rep-
etition of the same problem as before. For “we do not encounter 
temporal characters such as succession and duration merely in 
the primary content, but also in the Object apprehended and 
in the acts of apprehension” (PIT 37). And “Brentano […] also 
[falls] into the error of reducing everything, in the manner of 
sensualism, to mere primary content” (PIT 38), which is pre-
cisely Husserl’s basis for rejecting empiricism no less than “sen-
sualism,” assuming they are different in the first place. This is 
a serious problem for Gratton’s critique of OOO on time. For if 
Husserl’s theory of time — like his phenomenology more gener-
ally — is based on a shift from the content to the objects and acts 
of experience, this is a point on which the OOO theory of time 
closely resembles him. In short, our theory of the present is like 
Husserl’s, not like Brentano’s, and thus it cannot be claimed that 
we fail to live up to what Husserl has seen in these matters. What 
he has seen is that our relation to the past and future cannot be 
explained in terms of present content.
Husserl traces Brentano’s now-centric model to an idea 
found in Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) and Hermann 
Lotze (1817–81) to the effect that everything must be in the 
present, since even a temporal succession of instants must be 
understood as such by a single momentary consciousness. On 
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this basis, Brentano would be justified in reducing the past 
to phantasmal inscriptions in the present. But Husserl notes 
an objection to this idea by William Stern (1871–1938) who 
termed it the “dogma of the momentariness of [the] whole of 
consciousness.”109 What Stern defends by contrast is a model ac-
cording to which, in Husserl’s words, “we do not have the sounds 
all at once, as it were, and we do not hear the melody by virtue 
of the circumstance that the earlier tones endure with the last. 
Rather, the tones build up a successive unity with a common 
effect, the form of apprehension” (PIT 41). In other words, there 
is something like a “specious present” in which we perceive a se-
ries of temporal nows without having to shove them all into the 
current one. While this is a good step forward, Husserl remains 
unsatisfied with Stern’s model, and asks as follows: “The ques-
tion still remains how the apprehension of transcendent tem-
poral Objects which extend over a duration is to be understood. 
Are the Objects realized in terms of a continuous similarity 
(like unaltered things) or as constantly changing (like material 
processes, motion, or alteration, for example)” (PIT 42)? Both 
Gratton and Shaviro are no doubt cheering for the latter option, 
but Husserl — and I with him  — will choose the former. As he 
puts it in a crucial passage, “a phenomenological analysis of 
time cannot explain the constitution of time without reference 
to the constitution of the temporal Object. By temporal Objects, 
in this particular sense, we mean objects which not only are uni-
ties in time but also include temporal extension in themselves” 
(PIT 43). Thus for Husserl there is no kaleidoscopic flux-o-rama 
acid trip in which change is primordial and unified objects a 
mere byproduct, as if opposed to a stodgy, middle-aged cigar 
party that affirms the stasis of enduring things. In this case, the 
middle-aged cigar smokers are not just closer to what Husserl 
and OOO think, but closer to the philosophical avant garde. 
In §8, Husserl begins to develop his own theory, beginning 
with a familiar Husserlian gesture: “We now exclude all trans-
109 William Stern, “Psychische Präsenzzeit,” New Yearbook for Phenomenology 
and Phenomenological Research 5 (2007): 310–51.
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cendent apprehension and positing and take the sound purely 
as a hyletic datum” (PIT 44). The sound “begins and stops, and 
the whole unity of its duration, the unity of the whole process in 
which it begins and ends, ‘proceeds’ to the end in the ever more 
distant past. In this sinking back, I still ‘hold’ it fast, have it in a 
‘retention,’ and as long as the retention persists the sound has its 
own temporality. It is the same and its duration is the same” (PIT 
44; italics added). I added italics to the final sentence in order to 
emphasize that, contra Gratton, there is an abiding identity here 
that precedes any discussion of change. Only in the shift to the 
“modes” of this experience can we speak of a “continuous flux” 
(PIT 44). There is a specific phase in which I become conscious 
of the sound beginning, and I remain “conscious of it as now” for 
as long as “I am conscious of any of its phases as now” (PIT 44). 
But I am also “conscious of a continuity of phases as ‘before,’ and 
I am conscious of the whole interval of the temporal duration 
from the beginning-point to the now-point as an expired dura-
tion. I am not yet conscious, however, of the remaining interval 
of the duration” (PIT 44). Once the sound ends, “I am conscious 
of this point itself as a now-point and of the whole duration as 
expired […] the end-point is the beginning of a new interval 
of time which is no longer an interval of sound” (PIT 44). The 
whole interval of sound is now “something dead […] a no longer 
living production, a structure animated by the now productive 
point of the now. This structure, however, is continually modi-
fied and sinks back into emptiness” (PIT 45). In other words, 
“the sound vanishes into the remoteness of consciousness” (PIT 
45). And furthermore, “The sound itself is the same, but ‘in the 
way that it appears,’ the sound is continually different” (PIT 45). 
Brentano gets into trouble by thinking that experience is only of 
the present, so that therefore anything past must be inscribed 
into the present through indirect “primordial associations.” It is 
an analysis of time based on “content,” whereas Husserl insists 
that the content remains the same and the sound changes only 
in the “way” it appears. This way or modality belongs not to the 
content of the sound-experience, but only to the changed status 
of the act that intends it. In short, Husserl deals with past sound 
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as a modification of the structure of the intentional act rather 
than of its content. Only the current sound is truly “perceived,” 
whereas the expired moments of the sound are something of 
which “we are conscious […] in retentions, specifically, that we 
are conscious of those parts of those parts or phases of the du-
ration, not sharply to be differentiated, which lie closest to the 
actual now-point with diminishing clarity, while those parts ly-
ing further back in the past are wholly unclear; we are conscious 
of them only as empty” (PIT 46). And further, “that part of the 
duration which lies closest still has perhaps a little clarity; the 
whole disappears in obscurity, in a void retentional conscious-
ness, and finally disappears completely […] as soon as retention 
ceases” (PIT 46). The closer we are in time to the present sound 
the more distinction there is, while the further we go the more 
blending there is (PIT 46). 
Even though the sound-object or musical object continues, 
it remains one and the same thing, but its past phases become 
modally cloudier and more obscure. To repeat, Husserl treats 
the past not as an inscription in the present, but as an emptier 
intention than the perfectly fulfilled one of the current phase 
of sound or music. These emptier intentions that pass away are 
called “running-off phenomena” (PIT 48). There is a “continuous 
line of advance” that is “constantly expanding, a continuous line 
of pasts” (PIT 48). This is a continuum, even though no moment 
in it is ever repeated. “Since a new now is always presenting itself, 
each now is changed into a past, and thus the entire continuity 
of the running-off of the pasts of the preceding points moves 
uniformly ‘downward’ into the depths of the past” (PIT 49). Im-
pressional consciousness passes into retentional consciousness 
(PIT 50). Each retention “bears in itself the heritage of the past in 
the form of a series of shadings” (PIT 51). The now is “the nucleus 
of a comet’s tail of retentions referring to the earlier now-points 
of the motion” (PIT 51). Once the sound ends, “we have a mere 
fresh phase of memory, to this is again joined another such, and 
so on” (PIT 52). Retentional sound “is not actually present but 
‘primarily remembered’ precisely in the now” (PIT 53). There are 
always reverberating echoes as well, immediately following the 
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“now” of a sound, but these are directly perceptual rather than 
retentional. As Husserl puts it, “The reverberation of a violin 
tone is a very weak violin tone and is completely different from 
the retention of loud sounds which have just been” (PIT 53). 
Brentano failed to recognize that there is a difference between 
the phantasy of a sound and the present of that sound. “‘Past’ 
and ‘now’ exclude each other. Something past and something 
now can indeed be identically the same, but only because it has 
endured between the past and now” (PIT 56).
Husserl goes on to draw even more insights for another sev-
enty pages or more. But since we are concerned primarily with 
Gratton’s critique, what we have already cited is enough to es-
tablish the following points. First, the OOO conception of time 
as SO–SQ is no more confined to a timeless now-point than in 
Husserl’s conception, since the two conceptions are one and the 
same. Time is concerned primarily with the identity of an ob-
ject that persists over a duration, even though different phases 
of that duration pass further and further into the depths of re-
tentional consciousness. In other words, there is no contradic-
tion between identity and time. Quite the opposite. Second, and 
related to this, there is no question of a wider category called 
“time” that must be drawn upon as if it were prior to the dif-
ference between an intentional object and its adumbrations. If 
there were just one adumbration after another, as in Brentano’s 
theory of one momentary set of present content after another, 
then we would not experience time at all, and would live our 
lives in the manner of disconnected instants of consciousness. 
The only reason Husserl can account for anything like time is 
because he rejects Brentano’s model of consciousness as a spe-
cific experienced content and shifts to his own model of inten-
tional objects that are deeper than any such content. The same 
violin-sound rings out for five or six seconds with a subtly wa-
vering vibrato; it is the same because it is the vibrato of one and 
the same violin-sound. Far from identity being excluded from 
the analysis of time, time is always the time of identities. Third 
and finally, and again contra Gratton, this model of present im-
mediacy fading ever further into the depths of the past is not at 
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all what is going on in Heidegger’s threefold temporal structure, 
which would still be found even if we could condense time into 
a single punctiform instant.
Stated differently, I am saying that Husserl has a philosophy 
of time but Heidegger most certainly does not. Any claim that 
Heidegger passes from vulgar clock-time to Dasein’s authentic 
temporality to the Temporalität of Being itself does not even 
address the issue of whether he has any theory of time at all. 
Indeed, the shift from the vulgar flow of clock-time to Dasein’s 
authentic temporality is an explicit effort to get rid of the Hus-
serlian notion of time as a flow, which is precisely why Augen-
blick (moment of vision) is a key term for Heidegger but not for 
his teacher. In other words, there is no “phenomenology of in-
ternal time-consciousness” anywhere in Heidegger’s philosophy, 
despite the fact that he was the editor of Husserl’s own treatise 
on the subject (though rather reluctantly so, I might add). As for 
the supposed shift from Dasein’s temporality to the Tempora-
lität of Being itself, this is no switch back to the moving flow of 
time, but simply another aspect of Heidegger’s movement from 
an activist conception of resolute Dasein to the passive model of 
letting-be, eventually completed at some point in the 1930s. But 
the active/passive distinction has nothing to do with the instant/
flux distinction. Heidegger belongs, I have said, to the occasion-
alist tradition of time: much like Whitehead, which is one of 
their most striking points in common. Husserl, idealist though 
he is, belongs instead to the tradition of time as an unbroken 
continuum found not only in Bergson and Deleuze, but much 
further back in Aristotle’s Physics. On this point I side with Hus-
serl and his confederates, not with the Heidegger/Whitehead 
model of occasionalist time, though I do accept the “spatial oc-
casionalist” problem of the difficulty of causal relations.
Given that Husserlian time is so far from refuting the OOO 
model of SO–SQ that it practically coincides with it, one has to 
wonder why Gratton was so confident in the lethality of his ap-
peal to Husserl. There must be another influence. I smell Der-
rida nearby, and in particular, I smell the Derrida of “Ousia and 
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Grammē.”110 In this article Derrida deals not with Husserl’s theo-
ry of time as just discussed, but with Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, 
and — to a lesser extent — Kant. It contains Derrida’s usual 
wordy historical analyses, culminating in a four-page summary 
of the general ideas of his piece. Two in particular jump out. The 
first is his claim that “presence” in the sense of presence-at-hand 
and “presence” in the temporal sense of the now are so closely 
related as to be indistinguishable. For this reason Derrida will 
oppose both, and Heidegger understands himself to be doing 
much the same thing, though here I think he misreads the ten-
dency of his own philosophy. As Derrida writes, at the bottom 
of his first page,
In what way has a certain determination of time implicitly 
governed the determination of the meaning of Being as pres-
ence in the history of philosophy? Heidegger announces the 
question […] only, and does so on the basis of what he still 
considers a sign, a point of reference, an “outward evidence.” 
This outward evidence is the treatment of the meaning of Be-
ing as parousia or ousia, which signifies, in ontologico-Tem-
poral terms, ‘presence’ (Anwesenheit). Beings are grasped in 
their Being as ‘presence’ (Anwesenheit); this means they are 
understood with regard to a definite mode of time — the 
‘Present’ (Gegenwart).111 
The point is repeated near the end of the article: “In Being 
and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics it is diffi-
cult — we are tempted to say impossible — to distinguish rigor-
ously between presence as Anwesenheit and presence as Gegen-
wärtigkeit (presence in the temporal sense of newness).”112 Note 
that Derrida is not just “tempted” to call it impossible but does 
110 Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē: A Note on a Note from Being and 
Time,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 29–67. 
111 Ibid., 31. Both of the Heidegger passages cited here are from Being and Time, 
47.
112 Derrida, “Ousia and Grammē,” 64.
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call it that, despite his usual mannerism of quickly half-revoking 
whatever he says in order to escape possible charges of being too 
simple-minded. It follows for Derrida — as for Gratton — that if 
we are to break free of the ontotheology of the metaphysics of 
presence, we must escape both the immediate presence-at-hand 
of anything to the mind and the idea that there is any “now” in 
time. Here I disagree with Husserl on one side, with Heidegger 
on the other, and with Derrida altogether.
In the case of Husserl, I agree with both Heidegger and Levi-
nas that his phenomenology is utterly saturated with the pres-
ence of Anwesenheit. We have seen that Heidegger makes this 
case brilliantly in the first one hundred pages of History of the 
Concept of Time. For Husserl, the being of anything consists in 
its presence before the mind, and he never questions the being 
of intentionality as such, which is why he missed, perhaps nar-
rowly, posing the question of Being himself rather than letting 
Heidegger do it later. Levinas makes the same objection by argu-
ing that intentionality closes off alterity, though he is also unsat-
isfied with Heidegger’s solution, since Being belongs to the cir-
cle of the Same and is therefore not enough. We must go further 
and seek out that which is epekeina tēs ousias, the Good beyond 
Being. We are now familiar with Derrida’s argument that Levi-
nas is unfair to both Husserl and Heidegger, given his claim that 
Husserl knew about the ultimate unfulfillability of intentional 
acts and the non-objectifiability of the horizonal wellspring of 
all intentional objects, and his further claim that Heidegger’s on-
tological difference already does the work of alterity that Levi-
nas thinks ethics alone can perform. As a reminder, I reached 
a mixed verdict on Derrida’s assessment here. For there is no 
sense in which unfulfillment and the horizon can do the work of 
Heideggerian Being, given that Husserl cannot accept either an 
object or a horizon that would not, in principle, be there implic-
itly for consciousness, and also — contra Derrida — no sense in 
which the implicit/explicit pair exhausts the theme of philoso-
phy. The implicit is still found only in intentional acts, and the 
being that withdraws is what is inaccessible to any intentional 
act, and therefore nonexistent in Husserl’s eyes. In Heidegger’s 
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case I largely agree with Derrida that the ontological difference 
is good enough to resist the reign of presence, and thus I think 
that Levinas has a better case against Heidegger in the other di-
rection — on the side of immediate enjoyment and the elemen-
tal ether in which such enjoyment takes place.
In the case of Heidegger, I do not agree with Derrida’s view 
that Anwesenheit and Gegenwärtigkeit are one and the same. 
The reason is that Heidegger easily overcomes Anwesenheit with 
his relentless assault on presence-at-hand as accounting for the 
Being of beings. Indeed, this is his most singular philosophi-
cal achievement. But in no way does he overcome the Gegen-
wärtigkeit of the temporal now. No matter how hard Derrida 
tries to show that Heidegger and Bergson are both stuck in the 
Aristotelian tradition of thinking about time, Bergson and Ar-
istotle (like Husserl) are deeply aware that time is a continuum. 
Indeed, this is the central insight of all three thinkers when it 
comes to time. Presumably, Heidegger as a human being was 
also aware of the continuous aspect of time, but this does not 
mean that Heidegger’s philosophy accounts for it. To the con-
trary, Heidegger is unable to reach any continuum through his 
threefold analysis of Dasein’s authentic temporality (or even of 
the Temporalität of Being itself). When Heidegger analyzes the 
threefold structure of thrown projection, this merely gives us 
another critique of Anwesenheit, since thrownness means we 
are always thrown into a situation whose exact character can 
never be directly present to the mind. But it is not also a critique 
of the Gegenwärtigkeit of the now, even though most readers 
assume he has also accomplished this very different step. By 
treating time as a continuum, Aristotle, Bergson, and Husserl 
all reject the notion of an isolated now-point from the start. But 
Heidegger merely shows that in any given instant, much more 
is going on than meets the eye, so that even Gegenwärtigkeit au-
tomatically excludes Anwesenheit, despite Derrida’s assumption 
that the two concepts are indistinguishable.
I argued as early as Tool-Being that if we attempt the thought 
experiment of asking what a single, isolated instant of time 
would be like, we immediately find that this experiment cannot 
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even be attempted in the continuum model of time found in Ar-
istotle, Bergson, and Husserl (not to mention William James and 
Deleuze). But it can easily be carried out in Heidegger’s philoso-
phy, since any isolated “now” can be analyzed perfectly well in 
terms of thrown projection. There is nothing, absolutely nothing 
in Heidegger that requires him to refuse the theory that time is 
made up of individual “frames” in the cinematic manner. Stated 
differently, there is no easy passage from thrown projection to 
any “flow” of time. This is a passage that Heidegger simply never 
illuminates for us; in fact, this is already the thrust of his cri-
tique of vulgar clock-time: the fact that such a vulgar conception 
merely treats time as “passing” without pausing to understand 
how complex the “now” already is. Heidegger, like Whitehead 
and Latour, belongs to the occasionalist tradition of time rather 
than the continuist tradition, even if he never calls upon God 
or anything else to explain how one moment gives way to the 
next. To summarize, Derrida gets it wrong in both cases. There 
is no infinity beyond representations in Husserl, and no effective 
critique of the “now” in Heidegger, even if Heidegger himself 
seems to think so. Contra Gratton, to say such a thing is not in-
sulting to Heidegger, but simply the natural result of considering 
what Heidegger did and did not actually accomplish. No com-
mentator should aspire to flattery at the expense of precision. 
There are plenty of insights of which Heidegger can be proud, 
without our having to credit him with non-existent ones.
Earlier I mentioned that there is a second key idea that jumps 
out from “Ousia and Grammē,” and it is one we have seen before. 
Midway through his article, Derrida says the following about 
Hegel: “The transformation of Parousia into self-presence, and 
the transformation of the supreme being into a subject think-
ing itself, and assembling itself near itself in knowledge, does 
not interrupt the fundamental tradition of Aristotelianism.”113 
Forgetting about Aristotle for a moment, the critique of Hegel’s 
concept of the subject thinking itself in knowledge as a form 




thinking as self-transparent, though we need not accept this 
idea, which is precisely why I rejected the Shaviro/Strawson/
Chalmers priority of first-person introspective experience. In 
this limited respect, I am happy to agree with Derrida’s rejec-
tion of self-presence. But he also means self-presence in what 
he takes to be a more damaging sense — namely, in the sense of 
identity. This is the same reason why, in Of Grammatology, he 
rejects the idea of Being as anything apart from its manifesta-
tion in individual beings, and in “White Mythology” conflates 
his own critique of the literal meaning of words with the indi-
vidual being of substances. This leads him to misread Aristotle’s 
theory of substance as a police-like attempt to govern our use 
of language, though it is clear that Aristotle values ambiguous 
poetic language to a degree matched by few other philosophers. 
To summarize, Derrida not only thinks that the now of Gegen-
wärtigkeit is illusory, but also thinks that we cannot critique the 
Anwesenheit of onto-theology without also denying that a thing 
can be one and the same as itself. Remember that I am no He-
gelian, and do not accept that there is a subject viewing itself 
in utter transparency, which would be the only valid meaning 
of the phrase “self-presence.” The mere fact that a substance is 
itself and not another — as Aristotle argues, to Derrida’s cha-
grin — does not entail that any substance is “self-present.” A 
substance is zero-person, not a transparent first-person.
This is what makes the closing pages of “Ousia and Grammē” 
so unsatisfactory. In the first place, Derrida’s opening thesis is 
wrong: “Therefore we can only conclude that the entire system 
of metaphysical concepts, throughout its history, develops the 
so-called ‘vulgarity’ of the concept of time […] but also that an 
other concept of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in gen-
eral belongs to metaphysical conceptuality.”114 The first part of 
this statement is correct in a sense — insofar as the vulgar con-
cept of time sees it as consisting of a series of transient “nows,” 
it is tied to the metaphysical conception of a present now, al-




comes. But to assert further that Heidegger’s own conception 
of time cannot overcome this vulgarity neglects the fact that he 
actually does so. Dasein is thrown into an absence, and even 
if we view Dasein as existing in a single instant (which noth-
ing in Heidegger forbids), that instant of time is not constituted 
by vulgar presence. The whole point is that we are thrown into 
something fundamentally absent. As if anticipating this objec-
tion, Derrida soon adds the following complaint: “that which 
gives us to think beyond the [Greek] closure [of presence] can-
not be simply absent.”115 This statement has a mixed relation to 
Derrida’s reflections in “Violence and Metaphysics.” On the one 
hand, Derrida in that essay does credit Heidegger’s ontological 
difference with already doing the work of otherness that Levi-
nas found missing in the German philosopher. But on the other 
hand, we recall that Derrida immediately recuperated the oth-
erness of Being into presence by claiming that the inapparent 
must somehow appear, and that this is an unsurpassable limi-
tation of philosophy. The latter sentiment enables him to turn 
now against the same otherness of Being in Heidegger that he 
had used against Levinas and to offer, in contradictory fashion, 
something that sounds like a Levinasian objection to Heidegger. 
Derrida adds, with a typically modern European note, that “ab-
sent, [absence] would either give us nothing to think or it would 
still be a negative mode of presence.”116 
Essentially, Derrida paints himself into the corner of Meno’s 
Paradox several decades before Meillassoux does the same. That 
ancient Paradox, we recall, says that we either know something 
or we do not, which Socrates opposes with philosophia, the idea 
that we can look for something that we do not have and will nev-
er have. The modern-day Meno counters, like Derrida, with the 
claim that we are then left either with negative theology or with 
good old presence, albeit it in scare-quotes, and no other option 
in sight. Derrida’s philosophy is thus a classic case of Modern 





be absolutely excessive as concerns presence-absence, all pos-
sible production or disappearance of beings in general, and yet, 
in some manner it must still signify it, in a manner unthink-
able by metaphysics as such.”117 Where is Gratton when you need 
him? For all the hard knocks he dealt me for saying “somehow it 
must” and using the term “tension” before having a completely 
worked-out theory of all its details, he apparently gives Derrida 
a pass on saying that “in some manner” there must be an excess 
that signifies without signifying. But this is hardly a surprise. 
Derrideans always grant Derrida the license that they permit no 
one else, though this is perhaps “a merely sociological” fact, as 
Brassier might say.
Yet that is less interesting than Derrida’s coincidence with 
Meillassoux on this point. Readers of my book on the latter will 
recall my criticism of his argument that strong correlationism, 
which he attempts to radicalize into his own position, is not a 
form of idealism. He begins by deploying the correlational cir-
cle against both naïve realists and Kantian weak correlationists, 
using the familiar German Idealist argument — to think a thing 
outside thought is to turn it into a thought, and thus the circle 
of thought closes on itself. Nonetheless, Meillassoux adds, the 
fact that we cannot think the in-itself does not mean that there 
is none, and — presto! — the strong correlationist is not an ideal-
ist, because at least the former knows that thought and reality 
need not coincide. But nothing comes of this, because “reality” 
as anything different from thought has already been disqualified 
in the first step. Thus, there is only a choice between realism, 
weak correlationism, and outright idealism, and Meillassoux is 
stuck with idealism. See also Derrida, who accepts a version of 
the correlational circle (“there is no absence that does not also 
appear”) while adding that there must be another kind of ex-
cess that is somehow beyond the unified presence-absence of 
the circle that “must still signify, in a manner unthinkable by 





accept the correlational argument, you can never emerge from 
it, no matter how sophisticated a word-trick you produce, since 
any possibility of “excess” has already been foreclosed in the first 
step of your argument. This is why I opt instead for a radicaliza-
tion of weak correlationism, which avoids the impossibility of 
direct access as called for by mainstream realism, and the equal 
impossibility of an idealism that reduces things to their appear-
ance, however sophisticated the dialectics that turn it into an 
“objective” idealism that at least avoids “subjectivism.” Eliminate 
the two impossibilities as Sherlock Holmes would do, and radi-
calized weak correlationism, however improbable, becomes the 
only place to look.
But perhaps Derrida is not so incompatible with the object-
oriented approach after all. This is the verdict of Levi Bryant 
in his important article “The Time of the Object.” Bryant has 
a great deal to say about “Ousia and Grammē,” and he is more 
positive about it than I am. As usual, he shows considerable gen-
erosity to my position:
[In “Ousia and Grammē,”] Derrida immediately assimilates 
substances, things, to presence. Henceforth substance will be 
treated as a synonym for presence, such that to speak of sub-
stance is to speak of presence and to speak of presence is to 
speak of substance [… Yet] far from being characterized by 
presence, substance seems to be that which withdraws from 
presence, or that which is nowhere and never present. It is for 
this reason that Graham Harman argues that the very being 
of the substance of objects lies in withdrawal.119 
At the end of his article, Bryant speaks in the same spirit, “Har-
man’s concept of substance as withdrawal therefore renders leg-
ible a whole series of ontological aporias” (TO 89). But a great 
119 Levi Bryant, “The Time of the Object: Derrida, Luhmann, and the Pro-
cessual Nature of Objects,” in The Allure of Things: Process and Object in 
Contemporary Philosophy, eds. Roland Faber and Andrew Goffey (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 71–72. Subsequent page references are given 
between parentheses in the main text, preceded by TO.
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deal happens between these two passages. Even while seem-
ing to endorse my conception of withdrawn substance, Bryant 
adopts in the meantime a number of elements from Derrida, 
Maturana/Varela, and Luhmann that he thinks will help us gain 
a better conception of substance than my own. In doing so, he 
repeats Shaviro’s claim that my substances are too “static” and 
need to be invested with greater dynamism.
Early in the article, Bryant quickly says something that I 
would never say myself, “if substances are necessarily with-
drawn, if they cannot be treated as synonymous with presence, 
then this is precisely because they are fissured from within by 
time” (TO 74). In other words, Bryant wants a more dynamic 
theory of substance than the one I provide. We recall that for 
him, local manifestations are produced by various “regimes of 
attraction” or contexts of relation in which they occur. In a pair 
of fine examples, Bryant notes the different behavior of flames 
on earth and in a space station, and the different effects on hu-
man skin of different weather conditions (TO 75). Yet Bryant is 
still basically object-oriented in his approach, and thus he still 
holds that entities must have a certain independence from the 
various regimes of attraction in which they find themselves. Yes, 
a mouse will die if placed inside one of Robert Boyle’s vacuum 
pumps, but it is the mouse that dies rather than the entire con-
text — death is a local manifestation of the mouse rather than 
the mouse itself, and rather than the experimental apparatus as 
a whole (TO 75–76). For Bryant, what entities possess apart from 
their various manifestations are powers. By contrast, qualities 
are simply manifestations of these powers. Furthermore, powers 
are “fluctuating […] because they can gain and lose powers, and 
because the power of a substance’s powers can diminish and in-
tensify in their strength” (TO 77). Thus, the withdrawn powers of 
virtual proper being are not static, but constantly shift through 
variable intensities and even by adding or losing specific pow-
ers, “The affects of a substance are not fixed, but fluctuate in all 
sorts of ways as a result of processes within the substance and 
encounters with other substances” (TO 77). Thus, actualization 
is a temporal process — unlike in my theory of substance, which 
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treats process as belonging only to the sensual realm — and 
this leads Bryant to Derrida’s infamous notion of différance. 
Although différance has at least two main senses (differing, de-
ferral), Bryant says that “Derrida seems to prefer the sense of 
difference as a verb, seeing ‘difference between’ as an effect of the 
activity of différance” (TO 78). Bryant makes a surprising link 
between Derrida and Whitehead when he adds that “substances 
and their differences […] are therefore like blooming flowers. 
Their extended nature is something that must be produced in 
an extending or extensionalizing activity akin to that described 
by Whitehead in Process and Reality in his theory of extension” 
(TO 79). Although Bryant wrote his article on the occasion of 
a Whitehead conference, there is more to his invocation of the 
British philosopher than this. We recall that Bryant is primarily 
a Deleuzean, and bridges between Deleuze and Whitehead have 
long since been built (as by Shaviro and Stengers) despite my 
aforementioned objections to this link.
Further distinguishing his OOO position from my own, 
which is sometimes abbreviated OOP (for Object-Oriented Phi-
losophy), Bryant employs Derrida to argue that “the powers or 
potentials of an object themselves never become present, nor are 
they ever static, but rather they fluctuate in terms of the degree 
of their power and the power they possess” (TO 79–80). This 
brings us to the part of Bryant’s article influenced by autopoietic 
systems theory. From his previous arguments, he states, “it fol-
lows that the identity of a substance is not a fixed and abiding 
given that persists beneath change, but a perpetual activity on 
the part of substance” (TO 82). And further, “because objects are 
structured by différance, it follows that the identity of an object 
is not an abiding sameness, but a perpetual activity or process 
wherein the object constitutes itself as that object across time 
and space. Identity is a perpetual work objects must do in order 
to maintain themselves as that object” (TO 82). This having been 
established, it is easy for Bryant to turn to autopoiesis. As is well 
known, Maturana and Varela distinguish between “allopoietic” 
and “autopoietic” machines. The former are produced from the 
outside, with Bryant’s example being an asteroid formed from 
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the compression of numerous colliding rocks. A good exam-
ple of an autopoietic machine, by contrast, would be a living 
organism such as a cell. The cell’s unity is not given once and 
for all, like the asteroid until it is destroyed, but must be con-
stantly produced by labor on the cell’s interior. As Bryant puts it, 
“where allopoietic machines are largely indifferent to maintain-
ing their unity across time, autopoietic machines both strive to 
maintain a particular sort of unity and are perpetually produc-
ing that unity through the interaction of their components” (TO 
83). Autopoietic machines are also negentropic, in the sense that 
by producing their own unity, they work to decrease their own 
entropy. In this respect, transferring the terminology beyond its 
biological roots, “substances or objects are negentropic systems” 
(TO 83). The social systems theorist Niklas Luhmann, whose 
work Bryant knows well, draws on these ideas heavily. In Luh-
mann’s own words, “All elements pass away. They cannot endure 
as elements in time, and thus they must be constantly produced 
on the basis of whatever constellation of elements is actual at 
any given moment. Reproduction thus does not mean repeated-
ly producing the same, but rather reflexive production, produc-
tion out of products.”120 Bryant glosses this nicely by saying that 
“identity is not something in addition to the changing qualities 
of that substance but is rather the activity of the substance itself ” 
(TO 84). But despite this “structural” openness, there is “opera-
tional” closure, to use Luhmann’s terminology. Bryant cites the 
case of electric eels detecting other creatures in a river by means 
of electromagnetic fields, a type of perception closed to humans 
in our current evolutionary form (TO 84).
Nonetheless, différance would still seem to be incompatible 
with substance. As Bryant notes, “the local manifestations of 
substance are a product of deferral that is generally produced 
as a result of the exo-relations the substance enters into with 
other substances […] leading to the suspicion that substances 
are constituted by their relations, such that they have no autono-
120 Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. John Bednarz Jr. with Dirk Baecker 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 49.
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mous existence [apart] from their relations” (TO 86–87). Yet he 
also reminds us of the other sense of différance as “spacing,” 
through which “entities are differentiated from one another” 
(TO 87). It follows that difference is not just about the process of 
becoming-other, but also about the “scissions and divisions be-
tween entities whereby they become independent entities […] 
in the form of polemos” (TO 87). Turning to Derrida’s “Signature 
Event Context,” Bryant highlights his awareness of “the possibil-
ity of [a sign] breaking with the context in which it emerged, 
such that it can fall into other and different contexts” (TO 88), 
something we would never catch Ferdinand de Saussure say-
ing about signs, given his purely differential conception of how 
they work.121 Derrida refers to this as the “iterability” of signs in 
places other than their originating contexts, and Bryant won-
ders why Derrida restricts iterability to signs rather than natu-
rally extending them to allow for “iterable” substances that can 
be the same thing in multiple times and places (TO 89–90). In 
Voice and Phenomenon Derrida sounds a lot like David Hume 
(and Gratton) when claiming, in Bryant’s words, that “we must 
abandon the thesis that the synthesis of time is accomplished by 
a pre-existent transcendental identity or unity that affects the 
synthesis of traces of the past”122 (TO 90). It is the intentional 
object as a “bundle of traces” rather than a bundle of qualities, 
though to me this seems like needless forfeiture of what makes 
Husserl the thinker he is. Bryant challenges Derrida by saying 
that substances are real precisely as produced by “the interplay 
of these traces and differences themselves” (TO 90). There is no 
identity preceding the synthesis of time, since identity is the re-
sult of this synthesis itself (TO 90).
121 Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 307–30; Ferdinand 
de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994).
122 Jacques Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the 
Sign in Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Leonard Lawlor (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 2010).
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Bryant’s article has a number of points in its favor. First, it 
makes an ingenious attempt to synthesize the ideas of OOO with 
those of Derrida: a union that many find impossible, and that 
I for one prefer to downplay, given what I regard as Derrida’s 
excessive anti-realist baggage. Bryant also offers a vision of 
OOO as a dynamic theory opposed to the “static” model of real-
ity that many readers see and reject in my version. As usual, he 
also does fine interdisciplinary work in linking these ideas with 
the autopoietic systems theories of Maturana, Varela, and Luh-
mann, which he already did in memorable form in his widely 
read book The Democracy of Objects.123 To explain why I cannot 
follow Bryant in all of this will require several steps.
Let’s start with his “virtual proper being,” which is made up 
of powers, but powers which shift in intensity and even increase 
and decrease in number. The problem here, as I see it, is that 
Bryant thereby joins Derrida in a retreat from Husserl to Hume, 
though we should note that Bryant has far less at stake in Hus-
serl than does Derrida himself. Essentially, Bryant is saying that 
virtual proper being does not stay the same over time but is a 
“bundle” of altering powers with no inherent identity, even if it 
is “operationally closed” from its environment. He makes this 
clear at the end of the article when he proposes alliance with 
Derrida in holding that identities are not non-existent, but are 
produced through a bundle of traces synthesized in time. I imag-
ine that Derrida would be happy to go along with this, because 
it cedes the central point that identity is a derivative product of 
the non-identical, though the French thinker would surely add 
the distracting proviso that the primary/derivative distinction 
“remains within the language of metaphysics,” thereby “eras-
ing” this claim in the same moment as uttering it. But more 
importantly, such an alliance would leave Bryant with no way 
to account for the identity of a thing over time — given that its 
powers are constantly shifting — other than through a histori-
cal trajectory that links all the shifting powers as connected to 




some original virtual proper being at some unknown point in 
the past. Something similar is attempted by both DeLanda and 
Latour, though I do not think that either has much success with 
the maneuver. The problem is that it is far too permissive about 
what constitutes the identity of an object in its assumption that 
all the details of the history of a thing must be inscribed in its 
present state. In this way, it becomes impossible to distinguish 
between the essential and accidental “powers” of a thing, except 
by means of some arbitrary external criterion.
As an example, imagine a precocious four-year-old child 
who watches a chess program on television, becomes intrigued 
by the game, and receives a small chess set as a gift. It is easy 
to imagine such a child introducing the game to a growing cir-
cle of friends and easily defeating them in match after match. 
Let’s now imagine that this child does not continue with chess, 
forms entirely different mental interests within a few years, and 
by midlife is a rusty and barely competent chess player. Perhaps 
the grown-up child has become a world-renowned cellist, one 
so remarkably gifted that critics frequently say they were “born” 
to be a cellist. Now, we can say that this musician’s former chess-
playing powers have atrophied to the point that they barely exist 
any longer. Even so, a good number of their other four-year-old 
traits still persist as enduring aspects of their character. If we 
are devotees of Bryant’s philosophy, we will say that chess-play-
ing power belonged to the musician for a while at ages four to 
five before “de-intensifying” or perhaps disappearing. Yet given 
that Bryant wishes to speak of virtual proper being solely as a 
“bundle of powers,” it is not clear how the chess-playing future 
cellist can be the same person as the post-chess-playing child. 
One could always push things to the limit and say that they were 
not the same child, that the child is “many,” an adventure across 
time: that we can only speak of the “lives” of the cellist in the 
plural (there are still intellectual circles today where pluralizing 
any noun is taken as a sign of superior insight). But in that case, 
it is not clear why the fifty-year-old cellist would have any clos-
er relation to their four-year-old, chess-playing self than they 
would with other present-day cellist friends of similar lifestyles, 
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political views, taste in literature, and so forth. More generally, 
to say that identity is produced only from the outside is to sacri-
fice both the phenomenological fact that entities are recognized 
as the same despite changing features, and the ontological prin-
ciple that the same object can simultaneously be seen in dif-
ferent ways from different vantage points without being more 
than one object. After all, the latter claim would soon lead us to 
Merleau-Ponty’s impossible view that a house is “the house seen 
from everywhere,” as if it were a sum of views rather than be-
ing what makes views of the house possible in the first place.124 
Such a procedure treats everything as primarily a surface-effect 
or bundle-effect so that identities come second, as derivative 
products of those surfaces and bundles. But in that case, I am 
not sure why Bryant would still want to call his position object-
oriented. It would be more accurate instead if he were to call 
himself “difference-oriented,” while adopting a Derridean posi-
tion that iterability is all the identity we need.
Second, I do not think the references to autopoietic systems 
theory do the work Bryant wants them to do. According to sys-
tems theory, a system does maintain a certain identity across 
time from a standpoint outside it, which is precisely why it 
has often been accused of a bias toward political conservatism. 
I mentioned earlier that Luhmann is famous for holding that 
systems are extremely difficult to change, since they tend to in-
terpret outside influences in their own terms; his contempt for 
political protests is just one result of this view. In short, it is not 
even clear that autopoiesis is more committed to change than 
to stasis, which is why Luhmann’s ontology is nowhere near as 
relational as Latour’s.
It is true that as soon as we look inside any system, we will see 
that a lot of work goes into maintaining it. My former employer, 
the American University in Cairo, is still there in basically the 
same form as I left it, but there has been such turnover from 
my time in administration that I count only three people still in 
124 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 79.
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place of the dozen or more colleagues I had in the Provost’s Of-
fice. Eventually, those three will also be gone, no doubt replaced 
by competent successors. Any living or quasi-living system will 
experience abundant changes in its parts. But all this means is 
that the parts of a university administration, or of any system, 
have a limited time on the job. It does not follow that everything 
is in constant flux, so that identity is only a second-hand prod-
uct. It was not through some change in my identity that I decid-
ed to leave university administration; my position involved rela-
tively stable tasks over the course of four years, and this did not 
change even though the Provost, my boss, changed two or three 
times in rapid succession while I was there. In order to leave 
Cairo, I needed my wife to prefer to live elsewhere, then needed 
to cut down on commuting by accepting a new job closer to her 
own. In short, the notion of constant flux is a continuist solution 
to what is often a punctuated problem, as in the Eldredge/Gould 
or Margulis challenges to Darwinian gradualism in evolution-
ary theory. The parts of a cell seem to us to change constantly, 
but that is mostly because they die quickly by the standards of 
the human lifespan, which is not the same thing as saying that 
they have no identity but are immersed in Heraclitean flux. 
In my book Immaterialism, I criticized the actor-network ap-
proach to history on analogous grounds. Whereas ANT could 
treat the Dutch East India Company only as a flux or trajectory 
across time, characterized by constantly changing powers and 
personae, I argued that historical objects are best seen through 
a discrete series of initial symbioses — half a dozen or so, not 
infinite in number — that fix the nature of an entity early on, 
thus leading it into a long period of relative stability marked by 
a phase of ripening and a phase of decline, ending ultimately 
in destruction as it falls out of phase with its environment. By 
contrast, the “flux” model of history cannot explain why enti-
ties do remain relatively stable. When autopoiesis theory is suc-
cessful, as in Luhmann’s best work, this is generally because it 
emphasizes the stability of a system over its many vacillations. 
Yes, every system is swarming with internal parts, but once we 
regard these parts as systems, we see that they too are marked 
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by relative stability, however short-lived by comparison with the 
solar system or even the Roman Empire.125
Everyone knows that the world is marked by both stability 
and change, by the discrete and the continuous. The only ques-
tion is how we account for both of these in our thinking. Aris-
totle does this with a division of labor, placing endurance and 
discreteness on the side of substance, and perishing and con-
tinuity on the side of accidents, time, space, and number. We 
have seen that the occasionalists opt instead for radical discrete-
ness, and philosophers of difference for radical continuity, even 
when they add the last-minute epicycles of “folds” and “spac-
ings.” The problem with both groups of extremists (the Bryant 
of “The Time of the Object” belongs with Derrida in the second 
group) is that they must treat the opposite term as a byprod-
uct rather than as something real in its own right. OOO in my 
version follows a more Aristotelian model, treating the real as 
discrete and the sensual as the continuous, with ruptures on one 
level or the other intermittently rearranging the map. Note that 
I say intermittently, not constantly. Those who hold that flux and 
becoming must be constant are simply reducing all stasis to flux, 
and when everything is flux, then no flux is significant. The dif-
ference between stability and change becomes trivial.
125 See also Graham Harman, “Conclusions: Assemblage Theory and Its Fu-
ture,” in Reassembling International Theory, eds. Michele Acuto and Simon 






Wolfen dale’s book is very long, much longer than it needed to 
be. But in some respects the length is deceptive, since much of 
the philosophical work is done in the sections on withdrawal in 
Heidegger and OOO.1 Most of the rest of the book consists either 
of repetitive announcements of the supposed mistakes found in 
these pages, or in celebratory instances of the author high-fiving 
himself for having uncovered what he takes to be a gross pat-
tern of errors and manipulations. Here as elsewhere, Wolfen dale 
adopts a style of critical carpet-bombing, in the sense that near-
ly every paragraph finds something wrong or stumbles across 
some supposed new blunder. At times this makes it difficult to 
understand the chief premises from which he is operating, so 
that much reconstruction was needed in the form of outlines 
to identify his most important points. He also tends to present 
his own assumptions about philosophy as obvious truths, even 
while accusing me of the same vice repeatedly. Finally, he relies 
more heavily than he admits on the philosophy of Robert Bran-
dom, and in many instances I would rather have responded to 
Brandom than to Wolfen dale himself.
1 Peter Wolfen dale, Object-Oriented Philosophy: The Noumenon’s New Clothes 
(Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014), 39–78. Subsequent page references are given 
between parentheses in the main text.
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A few disagreements of fact must also be recorded. I deny the 
accuracy of Wolfen dale’s account of the state of the Speculative 
Realist blogosphere in the summer of 2010, which he depicts as 
if Levi Bryant and I strangled a thriving egalitarian ecosystem by 
merely asserting our own pre-eminence (xiv). Blog readers are 
free to travel where they will, and they gravitate naturally to the 
most active and interesting blogs available. Bryant is surely the 
greatest philosophy blogger in the history of the medium, and 
my own blog was visited frequently in those days by my increas-
ing number of readers.2 There was no assertion of supremacy 
over and above these basic facts, nor am I even sure what such 
assertion would entail. As with most social media, since Bryant 
and I were the two most visible bloggers, we also faced nearly 
constant attacks from trolls and other aggressors, some of them 
sending hate mail to our personal accounts. Wolfen dale was no-
where near the worst of our blogosphere opponents, though it is 
true that Bryant and I were consistently annoyed at the time by 
what we saw as his pretense of superior rationality. I am afraid 
there is still too much of this attitude visible in his book.
Finally, Wolfen dale seems to have misunderstood what hap-
pened in our email correspondence of June 2010. Thus a book, 
which by his own admission was motivated largely by revenge, 
was written in answer to a slight that never really occurred (xi–
xii). As I reread our 2010 correspondence now, I am struck by 
how polite it is on both sides. As Wolfen dale accurately reports, I 
wrote to him on June 21 of that year and offered two options for 
dealing with his increasing number of blog posts written against 
me — either condense all of his objections into a single post 
that I would then answer, or publish an article so that I would 
then feel obliged to respond. The next day, June 22, Wolfen dale 
responded at length, saying among other things that he would 
choose the blog post option. Now, he is perfectly correct that I 
2 Levi R. Bryant’s blog is entitled Larval Subjects, https://larvalsubjects.word-
press.com/, and has not been very active for the past few years. My own, 
Object-Oriented Philosophy, https://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/, is still 
active, but now functions mainly as a bulletin board for philosophy news. 
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responded on the same day in a message that included the fol-
lowing words: “However, I can’t be engaging in long responses 
to long blog posts at this stage of my activities; too little payoff 
for an awful lot of work. If you ever publish a critique some-
where so that our necks are equally on the chopping block, I’ll 
be delighted to write a response.” He summarizes this email by 
saying that I “revoked” the previously extended option of re-
sponding to a single long blog post. While I can see why he 
might have interpreted my email in this way, it is a simple mis-
understanding. Nowhere in the email just quoted was my earlier 
offer revoked; that is Wolfen dale’s own interpretation of my say-
ing, “I can’t be engaging in long responses to long blog posts at 
this stage of my activities.” All the facts show is that I had written 
two consecutive emails, a day apart, that seemed to contradict 
each other on a single point. Since I said nothing to explain this 
contradiction, I wonder why Wolfen dale simply didn’t ask me 
about it. The probable explanation of what happened is that I 
was buried in emails during that period, highly distracted by 
preparations for my upcoming administrative post, and sim-
ply forgot what I told him from one day to the next. Although 
he tells us that this incident “irked [him] a little” (xii), I see no 
evidence of annoyance in the emails that followed. His initial 
response was simply “I entirely understand,” and his next mes-
sage on June 24 turned to asking for advice about applying for 
a specific postdoctoral position, which I quickly provided. Thus 
I was surprised by Wolfen dale’s consistent rudeness to me on 
our next meeting, at Markus Gabriel’s two-week Bonn Summer 
School in 2012, where Wolfen dale was a student and I was on the 
faculty. When my attempts to joke with him at the refreshment 
table in Bonn were met with stone-faced silence, I realized he 
must be very angry about something and simply gave up trying 
to break the ice. Two years later, his book appeared.
Teamwork
Wolfen dale’s book, however, did not appear in isolation. There 
is a back-cover endorsement from Slavoj Žižek that speaks in 
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his favor against me. This came as a surprise, given that Žižek 
and I are on reasonably friendly terms, and given as well that his 
endorsement makes little intellectual sense. There was also the 
afterword to Wolfen dale’s book by my longtime friend-turned-
enemy Ray Brassier, ghoulishly entitled “Speculative Autopsy.”3 I 
will speak briefly to each of these peripheral factors before mov-
ing to deal with Wolfen dale himself. 
Initially, Žižek’s words on the back cover of the book disap-
pointed me. When it was published in 2014 I had still only met 
Žižek once in person, also at the Bonn Summer School two 
years earlier. But we had long engaged in warm correspondence 
linked with my ultimately failed efforts to bring him to lecture 
in Egypt. I should clarify that the first paragraph of Žižek’s en-
dorsement was neither a surprise nor an annoyance, but simply 
an accurate expression of his well-known differences from OOO. 
The surprise came in the second paragraph, where the Slovenian 
thinker is quoted as saying “what Peter Wolfen dale does in his 
detailed and forceful book is what Kant did to Swedenborg.” The 
reference, of course, is to Kant’s “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.”4 What 
puzzled me here is that Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) was 
a full-blown mystic who claimed to have seen dead spirits in 
dreams. This has nothing at all to do with OOO, which critiques 
both mysticism and rationalism for the same reason — their 
shared claim to know reality directly, whether by spiritual or in-
tellectual means. I eventually wrote to Žižek about the matter, 
and though I will keep his exact response private, suffice it to 
say that I no longer take his endorsement of the book seriously.5 
More recently, we have done events together in Los Angeles and 
Munich, videos of which can easily be found on YouTube.6 
3 Ray Brassier, “Postscript: Speculative Autopsy,” in Peter Wolfen dale, Object-
Oriented Philosophy (Falstaff: Urbanomic, 2014), 407–21.
4 Immanuel Kant, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer: Illustrated by Dreams of Meta-
physics, ed. Frank Sewall, trans. Emanuel F. Goerwitz (London: Forgotten 
Books, 2012)
5 Slavoj Žižek, personal communication, November 5, 2016.
6 For our Los Angeles discussion in March 2017, see Ippolit Belinski, “Sla-
voj Žižek & Graham Harman Duel + Duet (Mar. 2017),” YouTube, March 
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As for Brassier’s postscript, it continues the unfortunate pat-
tern of intellectual dishonesty found in all of his remarks on 
Speculative Realism since 2009. The interested reader can find 
my account of the history of that movement in at least three dif-
ferent publications, and Brassier has never dared deny any of it.7 
Instead, he has chosen to muddy the waters with a series of pub-
lic insults aimed at me and my colleagues rather than engaging 
in the interesting philosophical debate that could be had, often 
under the pretense that we are not even worth debating. In what 
follows, I will limit myself to correcting two factual errors and 
one badly misleading statement in his Postscript.
The two errors are both found, strangely enough, in Brassier’s 
first paragraph: “Has Speculative Realism passed the existence 
test? Graham Harman has certainly served as its indefatigable 
midwife. No doubt modesty forbade him from mentioning that 
he is commissioning editor of the ‘thriving book series’ he cites, 
and the self-volunteered editor of the new Speculative Real-
ism section of the popular PhilPapers website.”8 There is some 
real venom to this passage, and it is baffling that Brassier is so 
bothered by my routine editorial work; I scarcely need mention 
the foolish own goal of calling one’s opponent in philosophical 
debate a “midwife.” Let’s start with the second error, which is re-
futed more quickly. I am not the “self-volunteered” editor of the 
Speculative Realism section of the PhilPapers website, but was 
invited to become editor by no less a figure than David Chalm-
ers. I had never met or corresponded with Chalmers prior to 
this invitation, though he did mention having liked my article 
2, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1PJo_-n2vI. For our Mu-
nich discussion of December 2018, see Lagebesprechungen, “Graham 
Harman and Slavoj Zizek: talk and debate: On Object Oriented Ontol-
ogy,” YouTube, December 6, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
6GHiV4tuRt8.
7 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making, 2nd edn. 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 77–80; Graham Harman, 
“The Current State of Speculative Realism,” in Speculations IV, eds. Michael 
Austin et al. (Earth: punctum books, 2013), 22–28; Graham Harman, Specu-
lative Realism: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), 2–4.
8 Brassier, “Postscript,” 409.
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“Zero-Person and the Psyche,” which, ironically enough, Brass-
ier also liked very much at the time of its completion.9 Other 
than that, I am not sure why Chalmers invited me to do the 
job rather than Brassier or one of his allies. It might be because 
I write a lot and generally try to say “yes” to everything I am 
asked to do. Given that so many academics refuse to take on 
additional work, those who habitually accept it tend to acquire 
reputations and are “rewarded” with more work. As Vice Prov-
ost Ali Hadi of the American University in Cairo once told me, 
“If you want something done, ask a busy person.” If nothing else, 
I have been busy. As for not mentioning that I am the editor of 
the thriving Speculative Realism series at Edinburgh University 
Press, no, this was not due to “modesty” as Brassier sardoni-
cally remarks, but to the fact that I cannot legitimately claim 
credit for the success of the series. Here again I was recruited to 
the job, this time by Carol MacDonald at EUP, who asked me to 
write up a series proposal for referees to examine; it has been a 
rare pleasure to work closely with Carol for the past decade. The 
Speculative Realism series is, in fact, one of the best-selling at 
EUP, and if Brassier thinks I could make this happen with per-
sonal marketing and branding efforts rather than an interested 
readership and outstanding authors, he is overestimating my 
degree of evil charisma. 
Otherwise, Brassier’s postscript juggles affirmation and re-
jection of the relevance of correlationism, along with recurrent 
digs at me for deliberately referring to Speculative Realism as 
a “brand,” coupled with his own transparent efforts to rebrand 
it as the product of personal collaboration between him and 
his longtime friend Albert Toscano.10 Although he reports that 
9 Graham Harman, “Zero-Person and the Psyche,” in Mind That Abides: 
Panpsychism in the New Millennium, ed. David Skrbina (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 2009), 253–82.
10 Brassier, “Postscript,” 414n6. As for my use of the term “brand,” it occurs in 
the first paragraph of Graham Harman, “On the Undermining of Objects: 
Grant, Bruno, and Radical Philosophy,” in The Speculative Turn: Continen-
tal Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham 
Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 21–40.
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Toscano is “annoyed” to be associated with it, his remarkable 
response to this annoyance is to link his friend to Speculative 
Realism more closely than even before. I and others owe Tos-
cano gratitude for organizing the 2007 Goldsmiths workshop, 
and for capably replacing the absent Quentin Meillassoux at the 
follow-up event two years later in Bristol. But it is a matter of 
record that Speculative Realism is primarily something Brassier 
cooked up with me, during April 2006, and it is pointless to at-
tempt a revisionist history at this stage.
But the tricky central matter is responding to Wolfen dale’s 
book itself. As mentioned, my method in what follows will be to 
focus on a small set of important issues raised in his book, while 
trying to keep everything as impersonal as I can. On some points 
that arise I will invoke the right of self-defense, though I will try 
to exercise it in a non-inflammatory way; in any case, I will try 
to keep my tone less insulting than Wolfen dale’s own. I will first 
address the subtitle of the book, The Noumenon’s New Clothes. 
This was apparently meant to have a bite to it. The source of 
this well-known image is the famous 1837 tale by Hans Christian 
Andersen, in which a small child is the only one with courage 
enough to say that the emperor is wearing nothing at all, even 
as others obsequiously praise his non-existent clothing.11 Since 
then, the phrase “the emperor has no clothes” has been used and 
overused by sceptics to refer to the supposed nullity of other-
wise popular phenomena. Over the decades, critics have often 
been proud to refer to such figures as Jacques Derrida or Jack-
son Pollock as “having no clothes,” though the Irish art critic 
Declan Long once remarked on social media that those who use 
this metaphor “are dead to [him],” and I too am suspicious of 
those who resort to the phrase too quickly. Why exaggerate by 
claiming that a public personality is not just less important than 
other people think, but utterly naked? In the words of Raymond 
Chandler’s detective Philip Marlowe, “All tough guys are mo-
11 Hans Christian Andersen, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in Stories and 
Tales, trans. H.W. Dulcken (London: Routledge, 2002), 81–84.
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notonous. Like playing cards with a deck that’s all aces. You’ve 
got everything and you’ve got nothing.”12
What I mean to say is that “The Emperor’s New Clothes” was 
not a good model for the subtitle of Wolfen dale’s book, and for 
two reasons. First, we should remember that the naked man in 
the story was the emperor and that people feared to tell him the 
truth because of his immense political power over them. (In-
cidentally, he is not an entirely unsympathetic character in the 
story, given his initial honest insistence that he does not see any 
of the supposed clothes.) In what sense do I enjoy a mighty im-
perial power that terrified critics are afraid to debunk? This is 
the first respect in which Wolfen dale’s subtitle misses the mark. 
The next problem is the one-word substitution in the subtitle, 
which speaks not of the emperor’s, but the noumenon’s new 
clothes. It is noteworthy that Wolfen dale did not choose Kant’s 
New Clothes as his subtitle, presumably because he agrees with 
me that Kant is a legitimate great philosopher and by no means 
naked. But of all Kant’s major concepts, surely the noumenon 
is the least comparable to an emperor. Although most philoso-
phers since Kant are profoundly in his debt, how many of them 
have defended the inaccessible noumenon rather than attacking 
it as a residual piece of dogmatism? Obviously, the latter take 
is far more common. The defense of the noumenon made by 
me — and very few others — is a risky position that has to set up 
shop far indeed from any emperor’s palace. 
The proverbial subtitle Wolfen dale needed instead was this 
one: Old Wine in New Bottles. It would have made more sense 
and struck closer to the bone. This alternate subtitle would have 
implied that OOO was merely recycling a moment in the his-
tory of philosophy that had been widely discredited since Kant’s 
time. I have counterarguments against this claim too, but it 
would have been much closer to the target than charging that 
I am a very powerful person who is really completely naked. 
12 Raymond J. Chandler, The Long Goodbye, in Later Novels and Other Writ-
ings (New York: Library of America, 1995), 483.
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Let’s see now if I can distill Wolfen dale’s book into a manageable 
number of key points. 
His lengthy work covers many different topics. The impres-
sion he apparently wants to give is that of a total demolition of 
my work, as if he were exposing an utterly empty and fraudulent 
project. But that is not what actually happens over the course of 
his many pages. Instead, Wolfen dale begins with a set of per-
sonal suppositions (often left unstated) about what philosophy 
ought to be, notes my divergence from them, and hints that this 
is evidence of a systematically irrational and incompetent ap-
proach. Strangely central to his enterprise is a point-by-point 
“refutation” of the interpretation of Heidegger with which my 
authorial career began. Since relatively few readers of Wolfen-
dale’s book will have sufficient background — or even inter-
est — in Heidegger to judge his supposed refutation, he effec-
tively capitalizes on the ignorance of those who merely share his 
wish to throw stones at me and my colleagues, often for reasons 
that are less than admirable. To show the arbitrary character of 
both his philosophical presuppositions and his interpretation of 
Heidegger will go a long way toward showing that the book’s 
hundreds of pages are built on soft soil.
Wolfen dale’s introduction (3–25) gives a surprisingly good 
summary of OOO, and even shows a sense of humor and an en-
gaging prose style, despite the already malicious undercurrent 
of these early pages. It is not true, as Wolfen dale likes to claim 
(29), that my writings are such a mess that he had to labor as if 
in a salt mine simply to reconstruct the arguments contained 
therein. The unbiased reader — meaning one who is not reading 
the book primarily in order to bask in its negative affect — will 
no doubt find that my own expositions of OOO are clearer and 
more to the point. He divides his subject matter into three parts, 
and I have no objection to this manner of division: 1. Withdraw-
al, 2. The Fourfold, and 3. Vicarious Causation. Since Wolfen-
dale follows this schema in the expository sections of chapter 2, 
I will adopt it for my response as well. 
The opening section of Wolfen dale’s chapter 2 (30–37) also 
has an introductory feel to it, and thus I will consider it here as 
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well. Here we see an aspect of the book that is foreign to Brass-
ier’s own interests. Namely, along with his own rationalist pro-
clivities, Wolfen dale reports that he has ambitions to be recog-
nized as an insightful Heidegger scholar in his own right. This is 
mostly visible in the footnotes. In one such note, he reports that 
while his own Ph.D. dissertation on Heidegger diverges “from 
the standard analytic and Continental readings, much as Har-
man’s does, [it] comes to conclusions radically different (and, 
I would argue, far more nuanced) than Harman’s” (31n20; ital-
ics added). In another note a few pages later, he falsely claims 
that “Harman never provides any generic definition or analysis 
of the term [Being] that goes beyond his own metaphysical ac-
count of it” (33n23). It is hard to respond to this claim, given 
that the entirety of Tool-Being provides just such an account. 
Whereas most books on Heidegger merely repeat his presen-
tation of Being as a question, my debut book takes the risk of 
claiming that Heidegger already gives us a provisional answer to 
the Seinsfrage, and the same holds of my introductory book Hei-
degger Explained published five years later. Incidentally, since 
Heidegger scholars seem to enjoy cackling at the supposed arro-
gance of the title Heidegger Explained, I should mention in pass-
ing that the title was chosen for me: all books in that particular 
Open Court series consist of a philosopher’s name followed by 
Explained.
Wolfen dale also complains that I speak of being only in op-
position to “seeming,” whereas Heidegger — in his celebrated 
Introduction to Metaphysics — devotes whole sections to four 
separate oppositions. Although the author does not mention 
them by name in his note, they are as follows: 1. Being and Be-
coming; 2. Being and Seeming; 3. Being and Thinking; and 4. 
Being and the Ought.13 Does Tool-Being really limit itself to the 
second item on this list, as Wolfen dale claims? Not at all. For 
one thing, the real/sensual pair in my work is relevant to “Be-
ing and Thinking” no less than to “Being and Seeming.” As for 
13 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and 
Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).
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the first item on the list, Tool-Being drives an explicit wedge 
between Heidegger and Bergson on the question of becoming, 
precisely because of the strong link I see between Heidegger and 
occasionalism with its succession of isolated instants. In short, 
I do not think that Heidegger has anything of interest to tell us 
about becoming. That leaves only “Being and the Ought.” Given 
Wolfen dale’s allegiance to Wilfrid Sellars and the Pittsburgh 
School, preoccupied as it is with questions of “normativity,” I 
can see why he would wish I had dealt with the issue of norms 
in Tool-Being. But then he simply ought to have said so, instead 
of exaggerating the supposed one-dimensionality of my book’s 
treatment of Being. This brings us to one of the major problems 
with Wolfen dale’s book, as I see it: the low likelihood that it will 
receive a sufficient amount of the constructive critical feedback 
that young authors need. The most avid readers of the book will 
be those who hate me, OOO, or both, and these are not the right 
people to rein him in when his claims stray beyond the available 
evidence. Certainly it will not be Brassier who does this, judging 
from the unseemly flattery of Wolfen dale that fills up the final 
page of his postscript (421).
I am also left breathless when Wolfen dale praises himself for 
“discursive charity” in his reconstruction of my views (30). An 
example of his less-than-charitable charity comes when the au-
thor claims that “our current task is thus to draw [Harman’s ar-
guments] out of hiding and expose them to the light of reason” 
(29), which anyone will recognize as condescension rather than 
charity. This is a problem throughout the book. Rather than 
just saying that he strongly disagrees with what I say about a 
given topic, and giving reasons for why, he invariably presents 
himself in the guise of an enlightened hero in unique relation 
to reason who will now show where a lesser figure has botched 
everything in sight — although “reason” is usually just short-
hand for “Wolfen dale’s own philosophical commitments.” An 
example of this is his assertion that “Harman gives us little in 
the way of phenomenological methodology” (32). There is no 
trace in this statement of my original interpretation of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, centered in my argument that his true en-
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emy is British Empiricism and its “bundles of qualities” rather 
than psychologism. There is also my further claim that Husserl 
wrongly links the essential qualities/adumbrations pair with the 
thought/sensation pair. Both of these points are stark depar-
tures from the chain restaurant phenomenology one usually en-
counters, and on some level Wolfen dale must know it. Genuine 
“discursive charity” would not pass over these matters in silence 
while claiming that I give the reader “little in the way of phe-
nomenological methodology” (32). Wolfen dale’s real worry only 
becomes clear on the following page, with this bit: “This sidelin-
ing of methodological issues is rather worrying given Harman’s 
unapologetic calls to return to the problems of precritical meta-
physics” (33). This is already not quite right. No one should cite 
my view that pre-Kantian metaphysical problems should be fair 
game once more without also noting that I endorse the exist-
ence of the Kantian thing-in-itself, the ultimate remedy to all 
pre-critical dogmatism. What the author really seems to worry 
about in my supposed “sidelining of methodological issues” is 
the weakened status of epistemology in OOO. All his various put-
downs about methodology rest on his claim that epistemology 
must be the starting point for any real philosophy. This, finally, 
is a philosophical argument; unlike insults, it can be challenged 
via counterargument.
Wolfen dale calls his own philosophy “transcendental real-
ism,” and it easy to see what he means by each of these terms, 
which together form the heart of Modern Onto-Taxonomy. 
“Transcendental” means that we must begin with the self-reflex-
ivity of the human subject and ask how this subject is even able 
to know the world, just as happens with Meillassoux’s frequently 
overlooked embrace of the correlational circle. Wolfen dale real-
izes this similarity and soon tells us about it, “I agree with Quen-
tin Meillassoux that the essence of correlationism is epistemo-
logical rather than metaphysical, and that it must be challenged 
on this terrain rather than dismissed as ontologically arrogant” 
(36). OOO does not agree. Indeed, OOO does not accept the exist-
ence of a self-justified subfield called “epistemology” at all, but 
interprets it as a bad ontology that takes the thought–world rela-
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tion to be the basis of all others. By “realism,” Wolfen dale means 
a realism in which science has the ultimate say about the real. 
Although he and Brassier like to pretend that the term “scient-
ism” is meaningless or vacuous, a perfectly good definition of 
the term is given by James Ladyman and Don Ross in chapter 1 
of Everything Must Go — namely, that science ought to be the 
ultimate authority on all the problems usually treated by meta-
physics.14 And while Brassier likes to complain further that OOO 
conflates scientism with naturalism, any nuance on this point 
is irrelevant, given that both he and Wolfen dale wholeheart-
edly endorse a Ladyman/Ross form of scientism, according to 
which — for example — OOO is forbidden to speak about causa-
tion beyond the limits of current discussions in natural science. 
This is a thoroughly scientistic form of scientism, demanded 
solely for scientism’s sake. To summarize, Wolfen dale thinks 
philosophy should begin with epistemological reflections on 
what thought is able to know in the first place (“transcenden-
tal”) before ending in a deferential attitude towards science (“re-
alism”), except maybe on a few scattered ethical and aesthetic 
problems, if even there. This is a textbook version of Modern 
Onto-Taxonomy, and for this reason I regard the author’s 400+ 
pages against OOO as issuing from a philosophically retrograde 
stance. Speaking of history, Wolfen dale sees fit to “commend” 
me for “wielding [the] method [of historical exposition] with 
some skill” (31). The reader can almost hear him swallow hard 
as he makes this concession, and of course he quickly flips it into 
a negative: “this method […] can easily slip from licit exposi-
tion to illicit justification in the form of arguments from author-
ity. […] (equivalent to saying ‘you need to go read Aristotle/
Hegel/Heidegger etc. before we can talk seriously about this’)” 
(31). But he gives no examples of such “illicit justification” in my 
work, and thus I have to wonder how many he found. On the 
whole, I think my books do a good job of wearing their erudi-
tion lightly, giving readers just enough historical background to 
14 James Ladyman and Don Ross, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Natural-
ized (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 61.
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understand the context of an idea without making them feel ex-
cluded from the discussion. No doubt I do this more effectively 
in some cases than in others; that is the nature of the beast when 
writing books. We all know there are authors in philosophy who 
use their learning to bully readers into submission, but I would 
bet that vanishingly few readers, Wolfen dale included, consider 
me to be one of them. I expend a great deal of effort in writing 
user-friendly prose, or at least as user-friendly as prose in books 
of metaphysics can be. To say the least, neither Wolfen dale nor 
Brassier would have an easy time claiming they are more ap-
proachable writers than I am.
As a final initial point, I call attention to a second mistake 
in a footnote already mentioned (33n23). En route to Wolfen-
dale’s false claim that I “almost entirely [elide] the general sense 
referring to the Being of objects as such with which Heidegger 
himself is principally concerned” (33), he says that all I cover is 
the being of specific beings as well as the being of the totality of 
all objects. As for the first claim, I do not think there is any “Be-
ing of objects as such” apart from specific beings — though for 
different reasons from Derrida — and give multiple arguments 
to this effect. Hence there is no “elision” of Being as such in Tool-
Being, but an explicit discussion of why I see no such distinction 
in Heidegger as the one that Wolfen dale demands. As for the 
second, I explicitly reject the notion of a totality of objects, as 
Wolfen dale himself acknowledges later in the book. In making 
his claim about my supposed focus on totality, Wolfen dale sends 
the reader to page 294 of Tool-Being. But on that page I criticize 
Heidegger for treating tools as belonging to a single global sys-
tem, and try to show how his account of how tools break works 
against any holism of equipment. More generally, I reject the 
notion that all objects belong to one encompassing largest ob-
ject, as seen in a 2010 article (which Wolfen dale has read) that 
talks about how the uppermost level of reality consists of “dor-
mant” objects that are not currently in relation with anything 
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else and thus do not form part of a larger object.15 What Wolfen-
dale really seems to be saying is that I wrongly accuse Heidegger 
of treating Being as a single large object, though he leaves the 
point ambiguous at this early stage of his book. I will return to 
the topic shortly. This is a related problem that recurs repeatedly 
throughout the book. Quite often Wolfen dale will cite my view 
on a single point, or my failure to discuss a certain point, and 
make it sound as if this were ridiculous on its face and a sign of 
innate carelessness on my part. Yet more often than not, these 
critiques are based on some philosophical agenda of his own 
that he does not announce until much later, though it would 
have been helpful to know from the start how it motivates a par-
ticular complaint. In the present case, by saying that through 
my focus on beings I “almost entirely [elide] the general sense 
referring to the Being of objects as such with which Heidegger 
himself is principally concerned,” he tries to make it look as if 
I have messed up badly as an interpreter by failing to account 
for something obtrusively obvious in Heidegger’s own writings. 
We are a good way down the road before Wolfen dale clarifies 
the nature of his own investment in a sharp distinction between 
Being as a whole and the being of particular beings. For only in 
chapter 3 does he admit that “I doubt whether it is possible to 
think beings as such directly without either implicit definition, 
metaphorical allusion, or a highest genus of being,” a significant 
concession to my position, despite the hastily added caveat that 
he would “hesitate to claim that it is strictly impossible” (319). 
By shifting to the Whole, Wolfen dale thinks he can also shift 
from the indirect and the allusive to the direct mastery available 
to “logic.” To summarize, he belatedly admits that I am right 
about individual entities, and would prefer to change the topic 
to one where he thinks he has the upper hand. A fairer way to 
introduce our disagreement on page 33 would have been some-
thing like this:
15 Graham Harman, “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos: A New Theory of Cau-
sation,” Cosmos and History 6, no. 1 (2010): 15.
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Here we see for the first time an important disagreement 
between me and Harman that will have significant ramifica-
tions for this book. Harman chooses to focus on the structure 
of individual beings while downplaying any notion of Being 
as such. But while I concede that he largely gets it right about 
these individuals — in terms of the difficulty or even impos-
sibility of gaining direct access to them — I still hold that di-
rect access is possible to something like the structure of Be-
ing as a whole. In this way, Harman’s attempt to downplay the 
role of knowledge when it comes to Being is undercut, given 
that his allusively accessible withdrawn beings are dependent 
on a prior logic of Being in general that is perfectly knowable. 
This is how intellectual disputes ought to be conducted, not by 
pretending that an opponent’s disagreement with us is merely 
an outrageous blunder, before admitting three hundred pages 
later that he was at least half-right all along.
Perhaps the most programmatic statement in the introduc-
tory pages of Wolfen dale’s book comes in the final two points of 
a six-point list that he directs against me. I refer to the following:
(v) I predict that a return to metaphysical speculation with-
out the methodological awareness accompanying an answer 
to the question “What is metaphysics?” is doomed to failure; 
and (vi) I think that there can be no viable ‘realism’ without 
a definition of ‘real’ more subtle than “that which is always 
other than our knowledge of it.” (36)
Anyone can make “predictions” about what will happen in the 
near future of philosophy. More than that, everyone does make 
such predictions, since any philosophical career amounts to a 
bet placed on the relative long-term importance or unimpor-
tance of different currently available research programs. In 
point (v), with its insistence on “methodological awareness,” 
Wolfen dale is telling us that he has staked his own career on 
the need for epistemological preliminaries if philosophy is to be 
rigorous. In this he scarcely departs from Meillassoux’s surpris-
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ing allegiance — which I regard as ill-considered — to the “cor-
relational circle,” or from Brassier’s fondness for what he now 
terms “good correlationism” (412), another synonym for episte-
mology. But this is not the only possible method for philosophy, 
and Wolfen dale ought to just call it what it really is — his own 
preferred epistemological starting point. This only makes sense 
if one holds (as I do not) that the thought–world relationship is 
the one through which all others must be processed, so that to 
speak of the collision between two billiard balls self-reflexively 
means to speak of my thought of the collision of two billiard 
balls. OOO rejects this way of proceeding and considers it to be 
what is “doomed to failure.” Moreover, this is not just a “pre-
diction” on my part, but follows from a systematic rejection of 
Modern Onto-Taxonomy.
We move now to point (vi), “there can be no viable ‘realism’ 
without a definition of ‘real’ more subtle than ‘that which is al-
ways other than our knowledge of it.’” This is simply another 
version of the old “negative theology” canard that OOO can only 
tell us what an object is not, not what it is. It is mistaken on two 
levels. First of all, there are other features of the object we can 
deduce aside from its being “other than our knowledge of it.” 
Knowledge is Wolfen dale’s own obsession. For OOO, the object 
is other than any relation anything might have with it; this al-
ready does important work in broadening the initial scope of 
philosophy beyond the thought–world dyad in which Onto-
Taxonomists like Wolfen dale have imprisoned it. Beyond that, 
for OOO there must be multiple objects and not just one, mean-
ing it has already taken a position on a question that Kant appar-
ently considers insoluble. Objects are also torn by a rift between 
themselves and their own qualities, which takes us beyond the 
ambient British Empiricism in which even post-Husserlian phi-
losophy tends to operate. There are other features of both real 
and sensual objects that can be deduced, but I would prefer to 
leave the full list for a different occasion.
But the second problem concerns Wolfen dale’s — and not 
only Wolfen dale’s — inability to distinguish between philoso-
phia and knowledge. To accuse someone of “negative theology” 
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when they reject the primacy of discursively available prop-
erties of things is to fall into the trap of Meno’s Paradox. The 
reader will recall that this paradox amounts to the Sophist’s view 
that we either know something or we do not, and therefore it 
is pointless to search for what is not already contained in our 
starting point. Socrates responds with his central teaching about 
the status of human beings in the cosmos: that we are both in 
the truth and not in the truth. OOO’s way of addressing the is-
sue is with the impossibility of exhausting any object through 
undermining, overmining, or their simultaneous employment 
in duomining.16 Wolfen dale, instead, wants to see philosophy 
as another form of knowledge (i.e., of mining) in continuity 
with the natural sciences. This is not how Socrates saw it, and 
Wolfen dale’s later footnote depicting my reading of Socrates as 
some sort of catastrophic inversion (“a parody of Socrates as bad 
as Aristophanes’ The Clouds”) is a mere assertion based on his 
own deeply modernist vision of what philosophy ought to be: 
namely, an epistemological consigliere to the heavy-hitting Dons 
of natural science (335n426). There is no trace here of Socrates’ 
harsh remarks in the Phaedo on Anaxagoras’s physical explana-
tions.17 On this note, we turn to Wolfen dale’s analysis of with-
drawal, the fourfold, and vicarious causation in chapter 2 of his 
book. They make up the heart of his criticism of OOP before he 
claims in chapter 3 to determine the more general pattern of its 
errors and, in chapter 4, to poetic laments about the catastrophe 
that looms if the principles of my philosophy are widely adopt-
ed. Before discussing chapter 2, I should note that its respective 
sections on withdrawal, the fourfold, and vicarious causation 
are of uneven length and uneven seriousness. The part on with-
drawal is where Wolfen dale fires what he thinks is his heaviest 
artillery, trying to show that my writings are plagued with ambi-
16 Graham Harman, “Undermining, Overmining, and Duomining: A Cri-
tique,” in ADD Metaphysics, ed. Jenna Sutela (Aalto: Aalto University Design 
Research Laboratory, 2013), 40–51.
17 Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in Complete 




guities, equivocations, and inconsistencies, though generally all 
he shows is that his own presuppositions about philosophy are 
not the same as mine. Contrary to his usual rhetoric, it is I who 
needed to perform extensive reconstructive surgery on these 
pages, since they are mostly tedious lessons masked as displays 
of remorseless logic. The part on the fourfold is less interesting, 
though it begins with a tiny ray of agreement, and mostly in-
volves Wolfen dale claiming that I misread Heidegger, Husserl, 
and Saul Kripke. The final section on vicarious causation is espe-
cially short, and largely limits itself to affirming the Onto-Taxo-
nomical assumption that science deserve its current monopoly 
on discussions of the inanimate world, and that all vicarious cau-
sation offers by contrast is an “introspective theory of emotional 
intensity,” thereby repeating the usual scientistic cliché that aes-
thetics is about nothing more than “emotion.” Accordingly, my 
pages on withdrawal will be longer than the others.
Withdrawal
Wolfen dale is right when he says that “Harman has several ar-
guments for his account of withdrawal. By far the most famous 
is the reading of Heidegger’s tool-analysis presented in his first 
book, Tool-Being” (39). He knows that OOO arose from my read-
ing of the tool-analysis and tells us in a footnote that in Towards 
Speculative Realism, which contains pieces of writing from both 
before and after my debut book, “[eight] out of [eleven] essays 
contain truncated summaries of the tool-analysis”18 (39n28). 
That is not surprising to hear. 
Wolfen dale’s disagreement with my interpretation shapes 
everything that happens in the rest of the book, as concerns 
both content and method. His favorite trope when discuss-
ing my work is that everything is so hopelessly mixed together 
that he himself had to clean up my arguments before critiquing 
them. This rather self-congratulatory description of his activi-
18 Graham Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (Win-
chester: Zero Books, 2010).
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ties is often picked up by his supporters and repeated as if it 
were fact rather than self-congratulation. Here is one of his early 
versions of that claim:
despite the fact that the tool-analysis is referred to and sum-
marized to different degrees throughout Harman’s work, it 
remains fairly opaque in its logical structure. [… A]lthough 
it is referred to as if it were a single argument, Harman’s ver-
sion is really a blend of a number of distinct arguments, mix-
ing all three forms of exposition discussed above: historical, 
phenomenological, and metaphysical. (39)
This claim to have conducted a painstaking inquiry into the 
many tangled threads of my writings is really just a rhetorical 
sleight of hand; given how frequently it recurs in this form, it 
needs to be called out from the start. Let’s begin with the asser-
tion that I “mix” historical, phenomenological, and metaphysical 
approaches in my reading of Heidegger. As for the first, we have 
already seen that Wolfen dale concedes that I handle the method 
of historical exposition “with some skill.” We saw that he adds 
the pejorative caveat that this method could be used to bully 
readers into submission, though he never provides any evidence 
that I do so. Therefore, the “historical” ingredient of my “mix” 
is not relevant to his polemic, which thus consists of two terms 
rather than three: a “mixing” of the phenomenological with the 
metaphysical. All that Wolfen dale really means with these two 
terms is that I conflate the ontological and epistemological regis-
ters. This, in fact, is one of just two major arguments structuring 
his book as a whole. If my first supposed mistake is mixing the 
epistemological and the ontological, my second is daring to hold 
that philosophy might have something to say about inanimate 
objects that is not already done better by the natural sciences. In 
short, Wolfen dale is a loyal devotee of the two pillars of Modern 
Onto-Taxonomy, (a) correlationism and (b) science-worship, 
and thus his originality is very much in question.
The reason this needs to be mentioned here is that at the end 
of his book, Wolfen dale will make great efforts to “brand” me as 
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some sort of mainstream degenerate continental who peddles 
easy forms of skepticism for people who have been left behind 
by the greatness of science (401–6). He will tell us that if I am 
giving continental philosophy what it wants, he knows what it 
needs. However, it is rather disappointing to learn that what he 
thinks continental philosophy “needs” is more analytic philoso-
phy and more science. He will also tell us that the “good” part 
of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou is their interest in math-
ematics, while the “bad” part comes when Deleuze works with 
crazy Félix Guattari and Badiou talks about events (353–57). In 
short, what Wolfen dale has to offer is not some novel vision for 
philosophy, but a fairly standard “rationalist tough guy” mix of 
epistemology, mathematism, and scientism. I do not say this in 
defense of present-day continental philosophy, which — God 
knows — is decadent enough. But if there is anything on which 
the analytic and continental traditions fundamentally agree, it 
is the two pillars of Modern Onto-Taxonomy, which I have said 
are (a) correlationism and (b) a monopoly for science on dis-
cussions of the world. Both traditions follow Kant in beginning 
with reflections on human thought or language as instruments 
of knowledge. And while analytic philosophy celebrates science 
in a way that the continental tradition does not, the latter adopts 
an agnostic silence about the world itself that allows science-
worship to continue without resistance.
In short, it is not I but Wolfen dale who adheres to the ba-
sic principles of both analytic and continental orthodoxy, and 
he as well who accepts the two underlying dogmas of modern 
philosophy. This guarantees in advance that he will receive an 
easy hearing from any readers who join him in these biases. Ear-
lier we encountered Shaviro’s claim that panpsychism is enough 
to get one branded a crackpot, but in fact it is not even neces-
sary to endorse panpsychism to receive that particular insult. 
To be called a crackpot, all one needs to do is object to either 
of the pillars of Modern Onto-Taxonomy, arguing either that 
we should not begin with the thought–world relation or should 
not allow science to monopolize discussions of the inanimate 
world. OOO argues for both points, and thus it defends a posi-
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tion much bolder than the mainstream epistemological scient-
ism that Wolfen dale and Brassier take to be some sort of daring 
challenge to orthodox thought. In this way, they run the serious 
risk of being mere products of their era.
Well then, we have seen that Wolfen dale attempts to disguise 
the bland and false charge that I “conflate the epistemological 
with the ontological” by adding a third term (the historical) that 
I never conflate with anything. This is augmented in his book 
with needlessly technical language masquerading as nuanced 
tenacity. I refer above all to his practice of taking any of my chief 
points and claiming to split them up into discrete Arguments, 
“The Argument from X,” “The Argument from Y,” “The Argu-
ment from Z.” This enables him to pose as an uncompromis-
ing logician picking apart the sloppy reasoning of OOO, though 
more often than not it is simply a sign of boring pedantry. We 
will see how this plays out in his complaints about my interpre-
tation of Heidegger.
Before we get to those complaints, allow me to list my basic 
objections to Wolfen dale’s own manner of proceeding. Let’s be-
gin with something he gets right: “Harman is very clear that his 
version of the tool-analysis is not one that Heidegger himself 
would endorse, and that as such it must be assessed on its own 
merits” (40). He says that this is precisely what he will do, but 
before long he is back to the accusation that I get Heidegger’s 
intentions wrong, and he makes this charge in fairly severe form:
It is possible to read thinkers against themselves, but this re-
quires that there is some essential element present in their 
work that the work itself fails to live up to. But the element 
that Harman tries to unearth in Heidegger’s tool-analysis is 
not even there. [… H]e has stripped [the] relation [of Dasein 
to its tools] of everything that makes it recognizably Heideg-
gerian. (48)
In giving his reasons for saying so, he will try to make it look 
as if his own subtler account of the tool-analysis has unmasked 
a labyrinth of self-complicating errors in mine. But in fact, his 
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only reason for saying so is that he thinks the tool-analysis re-
ally is about Dasein rather than about all beings, and thus that 
I have “completely abandoned the semantic and epistemologi-
cal framework within which the encounter with the tool is de-
scribed” (48). In other words, it is only by presupposing pre-
cisely what I dispute — that the tool-analysis is “semantic” and 
“epistemological” — that he can claim my reading of that analy-
sis has run off the rails. For the very same reason, he is able to 
beat his favorite drum and accuse me of conflating the phenom-
enological and metaphysical registers. A related problem is that, 
although Wolfen dale claims I have stripped the tool-analysis of 
anything remotely resembling Heidegger, he says this not on 
the basis of careful attention to Heidegger’s own words, but on 
philosophical prejudices drawn mostly from Brandom. 
Be that as it may, he at least begins the chapter with a helpful 
list of the five main points on which he disagrees with my read-
ing of Heidegger: 
1. Harman reads “Heidegger’s critique of presence as champi-
oning a complementary notion of execution.”
2. Harman takes the ontic/ontological distinction to be the 
same as that between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand.
3. Harman claims that “world” is not a phenomenological ho-
rizon.
4. Harman holds that Dasein is not central to Heidegger’s on-
tology.
5. Harman identifies the encounter with the broken tool with 
the as-structure. (40)
All in all, this is not a bad list. None of these five statements dis-
torts my position, though some clarification is needed. Further-
more, Wolfen dale seems to miss that his list really boils down 
to just two basic disagreements, though there is a good deal of 
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interplay between them. Points 1, 2, and 5 have to do with the op-
position I call real/sensual. Usually, the distinction between Vor- 
and Zuhandenheit in Heidegger is read as a difference between 
the explicit awareness of something and implicit use of it. The 
key to my reading of the tool-analysis is that this is too anthropo-
centric to be a good starting point for philosophy; unfortunately, 
the anthropocentric reading is exactly the one that Wolfen dale 
gives. The surfeit of detail in his critique tends to conceal that it 
is based entirely on his own Dasein-centric prejudice.
Points 3 and 4 give us this prejudice in more open form 
— Wolfen dale does think “world” in Heidegger is a phenom-
enological horizon and does think that Dasein is at the center 
of the tool-analysis. But this, of course, is Modern Onto-Taxon-
omy incarnate: we cannot begin with a discussion of all beings, 
but must first consider the way these beings manifest themselves 
to Dasein. It was Descartes who launched modern philosophy 
by arguing that what is present to thought is more unshakably 
true than the mediated deductions we draw about anything out-
side thought. In the Meditations on First Philosophy and else-
where, we must first pass through God and his goodness to real-
ize that he is not an evil deceiver, with the result that if we make 
sure to use our reason correctly, we already have everything we 
need to reach correct conclusions about the world.19 Wolfen dale 
drops the “God” part, like most modern rationalists, but keeps 
the trust in reason as capable of giving us things the way they 
really are. After Descartes we have Malebranche, Spinoza, and 
Leibniz, for whom human thought is not quite as special as it 
was for Descartes, although they remain rationalists. But it is re-
ally from Kant onward that human thought becomes the obliga-
tory starting point, so that anyone straying from this method 
can only look like a crackpot. The most refreshing exception is 
Whitehead, who for this very reason is not warmly welcomed by 
either analytic or continental philosophy despite being one of 
the most original thinkers of the twentieth century.
19 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress, 3rd 
edn. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993).
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Before saying more about the Kantian era, I would call the 
reader’s attention to another problem with Wolfen dale’s point 
3, to the effect that “world” as shown in the tool-system should 
be taken as a phenomenological horizon rather than an onto-
logical claim by Heidegger. One problem this introduces is that 
if the tool-system is a horizon, then orthodox Husserlians are 
right, and Husserl already saw whatever Heidegger sees in the 
tool-analysis. While this claim is not obviously absurd, it misses 
Heidegger’s uniqueness in a way that Derrida already did — as 
seen in the chapter on Peter Gratton — when claiming that the 
horizon of intentionality already gives Husserl everything called 
for by Levinas under the name of “alterity.” Now, we saw with 
Derrida that the gist of the claim for Husserl having gotten there 
first is that we can never have an “adequate” intention of the 
horizon, since it is the primal source from which all intentions 
well up, though this is probably not how Wolfen dale would put 
it. While this does succeed in treating the horizon as an amor-
phous background that can never be fully objectified, it does 
not address the key difference between Husserl and Heidegger: 
the fact that Being in Heidegger, as that which withdraws, is not 
even potentially the correlate of an intentional act, not even in 
the sense of a telos toward which we are forever striving without 
success. In short, the Husserlian horizon is an idealist structure 
whereas Being is a realist one, even if Heidegger always cou-
ples it with Dasein. Wolfen dale would certainly not agree with 
everything that Husserlians say on the matter, but he will have 
a hard time explaining why Husserl is not already enough, and 
why the tool-analysis marked a step forward.
Returning now to the question of the Kantian era in philoso-
phy, one of the easiest ways to rank the many great philosophers 
is as follows. The handful of really pivotal philosophers rede-
fine the very terms in which philosophy works, while the great 
thinkers a half-notch below extend the application of those 
terms without quite redefining them. In this respect, the cen-
tral role of Dasein in Heidegger’s own philosophy — and I do 
not deny it is there — means that he is still working in the space 
carved out by Kant; great as Heidegger is, I would say that he is 
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not quite at the level of Kant. For this very reason, I have recent-
ly been reconsidering my career-long assertion that Heidegger 
is the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, and am 
now inclined to say it was Whitehead instead. Although I am no 
Whiteheadian, for reasons explained in my discussion of Steven 
Shaviro in chapter 2, it is Whitehead rather than Heidegger who 
struck a body blow against the Kantian assumptions in which 
Modern Onto-Taxonomists — including Brandom, Brassier, 
and Wolfen dale — conduct their business. What I mean to say is 
that Wolfen dale’s five-point list just cited should be condensed 
into a single point — his Onto-Taxonomoical allegiance to the 
principle that “epistemology” is where we must start. When he 
says that what I draw out of Heidegger “is not really there,” all 
he means is that I reject the Kantian assumptions that Heidegger 
takes for granted. Since Speculative Realism is often unfairly 
portrayed as an exercise in “Kant-bashing,” I should remind 
the reader of my view that the Ding an sich, which almost no 
post-Kantians accept, is the one portion of his doctrine that 
must be preserved. The Onto-Taxonomical assumption that 
any talk of object-object relations must be processed through 
a prior thought-object relation is the part that must be rejected. 
In Meillassouxian terms, it is Wolfen dale who is the real cor-
relationist, not I. For he accepts a version of the correlational 
circle, while I do not.
Let’s now consider how Wolfen dale goes wrong in challeng-
ing me on the five points listed above. The first has to do with 
“execution,” a term I took from José Ortega y Gasset’s essay on 
metaphor.20 Although Wolfen dale apparently concurs with my 
criticism of mainstream Heidegger scholarship for treating 
Vor- and Zuhandenheit as a catalogue of different kinds of be-
ings — as if the ready-to-hand were speaking only about ham-
mers and screwdrivers as opposed to other sorts of entities — he 
does not think I am justified in arguing that the executant real-
20 José Ortega y Gasset, “An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface,” in Phe-




ity of beings is what is deeper than presence. He thinks I have 
created a false either/or between the mainstream scholars and 
myself on this point. What is the alternative? In Wolfen dale’s 
own words, “it is possible to view [Heidegger’s distinction …] 
as a distinction between different modes of Being, […] without 
reducing it to a distinction between mutually exclusive types of 
beings” (41). This is already strange, since I do consider pres-
ence and readiness-to-hand as two possible modes of all beings, 
corresponding to my sensual and real, and Wolfen dale at this 
stage does not explain how his conception differs from mine. 
But he does get in a negative word about my linking of real be-
ings with the tradition of substance, and it will turn out that by 
“modes,” all he means is two different modes of things for Da-
sein. But this means that Wolfen dale already accepts the major 
premise of mainstream Heidegger scholarship, for which it is an 
article of faith that we are confined to treating everything first 
in terms of how it is manifest to human being. At most, what 
Wolfen dale adds to this standard picture is a greater reverence 
for science than what we find among Heideggerians, with their 
infamous dictum that “science does not think,” a statement I do 
not admire.
Second, Wolfen dale rightly notes that I do not think we 
should treat reality in terms of its intelligibility to Dasein. He 
claims that this amounts to the notion that intelligibility is a 
form of “seeming,” though this is one of Wolfen dale’s pet words, 
not mine. On this basis, he claims that the mainstream Heideg-
gerians and I are simply mirror-images of each other. We both 
think that Heidegger is mainly talking about meaningfulness for 
Dasein, though I attach a minus-sign to this and reject it while 
the mainstream simply affirms it. This leads him to the view that 
we both get something right even while missing the big picture: 
Heidegger thinks that being must be interpreted in terms of 
intelligibility, but also that it remains somewhat outside every 
interpretation. Wolfen dale thinks this balance is best struck in 
“[Heidegger’s] later work in particular” (42), given his increas-
ing attention in later years to the strife between earth and world 
or concealing and clearing. In the first place, there is no reason 
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to accept this developmentalist account of Heidegger: the dual-
ity in question is available in full-fledged form as early as 1919, in 
the Freiburg Emergency War Semester.21 But more importantly, 
I do not treat the sensual or presence-at-hand as a mere “seem-
ing.” As seen in the previous chapter, I am interested in Levinas 
primarily as a philosopher of the sensual realm in all its sincerity 
and also hold that the sensual is the only place where causation 
can be triggered, given that real objects are cut off from all direct 
interaction. Hence, the idea that I disdain “intelligibility” is just 
an artifact of Wolfen dale’s intellectualist bias.
As for the third point, which concerns “horizon,” Wolfen-
dale shows less precision. He spends too much time countering 
my mockery of how mainstream scholarship follows Heidegger 
too closely in retreating from one horizon into another and on 
into another. Wolfen dale objects that just because many schol-
ars overdo it does not mean that there is no such regress into 
ever-deeper horizons in Heidegger’s work. Au contraire, he tells 
us: Heidegger’s analyses often “have an end point in some more 
or less well-delimited unitary structure (e.g., Temporalität in 
the early work, or Ereignis in the later work)” (43). At first it 
is hard to grasp his point, since I already accept the existence 
of a unitary structure in Heidegger, the tool-system. I simply 
deny that it should be called a “horizon,” a phenomenological 
term which always refers to something already there before us 
as given, though without being the object of our explicit focus. 
But as mentioned earlier, if Wolfen dale thinks the tool-system is 
a horizon, then he may as well stick with Husserl, who already 
discusses this concept with more precision than Heidegger him-
self. What is unique about Heidegger is that he points beyond 
any horizon, though it is unclear whether Wolfen dale would 
contest this point in particular. What really bothers him is that 
I read what is “beyond the horizon” for Heidegger as a unity: 
“Harman’s alternative is to read ‘world’ as a complete totality of 
entities rather than a phenomenological horizon within which 




entities appear. This is a disastrous misreading, one that is ex-
plicitly counselled against by Heidegger” (43). Now, Wolfen dale 
has already claimed that he accepts my procedure of not saying 
that Heidegger would agree with my reading of his work, and 
that he would therefore judge it on its own merits. Thus it is 
unclear why doing something “explicitly counselled against by 
Heidegger” would amount to a “disastrous misreading.”
The same problem immediately arises with Wolfen dale’s 
fourth point. When I say that although Dasein is obviously cen-
tral for Heidegger, we can easily broaden his analysis to cover 
all entities, his rejoinder is as follows: “This is indicative of a 
really pernicious misunderstanding of Heidegger’s project that 
underlies the other points addressed so far” (43). It is always a 
bad sign when adjectives are asked to do too much work, and 
so it is with “pernicious” here. Let’s rewrite Wolfen dale’s sen-
tence without it: “This is indicative of a misunderstanding of 
Heidegger’s project that underlies the other points addressed so 
far.” From this we can see that Wolfen dale is back to the claim 
that I misunderstand what Heidegger is really doing, though he 
conceded at the start that I do not wish to read the tool-analysis 
in terms of Heideggers’s self-understanding. Perhaps aware that 
this contradicts his earlier claim to read my interpretation on 
its own merits, he adds the word “pernicious,” as if to imply 
that more than a matter of getting Heidegger’s own intentions 
wrong, there is some sort of deeper philosophical rot in our 
midst, though he does not say exactly what it is. Having already 
strayed into the realm of “what Heidegger really meant to say,” 
Wolfen dale summarizes what he meant in terms that merely re-
flect his own biases, “what characterizes Dasein qua Dasein (Ex-
istenz) is that set of conditions (Existentiale) without which Da-
sein could not count as freely choosing, and thus acting in any 
real sense” (44). Freely choosing? Acting? This already looks like 
a mainstream, Dasein-centric reading of Being and Time, which 
is precisely what I announced in Tool-Being I did not intend to 
follow. In other words, Wolfen dale pretended that he would 
play along to see what happens with my reading, but quickly 
recurs to the point that I cannot read the tool-analysis without 
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Dasein because Heidegger meant it to be about Dasein. The tech-
nical name for this maneuver is “begging the question.” It ena-
bles Wolfen dale to defend Heidegger’s rather weak distinction 
between world-forming humans and world-poor animals in 
1929/30 by saying that “[Harman] fails to see that [with animals] 
Heidegger is describing entities which have similar behavioral 
capacities to Dasein (drives) but which nevertheless lack the 
specific conditions of organization that enable choice (as op-
posed to mere disinhibition)”22 (44). In short, Wolfen dale — like 
Heidegger — is simply presupposing the commonsensical as-
sumption that animals have drives but only humans make 
choices. More than presupposing it, he ontologizes it, so that hu-
man “choice” is something so different from anything found in 
any other creature that it needs to be built into the very fabric of 
philosophy. It is the Game of Hurdles again. Wolfen dale falsely 
implies that I recognize no difference at all between animals and 
humans (high hurdle for me), but since there do seem to be such 
differences (low hurdle for himself), they must rip an ontologi-
cal chasm between humans and everything else (non sequitur). 
Worse yet, this is really just a fancy way of restating Brandom’s 
own painfully commonsensical sapience/sentience distinction, 
while shedding no new light on the human/animal distinction 
and merely repeating extant rationalist commonplaces about 
choice, reason, and the like. It is even more disastrous when 
Wolfen dale continues to project these biases back onto Hei-
degger himself. World for Heidegger, Wolfen dale tells us, is “an 
internally articulated space of possible action (i.e., the projec-
tion of what is possible), involving a grasp of both generality and 
particularity (e.g., the possibilities of pens as such vs. the possi-
bilities of this particular pen)” (44). This sounds a lot more like 
Brandom than Heidegger, and insofar as it relates to Heidegger, 
the argument amounts to nothing more than “Harman thinks 
the tool-analysis can be extended to all beings, but obviously 
22 Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World — Fini-
tude — Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 1995).
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it’s supposed to be about Dasein.” This is circularity at its worst, 
and given that Wolfen dale shamelessly accuses me of circularity 
throughout his book, he ought to have been more aware of his 
own rampant indulgence in petitio principii. He soon repeats the 
exercise, combining it with another misstatement of my views: 
“Harman cannot see that differences in modes of Being […] are 
not simple differences between types of beings, because he does 
not see the different ways they are supposed to be individuated 
as actualities within the world qua space of possibility” (44–45). 
This gets nothing right. I do not say that Vor- and Zuhandenheit 
are differences between types of beings, since this is exactly what 
I reject in the mainstream readings of Zuhandenheit as limited 
to specific items of hardware; indeed, this point is one of the 
best-known trademarks of my interpretation. As for the attempt 
to lecture me about seeing that the modes being are “individu-
ated as actualities within the world qua space of possibility,” this 
is both (a) a conflation of Heidegger with Brandom and (b) the 
presupposition of a Dasein-centric Heidegger whose validity I 
deny from the start. In fact, this passage is one of those places in 
Wolfen dale’s book where I am equally astonished and annoyed 
that it has been taken by his supporters for some sort of devas-
tating critique.
His fifth point mixes the interesting with the uninteresting. 
Let’s begin with the latter. Wolfen dale again slips into the com-
plaint that I misunderstand Heidegger’s intentions, despite his 
purported acceptance of my announcement that I am not at-
tempting to reveal Heidegger’s self-understanding but to show 
what his analysis really entails. In his own words, “[Harman] 
misunderstands Heidegger’s account of the as-structure and its 
relation to the broken tool encounter” (45). This is bad enough, 
but we are now familiar with this gesture and are probably no 
longer surprised. What makes matters worse is the utter trivial-
ity of how we are told the as-structure should be understood: 
“The crucial point is that Heidegger distinguishes between the 
hermeneutic ‘as’ and the apophantic ‘as,’ and associates these 
with the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, respectively. 
[… T]his is essentially a matter of the relation between the im-
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plicit and the explicit” (46). In this passage, three of the worst 
features of Wolfen dale’s argument are combined: (a) presup-
posing a Dasein-centric reading of Heidegger when that is what 
we were supposed to be debating, (b) reducing Heidegger to 
an implicit/explicit distinction that conflates him with Husserl 
by ignoring that Being for Heidegger is not just “implicit,” but 
phenomenologically inaccessible; (c) dragging in another of 
Brandom’s obsessions, this time the implicit/explicit distinc-
tion. The situation is simple: if you presuppose that the tool-
analysis can only be about what is hidden or present to Dasein 
because “that’s obviously what Heidegger meant,” then you can-
not possibly follow my argument for how, on its own terms, the 
tool-analysis really tells us a lot more than it claims. You have 
remained inside the Kantian transcendental thought-object 
dogma with Heidegger himself, while suppressing everything in 
Heidegger that pushes us beyond it. When Wolfen dale goes on 
to speak about the movement from implicit interpretations to 
abstract linguistic generalities, he is merely capitalizing on the 
limitations of his own starting point, rather than — as he evi-
dently thinks — teaching a masterclass to ignoramuses who fail 
to see that the tool-analysis is all about the difference between 
human praxis and human rationality. I cannot imagine a more 
mainstream reading of Heidegger than this.
The more interesting part of Wolfen dale’s fifth point is his 
confrontation with my claim that the tool-analysis can be ex-
tended to questions of causation. In denying that the analysis 
of equipment has anything to do with “use,” I am indeed saying 
that it “should be understood as a matter of reliance upon equip-
ment” (45). That much is correct. But Wolfen dale now mounts 
what he seems to regard as a devastating counterattack:
It is the fact that reliance is an essentially causal notion that 
underpins Harman’s claim that all interactions between en-
tities can be described as entities “understanding” one an-
other “as” something, and the development of this into the 
further notion that all such interactions are analogous to the 
encounter with the broken tool. (45)
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It is not clear why Wolfen dale puts “understanding” and “as” in 
scare-quotes in this passage. Presumably he is trying to insinu-
ate that I am arguing for a full-blown panpsychism of a sort that 
even Shaviro, Strawson, and Chalmers would not accept, as if 
rocks could “understand” the water into which they are thrown. 
As demonstrated earlier, I make no such claim. My argument, 
instead, is that while Heidegger’s discussion of understanding 
and the as-structure presents itself as an analysis of the basic 
features of Dasein, that analysis turns out to have highly gen-
eral features that can easily be extended into the causal realm as 
well. Whatever differences there are between humans and non-
humans — and there are many — they have to be redefined in 
terms of a prior flat ontology that tells us what is common to 
all relations. Above all, if we start by assuming with Brandom 
and Wolfen dale that what characterizes the human vis-à-vis 
animals (let alone rocks) is interpretation, choice, reason, and 
the implicit/explicit distinction, then we are left with nothing 
but commonsensical, pre-ontological anecdotes about human 
specialness when we ought to be digging much deeper. Such 
digging Wolfen dale does not do. He merely reports that it takes 
“special linguistic equipment” to “[extricate] the causal capaci-
ties of entities from the normative functions through which our 
everyday understanding grasps them,” as if I were claiming that 
language is present everywhere in the cosmos (46). It again gets 
worse when Wolfen dale says that “the exemplars of the present-
at-hand are those entities posited by science independently of 
any role they could have in everyday practices (e.g., electrons, 
black holes, mitochondria, etc.)” (47). We are now very far from 
Heidegger himself, who, to say the least, was not inclined to 
praise the scientific objectification of the world. Once more it 
is Brandom speaking through Wolfen dale’s lips, not Heidegger 
himself. Nor does Heidegger speak of any “exemplary” form 
of presence-at-hand: all forms of which belong, for him, to the 
dark and grievous reign of ontotheology and technology. One 
can certainly argue that Heidegger is much too harsh on pres-
ence-at-hand, but that is already what I do in my own work. Yet 
there is no question that for Heidegger all forms of presence-at-
228
skirmishes
hand share one basic point in common, in that they forget the 
being of that which they present.
Wolfen dale clearly dislikes this flat sense of presence, since 
it is an obstacle to his valorization of science, so palpably im-
possible within a Heideggerian framework. And as too often 
happens, rather than mount a sustained argument against it, he 
resorts to an adjectival insult: “Science is thus hardly the domain 
of pure presence in this vacuous sense, but rather the forerun-
ner of our attempt to work out what is really possible, over and 
above the expectations implicit in our parochial forms of life.” 
(47; italics modified). “Vacuous?” Oh my. But Wolfen dale no-
where demonstrates that it is “vacuous” to consider that there is 
a problem with presence, one that must be countered by some-
thing other than presence, which happens to be exactly what 
Heidegger thinks. Instead, Wolfen dale simply adopts main-
stream Heideggerianism with an opposite valence. As he has 
it, we start with “parochial” everyday habits, and this implicit 
parochialism becomes more and more explicit, until finally we 
have the “good presence” of scientific research. And I for one 
find this interpretation… vacuous. This is not because it disa-
grees with what Heidegger meant, but because the praxis/theory 
distinction is simply not very deep to begin with, and to read 
the tool-analysis as a contrast between implicit and explicit is to 
humanize it beyond repair. That is what Tool-Being is all about. 
Thus, I am unmoved when Wolfen dale concludes that “[Har-
man] has excised the structure of understanding wholesale, and 
thereby completely abandoned the semantic and epistemologi-
cal framework within which the encounter with the tool is de-
scribed” (48). The words “semantic” and “epistemological” are at 
least as foreign to Heidegger as any of my own terminology. But 
more importantly, we recall once more that Wolfen dale began 
with the boast that he would show that my interpretation fails 
by its own lights. Far from it. He simply asserts or rather pre-
supposes that the tool-analysis is obviously about Dasein in its 
practical and theoretical existence, which is exactly what I deny 
from one end of Tool-Being to the other. He ought to have made 
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actual counterarguments rather than simply projecting his own 
rationalist wish list onto Being and Time.
Almost thirty pages still remain in Wolfen dale’s repetitious 
account of why his interpretation of the tool-analysis is bet-
ter than my own. We have already seen that his basic strategy 
is nothing but a table-pounding insistence that the analysis is 
about humans, and ultimately about the great achievements of 
“explicit” human science. The pounding continues from pages 
49 through 78, and rather than listening to more of it, I propose 
instead that we leaf through those pages and look for possible 
signs of a new line of attack. It turns out that none of what comes 
next is entirely new, since it all somehow involves the claim that 
I am conflating phenomenology with metaphysics, or episte-
mology with ontology. But now and then they have a slightly 
different spin and are thus worth answering directly.
In his pages on what he calls “The Argument from Execu-
tion,” Wolfen dale is concerned with what he sees as a slippage 
in my analysis. In arguing that objects “withdraw from all epis-
temic and causal contact,” I am said to “[provide] no clarifica-
tion of [my] phenomenological method” (49). But the point is 
that the method here is not phenomenological in the first place; 
it is Wolfen dale’s requirement, not mine, that we begin with the 
phenomenology of how equipment appears to Dasein. To state 
my argument briefly, the fact that we ourselves are humans who 
use equipment in the world is not the basis for understanding 
that humans do not encounter tool-beings directly. Instead, this 
is something we deduce, not only through the fact that the tools 
often surprise us but more so from the realization that to use 
something is not to be it, and that to encounter something is 
not to encounter the whole of its being. But this very same de-
duction works for entities other than ourselves. We can deduce 
that other humans and animals are also unable to encounter the 
whole of the beings with which they interact, and can even do 
the same for entities that presumably have no conscious aware-
ness at all: as in my oft-repeated example, drawn from Medieval 
Islamic thought, of fire burning cotton. It is not because of hu-
man “awareness” of the cotton that we fail to do justice to its be-
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ing — this is the central dogma of Kant — but simply because no 
relation can exhaust its relata. By contrast, Wolfen dale defends 
the modern dogma by complaining that I extend the as-struc-
ture to entities “that lack anything that could be construed as 
awareness of the thing depended upon” (51). But this is precisely 
the point. I have already argued that “awareness” is not needed 
for anything to be finite, and thus there is no reason to restrict 
the term “finitude” to humans in the first place. He complains 
further that I slide from the properly active sense of equipment 
to a rather different sense of passive reliance upon it: “Gone is the 
emphasis upon equipment actively deployed toward a goal […] 
to be replaced with a focus upon ‘equipment’ necessary to pas-
sively sustain a given state” (50). Wolfen dale half-concedes that 
passive reliance might be “as eligible a goal as achieving one” 
(50), but in doing so he remains loyal to a notion of “goal” that 
merely reflects his own anthropocentric bias. The point of my 
reading of the tool-analysis is simply that all relations, whether 
human, animal, or inanimate, are equally unable to exhaust that 
to which they relate. Goal-oriented behavior is not unique in 
this respect, unless one begins like Wolfen dale by assuming that 
the tool-analysis can only be about humans because Heidegger 
says so. Again, my point is not that rocks and comets have 
“goals,” but that the analysis of relationality must also apply to 
relations that are far more primitive than goal-oriented praxis. 
When Wolfen dale adds that “we can already see the pretense of 
phenomenology slipping here” (51), he is forgetting that I never 
made any such pretense. The idea that the tool-analysis must 
be a “phenomenology” of tools is Wolfen dale’s own bias, since 
for me the analysis is primarily about what can never appear. 
He concludes with a pointless warning that the tool-analysis is 
supposed to be about “comportments that [lack] a specific kind 
of awareness, rather than lacking awareness as such” (51). What 
makes it pointless is that I never claim the contrary. From the 
early pages of Tool-Being it is clear that I do not intend to remain 
within the Dasein-centric motivations of Heidegger himself, but 
will show that his tool-analysis cannot remain restricted to hu-
man-specific cases such as the opposition between implicit and 
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explicit. Since that is a matter of record for anyone even loosely 
familiar with my work, Wolfen dale is merely bursting through 
a paper door with such claims. To think that finitude requires 
full-blown conscious awareness is the dogmatic kernel in Kant 
that was torn asunder by Whitehead at last.
After conceding that I am right that to rely on something 
requires that it have a specific causal capacity, he adds that “the 
way in which it is introduced and used by Harman is question-
able precisely insofar as it is metaphysical rather than phenom-
enological” (52). Nothing new here so far. The grain of novelty 
comes in his follow-up claim: “Harman is already straying into 
metaphysics in describing the thing as consisting in this capac-
ity, rather than simply possessing it” (52). Here he confuses me 
with George Molnar and other metaphysicians of powers.23 By 
no means do I think that an object consists in its causal capacity, 
since for me this is too much a derivative, relational conception 
of objects; the object is a specific simplification of the pieces of 
which it is composed and not primarily a causal agent. Indeed, 
I specifically theorize dormant objects that exist despite hav-
ing no causal effect on anything at present and perhaps even 
in the future.24 Since Molnar is a respectable analytic philoso-
pher, I would guess that Wolfen dale would not object to him 
doing metaphysics. It seems that the real difference between 
me and Molnar in Wolfen dale’s eyes stems from his false ac-
cusation about my “pretense” of doing phenomenology while 
covertly mixing it with metaphysics. He sees traces of such 
pretense in my use of the word “invisibility” to refer to with-
drawn objects, though I normally use this term to refer to the 
human use of equipment and simply as a way of illustrating 
that particular point. But Wolfen dale overdetermines this term, 
by way of claiming that invisibility to humans does not entail 
withdrawal of things from each other. True enough, but that is 
not how my argument proceeds. It is not “humans cannot see 
23 George Molnar, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, ed. Stephen Mumford (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
24 Harman, “Time, Space, Essence, and Eidos.”
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tools when they are using them, and therefore inanimate things 
cannot make contact with each other either.” Instead, it is this: 
“the invisibility of equipment to humans does not just refer to an 
‘implicit’ character in our use of them, but allows us to see that 
the implicit use of things does not grasp them any more directly 
than explicit perception of them does. And the same holds for 
causal interaction, which also does not deploy the full reality of 
interacting objects.”
Wolfen dale goes on to say that there is a “general paradox 
of the accessibility of inaccessibility” in my model, along with 
the “more specific paradoxes of modality and temporality” (55). 
He mocks these paradoxes as akin to “a zen master wielding a 
koan: a pure act rests beyond any superficial acts, a pure actu-
ality grounds all potential actualities. One hand claps slowly” 
(55). Let’s take these one at a time, bearing in mind that I reject 
Wolfen dale’s equation of the paradoxical with the nonsensical; I 
would say, instead, that the emergence of a paradox is often the 
best index that we have hit on something real. As for the “gen-
eral paradox” of the accessibility of inaccessibility, this is just 
the usual maneuver of invoking the correlational circle. Derrida 
uses it against Levinasian alterity, the German Idealists against 
Kant’s Ding an sich, and Meillassoux against the weak correla-
tionist. It always runs roughly as follows: “if something is said to 
be inaccessible, than we have already accessed it somehow, and 
thus there is a performative contradiction; to know a limit is al-
ready to be beyond it.” The point is that there a difference that is 
almost always elided between direct and indirect access. To say 
“there is something outside thought” is indeed itself a thought, 
but this does not mean that the thing referred to by thought 
is thereby also a thought; Wolfen dale’s own ally Brassier often 
makes a similar point when dismissing the argument known 
as “Stove’s Gem.”25 In Heideggerian terms, the fact that the tool 
becomes manifest in malfunction does not mean that it con-
sists in its manifestness. We know this in everyday life through 




instances of allusive and figurative language and the rhetorical 
use of enthymemes, which give us access to things as absent 
rather than as present, and which for this very reason tend to 
be unusually powerful. As for the “more specific” paradoxes of 
“a pure act […] beyond any superficial acts, [and] a pure actual-
ity [grounding] all potential actualities,” this is mostly a matter 
of Wolfen dale overreading the language of certain passages in 
Tool-Being. To be more specific, I only describe the executant 
reality of objects as an “act” in the early sections of the book, 
as Wolfen dale himself soon recognizes. “Act” normally implies 
having effects on something else, and the point of my real ob-
jects is that they are real even when they are not having such 
effects; once this is seen, there is no paradox at all. Objects must 
exist in order to act, and they must exist regardless of any “po-
tentiality” they might have, because potential also implies a re-
lationality that is excluded from real objects. 
There are just three remaining points in Wolfen dale’s pages 
on withdrawal. The first is his claim that I botch the argument 
for Heidegger’s tool-system by claiming that it is tantamount to 
a single large entity. His main argument here is, once again, the 
old chestnut that I conflate the phenomenological and meta-
physical registers. This is possible only because Wolfen dale 
again makes rather mainstream assumptions about the tool-
analysis being limited to Dasein, which he conceals — here as 
usual — with the term “modal,” his chicken soup cure for the 
realization that he is now repeating himself. The second is his 
rejection of what he calls my “argument from excess,” that the 
object can never be exhausted by any theoretical, practical, or 
causal contact for the same reason in all three cases. Here he 
will have recourse to a distinction between “qualitative” and 
“quantitative” excess, with Wolfen dale championing the latter. 
Third and finally, he goes after my argument that since complete 
knowledge of a tree would not itself be a tree, knowledge can 
only be a translation of the tree rather than a form of direct ac-
cess. Wolfen dale cites this argument from my article on James 
Ladyman and Don Ross, though it appeared again later in the 
Pelican book Object-Oriented Ontology, where it would be criti-
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cized by Stephen Mulhall (see chapter 8 in this text). The often 
needlessly technical character of Wolfen dale’s analyses of these 
three points conceals a fairly basic philosophical disagreement, 
while giving his own argument a false air of precision and mine 
a fake aroma of carelessness. I will take them in order.
In considering my analysis of how a bridge — on Heidegger’s 
terms, not mine — becomes a single holistic entity, Wolfen dale 
neglects to cite the single most relevant passage from Being and 
Time: “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. 
To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of 
equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is.”26 There is 
a sense in which my entire reading of Heidegger aims to oppose 
this single passage, which is by no means a textual outlier, but 
explains perfectly well what happens in the tool-analysis. Hei-
degger takes presence-at-hand to mean isolation, and indeed a 
false isolation. Obviously I disagree with this view, since for me 
Vorhandenheit is primarily about relation, whether to Dasein or 
something else. But Heidegger really does mean to say that pres-
ence-at-hand is about entities considered in abstraction from all 
other entities, and the reason he introduces his ultra-relational 
conception of equipment is to counter the Vorhandenheit that 
in his view has dominated Western philosophy since Plato. By 
contrast, Wolfen dale does not want to read Being and Time as 
an argument against presence-at-hand tout court, because he 
prefers an outcome in which there is a “good” form of presence-
at-hand for Heidegger: namely, scientific knowledge. That is all 
Wolfen dale is after whenever he employs the wowie-zowie term 
“modal,” which simply refers to his belief that the tool-analysis is 
all about the difference between “parochial” practice and admi-
rable cognitive abstraction. This is one weapon he uses against 
my analysis of the bridge in Tool-Being. The other is his attempt 
to show that I contradict myself by relying on the “functional” 
sense of tools before contradicting myself and saying that tools 
are “deeper” than any functionality. But more than just claiming 
I say two different things at different times, he wishes to imply 
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, 97.
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that the step to what is “deeper” than functionality itself relies 
on functionality, and therefore the argument destroys itself. Yet 
matters are considerably simpler than this.
When covering the so-called “Argument from Execution,” 
we saw that Wolfen dale complained about a “modal tension” in 
Tool-Being, in the sense that I refer to tools as an activity, though 
one that is deeper than any particular activity. But this is noth-
ing more than an artifact of his misreading of the pedagogical 
structure of the book. As Wolfen dale admits, despite the early 
pages in which I refer to tool-beings as actions or executions, 
the following passage appears later in the book:
[T]he time has come to admit to the reader that I have been 
guilty of a deliberate over-simplification […]. In fact, it is im-
permissible to replace the tool/broken tool distinction with 
the difference between causality and visibility. For it turns 
out that even brute causation already belongs to the realm of 
presence-at-hand.27 (62)
Although Wolfen dale calls this an attempt to “resolve the con-
tradiction between functional fixity and apparent change” (62), 
what it actually shows is that all of his previous complaints about 
the apparent contradictions of the “argument from execution” 
are cleared up in the pages of Tool-Being itself. Although I still 
like the term “execution,” what Wolfen dale calls the “argument 
from execution” is simply the provisional stage of the argument 
in chapter 1 of the book before I lead the reader to the central 
idea of Tool-Being in the passage just cited — causation reduces 
entities to presence-at-hand no less than praxis and theory do. 
Therefore, the sense in which objects are executant simply can-
not be a “functional” one, given that functions are also relations.
In any case, the reader of Tool-Being reaches page 221 and 
finds the passage cited by Wolfen dale above: “For it turns out 
that even brute causation already belongs to the realm of presence-
27 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2002), 221.
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at-hand.” This means that causal function is now framed as de-
rivative of a prior reality of the things, without which they could 
never have any effects at all. Any functional descriptions of tool-
being prior to that point in the book are only preliminary, as I 
openly state, and no knowledge of how the book was written is 
necessary to see that a provisional analysis has been replaced by 
a final one. The notion of objects as completely withdrawn did 
emerge biographically for me from the initial working hypoth-
esis that functionality was the deep being of things, but there is 
no logical dependence of one on the other. I could have rewrit-
ten the book so that it started instead with the claim that even 
causal relations occur on the level of presence-at-hand, but did 
not do so because I thought it would be too much for the reader 
to swallow in the opening pages.
However, this move from the functional/causal to the with-
drawn is my own move, not Heidegger’s, and he clearly means 
his tool-analysis in the functional sense. Thus, when Wolfen dale 
discusses my use of the language of function/effect/reference to 
describe tool-beings, while this is not my own position, it is 
in fact how Heidegger himself should be read. “Taken strictly, 
there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment.” This means that al-
though Wolfen dale summarizes my account of the bridge as 
some sort of misunderstanding of what Heidegger was up to, 
it is a perfectly accurate account of the intentions of Being and 
Time. Here is Wolfen dale summarizing my interpretation from 
pages 22 to 25 of Tool-Being: “The various girders, nuts, and 
bolts that compose a bridge are simultaneously depended upon 
by the bridge and captured in executing their functional role 
in sustaining the bridge as a systematic effect upon which fur-
ther things depend” (56). Everything here is correct, although 
his critical follow-up remark is not: “It is this interpretation of 
reference relations that collapses Heidegger’s account of world 
into a simple totality” (56). Why does he interpret my reading 
as a “collapse” of Heidegger’s account of world, given that Hei-
degger’s lucid phrase “taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as 
an equipment” supports me so strongly here? We are led back 
to the thoroughly mainstream character of Wolfen dale’s own in-
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terpretation, in which the tool-analysis shows us “a complex ho-
rizon that involves relations between both types and instances, 
understood in terms of their possible states” (56). I have already 
said why Heidegger’s analysis cannot be interpreted in terms 
of a “horizon,” for reasons having to do with the need to keep 
Heidegger distinct from Husserl. A horizon is an implicit back-
ground for the human observer, one that perhaps cannot be ful-
ly objectified, but is still governed by Husserl’s rejection of any 
reality that might not be the possible correlate of an intentional 
act as an “absurd” notion. Heidegger does sometimes use the 
word “horizon” in a positive sense, as when he speaks of time as 
the possible horizon for the question of the meaning of being. 
But Hans-Georg Gadamer, who when all is said and done is still 
one of the best readers of Heidegger we have ever seen, already 
saw through this device very well:
True, as the ideas of Being and Time unfolded, it seemed at 
first simply an intensification of transcendental reflection, 
the reaching of a higher stage of reflection, where the hori-
zon of being was shown to be time. […] But it was more than 
that. Heidegger’s thesis was that being itself is time. This burst 
asunder the whole subjectivism of modern philosophy.28
I doubt whether one can find even five or six other passages of 
Heidegger commentary as profound as this one. What it implies 
is that to speak of Heidegger’s analyses in terms of “horizons” is 
to yield too much ground to “the whole subjectivism of modern 
philosophy,” of which Wolfen dale’s interpretation is an excel-
lent example in view of his stubborn humanizing of the tool-
analysis. As a reminder, this is the sort of thing that Wolfen dale 
habitually says about that analysis:
Heidegger provides us with an intricate modal epistemology. 
He builds a phenomenological framework within which he 
28 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall, 2nd edn. (London: Continuum, 2004), 247–48.
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analyzes both our understanding of the entities we encounter 
in terms of both the normative features through the practices 
we are socialized into, the unthematic understanding of the 
causal features of these entities that is implicit in this, and the 
various levels of thematic understanding that can be devel-
oped out of it. His analysis of the encounter with the broken 
tool is a subtle demonstration of the interface between these 
levels of modal understanding. (65)
Again we see that it is Wolfen dale’s interpretation, not mine, 
that has nothing to do with Heidegger. The role of “normativ-
ity” in his reading comes from Brandom, not Heidegger; his 
mention of “the practices we are socialized into” sounds like 
it was cribbed from Hubert Dreyfus, not from Heidegger.29 It 
already falls well short of what Gadamer saw nearly six dec-
ades ago in the passage cited above: that the analytic of Dasein 
is simply the gateway to a discussion of Being itself, and not 
just Being as the correlate of Dasein’s “implicit” understand-
ing. Stated briefly, Wolfen dale reduces Heidegger to someone 
who gives an anthropological account of how various kinds of 
knowledge emerge, with science his ultimate version of the as-
cent of man. My procedure is exactly the opposite — by show-
ing that the ideas deployed in the tool-analysis hold good for 
much more than tools, we can continue to “burst asunder the 
whole subjectivism of modern philosophy” rather than rein-
forcing it with tedious “epistemological” and “semantic” scaf-
folding in the manner of Wolfen dale.
In the example I give of the bridge, we see that nuts, gird-
ers, cables, and panels support the lateral position of scaffolds, 
panels, and concrete. For Heidegger, these pieces are not treated 
as independent units, but as swallowed up into the work they 
do. The bridge is complete, and in turn enables further actions 
by the Dasein who is not consciously aware of the smoothly 
functioning bridge. “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as 
29 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, Division I (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
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an equipment.” Wolfen dale objects further that I conflate some-
one’s “mereological” or internal dependence on their own in-
ternal organs with “environmental” or external dependence on 
factors such as gravity or oxygen. I acknowledge no such differ-
ence. Someone’s crossing of the bridge would be halted equally 
by a heart attack, the sudden disappearance of all oxygen from 
the world, or the collapse of one of the bridge pillars. In any 
of these cases, no matter whether “mereological” or “environ-
mental,” the streamlined interlocking of the bridge-system with 
my own potentiality for being would be ruptured. Wolfen dale 
claims further that I “even [go] so far as to incorporate negative 
dependence relations (e.g., my dependence on a meteorite not 
falling from space into me)” (57). This sounds more like White-
head’s “negative prehensions” than anything I would say. In any 
case, Wolfen dale cites no page reference that can be double-
checked, and I certainly say nothing of the kind during the dis-
cussion of the bridge from pages 22 to 24 of Tool-Being.
He also goes on to speak of a “tension” between what I take 
to be Heidegger’s global holism and my focus on individuals, 
though he is soon using “tension” instead to refer to a purported 
problem internal to my own argument. He correctly notes that 
for Heidegger the individual bridge-pieces are individuated by 
their place in the total functional system, while for OOO the real 
individuality is prior to any such deployment (58). He then adds, 
inexplicably, that “the tension becomes manifest in the way 
Harman connects totality and invisibility through the charac-
terization of execution as functional role” (58). This is hardly a 
tension, but a smooth demonstration of how the principle that 
“taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment” shows 
us exactly what the tool-analysis is doing. The functional totality 
of the bridge-system is one and the same as its invisibility, de-
spite Wolfen dale’s nagging insistence that “invisibility” is merely 
an epistemic term: apparently forgetting that Dasein is always 
the terminus of any tool-system for Heidegger, and thus that the 
invisibility of something for Dasein is one and the same as its 
participation in a larger system whose details are suppressed by 
it. He then makes a false argument against my ontologizing of 
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the situation: “We focus upon what we are doing with the ham-
mer […] rather than the mechanics of the hammer and our use 
of it. Nevertheless, this phenomenological insight is not meant 
to preclude the possibility of our turning our attention to any 
of these easily overlooked details” (58). In other words, Wolfen-
dale argues that the hammer ceases to be invisible as soon as we 
decide to look at it, neglecting to notice two important compli-
cations. First, if we turn from the bookshelf we are building to 
the hammer, we are now simply inside a new tool-system, one 
in which the hammer is the terminus, though all of its sustain-
ing parts and environmental conditions (there is no important 
difference between the two) are still suppressed from view. And 
second, to look at the hammer is not to eliminate its execution, 
since we are still objectifying it in our specific Dasein-futural 
manner. This is why the Brandom–Wolfen dale implicit/explicit 
distinction carries no water in this case. Ultimately, whether 
Dasein uses the hammer implicitly or stares at it explicitly, both 
of these uses fall short of the hammer itself. Yet Wolfen dale con-
tinues to grant exceptional powers to consciousness awareness: 
“Our awareness of the task as an articulated whole enables us to 
shift our attention back to any aspect of it” (59). Great. So now 
we turn our attention from the bookshelf to the hammer, but 
in doing so we have simply shifted the population of the tool-
system and have not converted it into “explicit” awareness. 
At this point he announces that “the strangest move is yet to 
come” (59). What is this uncanny maneuver that I am about to 
foist upon my readers? “[For Harman,] it is not merely the vis-
ibility of the parts but their distinctness that collapses into the 
whole — vanishing becomes absorption” (59). At first this looks 
like just another repetition of the complaint about conflating 
the phenomenological (vanishing) with the ontological (ab-
sorption), though again Wolfen dale misses that it is Heidegger 
who does this for us by treating Dasein (phenomenology) as the 
terminus of a tool-system in which each item of equipment only 
is what it is within the system, not a substance held in reserve. 
“Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment.” But it 
is worse than this. For Wolfen dale also wants to claim that I am 
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guilty of a logical contradiction, since my reading of the tool-
analysis requires the discreteness of bolts, girders, and cables, 
although I then conclude that they are not discrete at all. He 
comments on this as follows: “This is highly problematic […]. 
We would be forgiven for insisting upon a reductio ad absur-
dum of some, if not most, of Harman’s premises at this point” 
(59–60). I will forgive but not forget, before noting the shoddy 
character of his argument. The point of my mentioning indi-
vidual bridge-pieces is to show that the tool-analysis makes no 
allowance for their individuality in the first place, but swallows 
them up into the total system of the bridge. “Taken strictly, there 
‘is’ no such thing as an equipment.” I mention the various piec-
es not to affirm that Heidegger acknowledges their individual 
character, but to show that this individuality is lost by his tool-
analysis from the start. There is no tension at all in Heidegger 
but rather a contradiction, since he simply dissolves all items of 
equipment into whatever whole they are serving, which is ulti-
mately some whole for Dasein. “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such 
thing as an equipment.” My argument is that this makes a poor 
fit with his insight into how tools break, which shows that taken 
strictly, there is such a thing as an equipment! If a trestle of the 
bridge collapses, it is the trestle that collapses, not the bridge as 
a whole, and thus we can speak only of a fragile tool-system that 
depends on the individual reserve of each of its pieces not going 
wrong. In short, the “live contradictions hovering in the back-
ground” (60–61) are not mine but Heidegger’s, and that is ex-
actly why I wrote Tool-Being and what it is about. Quite simply, 
Heidegger wants it both ways. Taken strictly, there both is not 
and is such a thing as an equipment. This is the inherent failure 
of the most important thought experiment of twentieth-century 
philosophy. We can either explore its consequences, or we can 
explain them away in terms of a supposed difference between 
“phenomenological” and “ontological” levels, even though Hei-
degger himself erases this distinction by making tools depend-
ent upon their position in the system and the system depend-
ent in turn on Dasein. It is Wolfen dale who takes the easy way 
out by artificially separating the two, claiming that Heidegger is 
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merely giving us a “modal” phenomenology of the causal, the 
implicit, and the “normative.” He has not risen to the challenge 
posed by the case at hand. 
After pedantically claiming that he will deal with my ar-
gument “one contradiction at a time” (61), he is soon back to 
trivializing the tool-analysis as giving us a difference between 
implicit and explicit in the sense of human awareness (61), even 
though Heidegger passed this point long ago by locating “im-
plicitness” in the way that tools fuse into one another in the sys-
tem. We cannot say that this is merely “phenomenological,” as if 
it could somehow be supplemented with the commonsense as-
sumption of a real world outside the system made up of discrete 
physical individuals, because Heidegger’s relational ontology is 
far more ambitious than that. Any idea of pre-existent individu-
als that are only “phenomenologically” one for a Dasein using 
tools must assume the existence of presence-at-hand things out-
side the tool-system, when in fact Heidegger takes such things 
to be a derivative byproduct of the system as a whole. 
Wolfen dale goes on to cite the “move” I make with the exam-
ple of an appliance sitting on a frozen lake. This appliance too, I 
argue, encounters the lake only as a stable surface (sensual ob-
ject) whose easy resting on the ice is haunted by a fragility that 
the appliance does not currently register. When the ice begins 
to melt, the readiness-to-hand of the surface collapses, and its 
innate fragility unleashes severe consequences for the appliance, 
which sinks to the bottom of the lake. As I have already argued, 
this requires no “awareness” of the lake by the appliance; there 
is no panpsychism here. The sheer causal dependence of the ap-
pliance on the ice turns out to have been just another form of 
presence-at-hand, just like the presence of phenomena before 
the mind for Husserl. Instead of claiming to find a contradic-
tion here, Wolfen dale returns to another typical anti-OOO trope, 
“negative theology.” As he puts it, “We are once more told what 
execution is not, but are none the wiser about just what it is” 
(64). Rather than repeating my response to the negative theol-
ogy charge, I want to ask why Wolfen dale still makes a point of 
using the word “execution,” even though Tool-Being has already 
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passed beyond the functional sense of this term to treat it as 
deeper than any function, cause, or effect. Wolfen dale falsely 
states that, “[Harman] does not stop characterizing execution in 
terms of function. He continues to think of objects in terms of 
systematic unity” (64). But I do stop characterizing execution as 
function, we have seen, as soon as I note that causation is still a 
relational notion that therefore belongs at the level of presence-
at-hand. In the case of the appliance sitting stably on the frozen 
lake, the “execution” of the lake is clearly not characterized in 
terms of function, since its current function is to stabilize the 
appliance, but that function will soon cease, with dire results for 
the appliance. As for the second claim, that I “continue to think 
of objects in terms of systematic unity,” that is a direct result 
of Heidegger’s own approach. “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such 
thing as an equipment.” But it is obviously not my own position, 
which emphasizes the other side of Heidegger: the thinker of 
broken tools.
I will speak more briefly of Wolfen dale’s remaining points, 
starting with the “Argument from Excess.” This is not actually 
a distinct argument that Wolfen dale needed to “tease out” (his 
phrase) of Tool-Being. As soon as we realize that execution is 
not function but what is deeper than any function, it is already 
the argument from excess. Neither Dasein, nor a goose, nor a 
frozen appliance sitting on a lake can relate to another object in 
its totality. Wolfen dale speaks: “the identification of theory and 
praxis paves the way for the more controversial identification of 
knowledge and causation” (67). One page later he asserts that I 
proceed from the “obvious fact that the causal capacities of an 
object can exceed our understanding of them” to the “conten-
tious claim that we cannot encounter the real objects in which 
this excess consists, but only the distinct sensual objects that 
they withdraw behind” (68). But in the first place, my case is now 
well beyond the “obvious fact” that the “causal capacities” of an 
object “can” exceed our understanding of them. For it is not my 
argument at this stage of Tool-Being that real objects consist in 
causal capacities; that was true only in chapter 1, only as a peda-
gogical device, before I later said that even causation belongs 
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to the realm of presence-at-hand. The real objects are not just 
“capacities,” which entails possible relations to other objects, but 
something deeper than capacities. But second and more impor-
tantly, what makes it so “contentious” for Wolfen dale that causal 
limitation and epistemic limitation would be conceived in the 
same terms? Not surprisingly, it his assertion — a mere asser-
tion — that I am “equivocating” between phenomenology and 
metaphysics, “collapsing” them into one another (69). To repeat, 
this claim puts Wolfen dale at a pre-Heideggerian level by merely 
assuming that the withdrawal of entities into the tool-system is 
nothing but a “phenomenological” description of Dasein’s ex-
perience, although Heidegger’s reduction of individuality to 
presence-at-hand says exactly the opposite.
Another way he puts it is to say that I turn “factual” excess 
into “essential” excess (69). What he means is basically this: 
“hey, of course we don’t know everything about the objects 
around us, but that doesn’t mean we can’t learn it if we try!” 
What he is obviously trying to preserve here is the claim that 
science can know the real directly, and therefore we cannot say 
that there is anything “essentially” unknowable in the things. 
He also introduces some terminological hair-splitting with the 
claim that we need not take the objects of encounter to be “in-
trinsically” unknowable, since they are really just “extrinsically” 
unknowable to a finite knowing subject. He soon rewrites this 
as a distinction between “qualitative” and “quantitative” excess, 
implying that the latter is all that really faces us. As he summa-
rizes his position, “It could simply be the case that the subject 
can only grasp a finite number of the infinity of features belong-
ing to each thing, but that there is no particular feature that is in 
principle ungraspable” (70). For Wolfen dale, then, we are deal-
ing only with an extrinsic and quantitative unknowability. The 
fact that we cannot grasp all the features of a thing does not 
mean that we cannot grasp, say, 3,000 of them. Wolfen dale is 
right that I favor instead what he calls an “intrinsic” and “quali-
tative” version of the ungraspable as equivalent to the “substan-
tial reserve” of any thing, though as expected, he blames this on 
a conflation of epistemic and causal excess, which we have seen 
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repeatedly is really the only argument in his toolbox. He puts 
it as follows: “The equivocation between knowledge and causa-
tion thus disguises an illicit leap from quantitative to qualitative 
excess, along with the mysterianism it invokes” (72).
Let’s deal first with the charge of “mysterianism.” As argued 
throughout this book, the charge only holds if we confine our-
selves to Meno’s Paradox and think that either we know some-
thing or we don’t. This basically rationalist position is best ex-
pressed in words from Adrian Johnston that I have cited often 
enough, though it is worth doing so again here:
[N]umerous post-idealists in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries end up promoting a facile mysticism whose basic 
underlying logic is difficult to distinguish from that of nega-
tive theology. The unchanging skeletal template is this: there 
is a given “x;” this “x” cannot be rationally and discursively 
captured at the level of any categories, concepts, predicates, 
properties, etc.30
The problem with this passage is its false dualism between “un-
knowable x” and “discursive capture at the level of categories, 
concepts, predicates, or properties.” This is precisely the duality 
that Socrates rejects. For we are in the truth and not in the truth, 
and although Wolfen dale would presumably wish to read this as 
a merely “quantitiative” excess, so that Socrates already knows 
a number of things but does not yet know the rest, this is not a 
very rigorous sense of philosophia. Socrates’ proclamations of 
ignorance clearly do not mean “I only know 3,000 things but 
do not yet know the other 54 million.” What it does mean is 
that we must approach reality obliquely or sideways, and know 
it indirectly rather than directly. This is not the way that natural 
science likes to proceed, but there are many other modes of hu-
man cognition that do so, from art and architecture criticism, 
30 Adrian Johnston, “Points of Forced Freedom: Eleven (More) Theses on Ma-




to biography, to wine tasting. In these cases it is not a matter 
of “quantitative” failure to reach all the facts, but a question of 
whether the topic has to do with facts at all, in the sense of that 
which is “discursively capturable.” In the arts and humanities 
we easily find the “qualitative” access that Wolfen dale disdains 
precisely because he assumes, contra Socrates, that philosophy 
ought to serve as a private secretary to natural science.
Perhaps more importantly, as concerns “quantitative” un-
graspability, Wolfen dale recognizes the similarity of his argu-
ment to a related objection I often face. Against my argument 
that direct relations are impossible, many critics have countered 
that “relations are direct but partial.” Since I already discussed 
this point in connection with Bryant — in the chapter on Shavi-
ro above — I will not review it here in full. But it may be helpful 
to restate it in Wolfen dale’s own epistemic terms, rather than 
the causal ones that arose in debate with Bryant. What Wolfen-
dale basically claims is that I can know some of a thing even if 
I cannot know all of it. So, let’s say I am a botanist who knows 
1,000 facts about roses. Wolfen dale concedes that there may be 
“infinitely” many more facts about roses than that, though here 
I think he is guilty of leaping straight to the infinite sublime, 
when it may simply be a question of a very large finite number 
of facts à la Morton in Hyperobjects. But to know any given fact 
about a rose is already an abstraction from the rose as a whole, 
one that has been removed from the rose itself and has taken up 
residence in my mind. The reason this cannot entail merely an 
“extrinsic” unknowability about the rose is that the rose is not 
composed of a finite or even infinite number of “facts” any more 
than a house, as Merleau-Ponty wrongly thinks, is made up of 
an infinite number of possible views. We saw that the house is 
what makes the views possible even while not being itself a view, 
and the same holds for the rose: all possible facts about a rose 
will never add up to a rose. 
This leads us directly to Wolfen dale’s last effort to “tease out” 
of one of my arguments, which again is not distinct from the 
others, despite his book-long pretension that I mix different 
arguments together and thereby force him into Herculean la-
247
wolfendale
bors of philology. The new, supposedly separate argument is the 
so-called “Argument from Identity.” Although Wolfen dale cites 
its appearance in my article on Ladyman and Ross, its original 
target was the mathematism of Meillassoux. The reader will re-
call that Meillassoux holds that the primary qualities of things 
are those which can be mathematized. He is quick to preempt 
any charge that this amounts to Pythagoreanism, and to this 
end develops a theory of mathematics as consisting of “mean-
ingless signs” (an argument found already in Badiou). Stated 
differently, Meillassoux says he is not claiming that reality itself 
is mathematical, but only that mathematics indexes the real pri-
mary qualities of things in their own right. The problem is that 
to do so, he needs to posit the old standby “dead matter” as the 
external medium in which these primary qualities inhere. As is 
known to readers of my books, I see no legitimate motivation 
for any concept of “dead matter.” As self-evidently meaningful as 
dead matter may seem, it has been used primarily to deny accu-
sations of idealism from those who object to the idea of knowl-
edge as extracting forms from the world and bringing them into 
the mind. Thus, I have objected to Meillassoux that without his 
arbitrary positing of “dead matter,” he would in fact be a Py-
thagorean, since he would be claiming that perfect knowledge 
of a lemon and the lemon itself are one and the same thing. For 
otherwise, the same primary qualities would exist both in the 
lemon and in our knowledge of it.
Now, Wolfen dale splits my counterargument into no less 
than five separate propositions and tries to map the purported 
logical blunders that lead me to infer some of them from the 
others. But the argument is really much simpler than he thinks, 
as we will see again with Mulhall in chapter 8 in this text. The 
sole question at issue is this: what is the difference between the 
forms in the object and the forms in our knowledge of the ob-
ject? Meillassoux’s answer is effectively: no difference. We can 
mathematize the primary qualities of things (its forms), and 
this is not Pythagoreanism because the things also consist of 
dead matter which does not come into the mind along with the 
forms. For anyone who rejects the concept of dead or even liv-
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ing matter, as I do, this argument does not work. Meillassoux 
has simply posited “matter” as a bulwark against Pythagorean-
ism, aided in this effort by the fact that “matter” will no doubt 
sound to his readers like a good “materialist” principle that sup-
ports science, Enlightenment, and the political Left. Thus he is 
unlikely to get much pushback, except from hardliners like me 
who see no reason to accept the existence of anything like mat-
ter as distinct from form in the first place.
Wolfen dale’s argument looks somewhat different, though at 
bottom it is the same. He begins by conceding the difficulty of 
knowing all the forms of the things, perhaps because his pre-
ferred model is natural science rather than mathematics, and 
in science it is more difficult to claim to have exhausted any 
given topic. There is always an Einstein to follow a Newton, and 
while new branches of mathematics open up all the time, it is 
exceedingly rare for well-plowed mathematical fields to collapse 
completely. That is why these days there are various attempts 
to reconceive science in mathematical terms by claiming that a 
certain mathematical core remains even when scientific para-
digms collapse: “structural realism,” as this strategy is gener-
ally known, of which Ladyman and Ross offer just one variant. 
I hold that these attempts fail. In any case, Wolfen dale’s argu-
ment differs from Meillassoux’s through his greater willingness 
to concede a vast number of unknown properties in the things, 
even though he calls their unknowability “extrinsic” and “quan-
titiative,” meaning that they may become knowable through fu-
ture developments in science and technology.
But at bottom their argument is one and the same. For both 
Meillassoux and Wolfen dale, there is no intrinsic way in which 
the forms in the things differ from the forms in our knowledge 
of those things. And this is precisely what I deny, for reasons re-
lated to Latour’s famous phrase that there is “no transport with-
out transformation.” To extract facts from roses is like taking 
different viewpoints on a house — it does not get us any closer 
to the rose than the views of a house get us to the house. It in-
creases our amount of sensual information on these objects, and 
though Wolfen dale claims I conflate sensual with “empirical” 
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information, this is a mere assertion of the superiority of theory 
over the senses in getting closer to the real, which is precisely 
what is under dispute. A fact about a rose is a form in my mind, 
but is incommensurable with the forms in the rose itself. The 
reason is that any fact about the rose is actually a fact about my 
relation with the rose, which OOO argues is a new object in its 
own right, just as water is a new object formed from hydrogen 
and oxygen. Meillassoux’s “dead matter” is a poor solution to the 
specter of Pythagoreanism, but Wolfen dale’s solution also veers 
dangerously close to Pythagoras. For while he concedes that we 
cannot know all the qualities of the rose, he offers instead a lo-
cal Pythagorean theory in which the qualities I do know are the 
same in both my mind and the rose. And without the assump-
tion of “dead matter” somewhere in the background, he will not 
be able to explain why my knowledge of the rose’s mechanism 
for feeding is not the same as that feeding itself. An object is not 
a bundle of thousands of forms that can be peeled away one at a 
time and directly known, but a system of forms that cannot be 
abstracted from the object without becoming different forms. 
The Fourfold
Wolfen dale’s pages on my interpretation of the fourfold begin 
on a shockingly positive note:
Harman’s reading of the fourfold is to be praised for refusing 
either to sideline it as an unimportant feature of Heidegger’s 
work, or to deny the numerical specificity of the categories 
constituting it. Moreover, it is to be commended for inter-
preting these categories as the result of the intersection of 
two distinctions that it basically gets right: cleared/con-
cealed, and multiple/unitary. (79)
Are we entering a section of the book where Wolfen dale thinks 
I am largely right about something? Of course not. The familiar 
negative affect quickly resurfaces: “It is in [Harman’s] interpre-
tation of these distinctions that everything goes wrong” (79). 
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Not just certain things, mind you. Everything goes wrong. I am 
reminded again of Detective Marlowe’s lament, “All tough guys 
are monotonous. Like playing cards with a deck that’s all aces. 
You’ve got everything and you’ve got nothing.”31 Let’s examine 
Wolfen dale’s deck of fifty-two aces to see if any of them are real.
He finds that there are two initial problems with my reading 
of das Geviert. “The most serious problem is that Harman con-
flates the more well-known [1949] fourfold […] with another 
fourfold schema found earlier in Heidegger’s works — namely, 
in his lecture course during the Freiburg Emergency War Se-
mester of 1919”32 (80). But that is not all: “This is complicated 
by the fact that Harman also misreads the 1919 schema, read-
ing its concern with the ‘something’ as a matter of singularity 
as opposed to universality, of beings as opposed to Being” (80). 
He adds the related complaint that I suppress all trace of the 
fourfold in the Heidegger of the 1930s, even though that decade 
would supposedly have provided my best evidence: “Harman 
overlooks [‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and Contributions 
to Philosophy] for the most part, in favor of his attempt to read 
a continuity with the 1919 schema. It is ironic, then, that his in-
terpretation of the twin distinctions that constitute the fourfold 
gains more traction upon these works”33 (81).
Let’s begin with the last point. The reason for my focusing 
so heavily on the 1919 course is to show that the fourfold, usu-
ally thought to be an enigma exclusive to the “later” Heidegger, 
is already fully operative in a lecture course he gave at the age 
31 Chandler, The Long Goodbye, 483.
32 The original source on the 1949 fourfold is Heidegger, “Insight into That 
Which Is,” in Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight into That Which Is 
and Basic Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2012). The 1919 version can be found in Martin 
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (London: 
Continuum, 2008).
33 Martin Heidegger, “Origin of the Work of Art,” in Off the Beaten Track, eds. 
and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 1–56; Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: 
Of the Event, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 2012).
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of twenty-nine. To my knowledge this had not been noticed 
previously by scholars, although Theodore Kisiel had made a 
similarly bold claim that the term Ereignis (event) — also nor-
mally seen as confined to the later period — is the key to the 
earliest lecture courses as well.34 Indeed, scholarly commitment 
to a pivotal “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking, and to a correspond-
ing sharp distinction between “early” and “later” periods, is so 
widespread that to oppose it is already a risky stance. 1919 and 
1949 give us the original and ultimate versions of Heidegger’s 
fourfold structure, and thus we need to keep our eyes on these 
two specific moments in his career. Naturally, it would also be 
interesting to write a career-long history of this concept in his 
philosophy. But if I were to do so, I would not follow Wolfen-
dale’s rather conventional path of focusing on the “Origin of 
the Work of Art” and Contributions to Philosophy. Instead, I 
hold that there are two other points in the development of the 
fourfold that are more important. One of them, unmentioned 
by Wolfen dale, is the portion of Gesamtausgabe Volume 50 en-
titled Nietzsches Metaphysik, dating from 1941/42.35 There we 
are introduced to a fivefold reading of Nietzsche, though it is 
recognizably Heidegger’s own Geviert with the addition of an 
overarching fifth term, seldom used by Nietzsche himself: Ge-
rechtigkeit (justice), presumably an allusion to the pre-Socratic 
thinker Anaximander.36 Stripped of its fifth term, the remain-
ing fourfold goes on to dominate (however covertly) the whole 
of Heidegger’s more famous multi-volume work on Nietzsche.37 
The bigger omission by Wolfen dale, though I discuss it explic-
itly in Tool-Being, is the key role of the twin 1929 pieces “What 
34 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1995). The reader is referred to Kisiel’s Appendix 
D, “Genealogical Glossary of Heidegger’s Basic Terms, 1915–1927,” 490ff.
35 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsches Metaphysik/Einleitung in die Philosophie 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007). 
36 Martin Heidegger, “The Anaximander Fragment,” in Early Greek Thinking: 
The Dawn of Western Philosophy, trans. D.F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 13–58.
37 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 4 vols., trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1979–82).
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Is Metaphysics?” and “On the Essence of Ground,” which again 
draw our attention to the double axis that first appeared in the 
1919 lecture course.38 
Let us now consider Wolfen dale’s claim that I “conflate” the 
1919 and 1949 versions of the fourfold. Here a preliminary word 
is in order. Earlier in the book, when referring to our 2010 email 
disagreement about his blog posts, he tells us that “my own 
[philosophical] commitments […] are quite different from Har-
man’s, and this leaves little ground for praise on my part” (35). 
This misses the point, which is not “praise,” but fairness. One 
could imagine a book or article filled with nothing but severe 
criticism that would still be perfectly fair; more than “imagine” 
it, we have all actually read fine examples of this critical genre. 
Now, what is it that makes Wolfen dale’s book not just lacking in 
“praise” but so fundamentally unfair? It is not just that most of 
his sections append gratuitous insult to arguments that ought to 
be left to stand or fall on their own merits. More importantly, 
the unfairness is found in the various ways that Wolfen dale tries 
to position himself in advance on a pedestal of superior ration-
ality, rather than simply pitting counterarguments against my 
own arguments and seeing what happens. In his critique of my 
reading of the fourfold, for instance, he adopts the air of a sea-
soned veteran marking the efforts of an apprentice with red ink, 
though it is perfectly clear from the details that my interpreta-
tion was the inspiration for his own. One would never realize 
from reading Wolfen dale that the fourfold had been either ig-
nored or trivialized in the decades since its appearance, and that 
along with the fine efforts of the late Jean-François Mattei in 
Nice, my interpretation of the fourfold in Tool-Being was among 
the first to treat it as Heidegger’s central theme.39
38 Martin Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks, ed. William Mc-
Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 82–96; Martin Hei-
degger, “On the Essence of Ground,” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97–135.
39 Jean-François Mattei, Heidegger et Hölderlin: Le Quadriparti (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2001).
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Yet this sort of failure to give credit where it is due is simply 
a familiar feature of the brashness of youth; no doubt we have 
all been guilty of it at some point in our lives. A more important 
example of unfairness is Wolfen dale’s claim that I “conflate” 1919 
and 1949, since this implies to the reader not just that we disa-
gree about how to interpret these two models, but that I fool-
ishly hold they are one and the same. We will see shortly that 
this is a falsehood. There is also Wolfen dale’s claim that I sup-
press the role of “Origin of the Work of Art” and Contributions 
to Philosophy in an “attempt to read a continuity” (81) between 
the two models, which again we will see is not true. It is also 
somewhat odd, given that Wolfen dale has read The Quadruple 
Object, and in that book it is made abundantly clear that I do not 
think the 1919 and 1949 fourfolds are the same.40 The reader is 
asked to turn to page 88 of that book and consider the following 
contrast in the bullet-pointed list:
• 1919: “there is a duel between the apple as ‘something at all’ 
and its specific apple-qualities,”
• 1949: “there is a duel between reality as a whole and apple-
qualities.”
Far from “conflating” the two models, I make perfectly clear 
that the 1919 fourfold ascribes a separate unity to each indi-
vidual object, while in 1949 it is the unity of reality as a whole, 
echoing Heidegger’s treatment of Angst in Being and Time and 
“What Is Metaphysics?” But not only do I not “conflate” the two 
models, I treat the 1949 model as a regression from 1919, and de-
scribe the earlier version as much closer to OOO. As stated in the 
book, I still think the earlier model can be faulted for treating 
the “unitary” side too much in accordance with Humean “bun-
dles of qualities.” This demonstrates my overriding point that 
Heidegger simply overlooked Husserl’s greatest discovery — the 




tension between intentional objects and their sensual qualities 
or adumbrations. In this specific respect, Husserl remained the 
more advanced thinker. In more technical terms, Heidegger’s 
1919 “formal-logical objective something” (formallogisches ge-
genständliches Etwas) is the same for each and every thing. If 
we consider the case of an apple, “there is nothing especially 
applesque about its ‘something at all’ pole […] This makes the 
‘something at all’ disturbingly close to Hume’s ‘bundle,’ which 
does not differ qua bundle in our respective experiences of cot-
ton, dogs, melons, or trees.”41 It is also misleading when Wolfen-
dale says that “Harman underplays Heidegger’s version of the 
cleared/concealed and multiple/unitary axes in order to draw 
a continuity with his own fourfold” (82), since I make it clear 
that this is not the case. Only in his footnote 92 does Wolfen dale 
finally make the fair point that I am less explicit about this in 
Tool-Being than in The Quadruple Object. I have just gone back 
and reread the relevant passages and can see that this is true. But 
I no longer recall whether this was strategic simplification while 
writing Tool-Being, or whether I did not become fully conscious 
of this difference between my model and Heidegger’s until later. 
That said, from Wolfen dale’s account one might assume I had 
missed this point completely.
That brings us to Wolfen dale’s final major complaint about 
my reading of the fourfold: “the fact that Harman also misreads 
the 1919 schema, reading its concern with the ‘something’ as a 
matter of singularity as opposed to universality, of beings as op-
posed to Being” (80). As seen previously, this is not a question 
of a “misreading,” but of a philosophical disagreement between 
me and Wolfen dale as to whether it makes sense to speak of Be-
ing in general apart from specific beings. In any case, he draws 
conclusions that lead him astray. He does begin with the cor-
rect observation that “Harman does not so much think that 
the whole conceals itself, as that it doesn’t exist” (83). From this 
correct premise he proceeds to something fundamentally incor-




terpreting it as a single being composed out of all other beings 
[…]. This makes Heidegger’s position into a variant of what he 
would call onto-theology, insofar as it comprehends Being in 
terms of a single privileged Being” (83). He then claims further 
that I thereby “blend” two separate distinctions, before using a 
footnote to accuse me of “convoluted transitions” that are “be-
yond the scope of [his] book” (83n95).
But here it is Wolfen dale who “blends” and “convolutes” 
three separate issues. First, we know that Wolfen dale wants to 
speak of “Being as a whole” without its being treated as a single 
object. As seen in the previous section, the reason this cannot be 
done is that Heidegger himself treats the tool-system as a holis-
tic unity; I argued this point above and will not do it again here. 
Second, Wolfen dale conflates Heidegger’s aspirations with his 
own; for we have seen it is Wolfen dale who will later concede my 
point that beings can only be known through allusion or other 
modes of indirect access, while arguing that Being itself is more 
amenable to direct intellectual treatment. Yet this is merely an 
epistemological wish, one that makes a poor fit with Heidegger’s 
own insistence that Being must not be confused with any con-
cept of it, a point where Derrida shows superior prudence. Third 
and finally, to say that Heidegger’s tool-analysis treats Being as a 
single entity is not to ascribe “onto-theology” to him, as Wolfen-
dale claims. Although it is true that he blames onto-theology for 
“[comprehending] Being in terms of a single privileged Being,” 
this is not an argument against monism — which Heidegger of-
ten verges on himself, given his own conflation of withdrawal 
with unity — but against presence. For Heidegger the problem 
with onto-theology is less its concern with “a single privileged 
Being” than with the assumption that this privileged Being can 
be made directly present to the mind. As seen in my remarks 
on Gratton, we cannot understand the notion of onto-theology 
without grasping that it primarily marks Heidegger’s break with 
phenomenology. This is clear from History of the Concept of Time 
and its discussion of why Husserl missed the Seinsfrage — the 
fact that the older thinker interprets being in the sense of “pos-
sible correlation with an intentional act.”
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Let’s turn in closing to the remaining sections of Wolfen-
dale’s pages on the fourfold, which in typical, needlessly techni-
cal fashion he calls “The Argument from Eidos” (84–88) and 
“The Argument from Essence” (88–95). As a reminder, all of the 
many sections in his book entitled “The Argument from X” are 
efforts to support his overriding rhetorical conceit that my argu-
ments are so unclear and intertwined that he had to isolate them 
for me, though the unbiased reader will invariably find that my 
arguments are clearer than Wolfen dale’s own.
He begins with what looks like a surprising concession to my 
double-axis model: “Harman does not really need to argue for 
the distinctions between objects and qualities, at least insofar 
as it is a correlate of the intuitive distinction between subjects 
and predicates” (84; italics added). What does need further ex-
amination, he thinks, is the way this distinction plays out along 
the other axis, real/sensual. For the moment, at least, he seems 
to accept that the object/qualities distinction is not just a cor-
rect interpretation of Husserl, but even an accurate diagnosis of 
intentionality itself. In other words, for now he is granting my 
claim that the object-pole is distinct for each sensual individual. 
Since we already know he complains about my doing so on the 
real level, where I also individualize the object-pole rather than 
making it a general “Being” shared by everything, the current 
state of his argument seems to be as follows: “It may work on 
the sensual level, but on the real level it effaces the generality of 
Being that Heidegger demands.” His further summary of my in-
terpretation of Husserl (84–86) is faintly sarcastic, but he mostly 
lets it pass with no sign of disagreement, aside from an excep-
tion I will now consider.
That exception comes with the SO–RQ tension that I call eidos. 
As Wolfen dale correctly notes, although I argue that SO–sQ con-
sists of purely accidental qualities that can be subtracted from 
the sensual object, this cannot be done to SO–RQ without strip-
ping objects of any essential qualities at all, something I could 
obviously never accept. His objection is not to this point, but to 
my neighboring rejection of Husserl’s claim that sensual quali-
ties are known through the senses and eidetic qualities through 
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the intellect. I recall his asking an astonished question about this 
very point when I gave my 2012 lecture at the Summer School 
in Bonn, and it came as no surprise. For Wolfen dale, a dyed-in-
the-wool rationalist, if the intellect cannot gain direct access to 
the real then philosophy is doomed.42
His horror at my denial of Husserlian intellectual intuition 
leads him to three additional claims that cloud the discussion 
further. First, he argues that “Husserl’s concept of eidos is an 
account of general essence, as opposed to the account of indi-
vidual essence that Harman is attempting to develop” (86). This 
is clear in Ideas I, the only source Wolfen dale cites in opposing 
me, though I refer throughout my argument to the Logical In-
vestigations. In this way he opens up a can of worms concerning 
the relation between the Husserl of 1900/1901 and the Husserl 
of 1914, a span of time during which he famously shifted from 
a half-hearted faux realism to a full-blown idealism. Given my 
view that Husserl was already an idealist in the 1890s, I am per-
fectly willing to entertain the notion that in the Logical Investi-
gations eidetic qualities are also meant in the sense of knowable 
universals. But the point is irrelevant, since I make no claim 
to be a Husserlian in the first place. I have already discarded 
his strong opposition between sensual and categorial intuition, 
and have equally little concern with whether I am being loyal 
to Husserl’s own theory of qualities. Even if Wolfen dale could 
prove to my satisfaction that the treatment of the theme in Logi-
cal Investigations is not all that different from the later account 
in Ideas I, my response would simply be: “All right then, I disa-
gree with Husserl on this point as well.” My homage to Husserl 
is limited to his crucial threefold distinction between sensual 
object, sensual qualities, and eidetic qualities, phrased in OOO 
terminology as SO–sQ/SO–RQ. I take this to be a decisive blow to 
the empiricist “bundles of qualities” model, and a wonderfully 
paradoxical recognition that an element of the real (namely, RQ) 
is embedded in the heart of sensual existence itself. I am under 




no obligation to accept the additional baggage of Husserl’s phi-
losophy, of which his idealism is merely the heaviest.
Yet, and this is my second point, Wolfen dale persists in his 
assumption that I claim to be Husserlian but really am not. This 
is clear from the end of the section, where he complains that my 
model “bears no resemblance to the Husserlian phenomenolog-
ical method on which it is supposedly based” (88). No resem-
blance? He exaggerates once again. Like any other philosopher, 
I have the right to agree with Husserl on some points but not 
others, and thus I am free to draw the SQ-SO–RQ triad from him 
while not accepting his assumption that RQ can be penetrated 
by the intellect. So offended is Wolfen dale by my non-rationalist 
approach that he echoes Gratton in the false remark that in this 
way, my argument “seemingly conflates allure […] with theory” 
(88). Not at all. The two are completely different. Allure is an 
RO–SQ fusion produced by the aesthetic withdrawal of a real ob-
ject, so that the observer has to perform the missing object, as 
in the case of metaphor. There is no such performance in theory, 
which occurs along the totally different axis of SO–RQ. To repeat, 
allure is RO–SQ, and theory is SO–RQ, which means that they 
share not a single term. The only resemblance is that both con-
tain a real element (RO in allure, RQ in theory) which means that 
there is something that eludes the intellect in both cases. The 
fact that Wolfen dale equally dislikes my accounts of both does 
not mean they are “conflated” in my treatment of them. That 
would merely be an “Argument from Emotional Effect” of the 
sort that Wolfen dale otherwise disdains. In short, this is yet an-
other case of Wolfen dale disagreeing with me on philosophical 
grounds while portraying the disagreement as an interpretative 
blunder on my part.
Let’s turn now to Wolfen dale’s third point, which already 
bothered Brassier even in the 2007 heyday of our joint collabo-
ration on Speculative Realism. Given my treatment of qualities 
as individual or specific rather than universal, Wolfen dale com-
plains further that “this dearth of generality means that there is 
no basis for the process of comparison, insofar as there are no 
qualities that could possibly be shared” (87). That brings us to 
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the following punch line: “this makes the basis of the process of 
subtraction entirely mysterious, as there are no criteria for sort-
ing accidents from eidos. In essence, what Harman does is capi-
talize upon this mystery” (87; italics added). Here Wolfen dale 
declares his allegiance to an aspect of Modern Onto-Taxonomy 
that I have called “epistemism.” Epistemism is the brand of real-
ism that does not care at all about the real except insofar as it 
can be known, hence Wolfen dale’s ungenerous reaction to my 
interpretation of Socrates. Since I insist that Socrates never at-
tains knowledge and does not even mean to attain knowledge, 
in Wolfen dale’s eyes this means I am calling Socrates a worthless 
sophist, in what he calls a perverse misinterpration of our disci-
plinary hero equal to that of Aristophanes. Again, this hinges on 
Wolfen dale’s “implicit” acceptance of Meno’s Paradox, since he 
thinks something is either knowable or unknowable, and what 
is unknowable is not even worth talking about: Wittgenstein’s 
“what must be passed over in silence.”43 But in this way Wolfen-
dale merely abandons philosophy for epistemology, throwing 
philosophia into the ditch for the Greater Glory of Science. Yet 
there are numerous ways to get at the real without knowing it, 
and not all such efforts are equal. To say that we need “criteria” 
for distinguishing between the accidental and the essential is to 
assume that a number of propositions are arrayed equally before 
us, some of them true and others false, and that valid epistemo-
logical criteria are needed to sort the wheat from the chaff. Here 
we are essentially at the level of Sellars’s manifest and scientific 
images: we confront many images, and some are scientific and 
others less so. Needless to say, this disappointing metaphysics 
of images is not how OOO frames the problem. In my model, 
both allure and theory contend with an element of the real (but 
not the same element — real objects for allure, real qualities for 
theory) that the intellect cannot touch any more directly than 
the senses. Here Wolfen dale will no doubt fall back on accu-
sations of “negative theology.” But we do face the necessity of 
43 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and 
B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge, 1974), 89.
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inventing methods for indirect detection of the real, since that 
is all the real permits. One example of how this can be done is 
developed in my book Immaterialism. If we ask for “criteria” for 
the essential and inessential elements in the history of the Dutch 
East India Company, such criteria could never be better than 
external and accidental: which news made the biggest noise at 
the time, which battles had the largest body counts, which ship-
ments earned the most money. We have seen that Wolfen dale 
likes to pretend that I never discuss methodology, though in 
fact I do so frequently. In the case of Immaterialism — and there 
are ramifications well beyond that book — what is sought are 
moments of irreversible symbiosis between the Company and 
something else. And here, external “criteria” are not enough. 
What is required instead is some touch and agility of the sort 
that Socrates so often showed.
We turn at last to what Wolfen dale calls “The Argument from 
Essence.” Here he argues that my interpretation of Saul Kripke’s 
theory of reference “seriously [warps]” (93) Kripke in the same 
way that I seriously warped Husserl. In the latter case we saw 
that there was no warping of Husserl, but simply the arbitrary 
dictate by Wolfen dale that since I reject Husserl’s theory of the 
intuition of essence, I am forbidden to borrow anything from 
him at all. It was a curious argument in that case, and his “Ar-
gument from Kripke” has curious features of its own. He again 
begins by way of Husserl: “[Harman] interprets Husserl’s claim 
that all other intentional acts are founded upon nominal acts as 
saying that in any intentional relation we are acquainted with an 
immediate ‘this’ (sensual object) that in turn refers to a shadowy 
‘this’ (real object)” (89). I was confused when reading this be-
cause, as Wolfen dale ought to know, I do not think Husserl has 
any conception of real objects at all, given his a priori exclusion 
of objects that might not be the potential correlate of an inten-
tional act. Hence, I followed his citation back to pages 28 to 29 
of Guerrilla Metaphysics, and immediately found that he got me 
wrong. Here is what I wrote: “Echoing Aristotle and anticipating 
Saul Kripke, Husserl holds that names are ‘fixed appellations’ 
(cf. ‘rigid designators’) referring directly to an underlying shad-
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owy ‘this’ rather than to any particular set of sensual-material 
qualities.”44 (28). In fairness to Wolfen dale, he was probably mis-
led by the word “shadowy,” which I normally use when speak-
ing of the real rather than the sensual. But the ensuing passage 
about Husserl’s example of a blackbird flying in the garden 
makes it abundantly clear that I am speaking, with Husserl, of 
the blackbird as distinct from its numerous visible properties, 
not of a real blackbird distinct from the sensual one. Nominal 
acts, like everything else in Husserl’s philosophy, simply have 
no traffic with the withdrawn real objects that are completely 
excluded from his model of the cosmos.
Wolfen dale continues, with the aid of Fregean terminology: 
“Names [for Husserl in Harman’s reading] are attached to [sen-
sual objects] as if they are the senses that determine their refer-
ence. This means that distinct sensual objects can refer to the 
same real object insofar as one thing can have many names”45 
(89). What Wolfen dale probably has in mind is Frege’s famous 
example of “morning star” and “evening star” as two different 
names for Venus. But in light of Husserl’s idealism, some quali-
fications are obviously needed. Since there are no real objects for 
Husserl, Venus can never be anything more than a sensual ob-
ject, though of course we can still call it the “reference” of both 
“morning star” and “evening star.” This cannot be a relation be-
tween two sensual objects and a real one (since no such distinc-
tion exists in Husserl) but only between two adumbrations and 
a sensual one. That is to say, I encounter a morning-time adum-
bration of a bright planet near the horizon, and later in the year 
I encounter a night-time adumbration of a bright planet. Once I 
learn they are both Venus, I decide that these two adumbrations 
refer to one and the same sensual object rather than two differ-
ent ones. Any talk of real objects simply cannot apply to Husserl. 
Wolfen dale is right in his follow-up point that I do not think 
44 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry 
of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 28.
45 Gottlob Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
Philosophische Kritik 100 (1892): 25–50.
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descriptions are needed to become acquainted with sensual ob-
jects, but I am not sure who would say the contrary, unless it 
were a philosopher who sees language at work even in imme-
diate perception. Wolfen dale is also right that I relate Ortega’s 
term “feeling-things” to sensual objects, insofar as any such ob-
ject has a unified effect on us prior to any analysis of that effect. 
Unfortunately, however, I suspect that he makes this connec-
tion mostly to associate me with the word “feeling,” which fuels 
his eventual attack on the supposed “emotional introspection” 
of OOO. But Ortega’s feeling-things are not restricted to “emo-
tions” any more than Husserl’s intentional objects are; rather, 
they are interwoven with all manner of features of these objects, 
including those achieved through theoretical inference. Despite 
his confusing use of the phrase “real objects” with respect to my 
reading of Husserl, Wolfen dale is well aware that Kripke at least 
looks like a different case. As he frames it, whereas for Husserl 
the difference is between a name and its sense, with Kripke it 
amounts to the difference between a name and its reference, so 
that it looks as if we are headed outside the thought-world corre-
late and toward reality itself (90). This would appear to be on the 
right track, although Wolfen dale’s follow-up gloss of this claim 
ends up in avoidable error: “Whereas the immediate ‘this’ [in 
Husserl] is something more than the particular descriptions that 
give us purchase upon it, the shadowy ‘this’ is something deeper 
than every possible description” (90). What makes this confusing 
is that Husserl’s sensual object is already deeper than “every pos-
sible description,” which is precisely why Husserl grounds all ex-
pressions of a thing in the prior nominal act through which it is 
given. Whether Kripke’s theory refers to the real rather than just 
the sensual is a separate question, but the difference between 
him and Husserl is certainly not that between “every possible 
description” and “particular descriptions.”
It is also worth a devoting a paragraph to a genuine point 
of surprise on my part. Although Wolfen dale rarely misses the 
chance to accuse me of a mistake, he completely misses the big-
gest one in Guerrilla Metaphysics, which I noticed soon after 
publication: the ambiguity in that book as to whether Kripke’s 
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rigid designator points to a real object or a sensual one. There 
are two passages where I seem to be arguing that it is the real 
object: (a) “Ortega holds that the inwardness of things is a depth 
that can absolutely never be fathomed, insofar as it is not in-
terchangeable with any sum of its attributes (cf. Kripke’s objec-
tion to Russell’s theory of names)”;46 (b) “the rigid designator is 
pointing to a subterranean President Nixon with real [qualities], 
though by definition it is impossible in the case of real objects 
to determine exactly what these [qualities] are.”47 By contrast, 
perhaps the clearest passage arguing that rigid designators point 
at sensual objects instead is the following: 
What we have with proper names as rigid designators are 
the feeling-units “gold” or “Nixon,” not gold and Nixon in 
themselves, since these consist only in executing their own 
reality and can never be reduced to names or thoughts any 
more than to definite descriptions. A proper name is simply 
not the thing itself, even if it points more closely to that thing 
than does an adjective.48
As a reminder, the term “feeling-units” is drawn from Ortega’s 
theory of metaphor, and I have argued that it is analogous to 
Husserl’s intentional objects and my own sensual ones. Now, it 
may seem obvious that by the standards of OOO, reference in 
Kripke’s theory cannot be pointing to real objects. We need only 
consider his view that the essence of gold is to have seventy-nine 
protons, a basically scientistic result having nothing in common 
with an elusive deep essence of the thing. Most probably, what 
I had in mind when writing the two contrary and misleading 
passages was that Xavier Zubíri both speaks of the deep non-
relational reality of essence and locates that essence in a thing’s 
“atomic-cortical structure.”49 Since this sounds a similar scien-
46 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 105.
47 Ibid., 199.
48 Ibid., 109.
49 Xavier Zubíri, On Essence, trans. A. Robert Caponigri (Washington, dc: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1980).
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tistic note to Kripke’s seventy-nine-proton gold-essence, per-
haps I was willing to think that both authors were concerned 
with a withdrawn essence nonetheless. At present, however, I 
would argue that Zubíri is much closer to such a possibility than 
Kripke. The question was best illuminated by Niki Young in 
Malta, whose knowledge of OOO is vast to the point of unnerv-
ing. As he put it in an email to me, rigid designation is obviously 
not a form of allure, and therefore it must point to sensual ob-
jects, not real ones.50 Here I think Young gets it right.
We return to the main topic. Wolfen dale sees me as produc-
ing an illegitimate combination of one point from Leibniz and 
another from Kripke. The Leibnizian point, taken from Monad-
ology §8, is that although all monads are one they must also have 
numerous qualities. For otherwise, (a) they could not even exist, 
(b) they would not be able to change, and (c) they would all 
be alike. As Wolfen dale accurately summarizes my argument, 
“if sensual qualities are unable to compose these essences, there 
must be an entirely distinct type of quality capable of doing so” 
(92). Nor does he seem to reject this argument; his real gripe is 
with how I use Kripke. As he puts it, “[for Harman,] because 
Kripke shows that the reference of names is somehow independ-
ent of our beliefs about their qualities, the individuation of the 
objects they refer to cannot have anything to do with these be-
liefs” (91). But this is less a matter of properly understanding 
Kripke than of the usual disagreement between me and Wolfen-
dale. He thinks that both the true and false qualities of things 
are available to the mind and we need criteria for sorting them; I 
think that all the qualities available to the mind come up short of 
the things, and this is why “our beliefs” can never be isomorphic 
with what our beliefs are about. Wolfen dale thinks this leads 
to skepticism and negative theology, while I think it compels 
fresh methods of indirect access to reality. One example of this 
difference is Wolfen dale’s point that Kripke merely means rigid 
designation in a “modal” sense, referring to counterfactual cases 
such as those in which Aristotle might have been clean-shaven 
50 Niki Young, personal communication, February 20, 2019.
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or chose not to study with Plato, while he calls my own use of 
these designators “epistemic.” As he nicely puts it, “[Kripke, un-
like Harman] thus does not think that grasping the essence of a 
thing is impossible, but simply that it is distinct from grasping 
the meaning of a name that refers to it” (94). But here as with 
Husserl, I am not sure why Wolfen dale thinks I am bound to all 
aspects of Kripke’s theory just because I accept some of them. At 
the 2007 Goldsmiths workshop I called Kripke’s position “disap-
pointing realism,” and this is the reason why.51
On this basis, Wolfen dale claims that my position should be 
called “stubborn designation” rather than “rigid designation,” 
since “[for Harman] names not only refer to the same thing 
throughout counterfactual variations, but across all possible ap-
pearances” (94). What is the point of this witticism? For Wolfen-
dale, of course, it is a question of “criteria”: if we are to distin-
guish between the essential and inessential features of things, 
then all of these features must be equally accessible in order to 
be judged with blue or red ink, as the case may be. This is what 
Wolfen dale is after when he says that the same property can be 
essential for one thing and accidental for another: “a living cell’s 
salinity […] must remain within a narrow range for it to func-
tion [… while] a cooked pasta’s salinity […] can vary well out-
side of this range without dissolution” (92–93). But note that to 
say this he must treat “salinity” as a universal accessible to the 
mind, one that can be either essential or accidental; for me, as 
Wolfen dale himself already complained, essential qualities are 
peculiar to the individual object, a level where even he admits 
that only something like allure can help us. For OOO, since we 
know that the essential is inaccessible, what we need are not 
“criteria,” but methods for getting at the essential qualities indi-
rectly, as in the case of the Dutch East India Company. Thus my 
rejection of “criteria” as the heart of the matter does not mean, 
as he implies throughout his book, that anyone can say any-
thing they please. Instead, it only means that the real qualities 
51 Ray Brassier et al., “Speculative Realism,” in Collapse III, ed. Robin Mackay 
(Falstaff: Urbanomic, 2007), 379–80.
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of things require a more indirect means of access. But of course, 
Wolfen dale’s dogmatic rationalist commitment to a continuity 
between philosophy and science means that he can only view 
indirect access as negative theology.
His final claim in this connection is an attempt to strike at the 
heart of OOO’s concern with individuals. In the absence of “cri-
teria,” he holds, we cannot even know if beings are many rather 
than just one: “Even more worryingly, perhaps, we are left won-
dering why we must affirm the reality of discreteness at all, rath-
er than some single Apeiron underlying a plurality of discrete 
appearances” (95). His case seems to be that my argument is cir-
cular, and to establish this point he quotes me as referring to the 
“glaringly obvious fact” of the existence of numerous discrete 
entities. He does not give a citation for this phrase, and I am 
unable to find this exact wording during word-searches of both 
Tool-Being and Guerrilla Metaphysics. The closest I can find is a 
passage referring to sincerity in Levinas, which runs as follows: 
As Levinas puts it, life is a sincerity, contending not just with 
a total equipmental system, but with an innumerable variety 
of distinct elements. The problem is that, for now, we can 
only concede this existence of individual objects as a glaring 
experiential fact — no room has been found for it yet in the 
context of Heidegger’s theory.52
But the reference here is to a glaring experiential fact, which 
means I am discussing sensual objects. Presumably even Wolfen-
dale would admit that at the level of experience there seem to be 
many individual things, and this is the level at which sensual 
objects are relevant. Obviously, what Wolfen dale means is that 
a plurality of individual sensual objects does not prove that the 
real is not just a One. True enough, but I have never called mul-
tiplicity at the level of the real a “glaring experiential fact”; quite 
the contrary, since the real is for me something deeper than sen-
sory, theoretical, or pragmatic experience. An argument is in 
52 Harman, Tool-Being, 43.
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fact needed for plurality on the level of the real; I gave it already 
in the chapter on Gratton, in connection with Derrida, and will 
not repeat it here. But I gave the same argument against Lady-
man and Ross in “I Am Also of the Opinion That Materialism 
Must Be Destroyed,” an article Wolfen dale has clearly read but 
never refutes. He not only cites it in his book, but was even in 
the audience in Dundee, Scotland when it was first presented it 
as a lecture.53 
Vicarious Causation
The pages on vicarious causation (97–105) are the shortest and 
least interesting of the three sections considered here, mainly 
because Wolfen dale thinks this theme is motivated by “argu-
ments [he has] already considered and rejected” (97). More spe-
cifically, we can say that Wolfen dale rejects vicarious causation 
because of his persistent allegiance to the twin pillars of Mod-
ern Onto-Taxonomy, (a) the correlational circle and (b) science-
worship. Point (a) is used to deny that object–object interactions 
are of the same philosophical order as thought–object interac-
tions; given his insistence on an epistemological starting point, 
he thinks that the thought–object correlate (or “phenomeno-
logical horizon”) is where all rigorous philosophy must begin. 
We have seen that this is also the case for Meillassoux, in view 
of his often overlooked admiration for the correlational circle. 
It is equally true for Badiou’s opposition between inconsistent 
and consistent multiplicity, since the former is treated as only 
the retroactive effect of a “count,” and there is no evidence in his 
53 My Dundee conference lecture was held on March 27, 2010 at a conference 
entitled “Real Objects, or Material Subjects? A Conference on Continental 
Metaphysics.” Wolfen dale and I were still on reasonably good terms at that 
point, and I remember him approaching me afterward with the claim that 
Deleuze is neither an underminer nor an overminer. I was too exhausted 
from the lecture to respond at the time and excused myself from the room; 
perhaps he was irked by that incident too, though I meant no harm.
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writings that anything but a human can perform the count.54 I 
mention all this to emphasize that here Wolfen dale is squarely 
in the continental mainstream, despite the closing chords of 
his book that depict me as the calculating purveyor of rampant 
continental prejudice. While he will claim that OOO is guilty of 
the most extreme form of correlationism, this is only because 
he, like Meillassoux, takes correlationism to be the equivalent 
of finitude, and therefore as something that can only be over-
come by securing access to direct knowledge of reality. For my 
part, I think this is not the main problem with Kantian correla-
tionism, which consists instead in a false attitude that is widely 
taken for a truism: that we cannot speak of any object-object 
relations without treating them as derivative versions of the 
relation between objects and human thought. As for point (b), 
what I mean by science-worship is the notion that only science 
is permitted to speak about object–object interactions, and that 
science is doing this so well that philosophers ought to shut up 
about the matter and merely comment on the results of “the best 
science we have.” Thus, Wolfen dale’s quick dismissal of vicarious 
causation is a natural consequence of the rather commonplace 
biases built into his starting point. If you accept the same biases, 
then you are likely to give Wolfen dale too easy a hearing and not 
push back with tough questions.
He begins by quoting a passage from Guerrilla Metaphysics: 
“Once it was conceded that the world is made up of withdrawn 
objects, utterly sealed in private vacuums but also unleashing 
forces upon one another, all the other problems emerge in quick 
succession. Let anyone who does not agree with the strategies 
of guerrilla metaphysics specify clearly which of its initial steps 
is invalid.”55 His response to this is immodest: “This is precisely 
what I have done. None of these initial steps has proved valid, 
let alone all of them. This seems to rule out vicarious causation 
by default” (97). But as mentioned, what Wolfen dale considers 
54 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 
2005), 25.
55 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 97.
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to be a demonstration of the invalidity of vicarious causation is 
really just a result of his own biased commitment to the Onto-
Taxonomical Two-Step, (a) the correlational circle and (b) sci-
entific monopoly on discussions of the world itself. Let’s take a 
brief look at how this plays out in his breezy eight pages on the 
theory of vicarious causation.
Wolfen dale turns first to the historical context I supply for the 
problem. Earlier we saw that he concedes I deploy the method 
of historical contextualization “with some skill,” though he then 
immediately warns that this “could” lead to attempts to intimi-
date readers unfamiliar with the sources I describe, without giv-
ing examples of this ever happening in my work. In the present 
section he makes a half-hearted attempt to insinuate that I try to 
intimidate readers on the present topic, though he never comes 
right out and makes the claim. He begins as follows: “[Harman] 
provides a further historical narrative regarding the tradition of 
occasionalist accounts of causation, which is meant to suggest 
that the problem his theory responds to emerges from a broader 
range of concerns than his own” (97–98; boldface changed to 
italics). Far from merely “suggesting” it, I have given a number 
of analyses of the similarities and differences between the dif-
ferent variants of occasionalism found in early Islamic specu-
lation (the Ash‘arites), the seventeenth-century continentals 
(Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz) as well as Berkeley, 
whose occasionalism is just as pronounced as that of the others. 
Whitehead is added to the list as a fascinating historical outlier, 
a twentieth-century thinker who ascribes a central causal role to 
God as the mediator (by way of eternal objects) of all prehen-
sions (relations). Wolfen dale rightly adds that I read Hume and 
Kant as providing a different sort of occasionalism, though with 
the mind rather than God as the sole causal mediator. This argu-
ment is important for me, since it demonstrates that occasional-
ism is not just the laughably outdated religious theory it is often 
taken to be, but that by transferring causal monopoly to the hu-
man mind, Modern Onto-Taxonomy (including Wolfen dale’s 
version) remains a derivative form of occasionalism without 
knowing it. This has the added merit of suggesting a paradoxi-
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cal secret dependence of modern European rationalism on the 
most radical theories of medieval Islam, which opens up new 
avenues of historical research. All of this leads Wolfen dale to 
make the following, unsurprising statement: “Now, although 
this strikes me as presenting a somewhat perverse reading of 
Kant and Hume, insofar as it reads their epistemological con-
cerns in metaphysical terms they would abjure, there are defi-
nite continuities here” (99). Let’s deal first with the charge of 
“perversity,” and second with the apparent concession that 
“there are definite continuities here.”
The supposed perversity of my reading of Hume and Kant 
hinges entirely on Wolfen dale’s presupposition of a gulf between 
epistemology and metaphysics. As already seen, I refuse such 
a strict division, which is based on an acceptance of the cor-
relational circle that I reject outright. But let’s play along for a 
moment and see where it takes us. It is easy to see why someone 
would make the charge of perversity. After all, the theological 
occasionalists all make positive claims about the way causation 
really works in the world: for the Ash‘arites of medieval Basra, 
God is so mighty that he must be the only causal agent and not 
just the only Creator; for Descartes He provides a bridge be-
tween the two distinct finite substances; for Malebranche it is 
closer to the Ash‘arite view that God mediates relations between 
any two things; for Spinoza, God is the sole substance and eve-
rything happens inside God or nature; for Leibniz, what seems 
like causation is the result of the pre-established harmony be-
tween monads ordained by the Lord; for Berkeley, God is the 
sole producer of apparent regularities that cannot result from 
the things themselves, which are mere images with no hidden 
causal powers; for Whitehead as well, all relations pass through 
God. Obviously, these are all strong metaphysical claims that 
would count as “pre-critical” or “dogmatic” by present-day 
standards. But is it not altogether different for Hume and Kant, 
who merely say that we cannot know what causation really is, 
or know if it even exists, and therefore must focus our attention 




The difference is not as great as it seems, and certainly can-
not be proven with the terminological artifice of saying that the 
first group makes claims about the world itself and the second 
only about human experience of the world. The reason is that 
the decision to start from what is given to us and not specu-
late about the shadowy beyond is itself an ontological doctrine. 
Epistemology is merely a name for a specific ontology, not an 
entirely separate branch of philosophy. Namely, the epistemolo-
gist simply assumes that we have direct access to the thought–
world relation but no direct access to world–world relations 
between inanimate things, and thus we cannot philosophize 
without first examining the capacities of one specific entity (the 
mind) to make contact with the world. The epistemologist and 
the theological occasionalist are perfectly alike in holding that 
there is some ultimate important entity whose various relations 
with reality are different in kind from the relations of other enti-
ties. Yes, the epistemological standpoint is far more respected 
today than the theological one; after all, no one has seen God di-
rectly, though all of us have conscious experience, and therefore 
the second alternative looks like a far more rigorous starting 
point. But the problem is as follows. The fact that we begin (like 
Hume and Kant) with doubt about whether our own experience 
provides evidence of causal relations existing outside us is not 
something we glean from our experience of the world, except 
in the trivial sense that an entity without experience could not 
philosophize at all. Instead, this very doubt requires an infer-
ence that there may be a difference between our experience and 
a world outside it. And by the same token, we can make the 
very same inference about object–object relations, just as the old 
occasionalists did. Whenever Wolfen dale accuses me of cloudy 
“methodology,” this is all he really means: he is fully on board 
with the Onto-Taxonomists in assuming that we have direct ac-
cess to the thought–world relation but not to the world–world 
kind. Against this prejudice, the OOO methodology is clear — to 
infer a possible difference between our experience and reality, 
and to infer another possible difference between the relations of 
objects and their independence from those relations, is one and 
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the same inference. If we are prepared to give up the possible 
idealist monism of solipsistic experience (and otherwise science 
would never work) then by the same token we must give up 
the notion of direct contact between non-human entities. Stat-
ed more provocatively, Wolfen dale can proclaim a respectable 
atheism all he likes, but with his insistence on “epistemology” as 
our starting point, he remains in the basically theological tradi-
tion of a single super-powered super-entity that is the root of all 
other causation.
Aside from that, he strangely admits that “there are definite 
continuities here,” meaning that he basically grasps my point 
and sees some merit in it. Naturally, he does not pause to ap-
preciate this result and credit me for seeing it. But it is one of the 
chief historical results of OOO method, and to my knowledge it 
has never been seen as clearly by historians of philosophy as it 
has been here, although Steven Nadler has written a fine piece 
on the occasionalist roots of Hume in the writings of Nicolas 
d’Autrecourt.56 Instead, here as always, Wolfen dale explores 
every possible path to saying something negative about my pro-
cedure even in cases where he agrees. He does so by changing 
the subject and saying that all of these thinkers had different 
motivations for considering indirect causation, as if I had not 
already made this point at length in my pages on occasional-
ism. As he puts it, “There are overlapping themes that seem to 
motivate a similar account of causation, insofar as they all de-
mand some form of causal mediation. However, this demand 
does not arise from a single problem held in common by the 
various sub-traditions that make up this narrative” (99). No kid-
ding. It should hardly be a surprise that philosophers can end up 
in the same place after starting from different motivations, and 
Wolfen dale knows this: do all realists have the same motivations 
for realism, or all theologians the same motives for believing in 
God? Do we then need a different name for every occasional-
56 Steven Nadler, “‘No Necessary Connection’: The Medieval Roots of the Oc-
casionalist Roots of Hume,” in Occasionalism: Causation among the Carte-
sians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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ist system instead of referring to them with a single term? That 
would be historically disabling. Perhaps sensing that this line of 
critique is headed nowhere, Wolfen dale changes the subject yet 
again, saying that “we still need some good reasons, above and 
beyond this narrative, to accept the problematic status of unme-
diated causal relations” (99). This seems to imply that I think the 
historical narrative of previous thought on indirect causation is 
sufficient reason to embrace it once more, though of course I 
never say such a thing and have never thought it. Rather, the 
reverse was the case: I came to the need for indirect causation 
along my own philosophical path, and only then did the home-
work that confirmed I was not the first to run up against this 
problem.
Now, Wolfen dale knows full well that I came to indirect cau-
sation through the argument that thought–object and object–ob-
ject relations are not ontologically different in kind. Rather than 
contenting himself with a counterargument, he adopts his usual 
pretense that my argument is so convoluted that he had to expend 
precious time in carefully distilling it from my writings. We can 
see this from his typical habit of giving an artificially technical-
sounding, analytic philosopher’s sort of name to an argument I 
already make clearly enough: “The Argument from Independ-
ence,” he calls it in this case. Naturally, he then goes on to call it 
a “tangle of claims about epistemic access and causal interaction” 
(100), though here as usual he begs the question by simply as-
suming the radical difference between epistemology and ontol-
ogy that OOO always contests. He then promises to demonstrate 
“a non-sequitur underlying the other arguments” (100).
What is this crushing non sequitur? Wolfen dale gets off to a 
bad start by ascribing yet another view to me that I have nev-
er held. Namely, he says that my “conflation” of causation and 
knowledge “[treats] things as striving for ends” (100). But I have 
never claimed that inanimate objects “strive” to have effects 
on other entities, as my cautious attitude toward panpsychism 
shows. His argument seems to be as follows: while reference can 
obviously be either successful or unsuccessful, to say the same 
thing about causation is an illegitimate anthropomorphization 
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of inanimate beings. The source of this claim in my writings is 
unclear, for it is not something that Wolfen dale found in the 
underbrush of my “tangle of claims,” but something he invented 
himself. For my part, I see nothing wrong with saying “the fire 
failed to burn the cotton because it was wet,” or even “the fire 
was unsuccessful in burning the cotton because it was wet.” And 
even if Wolfen dale wishes to adopt a highly puritanical attitude 
towards metaphor — as Onto-Taxonomists always do — and 
claim that “failure” and “success” should be ascribed only to free 
conscious agents, we could easily remedy this problem. Namely, 
we can let him restrict these words to humans if he pleases, how-
ever stylistically boring the result, and introduce other language 
that presumably would not offend him: such as “the speaker did 
not actually refer to an object in the world” and “the fire did 
not burn the cotton.” I sincerely hope Wolfen dale will not claim 
further that “did not” should only refer to humans and not be 
illegitimately extended to inanimate objects, because that would 
amount to the arbitrary dictate that no words can apply equally 
to both human and non-human entities, much like German uses 
essen for human eating but fressen for eating done by animals. 
This would be nothing more than an attempt to enforce Onto-
Taxonomy with an artificial demand for two parallel languages. 
In any case, OOO has never claimed that objects “strive” toward 
anything, which sounds more like the dynamicist modifications 
of OOO that I reject. Having merely restated a prejudice rather 
than making an argument, Wolfen dale concludes with the air of 
someone who has successfully accomplished the latter: “It is the 
equivocation between the standards of representational success 
and causal success that allows [Harman] to convert epistemic 
excess into causal independence” (101).
When a question is under dispute, and one party builds his 
own view in advance into the standards for how the question 
is to be adjudicated, this is called “begging the question.” It is 
exactly what Wolfen dale does here. He seems to know this on 
some level, since he concludes the section with additional in-
sults rather than further argumentation. My model, he says, is 
“more like access to narcotics than access to information” (102). 
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Of course he will get away with it among many of his readers, 
since they came for laughs and for the negative affect of the 
book, not because they want to weigh carefully the respective 
cases for and against vicarious causation. And though he ends 
with the claim that “[Harman’s] non sequitur is hidden by bla-
tant circularity” (102), we have already seen that Wolfen dale is 
the one trapped in a circle, arguing for a vast rift between the 
epistemic and the causal by way of presupposing this very rift. 
His lone remaining sentence in the section is simply a mistake: 
“Harman’s aesthetics is an introspective theory of emotional af-
fection” (102). To repeat, I explicitly deny the priority of first-
person introspection over third-person scientific description, 
and treat both as equally derivative of a prior zero-person reality 
of things.57 Furthermore, Wolfen dale’s identification of aesthet-
ics with “emotion” is a scientistic parody of what aesthetics is 
about, as even a quick re-reading of the Critique of Judgment 
would have clarified; already in Kant it is a question of the dis-
interest of taste, not the “emotion” of it. At least this misstep 
reveals the deeply emotional presupposition behind Wolfen-
dale’s own biases: namely, that science is cold, hard, and rigor-
ous, while the arts are populated by airy-fairy wussies who can 
say whatever they want without being refuted. There has never 
been a more emotional basis for a philosophy than this; in the 
work of Wolfen dale’s master, the glowering Brassier, it takes on 
even more emotional form.
Again offering a needlessly technical name for an argument I 
make perfectly well, with the aim of insinuating that he has dis-
cerned my argument better than I have myself, Wolfen dale now 
turns to what he calls “The Argument from Supplementation” 
(102). He begins by summarizing my views with perfect accu-
racy, though I have already done it more effectively elsewhere: 
“[Harman] defends philosophy’s right to tackle the same topics 
as the sciences by claiming that it can approach them through 
57 Graham Harman, “Zero-Person and the Psyche,” in Mind That Abides: 




other means” (103). Wolfen dale takes the opposite view, of 
course, given his advance commitment to the Onto-Taxonom-
ical division of labor: only science is allowed to discuss object–
object relations (and look at how successful it has been!) while 
philosophers must remain content with transcendental-episte-
mological reflection on the thought–world relation. As usual, he 
tries to call my view into question with a redundant reference to 
the “difficulties we have encountered in determining Harman’s 
methodology so far,” which now as always is nothing more than 
Wolfen dale reporting how aghast he is at my not joining him 
inside the correlational circle of epistemology.
Now citing another passage from Guerrilla Metaphysics, in 
which I complain that naturalism treats causation as “essen-
tially a physical problem of two material masses slamming into 
each other or mutually affected through fields,”58 Wolfen dale 
pretends to be appalled at this “incredibly crude version of the 
sciences” (103), citing “phase space modelling, statistical analy-
sis, information theory, etc.” (104) as topics excluded from my 
“crude” view of science. But Wolfen dale knows I was not trying 
to give an exhaustive catalogue of existing scientific approaches, 
and even he leans too heavily on the “etc.” in the passage above. 
More importantly, he knows I mean that science as we know 
it has not explicitly formulated the idea that perhaps all causa-
tion is indirect. If he somehow thinks it has, then this would 
only strengthen the case for the immediate scientific relevance 
of OOO. But that is not what he thinks, since he goes on to com-
plain bizarrely about the “crude misunderstanding” that I think 
science is confined to indirect knowledge whereas philosophy 
can somehow do it directly: “on second thought, the real prob-
lem is that Harman’s approach precludes him from paying atten-
tion to [science] anyway. As far as he is concerned, the sciences 
don’t tell us anything about reality. They only talk about it as it 
seems, whereas philosophy can talk about it as it is” (104). It is 
hard to imagine a teaching less compatible with OOO than this. 
Note first that Wolfen dale plays the Game of Hurdles by claim-
58 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 18.
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ing that I do not think the sciences teach us anything about re-
ality (high hurdle for me) although obviously they must (low 
hurdle for himself). But in fact, Wolfen dale has a rather high 
hurdle to clear in assuming that science tells us everything we 
can possibly say about the real better than any other discipline, 
which is not a difficult proposition to refute. As soon as one 
demonstrates that the intrinsic reality of any entity cannot be 
exhausted by any means, then neither science nor any non-sci-
entific field can claim mastery of a particular category of objects. 
And by no means do I think that philosophy has direct access to 
reality, which is why I argue again and again — unlike Wolfen-
dale himself — that philosophy is philosophia, the polar opposite 
of any claim to direct knowledge. Wolfen dale gets his feet even 
muddier with his more detailed claim that OOO “[seeks] out a 
special kind of intuition unknown to the sciences” (104). What? 
For me there is no direct access to reality by any field, whether 
it be science, mathematics, poetry, or philosophy: which, by the 
way, is why scientism rather than OOO is close to mysticism in 
its claim of direct access to truth. OOO does not argue for any-
thing like a Bergsonian or even Husserlian direct “intuition of 
the real,” and I believe I am even on record in support of Brassi-
er’s critique of intellectual intuition in Meillassoux’s work.59
At the end of his pages on vicarious causation, Wolfen dale 
returns to his strange assertion that OOO “amounts to the prac-
tice of introspective metaphysics” (104) and even “provides us 
with an introspective theory of causation modelled upon emo-
tional intensity” (105). To repeat, OOO is fiercely opposed to any 
priority of first-person, introspective experience — recall that 
this was one of my arguments against Shaviro — and denies, 
with Kant, that aesthetics is primarily about emotion. In more 
recent writings I have treated all art as inherently performance, 
but this is not the same thing as emotion; a dry accountant or 
lawyer also performs what they do, though with as little emo-
tion as possible. There is also a perfectly obvious difference 




between calm and histrionic art, as explored among others by 
Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy.60 What is again telling in this 
section of Wolfen dale’s book is that he is so little confident in 
his argument that he adopts the “rhetorical” method of ending 
the section with an insult: “The phenomenological trappings 
in which Harman’s metaphysical introspection are clothed are 
at best a bad disguise, as if an unusually pensive crook were to 
don a rubber Husserl mask to preserve his anonymity during a 
hold-up” (105). It would be a fine and amusing image, if not that 
OOO is a realism rather than a phenomenology, and if not that it 
denies the privilege of introspection, despite Wolfen dale repeat-
edly belaboring the contrary claim.
General Remarks
That is far from the end of Wolfen dale’s book. He goes on for al-
most 300 more pages, taking me to task for a variety of purport-
ed philosophical blunders, before giving a bleak depiction of the 
philosophical wasteland that would result if my ideas were to 
gain ascendancy. I am portrayed not only as a slick manipulator 
and a philosophical clown, but as a socially dangerous threat 
to the ongoing Enlightenment project. Although Wolfen dale 
seems to think that nearly everything I say is erroneous, he also 
views me as such an insidiously powerful figure lurking in the 
shadows that at times he seems driven to despair. By the end of 
the book I no longer recognize any resemblance of his vitriolic 
portrait to what I know myself to be: a hard-working student of 
the history of philosophy with a relatively classical orientation 
toward the theory of substance, who happens to reject the view 
that science deserves the sole word on the inanimate universe, 
who also loathes boring philosophical prose of the sort found 
in many of Wolfen dale’s heroes (Brandom, Willard Van Orman 
Quine), and who therefore employs a variety of stylistic means 
60 Graham Harman, Art and Objects (Cambridge: Polity, 2020); Friedrich 




to keep the reader awake, alert, and engaged. I suspect this is 
also a good match for what most readers find in my books. Not 
content simply to disagree with the basic principles of OOO, 
Wolfen dale chooses to depict me as the grim horseman of an 
impending new era of darkness. But as complex and detailed as 
his exposé of my stealthy maneuvers may seem, recall that eve-
rything boils down to his acceptance — and my rejection — of 
the two basic features of Modern Onto-Taxonomy, (a) the cor-
relational circle or epistemological starting point for philosophy 
and (b) science-worship, where worship means the view that 
science deserves not only the final word but the sole word on 
anything lying outside human thought. If you accept these two 
principles, then you are a modernist who belongs on Wolfen-
dale’s side of the quarrel. But since I do not accept them in the 
first place, most of the detail of his book reads to me like an at-
tempt at ruthless deduction from false axioms.
For this reason I will not analyze chapter 3, with its specific 
discussions of such topics as semantics, qualia, relations, onto-
logical liberalism, and the definition of metaphysics. I have nei-
ther the space nor the interest to chase Wolfen dale around the 
arena and answer tit-for-tat after he gets off so badly in chapter 
2, though he occasionally makes some interesting claims that I 
reserve the right to address elsewhere. Instead, the closing pag-
es of this chapter will address the charge that OOO is engaged 
in what he calls “ersatz interdisciplinarity” (377). Like Brassier 
himself, Wolfen dale has apparently noticed that OOO has been 
picked up and utilized in numerous disciplines outside philoso-
phy, and seems to be worried about it. Since this is normally 
an excellent sign of the fertility of a philosophical theory, the 
Urbanomic publishing circle has no choice but to attack this 
well-known strength of OOO and portray it as a symptom of 
weakness. Wolfen dale does so with respect to science (377–79), 
politics (379–83), and art (383–90), and OOO is said to have had a 
disastrous impact in all three of these areas. Let’s consider these 
themes in order.
His discussion of the supposedly corrupting influence of 
OOO in its attitude toward science is short, presumably because 
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he thinks he has already made the case earlier in his book. That 
case, such as it is, amounts to a twofold complaint. In the first 
place, OOO tries to privilege “introspection” over empirical re-
sults, thereby “[providing] more than an escape route for those 
who have been left behind by physicists’ penetrating investiga-
tions of traditionally metaphysical topics (e.g., space/time, or-
der/chaos, causality, etc.)” (378). In passing, this is yet another 
example of how tiresome it is to hear Wolfen dale complain on-
line and elsewhere that “scientism” is a “vacuous” term. For his 
assumption that physics can now take over all considerations of 
space/time, order/chaos, and causality while pushing philoso-
phy to the side is precisely what scientism means. I would cer-
tainly not say the reverse and claim that philosophy has nothing 
to learn from physics, but the implicit view that one discipline 
must “dominate” shows the essentially political character of sci-
entism. Brassier’s demand that science must be given “maximal 
authority” is just an especially clear example.61 In the second 
place, Wolfen dale complains that OOO provides “an elaborate 
excuse to suggestively dabble in physics” (378). What this means 
is that it “allows one to claim the support of physics wherever it 
seems consistent with one’s views, while eschewing the recipro-
cal responsibility to make one’s views cohere with physics” (379). 
As a result, for OOO “it becomes more important to cultivate a 
taste for the weird and wonderful in physics than to develop an 
understanding of its consequences” (379).
Let’s begin by addressing the accusation that OOO buries it-
self in “introspection.” We have seen that this is a perfect exam-
ple of begging the question, since philosophy can only be called 
“introspection” if one has decided in advance that it is stranded 
in the “epistemological” realm of the thought–world relation. 
In order to get outside thought, Wolfen dale assumes, we need 
science, since only science is allowed to speak of object–object 
relations in which humans are not one of the active terms. Phe-
61 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” in The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham 
Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 64.
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nomenology also claims to cover the whole of reality, of course, 
but it would not be unfair to call it “introspective,” given that 
it limits the whole of reality to the field of possible intentional 
objects. OOO accepts no such limitation, but has the whole of 
reality as its theme, including the withdrawn real objects that 
Husserl simply forbids. As seen repeatedly in this book, OOO 
is severely critical of the first-person introspective approach 
and equally critical of Wolfen dale’s own great love, the third-
person scientific standpoint. Both are forms of description that 
cannot account for the zero-person reality that underlies both. 
The same holds of course for the overrated Sellarsian distinction 
between the “manifest” and “scientific” image, an ontology of 
images as extreme as Bergson’s in Matter and Memory, despite 
its veneer of hard-nosed methodological prudence.62 To invoke 
Sellars on the “myth of the given” as Wolfen dale does works best 
on Hume, not so well on Husserl, and poorly indeed in the case 
of OOO, which is perfectly happy to grant the intertwining of 
perception with theory, since that is what the sensual realm is. 
Remember, the sensual refers to sensual enjoyment rather to 
sense-perception, and also includes theory under its rubric.63 
Wolfen dale is on even thinner ice when he counters OOO with 
“the (neuro)psychological reduction of consciousness to the 
functional architecture of the brain promised by cognitive sci-
ence” (377). The word “promised” plays an unusual role in this 
sentence, bribing our confidence with money not yet earned. 
Wolfen dale would certainly be the last person to grant any cre-
dence to an intellectual “promise” made by me. It should also 
be noted that a reduction of consciousness to the functional ar-
chitecture of the brain is nowhere near in sight. Read Thomas 
Metzinger’s deliberately ominous book Being No One, and you 
will find with comical regularity that he is forced to admit, for 
one property of consciousness after another, that no “minimally 
62 Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in In the 
Space of Reasons, eds. Kevin Scharp and Robert B. Brandom (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 369–408.
63 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1997).
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sufficient neural correlates” have yet been found.64 I would not 
wish to compare science to a religion, but scientism displays the 
very same features one expects of Calvinist zealotry. The elect 
are already sure of the eventual Grace of Father Neuroscience, 
while the others are damned in advance and not worth saving.
We turn now to the charge of an “opportunistic” relation to 
science, defined as using science only from time to time in or-
der to bolster one’s case; the same charge has frequently been 
levelled at Meillassoux. All the trouble here is caused by one of 
Wolfen dale’s own arbitrary assumptions — namely, the Onto-
Taxonomical dogma that philosophers have a responsibility 
“to make [their] views cohere with physics” (379). The problem 
is that, while no one would wish to propose a philosophy that 
runs directly counter to basic physics, Wolfen dale smuggles in 
the further tacit dictum that “coherence with physics” applies 
to philosophy in a maximalist sense. Now, it would be foolish 
indeed for a philosopher to propose that Newton was wrong, 
and that celestial and terrestrial motions are governed by two 
different kinds of forces rather than a unified one called gravity. 
In this respect Newton had important consequences for philos-
ophy, and the same holds for Darwin, whose theory destroyed 
the philosophers’ assumption that the number and identity of 
life forms has always been the same. Another case of a phi-
losopher being directly influenced by a discovery in physics is 
Whitehead’s conclusion that we must listen to Einstein and no 
longer speak straightforwardly of the simultaneity of different 
events: “According to modern relativistic views, we must admit 
that there are many durations [that include an occasion] M — in 
fact, an infinite number, so that no one of them contains all M’s 
contemporaries.”65 The exact nature of how philosophy and sci-
ence influence each other is a fascinating though still somewhat 
obscure topic, and only the most dogmatically scientistic phi-
64 Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-model Theory of Subjectivity 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); Graham Harman, “The Problem with Metz-
inger,” Cosmos and History 7, no. 1 (2011): 7–36.




losopher would hold that the philosopher must march in lock-
step with contemporary mainstream science. The constant ap-
peals to “the best science we have” forget that the best science 
is not always the same thing as the consensus science we have, 
and that sometimes it takes decades if not centuries to sort the 
matter out.
A good example comes to mind. Although I have never writ-
ten on the topic, I could imagine myself inclined — on the basis 
of OOO itself, not “the best science we have” — to argue that time 
and space cannot have been created. After all, for me these result 
from the inner strife of objects, and I see no reason to postu-
late an initial creation of objects ex nihilo. In Wolfen dale’s eyes, 
this would be an automatic absurdity, since it entails speculating 
against the grain of “the best science we have,” which currently 
tells us that the universe was created in a singularity or Big Bang 
rather than having always been present. But why should phi-
losophy limit its speculations to the current “best” science, rath-
er than exploring conceptual possibilities on their own terms, 
possibilities that science may someday eventually need. In the 
famous dispute between Leibniz and Newton’s proxy Samuel 
Clarke, there is no question that Newton’s theory of space and 
time as empty containers was closer to “the best science we 
have” of that time. The best science in question, after all, was 
Newton’s own. But the Leibnizian relational theory was much 
closer to what a clairovyant at the time might have called “the 
best science we will have, once Einstein overthrows Newton two 
centuries from now.”66 I also doubt very much that Wolfen dale 
would demand that mathematics limit itself to “the best science 
we have.” For if Bernhard Riemann had waited to develop his 
curved-space geometries until Einstein demonstrated the physi-
cal relevance of such space, then neither Riemann nor Einstein 
would have made their discoveries, since Einstein needed Rie-
mann to get there first. Somehow, philosophy alone is supposed 
66 G.W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indian-
apolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000).
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to limp along after whatever science has done in the past few 
years, always behind and never ahead.
In chapter 5 I will cite a counterargument from the Italian 
physicist Carlo Rovelli when considering Toscano’s objection to 
“neo-monadological” philosophies such as mine and Latour’s. 
Here I will cite instead a typical remark from the physicist Lee 
Smolin, who frequently asks philosophers to challenge physi-
cists more boldly and openly. Smolin had the following to say 
about philosophy, during a heated 2012 debate in the comments 
thread of Richard Woit’s blog:
I believe that the pendulum is swinging back because many 
of us [physicists] have learned that an engagement with phi-
losophy does greatly aid a serious assault on the key ques-
tions physics faces such as quantum gravity, the foundations 
of quantum theory and questions as to the choice of laws and 
cosmological initial conditions.67 
This is the polar opposite of the “maximal authority” for science 
demanded by Wolfen dale and Brassier. To be sure, other scien-
tists have agreed with these two about the relative uselessness 
of philosophy in questions of nature — most recently Stephen 
Hawking, but at an earlier point such luminaries as Richard 
Feyn man and Freeman Dyson.68 But this dispute will continue, 
and it cannot be dissolved by the Modern Onto-Taxonomy to 
which Wolfen dale adheres and which he tries to force on me as 
well. This is true even on topics about which science has nothing 
67 Lee Smolin, comment to Richard Woit, “Much Ado about Nothing,” Not 
Even Wrong, April 27, 2012, https://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpr
ess/?p=4623&cpage=1#comment-109957.
68 Matt Warman, “Stephen Hawking Tells Google ‘Philosophy Is Dead’,” The 
Telegraph, May 17, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/goog-
le/8520033/Stephen-Hawking-tells-Googlephilosophy-is-dead.html. For a 
response to Hawking, see Graham Harman, “Concerning Stephen Hawk-




to say, such as the vicarious/indirect causation that is motivated 
for me by a problem not even considered by present-day physics.
Another point concerns the supposed “opportunistic” use of 
physics by OOO. Here it is telling that Wolfen dale does not even 
quote from my own work, perhaps because he has noticed that 
I tend to be cautious about appealing to the current findings of 
natural science. Instead he cites Timothy Morton from Realist 
Magic, a marvelous book hated by the scientistic wing of Specu-
lative Realism due to its treatment of causation as analogous to 
literary forms of allure. I have seen at least one generally abu-
sive tweet by Wolfen dale directed at Morton, but in his book he 
seems most offended by this passage from my OOO colleague: 
“quantum theory and relativity are valid physical theories to 
the extent that they are object-oriented.”69 Wolfen dale would 
have done well to provide some context for this statement. As 
he knows, the usual “opportunistic” use of quantum theory in 
philosophy is to treat it as proof of a correlationist or outright 
idealist ontology (Barad, Žižek), usually with reference to the 
famous double-slit experiment concerning the wave/particle 
duality of light.70 Against these anti-realist readings, Morton 
makes the perfectly valid point that quantum theory tells us re-
ality is made of discrete packets, and hence that this theory is 
more legible as one in which the properties of things are defined 
by measurement rather than the things themselves.71 And fur-
thermore, what would a “non-opportunistic” use of quantum 
theory even look like? For Wolfen dale, it would apparently re-
quire that we do no more than report what is said by quantum 
theorists themselves. But this is made rather difficult by the fact 
that they do not agree among themselves on the key issues, so 
69 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor: 
Open Humanities Press, 2013), 30.
70 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the En-
tanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); 
Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
71 See also Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the 
End of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).
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that “the best science we have” is not only ontologically but also 
physically inconclusive.
As for politics, Wolfen dale introduces OOO’s relation to the 
theme as follows: “There is a peculiar pressure in Continen-
tal circles to secure the worth of one’s philosophical insights 
by demonstrating their political applicability” (379). What he 
neglects to mention is that the “peculiar pressure” at issue is a 
pressure toward some recognizable permutation of Leftism, and 
that any theory with even a whiff of Leftness about it is more 
likely than others to receive a sympathetic hearing in continen-
tal circles. Unfortunately, this is equally the case whether the 
Left position in question is a natural outgrowth of the philoso-
phy as a whole, or whether someone just vaguely waves a black 
or red flag to show team allegiance, as if it were a question of 
choosing arbitrarily between Beşiktaş or Manchester United. 
Wolfen dale’s master Brassier gives us an especially egregious 
sample of this tactic when he calls Bruno Latour a “neo-liberal” 
and shouts vaguely for “revolution” instead.72 Aside from the 
fact that Latour is not a neo-liberal but a rather severe critic of 
homo economicus, the main problem here is that “revolution” as 
a political act is never explicitly justified in Brassier’s books, and 
by no means follows naturally from his pessimistic nihilism.73 In 
short, Brassier caved in to “the peculiar pressures in Continen-
tal circles” and simply waved the flag of Manchester United to 
curry favor with his teammates. No substantive political argu-
ment can be found anywhere in Brassier’s writings to date, and 
thus his purported commitment to the Left remains pure doxa, 
without philosophical significance. By contrast, OOO has shown 
patience and courage in not succumbing to demands for a quick 
and familiar Leftist result.
72 Ray Brassier, “Concepts and Objects,” 53.
73 A good chunk of Bruno Latour’s An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An 
Anthropology of the Moderns, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013) is devoted to the decomposition of economics into 
the three distinct modes of [ATT]achment, [ORG]anization, and [MOR]ality. 
To say the least, this is not a “neoliberal” gesture but one of the harshest 
critiques of neoliberalism in recent philosophy.
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Naturally, Wolfen dale has nothing to say about this “pecu-
liar” incident involving his friend, but points the political finger 
at me and Latour instead. I have no problem with Wolfen dale 
calling OOO “the paragon of contemporary ontological liberal-
ism” (380), especially since he is quick to add — I assume sin-
cerely — that there is no direct link between ontological and 
political liberalism. He makes no direct criticism of my attitude 
toward politics, but is content with blaming me for “[catalyzing] 
the development and appropriation of Latour’s social theory [… 
which] threatens to let a methodological mutation in one area 
explode into a full-blown methodological metastasis across the 
social sciences” (380). Aside from the intellectual swear word 
“metastasis,” a grotesque rhetorical maneuver designed to com-
pare me and cancer survivor Latour to the horrors of cancer 
itself, Wolfen dale has two specific political complaints about us. 
The first is that we attempt “to project some form of ontological 
egalitarianism into the political sphere” (381), meaning that we 
treat inanimate things as “agents” just like humans. According 
to Wolfen dale, this amounts to “[turning] this defunct analogy 
into an unruly metaphor that confuses our understanding of 
the very problem we are supposed to be solving” (383), The sec-
ond is that we indulge in the “political convenience in reducing 
every social situation to a series of interlocking trials of strength 
(i.e., a resurrected and rebranded will to power)” (381), Although 
Wolfen dale rarely if ever tips his own political hand — though I 
know from the blogosphere that we share a common disdain for 
Donald Trump — we can deduce his deepest commitments by 
simply reversing his two criticisms of Latour and me. Namely, 
Wolfen dale sees politics as revolving around humans rather 
than all actors equally, and also holds that might and right must 
not be conflated: there is an “ought” in politics, just as in eth-
ics and science. How do these commitments stack up against 
Latour’s and my own?
Let’s begin with the relation between politics and flat ontol-
ogy. One of Latour’s most important contributions to political 
theory is his idea that “society” is not just made up of humans, 
but of a heterogeneous series of actors. We see this in early ca-
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reer in his important co-authored article with the primatolo-
gist Shirley Strum, where they conclude that baboons are even 
more condemned to social existence than we are, given that 
human society is largely stabilized by inanimate entities such 
as driver’s licenses, wedding rings, guns, and the like.74 In his 
1999 book Politics of Nature, Latour tries to incorporate the new 
entities discovered by science into the political sphere, on the 
same footing as the oppressed and abject human outsiders to 
whom moralists call our attention.75 More recently he has been 
inspired, by the Gaia theory of climatologist James Lovelock, to 
call for assembling a new collective of humans and non-humans 
in the face of the threatening Anthropocene.76 While I do think 
Latour has already reached interesting results along this path, 
perhaps its greatest significance stems from its historical nov-
elty. When Wolfen dale complains about a flattening of political 
agency in both Latourian actor-network theory and OOO, he is 
effectively saying that politics is a human concern whose defini-
tion must revolve around human rationality, an utterly Onto-
Taxonomical view of the situation. Perhaps without his realizing 
it, this puts Wolfen dale back in the comfortable mainstream of 
modern political theory, which is centered in the question of 
whether human nature is inherently good or evil. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau is the classic example of a “humans are good” theorist 
who blames our corruption on society, with Thomas Hobbes a 
good example of the reverse position.77 The opposition between 
these two stances is perhaps best captured by Carl Schmitt: 
74 S.S. Strum and Bruno Latour, “Redefining the Social Link: From Baboons to 
Humans,” Social Science Information 26, no. 4 (1987): 783–802.
75 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, 
trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
76 James Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia: A Biography of Our Living Earth (New 
York: Norton, 1995); Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New 
Climatic Regime, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Polity, 2017); Bruno 
Latour, Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2018).
77 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. Donald 
A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992); Thomas Hob-
bes, Leviathan, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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“One could test all theories of state and political ideas according 
to their anthropology and thereby classify these as to whether 
they consciously or unconsciously presuppose man to be by na-
ture evil or by nature good [… by their] answer to the question 
whether man is a dangerous being or not, a risky or a harmless 
creature.”78 Although Latour draws heavily on Hobbes for his 
own political theory, and to a lesser extent on Schmitt, there is 
a sense in which his theory entails that Hobbes, Schmitt, and 
Rousseau have all equally missed the point. Whether we think 
that human nature is good or actually evil, in both cases we as-
sume that politics is primarily about human nature. Yet this was 
never really plausible, and is even less so as technological and 
other means of mediation begin to multiply. By insisting with 
the moderns that politics remain a purified human realm, void 
of non-human contaminants, Wolfen dale misses the chance to 
approach political philosophy from a fresh angle.
The other point concerns Wolfen dale’s fear that a Latou-
rian flat ontology of actants would amount to little more than 
a power struggle between various human and non-human en-
tities, with no overriding principle of right and wrong. This is 
one of the central topics of my book Bruno Latour: Reassembling 
the Political; since it was published shortly before Wolfen dale’s 
own book, he could not have known what I would say there, 
although a brief summary will at least show what he misses. As 
mentioned early in Reassembling the Political, one of the four 
referees who reviewed my book proposal expressed the same 
worry as Wolfen dale, to the effect of “go ahead and write the 
book and see what happens, but I doubt you will find more to 
Latour’s politics than ‘might makes right.’”79 As it happened, I 
found a lot more than that. The Latour of the 1970s and 1980s 
does take pleasure in mocking morality and stressing the “pa-
thetic” character of being right without having the might to 
78 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 58.




make anything happen. This comes through most emblemati-
cally in his 1981 article with fellow youngster Michel Callon, 
“Unscrewing the Big Leviathan.”80 Yet everything changes with 
We Have Never Been Modern in 1991.81 Here he openly confronts 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s argument that Hobbes was 
right and Boyle was wrong, that society trumps science because 
society itself decides the definition of what counts as good sci-
ence.82 And while this is the same sort of argument that Latour 
himself had formerly made, he suddenly feels horrified by the 
asymmetry of it. Thus he now claims that if we deconstruct sci-
ence, we must be prepared to deconstruct “power” as well, plac-
ing the two on equal footing. From 1991 forward, Latour is no 
advocate of “might makes right” but is always alert to what lies 
outside the currently formatted networks of power. In this re-
spect, we could even say that his politics has become the most 
ontologically realist side of his philosophy. We have seen that in 
Politics of Nature it is a question of detecting new human and 
non-human entities wrongly excluded from the political assem-
bly. A few years later, under the influence of Noortje Marres’s 
re-reading of the Lippmann/Dewey debate, Latour is on the 
scent of the never fully visible object of politics, culminating in 
what his major book An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence will call 
an “object-oriented politics.”83 In Latour’s later writings on cli-
80 Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Ac-
tors Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them To Do So,” in 
Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Mi-
cro- and Macro-Sociologies, eds. Karin Knorr Cetina and Aaron V. Cicourel 
(Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 277–303.
81 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
82 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, 
Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985).
83 Noortje Marres, “No Issue, No Public: Democratic Deficits after the Dis-
placement of Politics,” PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands, 2005; Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1993); John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems: An 
Essay in Political Inquiry, ed. Melvin L. Rogers (University Park: Penn State 
University Press, 2012); Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: 
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mate there is a return to Schmitt’s modernism, but only because 
he thinks we face an existential struggle with global warming 
deniers. After the initial Schmittian gesture of cutting off these 
pettifogging opponents as the “enemy,” he is back to propos-
ing networks of human and non-human actors, not calling for 
amoral power struggles.84 Given Latour’s agreement with Dewey 
that the objects of politics never become fully transparent, he 
pursues a non-rationalist political philosophy rather than the 
rationalist one Wolfen dale no doubt prefers. But if there is any 
arena in which rationalism is doomed to fail, it is surely poli-
tics. While it is not the case that science is more deconstructible 
than politics, the fact remains that the decision about what is 
“rational” in any situation is often determined precisely through 
political struggle. No epistemologist, not even Brandom him-
self, will ever be in a position to settle the rival claims to Kash-
mir, legal abortion, or a Nobel Prize. These will always be, with 
differing levels of intensity, political struggles sorted out by po-
litical means.
We turn in closing to Wolfen dale’s remarks on OOO and art, 
which are the weakest and most cynical of them all. Here he 
makes little reference to my own extensively published views on 
art, but focuses instead on the supposedly grim effects of my 
work on artistic and curatorial practice: “The greatest effect that 
OOP [Object-Oriented Philosophy] has had lies, no doubt, in its 
appropriation by artists, architects, curators, and the discourses 
that cater to their theoretical needs” (383–84). The word “cater” 
is manipulative, since it implies — without evidence — an un-
scrupulous pandering to the ingrained biases of these aesthetic 
professions. Like Brassier, Wolfen dale sees no especial cognitive 
value in the arts, and thus he seems unconcerned by how offen-
sive his view of the arts is likely to be. He baldly states, without 
argument or textual basis, that the “foundational status” OOO 
gives to aesthetics suggests that “artists can do philosophy sim-
An Anthropology of the Moderns, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2013), 337.
84 Latour, Facing Gaia.
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ply by doing art” (384). No source in my writings is given for this 
sweeping proclamation, for the simple reason that I have never 
said or even fleetingly thought such a thing. All I recall saying 
on the topic is that philosophy in its original sense of Socratic 
philosophia — for me the pre-Socratics are magnificent but un-
dermining forerunners of philosophy, rather than philosophers 
proper — is more closely related to aesthetics than to any form 
of knowledge, given that all knowledge amounts to some kind of 
undermining, overmining, or duomining. Nowhere have I sug-
gested that an artwork is a piece of philosophy. The great works 
of Édouard Manet or Pablo Picasso must be called art, not phi-
losophy. Nor do I know any practicing artists who even aspire 
to be called philosophers, and thus I strongly doubt that this 
non-existent blurring of disciplinary boundaries is what draws 
artists to OOO.
But no matter. As mentioned, Wolfen dale is less concerned 
to criticize my own conception of art than to claim, rather in-
sultingly to artists, that they have no clear idea what OOO is all 
about. In particular, he sees art-world figures as having utilized 
my explicitly non-relational philosophy as a means of combat-
ting the Nonrelational Aesthetics of the curator Nicolas Bour-
riaud.85 This too he calls “opportunistic,” since “the concept of 
relation is being deployed differently in each case” (385). A nice 
point indeed, but one I have already made more clearly myself 
in an article entitled “Art without Relations.”86 Since Wolfen dale 
does not bother to spell out the different “deployments” of the 
term “relational,” I will have to do it for him. When Bourriaud 
praises relational aesthetics, he is talking about something that 
would more appropriately be called “convivial aesthetics,” since 
he is referring to art designed to produce social interaction be-
tween gallery visitors. I have nothing a priori against such art-
works, since the only “relational” approach to art I oppose is the 
sort that thinks art consists entirely in its socio-political effects 
85 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics (Dijon: Les Presses du Réel, 1998).




or in the precise reaction of its beholders. Although Wolfen dale 
hints at mass misunderstanding by artists and curators of this 
nuance, he provides no evidence for his claim, and seems to be 
relying on limited anecdotal evidence.
There is further cloudiness when he says that “OOP provides 
a pseudo-aesthetic justification for the Duchampian gesture af-
ter its conceptual innovativeness has waned” (386). In the first 
place, it is unclear whether Wolfen dale means to claim that I 
have purposely bolstered “the Duchampian gesture” in my 
work, or whether I have simply had a bad unintended effect. 
If he knew my writings on art a bit better, he would recognize 
the obvious point that my sympathies are with the explicitly 
anti-Duchampian currents of formalist criticism embodied 
in the writings of Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried.87 It 
would be an understatement to say that the influence of these 
two critics has been highly marginalized in the arts from the 
1960s through the present, and hence it is bizarre to imply that 
I “cater” to contemporary artistic practice by giving it the exact 
opposite of what it has demanded for the past fifty years. If any-
thing, I throw down the gauntlet to contemporary practice. This 
was seen clearly by at least one working artist, Hasan Veseli in 
Munich, who wrote to me as follows:
My art friends and I can’t understand why you go on and 
on about Greenberg, although we do get your point (back-
ground, flatness). In retrospect it feels that his writings were 
already assigned an expiration date at the time that he wrote 
that stuff (probably because of his problems with subject 
matter, making art just a formalist exercise). Notable critics, 
from today’s perspective, are the likes of Rosalind Krauss, 
David Joselit, Hal Foster, Arthur Danto.88
87 Graham Harman, “Greenberg, Duchamp, and the Next Avant-Garde,” in 
Speculations V, eds. Ridvan Askin et al. (Earth: punctum books, 2013), 251–
74; Harman, Art and Objects.
88 Hasan Veseli, personal communication, December 4, 2016.
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Furthermore, OOO in no way promotes or encourages what 
Wolfen dale calls “curatorial interest in diverse arrays of intrigu-
ing objects transplanted from their native contexts” (388). Again, 
I have nothing a priori against such displays; here as with any 
genre, there are likely to be both successes and failures. Wolfen-
dale is simply indulging in equivocation between “object” in the 
OOO sense and “object” in the sense of a medium-sized physical 
entity that might be used as part of an artwork, though I have 
frequently warned against this in print. Thus, when he claims 
further that “Harman is entirely happy to supply his own brand 
of sugar pills” (388) to anyone who uses mid-sized, decontextu-
alized objects in art, he has strayed into the realm of polemical 
fantasia. For good measure, he adds the emptily cynical innu-
endo that “there is a surprising amount of money to be made” 
(388) in such efforts, though I have yet to see much of this pur-
ported financial windfall. More importantly, Wolfen dale has no 
knowledge of my communications with professional artists, in 
all of which I am more the learner than the teacher. Unfortu-
nately, his own philosophical biases are likely to exclude him 
from such informative dealings with artists, since no one enjoys 
the sort of belittlement he routinely aims in their direction no 
less than mine.
Worse yet, Wolfen dale completely misses that his own fixa-
tion on the “conceptual” side of art puts him much closer to the 
biases of the contemporary art world than my own approach. 
For it is he, not I, who sides with Duchamp’s bias against “ret-
inal art” and in favor of art that “makes us think,” even if he 
is quick to add that in contemporary art the conceptual focus 
has “waned.” He seems unaware that his notion that art should 
primarily be a prod to “thinking” runs counter not only to my 
views and those of the formalist critics I so admire, but to Kant’s 
own view in the Critique of Judgment. Worse yet, he does not 
think that art based on concepts is very good thinking anyway; 
in keeping with his commitment to Brandomian dogma, any 
thinking provoked by art is little more than “implicit” and needs 
to be turned into “explicit” conceptuality, presumably with the 
295
wolfendale
aid of epistemology.89 But it hardly matters, since few artists are 
likely to have much interest in this set of prejudices, or even take 
much note of them.
89 Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Dis-








Let’s begin Part Two by responding to an unusually brief 
criticism of OOO by Alberto Toscano of Goldsmiths, University 
of London, a productive researcher of a distinctly Leftist stripe. 
Although Toscano is close to Brassier and his circle, he has al-
ways maintained a level of professionalism in disagreement that 
is seldom in evidence from the others. Toscano’s 2006 debut 
book The Theatre of Production shows speculative talent and an 
advanced awareness of the up-to-date philosophy of the time; in 
particular, it remains a go-to source on the philosophy of Gil-
bert Simondon for those who cannot read his still untranslated 
major works in French.1 As mentioned earlier, it was Toscano 
who organized the 2007 Speculative Realism workshop at Gold-
smiths, and he as well who filled in for Quentin Meillassoux 
when the latter declined to attend the follow-up 2009 workshop 
in Bristol.2 The same year saw the publication of Toscano’s Eng-
1 Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation 
between Kant and Deleuze (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
2 Alberto Toscano, “Against Speculation, or, a Critique of the Critique of Cri-
tique: A Remark on Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude (After Colleti),” 
in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi R. 




lish translation of Alain Badiou’s important Logics of Worlds.3 
Toscano was also on the guest list for my February 2008 dis-
cussion with Bruno Latour at the London School of Econom-
ics, later published as The Prince and the Wolf.4 In that capacity, 
he was one of ten guests who accepted our invitation to sub-
mit written questions. I will focus here on two specific passages 
from Toscano’s questions, which the interested reader can find 
on pages 139–40.
Does the endeavor to avoid “modernist” practices of abstrac-
tion, separation and reductionism for the sake of a neo-mo-
nadological theory of actants not undermine any attempt to 
speculate about “the structure of reality”?
Doesn’t the more-or-less panpsychist dramatization of 
the alliances of actants in jauntily anthropomorphic terms 
enact the ultimate reduction, whereby objects and things are 
thought as analogies of human action, in ways far less chal-
lenging or surprising than the “reductive” explanations of 
mechanists and determinists?5 
Let’s treat these objections in order, keeping in mind that the 
responses that follow are solely my own. Latour would likely re-
spond to Toscano’s remarks in a different way.
The first problem with Toscano’s term “neo-monadological” 
is that the prefix is asked to do too much work. He could simply 
have referred to Latour’s position and my own as “monadologi-
cal,” thereby conveying accurate information about some simi-
larities between both of us and Leibniz.6 By smuggling in the 
“neo-” beforehand, he adds a derisive element with the insinu-
3 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II, trans. Alberto Toscano 
(London: Continuum, 2009).
4 Bruno Latour, Graham Harman, and Peter Erdélyi, The Prince and the Wolf: 
Latour and Harman at the LSE (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011).
5 Ibid., 140.
6 G.W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology,” in Philo-
sophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hack-
ett Publishing Company, 1989), 213–25.
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ation that we are merely recycling a historical philosophy that 
is rightly dead and buried. In so doing, he fails as a critic on 
two separate counts. The first is that there are highly significant 
differences between my and Latour’s positions and that of Leib-
niz, significant enough to speak strongly against our being in 
any sort of “neo-” relationship with the great German thinker. 
Above all, Leibniz is a philosopher of substance, while Latour 
is as anti-substance as one can be, since he allows for no en-
during entity beyond the series of unending actions that make 
up the life of any actant. Unlike Latour, I am a philosopher of 
substance and happily ally myself with the Aristotelian tradition 
to which Leibniz belongs. Nonetheless, Leibniz draws a rather 
rigid distinction between naturally occurring “substances” and 
artificially produced “aggregates,” which makes it impossible for 
him to speak of compounds, machines, or events as objects in 
the way I do. There is also the not unimportant fact that Leib-
niz’s monads were all created at the beginning of time in order 
to spare God superfluous labor, an idea that has no analogue in 
Latour’s ontology or my own, given that neither of us recognizes 
eternal entities despite our shared unpolemical attitude toward 
religion. Furthermore, the windowless monads of Leibniz hark 
back to the occasionalist tradition of a constantly intervening 
God, despite his variant doctrine of “pre-established harmony,” 
while Latour and I both take a secular approach to how con-
tact between two entities is always mediated by a third. Leibniz 
also leaves little room for free will in his philosophy, and while 
neither Latour nor I have published a full-blown theory on this 
central philosophical topic, one would be hard-pressed to find 
anything resembling determinism in our works. It seems to me, 
at least, that a theory should only be called “neo-monadologi-
cal” if it is significantly closer to Leibniz than this.
The second problem is that, in his apparent assumption that 
monadologies all deserve to have a “neo-” affixed to their name, 
Toscano fails to grasp why this sort of philosophy might rea-
sonably recur three centuries after Leibniz. As I see it, the chief 
virtues of monadic philosophies persist to this day, and are as 
follows. First, they flatten the world in a way that allows us to 
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consider the character of all individual things, without the hasty 
modern assumption that human thought is radically different 
in kind from everything else. Latour and I, like Whitehead, of-
fer much flatter monadologies than that of Leibniz, given his 
reluctance to extend monads beyond entities that exist by nature 
rather than artifice. This is already a significant revision of Leib-
nizian philosophy. Second, monadologies try to strike an effec-
tive balance between the core individuality of things and their 
involvement in relations with other entities. Some theories of 
this kind stress the “windowless” character of monads to a large 
degree (Leibniz), while others treat relations between entities as 
much easier to produce (Latour). In Latour’s case nothing can 
touch anything else without the presence of a mediator, as when 
politics and neutrons were brought together in pre-war France 
only through the mediation of the physicist Frédéric Joliot-Cu-
rie.7 These being the two chief virtues of monadologies, whoever 
sweepingly dismisses such theories must not see the point of 
these virtues. Either the critic does not see the point of a flat 
ontology, does not see why such a complex theory is needed to 
account for relations, or both.
Such a person is no doubt a modernist, and that brings us 
to Toscano’s complaint about the Latourian critique of moder-
nity, of which I am an enthusiastic adherent.8 Above all else, the 
modernist is an Onto-Taxonomist who accepts the existence 
of two and only two basic kinds of things: (a) human thought 
and (b) everything else. Naturally, the modernist position is 
not quite as ridiculous as it sounds when stated in this form. 
The taxonomy is grounded not just in human vanity, though 
this plays a role, but in René Descartes’s effort to produce a phi-
losophy of compelling mathematical rigor.9 Everything I ob-
7 Bruno Latour, “Science’s Blood Flow: An Example from Joliot’s Scientific 
Intelligence,” in Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
8 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
9 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress, 3rd 
edn. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993).
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serve in the outside world may be purely illusory, but the fact 
that I am thinking cannot be refuted, since I must be thinking 
even to be deluded: the famous “I think, therefore I am.” Thus 
the modern taxonomy could be rewritten as: (a) that which is 
immediately evident and (b) that whose existence is known in 
mediated fashion. However we write it, the result is the same. 
Any flat ontology will now look foolish, since human thought 
supposedly has special status as the immediately evident entity 
in which all others are grounded; thus it deserves an ontology of 
its own, rather than being forced to share one with such riff-raff 
as lobsters, rocks, unicorns, and square circles. And as soon as 
we turn from “human thought” to “everything else,” philosophy 
has no important role to play, since the natural sciences already 
enjoy undisputed success in their dealings with inanimate real-
ity. Therefore, philosophy from now on must concern itself only 
with the relation between human and world, while relations not 
involving humans will be reserved for science. The twofold tax-
onomy becomes a twofold division of labor. And when philoso-
phy is thereby converted into critical theory, to which Toscano 
himself is very much committed, one of the philosopher’s major 
tasks is to detect illegal anthropomorphisms and fetishes that 
result from improper transgression of one sphere on the other. 
Monadology, which adopts a false flat ontology and a nonexist-
ent problem of relations between beings, becomes the perfect 
example of a philosophical joke.
But the counterarguments are as follows. First, the fact that I 
as a human can only undergo human experience does not entail 
that I can say nothing about object–object relations not involv-
ing humans. For it is not by virtue of inhabiting human experi-
ence that I know of my finitude or of the separation of entities 
into an object-pole and a qualities-pole. These are deduced by 
means of philosophical arguments, and such arguments work 
just as well for inanimate interactions as for my reflections on 
my own thinking activity. Stated differently, I do not need to 
be fire or cotton to know that these entities fail to exhaust one 
another through interacting. And second, the apparent success 
of natural science in dealing with such entities does not mean 
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that philosophy has no right to discuss them in its own way. 
For note that the sciences deal largely with the mathematizable 
properties of entities occupying space-time, which means that 
they deal largely with the relational properties of things rather 
than their intrinsic ones. Coleman, following Bertrand Russell 
in a certain period, speaks to this point: “the concepts of physics 
only express the extrinsic natures of the items they refer to […] 
The question of their intrinsic nature is left unanswered by the 
theory, with its purely formal description of micro ontology.”10 
Modern Onto-Taxonomy actually has little in its favor other 
than its lingering status as a majority position among intellectu-
als, a situation dating to the era of Hume and Kant. 
That brings us to Latour’s critique of modernity, which the 
modernist Toscano obviously views with disfavor. One of the 
most intriguing features of recent French philosophy is that La-
tour and Meillassoux are joined in their view that Kant was a 
philosophical disaster, but say so for opposite reasons.11 For Meil-
lassoux, Kant is a correlationist who excessively binds thought 
and world while forbidding us to treat them in their independ-
ence, so that our access to world will never be more than rela-
tive or fideistic. For Latour, by contrast, the problem with Kant 
is that he creates an artificial separation between thought and 
world, although everywhere we find hybrids in which the natu-
ral and cultural elements are difficult to disentangle. I hold that 
Latour’s view is superior on this point, since human beings are 
such a minor element in the cosmos that it makes little sense 
to grant them dominance over fifty percent of ontology. Yet his 
particular solution to the problem is unfortunate: for Latour, the 
way to get over the Kantian separation between nature and cul-
ture is to insist that they are always bound together, so that eve-
rything is a hybrid. As a result, he sometimes forces himself into 
outlandish claims: Ramses II cannot have died of tuberculosis, 
10 Sam Coleman, “Being Realistic: Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperien-
tialism,” in Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail 
Panphychism?, ed. Anthony Freeman (Exter: Imprint Academic, 2006), 52.
11 See also Graham Harman, “The Only Exit from Modern Philosophy,” Open 
Philosophy 3 (2020): 132–46.
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since it had not yet been discovered in ancient Egypt, as if tuber-
culosis could not exist in its own right before being “hybridized” 
through its emergence in a cultural-scientific process.12
Nonetheless, Latour’s diagnosis of modernism remains on 
target; there is no reason to treat the human and non-human 
zones as two mutually forbidden territories not to be combined 
under penalty of death. Toscano is evidently among those who 
see this as running the risk of anthropomorphism, as when the 
new monadological theories speak of inanimate entities “ne-
gotiating” or engaging in “trials of strength.” But this is only a 
problem if we insist on both a puritanically literal use of lan-
guage and an utter incommensurability of humans and non-
humans, both of which flat ontology denies. It was Jane Bennett 
who gave the best response to this worry: “Maybe it is worth 
running the risks associated with anthropomorphizing […] 
because it, oddly enough, works against anthropocentrism.”13 
Toscano is also quick to assume that monadological theory nec-
essarily leads to panpsychism, but this hinges entirely on what 
we mean by “psyche.” As mentioned above, Skrbina has shown 
both that panpsychism is more common in Western philosophy 
than is generally believed, and that psyche can refer to a num-
ber of different capacities that must be carefully distinguished 
and enumerated.14 Although I do hold that inanimate objects 
oversimplify each other in their actions no less than humans do, 
and though I am not nearly as allergic to panpsychism as Tos-
cano and others, we saw in the case of Shaviro that there is an 
important reason why I do not consider myself a panpsychist. 
Namely, in the whole debate between panpyschism and anti-
panpsychism, the unfortunate assumption is shared by both 
sides that human thought is something so ontologically pivotal 
that it must either be: (a) jealously hoarded for humans alone or 
12 Bruno Latour, “On the Partial Existence of Existing and Non-existing Ob-
jects,” in Biographies of Scientific Objects, ed. Lorraine Daston (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 247–69.
13 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 120.
14 David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
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(b) made a ubiquitous property of every point in the cosmos. 
The rather different OOO principle that both human and nonhu-
man objects encounter each other as sensual objects rather than 
real ones does not require any sort of thought, perception, or 
other form of explicit representation. Therefore, the accusation 
that OOO is panpsychist tells us more about the fears of the critic 
than the actual content of OOO itself.
Finally, there is the fact that Toscano does not just accuse me 
of using anthropomorphic terms for nonhuman things, but of 
doing so in “jaunty” fashion. While this word is used less fre-
quently in North America than in the United Kingdom, I un-
derstand him to mean that the supposed anthropomorphism 
is deployed in a carefree and light-hearted way, without the 
hesitant scruples the case requires. All I can do in response is re-
mind him that OOO is the product of years of reflection and tens 
of thousands of pages of explication. It is no jocular contrarian 
stunt, but an attempt to rise to the joint “neo-monadological” 
challenge posed by flat ontology and the problematic status of 
relations. Toscano’s Modernist Onto-Taxonomy is still far more 
common than my own position, but this is no basis for thinking 
it more intellectually serious than OOO. As for his further claim 
that our approach to objects is “less challenging or surprising” 
than that of the natural sciences, these are simply the words of 
someone who has too little faith in philosophical speculation. 
Luckily, not all practicing scientists agree, as seen from the 
words of the physicist Carlo Rovelli: “I wish that philosophers 
who are interested in the scientific conceptions of the world 
would not confine themselves to commenting [on] and polish-
ing the present fragmentary physical theories, but would take 
the risk of trying to look ahead.”15 Such looking ahead is pre-
cisely what we lose when Modern Onto-Taxonomy is adopted 
as the form of present-day philosophy.
15 Carlo Rovelli, “Halfway through the Woods,” in The Cosmos of Science: Es-
says of Exploration, eds. John Earman and John D. Norton (Pittsburgh: Uni-





Christopher Norris is based at the University of Cardiff in Wales, 
and has an unusual dual interest in Derridean deconstruction 
and scientific realism. To my knowledge, his most in-depth 
discussion of Speculative Realism can be found in an article in 
Speculations, a journal founded by Paul Ennis and co-edited 
with a cast of his associates.1 Most realists will quickly agree 
with some parts of the article, such as Norris’s scathing critique 
of the empiricism of Bas van Fraassen, which he dismisses as 
an “absurd position” for its claim that only what can be seen 
with the naked eye or relatively simple technological extensions 
can be regarded as real2 (39). Unfortunately, Norris gets Quen-
tin Meillassoux wrong in two important and inter-related ways, 
one concerning the “arche-fossil” and the other in reference to 
“correlationism.” The arche-fossil is Meillassoux’s term for those 
objects studied by natural science that antedate the emergence 
of all conscious life. As Norris interprets him, Meillassoux takes 
the arche-fossil “to offer a standing refutation of the basic anti-
1 Christopher Norris, “Speculative Realism: Interim Report with Just a Few 
Caveats,” in Speculations IV, eds. Michael Austin, Paul J. Ennis, Fabio Gi-
roni, Thomas Gokey, and Robert Jackson (Earth: punctum books, 2013), 
38–47. Subsequent page references are given between parentheses in the 
main text.
2 Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
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realist idea that truth is coextensive with the scope and limits 
of attainable human knowledge, or that it cannot exceed the 
bounds of cognitive-linguistic representation” (38). Further, he 
claims that for Meillassoux the arche-fossil “[bears] witness to 
the basic realist claim that human beings and their particular 
[…] powers of sensory, perceptual, or cognitive grasp are by no 
means prerequisite to the nature, structure or properties of what 
those beings sometimes manage to cognize” (39). 
Norris sees this realist sentiment as the reason for Meil-
lassoux’s pejorative introduction of the term “correlationism,” 
which is “nowadays bandied about by speculative realists with 
the tone of mixed pity and contempt that once, in the heyday 
of post-structuralism and postmodernism, attached to the term 
‘realism’” (40). Norris is unimpressed with this line of argu-
ment, which he treats as old news among philosophers of sci-
ence; the first part of Meillassoux’s After Finitude “[puts] the 
realist-objectivist case in a way that is perhaps more striking 
and forceful than genuinely radical or original” (41). He sees the 
second half of the book as veering into groundless speculation 
that conflicts with its purported realism. Meillassoux’s theory 
of the sheer contingency of the laws of nature “is certainly not 
realism-compatible in any sense of ‘realism’ that will hold up 
again various well-honed lines of attack from the skeptical-rel-
ativist, constructivist, conventionalist, or anti-realist quarter,” 
something Norris thinks is done more effectively by traditional 
appeals to “abduction” and “inference to the best explanation” 
(44). On this basis, “any readers who endorse the arguments to 
be found in the first part of After Finitude should find them-
selves at odds with, or utterly perplexed by, the arguments put 
forward in its second part” (45). More than once, Norris uses 
the term “broken-backed” to refer to this purported tension in 
the book, a term clearly not meant as a compliment (41, 45). He 
speculates that this internal contradiction is an environmental 
effect of post-war French philosophical prejudice against plain 
old scientific realism, and colorfully bemoans 
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the way that Meillassoux blithely swings across, in the course 
of one short book, from a hard-line objectivist or ontologi-
cal realism that takes absolutely no hostages from that Ja-
nus-faced adversary camp to a far-out speculative (quasi-)
ontology of Heraclitean flux that offers no hold for any but a 
notional and explanatorily vacuous realism. (45–46)
He also claims in passing that Meillassoux’s point about what 
precedes the emergence of consciousness is supplemented by 
Ray Brassier’s assertion that the correlationist approach to sci-
ence also forbids any knowledge of what happens at “the op-
posite end” of the time-scale, given Brassier’s concern with the 
ultimate extinction of the universe at some point in the distant 
future (44).
Now, the central concern of the present book is to answer 
the critics of OOO, not of Speculative Realism as a whole. But as 
someone who has written an entire book reconstructing Meil-
lassoux’s arguments before criticizing them, I am struck by the 
remarkable sloppiness of Norris’s interpretation. Let’s begin with 
his two factual errors before getting to the more basic issues of 
misunderstanding. The first error is Norris’s assertion that Meil-
lassoux focuses solely on reality prior to consciousness and that 
it is Brassier who adds the futural point about the universe fol-
lowing the extinction of all matter. While it is true that Brassier’s 
work contains a number of scientific points not found in After 
Finitude, this is not one of them. Norris seems to have complete-
ly missed the Meillassouxian term “dia-chronicity,” introduced 
at the beginning of chapter 5 to cover events both prior to the 
emergence of thought and after the disappearance of thought.3 
The point is not a small one, and casts some doubt on Norris’s 
level of familiarity with the second part of the book, about which 
he speaks so harshly. More damning evidence comes from his 
assertion that Meillassoux offers a “far-out speculative (quasi-)
ontology of Heraclitean flux.” Far from it. Meillassoux argues 
3 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 112–13.
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explicitly that contingency need not result in flux but could lead 
just as well to a frozen, cosmic stability. As the French philoso-
pher puts it, “This is not a Heraclitean time, since it is not the 
eternal law of becoming, but rather the eternal and lawless pos-
sible becoming of every law. It is a Time capable of destroying 
even becoming itself by bringing forth, perhaps forever, fixity, sta-
sis, and death.”4 Once again, this is not a minor passage in After 
Finitude, but a pivotal moment in which Meillassoux tries to 
fend off one obvious possible misunderstanding of his notion of 
contingency. The fact that Norris steps so clumsily into this hole, 
despite Meillassoux patching it clearly and skillfully in advance, 
again calls into question the carefulness of Norris’s reading and 
further undermines his authority as an interpreter. Indeed, it is 
so blatantly off the mark that one wonders how it escaped the 
red pen of Ennis at the journal’s editorial desk.
But these mistakes are trivial compared to Norris’s wholesale 
misunderstanding of the way After Finitude develops its argu-
ment. As he sees it, Meillassoux uses the arche-fossil to “prove” 
the objective existence of a world outside the mind and on this 
basis leads Speculative Realism into pity and contempt for the 
sad correlationist, before it skips analytic philosophy of science 
altogether and heads off into a land of hallucinatory specula-
tion. This interpretation is worse than sloppy; it is, quite simply, 
rubbish. The point of introducing the ancestral arche-fossil in 
After Finitude is not to slap the correlationist’s face with the cold, 
hard facts of scientific inquiry, but rather to note an aporia. The 
basis of After Finitude is the notion that the scientific realist and 
the correlationist both have a point to make, and Meillassoux 
sets himself to resolving their dispute. Otherwise, he could have 
become just another scientific realist much like Norris himself, 
though in that case his book would have been less interesting. 
Anyone with lingering doubts on this point simply needs to 
reread Meillassoux’s presentation from the 2007 workshop at 
Goldsmiths, the entirety of which is a defense of what he takes to 
be the unsurpassable argument of the correlationist: if we think 
4 Ibid., 64. Italics added.
311
norris
something, it is given to us, and therefore we are not strictly 
thinking of it as “outside thought.”5 This holds no less for the 
arche-fossil, which Meillassoux, even in After Finitude, con-
cedes can easily be reduced by the correlationist to an “in-itself-
for-us.”6 In short, Meillassoux does not veer from “ontological 
realism” in the first part of the book to wild speculation in the 
second, because he never regards straightforward realism as an 
option in the first place: “On this point, we cannot but be heirs 
of Kantianism,” as he puts it.7 This is why it would be of no use 
for Meillassoux to engage closely with the standard literature of 
scientific realism, as Norris recommends. Instead, Meillassoux 
devotes his energy to a complex and ingenious argument for re-
versing what he calls Strong Correlationism into his own Specu-
lative Materialist position. Now, I have argued in print that this 
ultimately leaves Meillassoux with nothing more than idealism. 
But Norris has not bothered to understand the argument, and it 
is shocking that he fails even to mention the distinction between 
Weak and Strong Correlationism, not to mention the key phrase 
“Speculative Materialism” itself.8 That is to say, the central ar-
gument of After Finitude never so much as appears in Norris’s 
article, and thus the condescending tone of his piece is puzzling 
rather than insufferable.
What is more insufferable than puzzling is Norris’s treatment 
of my own object-oriented position, which lacks even the resid-
ual respect he occasionally shows to Meillassoux. For instance, 
“One sign that SR has grown up in a somewhat hermetic research 
environment is precisely the above-noted tendency, most visible 
in the writings of Graham Harman, to substitute the word for the 
deed — or the slogan for the detailed investigative work — when 
it comes to the real-world object domain” (46). What, exactly, 
5 Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meil-
lassoux, “Speculative Realism,” in Collapse III, ed. Robin Mackay (Falstaff: 
Urbanomic, 2007), 408–49.
6 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 3–4.
7 Ibid., 29.
8 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making, 2nd edn. 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 139–41.
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is his evidence for this charge? Nothing more than my stylis-
tic habit of frequently giving lists of assorted objects. As Norris 
complains, “there is not much point in continually reeling off 
great lists of wildly assorted objects if the upshot is merely to re-
mark on their extreme diversity, or irreducible thingness, with-
out (as it seems) much interest in just what makes them what 
they are” (46). In an oddly flowery passage, Norris admits that 
this technique does allow me to distance myself from the pomp-
ous darkness of Heidegger’s style: “Much better is [Harman’s] 
light-touch way with Heidegger — his breezy (if somewhat rou-
tine) celebration of the sheer multiplicity of objects each flaunt-
ing its strictly irreducible haecceitas — than the Schwarzwald 
redneck’s solemn lucubrations” (46). But despite granting me 
this small point of superiority to the “Schwarz wald redneck,” 
Norris thinks I am still caught up “with depth-ontology in the 
echt-Heideggerian mode: that [I find] no room for anything like 
what a scientist (or science-led philosopher of science) would 
count as a contribution to knowledge or a claim worth serious 
evaluation in point of truth-content or validity” (46). This is 
Norris’s first cluster of concerns about my work.
Here there are two separate issues, the first being my pur-
ported substitution of lists of objects for actual inquiry into 
what makes them what they are, and the second my suppos-
edly excessive closeness to Heidegger in dismissing the merely 
“ontic” character of science in favor of a depth-ontology. Norris 
is not the first to dislike the lists of objects: or, I should say, to 
pretend to dislike the lists, since he seems to have as much fun 
as anyone else with the way they counter Heidegger’s tone. Ian 
Bogost has given the name “Latour Litanies” to these lists, due 
to Bruno Latour’s outstanding fabrication of them throughout 
his many publications. The lists are not meant as “arguments,” 
but have a useful philosophical effect that I would be happy to 
call rhetorical, if not that “rhetoric” is no longer viewed in a se-
rious way — as it was among Aristotle and other ancient think-
ers — but has turned into the pejorative phrase “mere rhetoric” 
in purported opposition to rigorous scientific inquiry. As Ar-
istotle shows, the point of rhetoric is to prepare the battlefield 
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for argument by shifting attention to the unstated syllogisms 
(“enthymemes”) presupposed by the listener.9 My lists are not 
meant as a statement of sheer variety or haecceity, as Norris 
uninsightfully claims, but generally mix human, animal, veg-
etable, natural, and artificial elements in the same breath. The 
rhetorical purpose of this is to get my readers thinking in terms 
of a flat ontology that treats all objects as equally objects, rather 
than presupposing the Modern Taxonomy in which humans 
are one kind of entity and “natural” things another, with “ar-
tificial” objects such as plastics, oil refineries, hybrid corn, and 
battleships usually placed sloppily on the “human” side given 
that humans happen to have produced them. This taxonomy 
leads directly to the division of labor endorsed by Norris, ac-
cording to which science should have the only word on the 
“nature” side. OOO’s initial interest is not in the difference be-
tween humans and non-humans, but the preliminary equality 
between objects, and thus the various lists of objects do bona 
fide philosophical work by reframing the reader’s conception of 
how objects might be apportioned into various zones.10 Anyone 
who grasps the point early and grows bored with the lists is 
always free to skip them. Norris is wrong that there is nothing 
more to OOO’s investigation of objects than that, and it is note-
worthy that he makes no mention whatsoever of the fourfold 
OOO metaphysics of objects and qualities that marks a fresh for-
ward step in doing objects justice.11
The second point is Norris’s insinuation that I am too close 
to Heidegger in favoring a depth-ontology over science. Now, I 
am on record as denouncing Heidegger’s unfortunate statement 
that “science does not think,” and by no means do I regard sci-
ence as a merely “ontic” procedure.12 Since undergraduate days I 
9 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2018).
10 See also Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open Hu-
manities Press, 2011).
11 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011).
12 Graham Harman, Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing (Chi-
cago: Open Court, 2007), 146–47.
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have been an enthusiastic student of the history of science, and 
have always tried my best to keep up with the latest scientific 
developments, while claiming no special technical proficiency 
in these areas. While I do agree with Heidegger on the special 
power of poetic language, this need not entail a superiority of 
poetic to scientific language. But science aims at knowledge, 
and I have frequently made the case that knowledge is not the 
only form of cognition, and that philosophy and the arts should 
not be understood as forms of it. Knowledge occurs in two and 
only two forms: “undermining” by reducing objects downward 
to their components or causal backstory, and “overmining” by 
reducing them to their effects or empirical observability.13 I am 
a realist because I think the object itself cannot be fully replaced 
by any knowledge of it, and in this respect have some points in 
common with any number of scientific realists for whom Nor-
ris himself has high regard, including but not limited to Roy 
Bhaskar and Nancy Cartwright.14 I have also developed what I 
think is a more detailed account of the relation between science 
and poetics than Heidegger himself, though that account is by 
no means complete.15 Norris, being a shining example of a Mod-
ern Onto-Taxonomist, is apparently convinced that the modern 
division of labor gives science the sole right to discuss the sphere 
of reality that is unfortunately called “nature,” whereas I hold 
that there are metaphysical features of objects that can be dealt 
with by philosophy alone and not by the natural sciences. Aside 
from this, many objects are already beyond any adequate scien-
tific treatment, insofar as they are artificial, hybrid, or somewhat 
elusive. Above all, the tense separation between objects and 
their qualities, a central topic of my work, cannot possibly be 
dealt with by a natural science that is primarily concerned with 
13 Graham Harman, “The Third Table,” in The Book of Books, ed. Carolyn 
Christov-Bakargiev (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2012), 540–42.
14 Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso, 2008); Nancy 
Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
15 Graham Harman, “Aesthetics Is the Root of All Philosophy,” in Object-




the spatio-temporal behavior of physical matter and fields. As I 
see it, these are all relational properties of objects, while OOO is 
concerned to isolate their non-relational properties, along with 
the interaction between the former and the latter. The fact that 
a philosophy deals with the physical universe in terms different 
from those of natural science means neither that it is unserious 
nor that it wishes to replace science with speculative ontology, 
as even Meillassoux has wrongly claimed.16 Here, Norris would 
have been better-served by more patience and open-minded-
ness about work he seems not to know in much detail. It is cer-
tainly true that a dialogue between OOO and mainstream phi-
losophy of science could be fruitful, but that will take place on 
my schedule rather than Norris’s own.
Another misunderstanding comes when Norris says that I 
“get into problems […] when it comes to the issue of causality,” 
and that I make “somewhat desperate recourse to a version of 
the old occasionalist doctrine — recast as a notion of ‘vicarious 
causation’,” which Norris goes on to describe as “whacky” and 
“credibility-stretching” (47). Here he distorts and trivializes a 
topic on which I have worked far more seriously than he has. 
In the first place, to say that I “get into problems” with causal-
ity seems to imply that science and the philosophy of science 
already know everything there is to know about causation — a 
strange sentiment in the age of quantum theory and its long-
standing tension with General Relativity — and that I “get into 
problems” by straying from this reliable path. The point is that I 
pose a problem about causality that has only rarely been posed. 
Namely, given my argument — never mentioned or cited by 
Norris — that real objects can only confront each other as sen-
16 Meillassoux, in “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition,” accuses both me and 
Iain Hamilton Grant of a “hyper-physics” that transgresses the proper ter-
rain of science. But this only demonstrates his allegiance to the specific divi-
sion of labor resulting from taxonomical dogma. Quentin Meillassoux, “It-
eration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless 
Sign,” trans. Robin Mackay and M. Gansen, in Genealogies of Speculation: 
Materialism and Subjectivity since Structuralism, eds. Armen Avanessian 
and Suhail Malik (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 117–97.
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sual caricatures, there is a problem with understanding how 
sensual influence can lead to real effects. I do not doubt that 
such real effects occur, and doubt only that the problem has ever 
been posed in this form. Admittedly, this particular framing of 
the causation problem is unlikely to be of immediate interest 
to present-day scientists. But as seen from the Carlo Rovelli 
passage cited in the previous chapter, it is by no means clear 
that philosophers should limp along after present-day science 
while singing its praises. We are more likely to be of use when 
pursuing our own interests, which could prove useful to some 
future state of science. As mentioned, it took nearly two centu-
ries after Leibniz’s relational theory of space and time for Ein-
steinian General Relativity to appear on the scene. By contrast, 
Norris’s pets “abduction” and “inference to the best explanation” 
are unlikely to have similar imaginative impact on the physics 
of the future. These ideas are respectable efforts by professional 
philosophers to explain the extant achievements of science. But 
that sort of ex post facto success is precisely the sort of thing that 
Imre Lakatos associates with “degenerating research programs” 
(a term sometimes inaccurately applied to OOO itself) and no 
practicing scientist will learn much from it.17
The second problem comes when Norris refers to my “some-
what desperate recourse” to “the old occasionalist doctrine” 
(47). While he does note that I “recast” it as “vicarious causa-
tion,” his reference to the “old” occasionalist doctrine suggests a 
poor understanding of the difference between the two. When he 
calls my theory “whacky” and “credibility-stretching,” he invites 
the uninformed reader to imagine that I invoke God as a uni-
versal causal agent to escape a self-created jam; after all, every-
one knows that this is what the “old” occasionalist doctrine did. 
Here again, Norris does the reader a disservice by not citing any 
of my arguments for vicarious causation, or any of my histori-
17 Imre Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1: The Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes, eds. John Worrall and Gregory Currie (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978). See also Graham Harman, “On Progres-
sive and Degenerating Research Programs with Respect to Philosophy,” Re-
vista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75, no. 4 (2019): 2067–102.
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cal remarks about the “old” occasionalists.18 The differences be-
tween these theories and mine are not only clear, but painstak-
ingly enumerated in my writings on the subject. The traditional 
Islamic and Early Modern European occasionalists, as well as 
Alfred North Whitehead in the twentieth century, do appeal to 
God as a universal agent. We need not accept this theory to-
day — I certainly do not — but there were already arguments for 
this view that deserve better than the off-hand treatment Nor-
ris gives them. He also neglects to mention my argument that 
Hume and Kant are themselves heirs of occasionalism, with the 
human mind replacing the old occasionalist God; in this sense 
all modern philosophers, Norris included, owe more to the oc-
casionalists than they realize. My rejection of both the “old” oc-
casionalism and the modern Hume–Kant variant is that both 
restrict causal power to a single kind of entity. Although the 
mind is a more generally respectable causal medium these days 
than God, and epistemology held in higher regard than theol-
ogy, in both cases one special entity is posited as able to engage 
in direct causal relations though everything else is not. My solu-
tion is more consistent: nothing engages in direct relations with 
anything else, but everything real interrelates through a sensual 
object, and everything sensual through a real one. If Norris still 
objects to this, he should at least take the trouble to read my 
relevant pages on the topic before appointing himself as the en-
forcer of mainstream respectability.
Unfortunately, his manner of mentioning Speculative Re-
alism only with arched eyebrows seems to have spread to his 
younger disciples. Norris’s recent Ph.D. student Fabio Gironi 
sneaks the following dig into a footnote: 
Graham Harman, radicalizing Latourian “irreductionism,” 
bemoans all anti-object standpoints “[which] try to reduce 
reality to a single radix, with everything else reduced to dust 
18 See for example Graham Harman, “A New Occasionalism?” in Reset Moder-




[…],” since they generally fail to fully deliver the “weirdness” 
of reality, and declares himself happy to think “that electrical 
and geological facts are permeated by deeper metaphysical 
vibrations” than contemporary reductionist science can ac-
count for. It is hard to identify which kinds of theoretical vir-
tues “weirdness” is supposed to index, and the reader might 
be excused for dismissing it as an up-to-date, secularized 
form of credo quia absurdum.19
While the unearned contempt — including for Latour, who has 
revolutionized multiple disciplines — is reminiscent of Norris’s 
own style, in one respect Gironi’s passage is worse, since it is 
written largely in bad faith. For although he feigns ignorance 
of “which kinds of theoretical virtues ‘weirdness’ is supposed to 
index,” he is sufficiently familiar with my work to know the an-
swer to this question in advance, and I therefore conclude he is 
mainly playing for laughs. As Gironi is well aware, “weirdness” is 
a precise technical term in my philosophy, one with both a solid 
etymological pedigree and an impressive canonical user in the 
person of William Shakespeare.20 For OOO, the experience of the 
weird marks the important encounter with a rift between objects 
and their qualities, a rift that happens to lie at the center of my 
theory. It is something to be believed not “because it is absurd” 
but because it is compellingly strange, which is often enough the 
mark of ideas with staying power. Would it not be better for eve-
ryone if Norris and Gironi directly addressed my arguments for 
the object/quality split, drawn in part from the eminent pages of 
Leibniz and Husserl, rather than waving the flag of scientific ra-
tionalism while speaking in the snarky argot of schoolboys and 
aping deconstruction’s overdependence on scare-quotes? Since 
Norris is the teacher in this case, I hold him personally responsi-
ble for the sloppy remarks and bad form of both.
19 Fabio Gironi, “Between Naturalism and Realism: A New Realist Land-
scape,” Journal of Critical Realism 11, no. 3 (2012): 383, 79n.
20 Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Winchester: 
Zero Books, 2012); William Shakespeare, Macbeth, eds. S. Clark and P. Ma-





I will speak now of Dan Zahavi, who resembles Norris in his 
critical posture towards all that Speculative Realism represents, 
as seen from Zahavi’s dismissive review of Tom Sparrow’s The 
End of Phenomenology.1 The title of that book being what it is, 
Sparrow was always destined for some negative feedback, and he 
was well aware of the risk. Phenomenology is a well-established 
school with a sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus, equipped 
with societies and publishing series overseen by presiding offic-
ers, gatekeepers, and expert technicians, none of them amused 
to hear the claim that they are defending a theory whose time has 
passed. In many cases, phenomenology’s conflict with its newer 
critics simply displays the usual features of generational warfare. 
For this reason, Speculative Realism might well proceed by way 
of Max Planck’s verdict that crabby, I’ve-seen-it-all opponents of 
any new theory are often best waited out rather than assaulted 
frontally. Yet this method will not work with Zahavi. Accord-
ing to published information he was born on November 6, 1967, 
which would put him in the same high school graduating class 
as Quentin Meillassoux and I. Despite Zahavi’s relative youth, 
1 Dan Zahavi, “The End of What? Phenomenology vs. Speculative Realism,” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24, no. 3 (2016): 289–309. Sub-
sequent page references are given between parentheses in the main text.
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he is an ambitious and prolific author, long regarded as one of 
the world’s leading experts on phenomenology. In his review of 
Sparrow’s book, he manages to take shots at each of the original 
Speculative Realist authors, although just as with Christopher 
Norris, it is OOO which takes the brunt of the criticism. Here I 
will summarize the key points of his attack, before explaining 
what he misses about Speculative Realism more generally.
Much of Zahavi’s article is a critique of Sparrow. For reasons 
of space I will not spend much time here defending Sparrow, 
which he is perfectly capable of doing himself. I would just cite 
the following passage from Zahavi, since it contains both my 
chief agreement and disagreement with Sparrow: “[according 
to Sparrow,] speculative realism delivers what phenomenology 
always promised, but never provided: a full-fledged defense of 
realism. On the other hand, however, Sparrow also argues that 
phenomenology never really got started […] since no proponent 
of phenomenology has ever been able to adequately clarify its 
method, scope, and metaphysical commitments’” (290). I have 
already agreed with Sparrow’s claim about realism. Edmund 
Husserl is quite serious in his claim to return to “the things 
themselves,” but is unable to do so because of his disqualification 
of objects that could not be, in principle, the correlate of some 
intentional act. But such objects, which Kant calls the thing-in-
itself and I call real objects, are the core subject matter of OOO. 
We reject the Modernist Onto-Taxonomy that feels obliged to 
begin from a transcendental standpoint and then somehow de-
cides that the things themselves are already dealt with sufficient-
ly and exhaustively by natural science. As for Sparrow’s claim 
that no one has ever fully established what phenomenology is, 
I have agreed with him that “description” is too vague to do the 
trick, though I also think — like Zahavi, evidently (305n2) — that 
an airtight definition is too stringent a standard for any philo-
sophical school to meet. As I see it, we are inside phenomenol-
ogy as soon as we suspend the actuality of the real world (the 
phenomenological reduction) and focus on the tension between 
intentional objects and their adumbrations in an effort to reach 
their essential qualities (the eidetic reduction).
321
norris
The reason I am not a phenomenologist, despite great sym-
pathy for Husserl and his successors, is that I oppose the brack-
eting of the real and do not agree that the intellect can lead us to 
an intuition of essences any better than the senses can. In short, 
essences are not intuitable either sensuously or intellectually, 
but are accessed by way of allusion and other indirect means. 
Since Zahavi is a professional phenomenologist, it should come 
as no surprise that he would be hostile both to my view and to 
Sparrow’s. For me the problem is not that “the reduction can 
never be completed,” a view in which Zahavi draws on the sup-
port of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (291). Instead, the problem is 
that Merleau-Ponty does complete it, despite his disclaimer as 
summarized by Zahavi: “even the most radical reflection de-
pends upon and is linked to an unreflected life” (291). This is not 
really the point, since the difference between radical reflection 
and unreflected life unfolds entirely within the human sphere, 
and thus Merleau-Ponty makes no room for the real. As proof of 
this, consider the way that his supposedly most futuristic doc-
trine, that of “the flesh” in The Visible and the Invisible, tells us 
merely that the world looks at us just as we look at it. Nothing is 
said about the interaction of parts of the world with each other, 
which is a key aspect of any bona fide realism. A mere “real-
ism of the residue” like this one is not realism, but simply ideal-
ism with an alibi. Zahavi and Merleau-Ponty are both correct 
that even “Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world presup-
poses the reduction” (291), but this proves the opposite of what 
they think. Namely, it shows that Heidegger remains stuck in 
a transcendental-phenomenological standpoint, as is his clear 
from his own assumption that the difference between praxis and 
theory is some sort of major ontological rift, rather than simply 
two different ways of converting real things into sensual ones.
Turning now to Speculative Realism, Zahavi goes slightly 
astray in characterizing it as bitterly opposed to Kant (293). This 
largely holds for Meillassoux, though Zahavi only seems to know 
After Finitude, and thus misses Meillassoux’s later extension of 
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the term back to David Hume.2 It is certainly true that Meillas-
soux bemoans the “Kantian catastrophe,” and this puts him close 
to Alain Badiou’s own claim that the Kant-event has “poisoned 
philosophy.”3 This no doubt has something to do with their na-
tional preference for a resurgent French rationalism that takes 
alternative inspiration from René Descartes, for whom finitude 
is not a factor the way it is for Kant.4 Zahavi quotes five exempla-
ry passages from Husserl by way of proudly admitting that, yes, 
Husserl was a correlationist (293–94). He also quotes Ian Bogost 
and me, accurately enough, as saying that the relation between 
objects is no different in kind from that between thought and 
world.5 After first noting the superficial similarity between this 
position and philosophical naturalism, he deftly cites Timothy 
Morton to show that there is actually a big difference between 
the two. In Zahavi’s words, “if anything the aim seems the re-
verse [of naturalism’s], namely to finally recognize that all ob-
jects, including fireplaces, lawnmowers or slices of rotting pork 
possess an inner infinity of their own”6 (295). Zahavi wonders 
whether such a move really suspends correlationism or simply 
spreads it throughout the cosmos. To his credit, he has read and 
understood my response to this objection — in those passages 
referenced in the Steven Shaviro chapter above — where I worry 
that panpsychism continues to assume that human psyche is so 
2 Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” trans. Robin Mackay and M. Gansen, 
in Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity since Structural-
ism, eds. Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 
117–97.
3 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II, trans. Alberto Toscano 
(London: Continuum, 2009), 535.
4 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 124; Badiou, Logics 
of Worlds, 535.
5 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry 
of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 75; Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenol-
ogy, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2012), 30.
6 Timothy Morton, “Art in the Age of Asymmetry: Hegel, Objects, Aesthet-
ics,” Evental Aesthetics 1, no. 1 (2012): 132.
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important an ontological dimension that it must be found in 
germinal form in all entities. But Zahavi notes his “puzzlement” 
when I say that what is at issue is not psyche but sincerity, and 
when I add that this entails a weird realism (295). There is no 
reason to be puzzled, however, since I have often defined both 
sincerity and weirdness as technical terms. The mere fact that 
they are unfamiliar to Zahavi is no argument against them. Sin-
cerity means that everything just is what it is, and that at any 
moment it confronts a given range of sensual objects while not 
confronting others. This idea is drawn from Emmanuel Levinas, 
while adding a Whiteheadian cosmic dimension. Here I am as 
a human being, having certain phenomenal experiences; over 
there is a rock, which need not be “conscious” in the panpsychist 
manner, but which does confront sensual objects rather than 
real ones, simply because any human or non-human relation is 
capable of nothing more. As for weird realism, this is the notion 
that metaphysical realism does not entail that direct knowledge 
of the real is possible, but rather the reverse: precisely because 
objects are real, they are different not only from any human or 
non-human relation to them, but even from their own qualities. 
In the book Weird Realism I explore this notion with reference 
to the fiction of H.P. Lovecraft.
Zahavi proceeds to give an account of my theory which, al-
though hardly less critical than Peter Wolfendale’s, is consider-
ably more lucid. For instance, “on [Harman’s] account, scientific 
naturalism is itself a form of correlationism” (295). And further, 
“on Harman’s account, the real objects, the things-in-them-
selves, remain forever inaccessible” (295). And finally, drawing 
properly on two passages from Guerrilla Metaphysics, “every-
thing is isolated from everything else; nothing is ever in direct 
contact with anything else. This principle holds not only on the 
inter-objective level, but even on the intra-objective level: an ob-
ject also withdraws from and has no direct contact with its con-
stituent parts” (295). From this he concludes that even though I 
accuse phenomenology of enchaining us to the phenomenal, it 
is actually I who do this, and that I contradict myself by “making 
various claims about the structure and nature of this inacces-
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sible realm” (295). Here Zahavi overlooks two important points. 
The first is that I do not say we are limited to the phenomenal, 
but only that direct access to things is limited to the phenom-
enal. Indirect relation to the real happens frequently, and there 
is no contradiction in gaining indirect access to that which can 
ony be accessed indirectly. As a secondary point, he switches 
back to the claim of “our” (human) access being restricted to 
the phenomenal, forgetting my broader claim that non-human 
objects also have no direct access to each other. But the point of 
OOO is that real relations occur indirectly between real objects by 
means of sensual mediators, as seen in my various discussions 
of allure and vicarious causation. With his final complaint, that 
I make claims about the nature of the inaccessible, this simply 
repeats the strong correlationist assumption that we can only 
speak about the phenomenal, and that any attempt to discuss 
the real is itself a thinking that immediately collapses back into 
the phenomenal. But the fact that someone makes statements 
about the nature of the real is not the same thing as claiming that 
the real must also be phenomenally accessible to them. This is 
the same taxonomical error that leads readers to conflate Kant’s 
doctrine that we only have direct access to the phenomenal with 
the false corollary that we can therefore only talk about the rela-
tion between humans and world. These are two different points; 
I affirm the first while rejecting the second.
In passing, I should note that Zahavi misreads Meillassoux 
in the same way as Norris and most other critics: “[Meillassoux] 
insists that fidelity to science demands that we take scientific 
statements at face value and that we reject correlationism. No 
compromise is possible” (296). By no means. This is the view 
of straightforward realists like Paul Boghossian and John Nolt, 
not of Meillassoux himself. The latter is abundantly clear that 
the correlationist has a point too, and his entire philosophical 
position is an attempt to thread the needle between science and 
correlationism, through a complicated effort to radicalize strong 
correlationism into his own speculative materialism. Although I 
disagree strongly with both Meillassoux’s method and his results, 
it is important that we get his position right and not misidentify 
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him as a standard scientific realist. Zahavi follows this up by 
saying, “an even more extreme form of anti-correlationist sci-
entism can be found in the work of Brassier,” who treats the goal 
of enlightenment as a destruction of the manifest image (296). 
While this is true of Ray Brassier, the most intense opponent of 
phenomenology among the Speculative Realists, the phrase “an 
even more extreme form” wrongly implies a continuity between 
him and Meillassoux. They do have their agreements, but this is 
not one of them. For we have seen (at Goldsmith’s most clearly) 
that Meillassoux is not an anti-correlationist, and also that his 
position deserves to be called mathematism rather than scient-
ism. Peter Gratton has rightly noted that Meillassoux makes 
rather limited use of science in his philosophy. Oddly enough, 
Zahavi makes the same point himself toward the end of his ar-
ticle, though for polemical purposes: “as [Harald] Wiltsche has 
recently pointed out in a critical discussion of Meillassoux’s 
work, the latter’s treatment of an engagement with science is as-
tonishingly sparse”7 (302). But there is no contradiction here un-
less we assume that the passages on ancestrality and the arche-
fossil are a form of scientific realism, which they are not. In any 
case, I am very much with Zahavi and against Brassier when it 
comes to the destruction of the manifest image, especially since 
Brassier merely wishes to replace it with a different kind of im-
age: the scientific one. Thus, Brassier is primarily a philosopher 
of images, and to this extent he has more in common with phe-
nomenology than he would care to admit.
I will close this chapter by dealing with Zahavi’s final criti-
cism of me and showing that he understates several important 
points of agreement between us. He first quotes a passage from 
The Quadruple Object in which I argue that the idealism of phe-
nomenology is proven by the fact that many intentional objects 
are not real in the least. I might have added, more pertinently 
in this case, that there is no reason to assume that all objects are 
7 Harald A. Wiltsche, “Science, Realism, and Correlationism: A Phenomeno-
logical Critique of Meillassoux’s Argument from Ancestrality,” European 
Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 3 (September 2017): 808–32.
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necessarily available to intentionality — and in fact, I hold that 
no real objects are thus accessible. He responds as follows: “This 
criticism is unconvincing. It is an obvious non sequitur to argue 
that since some objects of intentionality are non-existing, all ob-
jects of intentionality are non-existing” (298). But this is not the 
argument, and only appears to be so because Zahavi has taken 
one passage out of context. The argument, instead, is that since 
an intentional object is something to which we relate directly, 
any intentional object that happens to be linked with some real 
object must differ in kind from it. Let’s imagine an unusual case 
in which I am intending a white dog that links with a real animal 
that is actually here in the room, while simultaneously halluci-
nating a green dog. Zahavi claims that Husserl has the resources 
to deal with this. He quotes the following from Logical Investiga-
tions: “the intentional object of a presentation is the same as its 
actual object, and on occasion as its external object, and […] it 
is absurd to distinguish between them”8 (298). 
The use of the word “absurd” is telling, since this is most often 
a table-pounding term rather than an argument. Even worse, 
Zahavi begs the question so hard that it probably phoned the 
police. For he simply asserts, along with Husserl, the supposed 
“absurdity” that there might be any objects that could not be-
come the object of an intentional act. This goes back to Husserl’s 
initial idealist turn in the 1890s in the essay “Intentional Ob-
jects,” meant as a rejoinder to Kazimierz Twardowski’s doubling 
of an object outside the mind with a content inside it. Husserl’s 
motive in that essay, much like Zahavi’s in rejecting my version 
of Speculative Realism as the worst of the bunch (despite my 
incorporation of numerous phenomenological insights) was 
the avoidance of “skepticism.” Namely, Husserl worries that if 
an intentional Berlin is doubled up with a real Berlin outside 
the mind, no knowledge of Berlin would be possible. But the 
fact that this would pose complications for knowledge does 
not mean that it cannot be true, and thus Husserl’s rejection of 
8 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, ed. Dermot Moran, trans. J.N. 
Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001), 2:127. Italics removed.
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Twardowski is never convincing, though his resulting idealism 
does allow him to explore the concreteness of the ideal sphere 
more fully than any idealist before him. (A further note: “con-
crete” and “real” are not the same thing, though Zahavi consist-
ently treats them as such.) Another way to put it is that Husserl’s 
apparent use of nuanced and layered terminology in the passage 
above — his threefold distinction between intentional object, 
actual object, and external object — falsely suggests he has cov-
ered every base with his model, which is not true. What Husserl 
must exclude tout court from phenomenology, if the theory is 
to work as he wishes, is any possibility of a real object that is 
not potentially an intentional one. Rather than making an ar-
gument for this, Zahavi merely joins Husserl in dismissing the 
other option as “absurd” (which is just what the German Ideal-
ists did to the Ding an sich, though with more of an argument 
than Husserl ever gives) and calling his theory of knowledge 
“non-representationalist” (301). This term is certainly an apt de-
scription of Husserl, but it does not get either Husserl or Zahavi 
off the hook of explaining why it is “absurd” to ask if there might 
be something to represent apart from the non-representational 
sphere. What Husserl calls the “external” object in the passage 
above is only external in the sense that we have not yet fulfilled 
our intention of it, though in principle we might. This is not 
the real object, which is completely missing from his threefold 
schema mentioned above. Then again, Zahavi can still dismiss 
the real object as “absurd,” and we can march forward into total 
idealism, resting easy in the assurance that it will enable us to 
avoid “skepticism” and “representationalism,” whether justifi-
ably or not.
Zahavi’s next point shows him in slipperier form. He begins, 
“Whereas it is true that some phenomenologists have suggested 
that one should stay clear of the realism/anti-realism (idealism) 
controversy, it is certainly not a position shared by all” (298). 
This is already somewhat evasive, since Zahavi is well aware that 
it is at least the usual position found among phenomenologists, 
and one that is often stated explicitly by the two chief figures 
of the movement, Husserl and Heidegger. Indeed, it is a posi-
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tion Zahavi himself seems to share, given his agreement with 
the “absurdity” of positing objects beyond all intentional access. 
This remains the case despite the fig leaf of citing two of his own 
articles in which the question of whether phenomenology is 
compatible with some form of realism “is debated.”9 But rather 
than just telling us what he thinks about the matter, he quickly 
follows these citations by shifting to a “more important” topic. 
That topic is as follows:
[M]any early phenomenologists (including members of 
the Münich and Göttingen circles of phenomenology, i.e. 
figures like Pfänder, Scheler, Stein, Geiger, Hildebrand and 
Ingarden) were committed realists who were disappointed 
by what they saw as Husserl’s turn towards transcendental 
idealism. They considered this turn a betrayal of the realist 
thrust of phenomenology and very much saw themselves as 
defending realism. (298)
The name-drop is never an effective way to end an argument, 
though it does allow Zahavi a segué into his needlessly conde-
scending conclusion that “ultimately one has to wonder wheth-
er [the Speculative Realists] are reliable and knowledgeable 
interpreters of the tradition they are criticizing” (299). I would 
say, instead, that ultimately one has to wonder whether Zahavi 
has a sufficiently robust sense of what “realism” means. Husserl’s 
idealism did not begin with his turn toward transcendental phe-
nomenology around the time of the First World War but nearly 
two decades earlier, in his proclamation of the “absurdity” of 
a real Berlin that could not be the correlate of an intentional 
act. It is true that most realists do not accept anything like the 
thing-in-itself, but we are speaking here of OOO, which does ac-
cept it (304). The various figures on Zahavi’s list of “realist phe-
9 Dan Zahavi, “Phenomenology,” in The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-
Century Philosophy, ed. Dermot Moran (London: Routledge, 2008), 661–92; 
Dan Zahavi, “Husserl and the ‘Absolute’,” in Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sci-
ences: Essays in Commemoration of Husserl, eds. Carlo Ierna, Hanne Jacobs, 
and Filip Mattens (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 71–92.
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nomenologists” differ greatly in the intensity of their commit-
ment to realism, even if all of them –and he could have added 
Heidegger — preferred the Logical Investigations to the rampant 
idealism of Ideas I.10 But it is at least probable that none of them 
would have disagreed with Husserl’s claim of the “absurdity” of 
objects beyond all intentionality. Yet an express commitment 
to such objects is what object-oriented realism is about, rather 
than the “scientific realism” that Zahavi questions in the com-
pany of Hillary Putnam (299–301). Furthermore, Zahavi cannot 
have it both ways about OOO, claiming sometimes that it is a 
wild and fantastic speculative skepticism and at other times that 
it is “old hat” (303). On another point, he simply misfires:
Heidegger is often portrayed by the speculative realists as an 
even more fierce idealist and correlationist than Husserl. This 
characterization, however, is by no means universally accept-
ed by Heidegger scholars. Many see him as a realist. There are 
even those who interpret him as a scientific realist. Recently, 
even Husserl has been interpreted along similar lines. (299)
The point about Husserl was dealt with above. To say that “even 
Husserl has been interpreted” as a realist is not yet a realist case 
for Husserl, a case that Zahavi more or less admits he does not 
believe anyway. It amounts to nothing more than saying “you 
can’t paint all phenomenologists with the same brush; there is 
great diversity amongst us!” Yet he simultaneously represses any 
diversity in the various Speculative Realist approaches to Hei-
deggger, while also implying that since some people have treat-
ed Husserl and Heidegger as realists, therefore realist concerns 
have been adequately covered by phenomenological authors. As 
concerns Heidegger, Zahavi seems entirely unaware that I inter-
pret Heidegger as posing one of the great realist challenges to 
correlationism. Although Zahavi generally seems to have done 
10 Edmund Husserl, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological 




his homework in reading the key Speculative Realist texts, one 
glaring omission from his references is my debut book, Tool-
Being. Thus, at least when it comes to Heidegger, ultimately one 
has to wonder whether Zahavi is “a reliable and knowledgeable 
interpreter” of the Speculative Realist tradition he is criticizing. 
Beyond this, the fact that a number of Heidegger commenters 
aside from me call Heidegger a realist (I happen to know the 
literature fairly well) tells us nothing about what kind of real-
ism they defend, and many so-called realisms are rather feeble 
versions of the doctrine. For instance, there are those who call 
Jacques Lacan a “realist,” despite the fact that his Real functions 
only as a trauma to the symbolic order. There are also numer-
ous “realisms of the residue,” which imply that the throwaway 
concession that something exists outside thought is enough to 
count as realism. Badiou is sometimes guilty of this trick, and 
Sparrow showed the same for Merleau-Ponty. There are also 
phenomenologies of “givenness” such as Jean-Luc Marion’s, 
which imply that to call humans passive recipients of the given 
rather than active formatters of it is enough to make one a real-
ist. And we have already met with Lee Braver’s “transgressive 
realism,” which is realism only in the sense that shock or re-
sistance alert us to reality. But as Jane Bennett has argued ef-
fectively, such forms of “recalcitrance” are not enough to make 
room for the real.11
Zahavi is a leading scholar, highly accomplished at what he 
does. His article is much clearer and fairer in spirit, I would say, 
than the books of Gratton and Wolfendale. He took time from 
his active schedule to read a good bit of Speculative Realist lit-
erature and mount counter-arguments against us. But his arti-
cle would have been better with less condescension, and with 
a more nuanced awareness of the different intensities of real-
ism found among the various thinkers who claim to be realists. 
Beyond this, he should simply have owned his obvious idealist 
commitments, rather than pre-emptively farming out a hypo-
11 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 61.
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thetical phenomenological realism to a glittering roster of third 
parties. Amidst his recurrent claims that the Speculative Realists 
make unfair generalizations, he ought not to have generalized 
unfairly about the Speculative Realist attitude toward Heidegger, 
given his apparent unawareness — and its coals-to-Newcastle 
outcome — of my numerous publications on Heidegger’s realist 
impulses. Zahavi would also have done well to engage with the 
reading of Husserl by the only original Speculative Realist who 
has offered such a reading, in a book he already cites in his arti-
cle.12 That would have been a conversation to relish.
Finally, there is Zahavi’s strange concluding lament that, 
even if the Speculative Realists have a point about phenomenol-
ogy’s in-built idealism, we still ought to celebrate phenomenol-
ogy’s fruitful impact on countless disciplines (302). This might 
be worth saying to Brassier, who would be perfectly happy to 
see phenomenology wiped from the face of the earth. But such 
a needed confrontation is rendered impossible when Zahavi 
clumsily cites Brassier’s boorish remark about the “online orgy 
of stupidity” of Speculative Realism, unaware of the complex 
human situation that lies behind that remark (304). More im-
portantly, how could Zahavi have read my book Guerrilla Meta-
physics — he does cite it — and still think I see nothing of value 
in phenomenology? And beyond that, if he demands recogni-
tion for the fruitfulness of phenomenology, why is he unwill-
ing to appreciate a similar impact of Speculative Realism across 
nearly as many disciplines, allowing for its much shorter life-
span so far? My sense is that Sparrow’s book put Zahavi into a 
defensive mood, and thus he was unable to let his guard down 
and engage in some good old give-and-take. I hope there will 
still be an opportunity for more substantive discussion with 
Zahavi in the future, especially since I love phenomenology as 
much as he does, whatever my reservations.






My book Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything 
was published under the Pelican label in the spring of 2018. On 
September 27th of that year, it received a critical assessment in 
the London Review of Books from Stephen Mulhall of Oxford.1 
Along with Mulhall’s work on Martin Heidegger and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, readers of the present book may know him for his 
editorship of The Cavell Reader.2 
Let’s turn directly to Mulhall’s review, which is just over 5,000 
words in length, but manages to make multiple objections to the 
theory advanced in my Pelican book. Drawing on Wittgenstein 
in the Philosophical Investigations, Mulhall begins by question-
ing the value of “theories of everything” such as the one prom-
ised by OOO.3 If we say that every tool “modifies something,” this 
is clear enough in the case of a hammer or saw, but in what sense 
do a glue pot or ruler also “modify” something? In expanding 
the sense of “modify” to cover a greater number of cases, the 
1 Stephen Mulhall, “How Complex is a Lemon?” London Review of Books, Sep-
tember 27, 2018, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v40/n18/stephen-mulhall/ 
how-complex-is-a-lemon. Since I am quoting from the online rather than 
the print version of this article, no page numbers will be listed.
2 Stephen Mulhall, ed. The Cavell Reader (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996).
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 
3rd edn. (London: Pearson, 1973).
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meaning of the word becomes “increasingly loose and baggy,” 
so that we end by “evacuating the theory of any content.” There 
is a twofold way in which this complaint might apply to OOO. 
In Tool-Being, a book Mulhall seems to know at first hand, my 
method was of just the sort that Wittgenstein complains about, 
since I argue there that Heidegger’s “tool-analysis” cannot be 
limited to hammers, saw, glue pots, rulers, or any other familiar 
“tools”; instead, I hold that Heidegger’s analysis hold good for 
any object whatsoever. In the Pelican book sixteen years later, I 
presented a global theory of objects, which is exactly what OOO 
is. Mulhall responds to such efforts with blanket skepticism: 
“This is the trouble with philosophical theories of everything, 
whether it’s in a given domain (tools, say, or language) or abso-
lutely everything. It isn’t so much that their generality increases 
the risk of incorporating erroneous claims; it’s that they risk 
failing to make a claim at all.” But this is not true. If it were, 
then philosophy (or at least ontology) would be impossible. 
The broader the theory, the more it must abstract from the fine-
grained detail of any specific locale. We do not need Heidegger’s 
tool-analysis to build a tree house any more than I need a globe 
to drive from my home in downtown Long Beach to my office 
in downtown Los Angeles. But a globe is surely not “vacuous” 
just because it shifts us to a different level, and neither is the 
tool-analysis “vacuous” when I apply it to all entities. The tool- 
analysis shows, in my reading, that entities withdraw not only 
from our theoretical awareness, which is as far as Heidegger 
goes, but also withdraw from our practical handling and even 
from each other in causal contact. One can argue that this theo-
ry is wrong, as Mulhall does elsewhere in his review, but it would 
be hard to claim it says nothing at all. If that were the case, then I 
would not have been challenged repeatedly by relational ontolo-
gists, such as Bruno Latour or Steven Shaviro, who understand 
perfectly well what I am saying and argue the opposite instead.
For the sake of illustration, imagine Mulhall giving the same 
sort of verdict about Immanuel Kant: “by claiming that every-
thing is an appearance according to space, time, and the catego-
ries as opposed to the thing-in-itself, Kant risks failing to make 
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a claim at all. For he thereby loses the distinction between some 
things that are very easy to see directly, like chairs and dogs, 
and others that transcend our understanding, such as God, the 
inside of a black hole, or what happens after death.” This would 
be a strange thing to say, and a good Kantian would crisply re-
tort that noumenon/phenomenon is a distinction that goes well 
beyond the empirical question of how easy various things are to 
know. If philosophy is not permitted to explore the basic back-
ground features shared by everything that exists, then I am not 
sure what it is supposed to do, or even what Mulhall thinks it 
is supposed to do. A blogosphere critic once told me that “if 
everything is an object, then nothing is an object,” but this is 
both platitudinous and false. It is simply untrue that we know 
what things are only by contrast with other things. Ontology in 
its first steps works primarily not by drawing contrasts but by 
asking what all things share qua things.
All right, then: what is shared by all things, or — in OOO ter-
minology — by all objects? Mulhall begins on a charitable note, 
“Harman’s opening attempts to specify what he means by [‘ob-
ject’] look promising.” As he summarizes these attempts, “For 
Harman, an object is simply anything that is resistant to reduc-
tion: anything whose autonomous, unitary nature and existence 
cannot be explained away by being reduced to its component 
parts, or to its effects on the world, or to its relations with other 
objects.” Mulhall never refers to my undermining/overmining/
duomining terminology, but that is what he means. Most crit-
ics, with Peter Wolfendale being a good example, cite my “non-
reducible” definition of objects only to follow up immediately 
with something resembling a “negative theology” complaint: 
OOO can only say what an object is not, rather than what it is. 
But saying what something is not is at least a good start, espe-
cially when so many philosophies in the course of two-and-a-
half millennia have given just the sorts of answers that I take 
to be the wrong ones: undermining everything into water or 
atoms or apeiron, overmining everything into ideas or relations 
or dialectical process. Furthermore, such preliminary negations 
are by no means all that OOO says about objects. We also argue 
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for points such as the following: real objects are plural, they have 
both real and sensual qualities, they interact through the media-
tion of sensual objects, they have parts without incorporating 
all the features of those parts, they are destructible, and so forth. 
But the “negative theology” line does not figure prominently in 
Mulhall’s review. Instead, there are two other problems that con-
cern him about OOO’s definition of objects.
The first has to do with whether or not this definition is use-
ful. For “even at this early stage […] we might worry that Har-
man’s strategic orientation towards objects is less distinctive 
than it seems. It’s not clear, for example, that that his ontological 
open-mindedness in social theory generates anything terribly 
original in the way of insights into the nature and history of its 
distinctive objects.” Or as he puts it shortly thereafter, “it’s hard 
to see how conceptualizing matters in [Harman’s] way helps 
the working historian.” His assumption, then, is that history is 
something dealt with by historians, and it is unclear how my 
theory can help them. It is Mulhall’s equivalent of the taxonomi-
cal argument employed earlier by Wolfendale and Christopher 
Norris, to the effect that nature is dealt with by scientists, and 
since OOO cannot do anything of obvious help to scientists, it 
should stay in its own lane and just talk about the thought-world 
relationship like other post-Kantian philosophers. But first of 
all, it is not clear that this is the case. OOO has enjoyed exten-
sive interdisciplinary success precisely because practitioners 
of various disciplines have found my writings useful. It would 
not be at all surprising to hear that a group of historians some-
where had taken Immaterialism to heart and found ways to use 
it for some collective project or other, just as it was unsurpris-
ing when a group of organization theorists in Leicester held a 
special conference on my book Dante’s Broken Hammer.4 Some-
thing analogous holds for physics, which — as Mulhall, Wolfen-
dale, and Norris may have heard — has been in a bit of a jam in 
4 Graham Harman, Dante’s Broken Hammer: The Ethics, Aesthetics, and Met-
aphysics of Love (London: Repeater Books, 2016). The conference on this 
book was held at Leicester University on June 19, 2017.
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recent decades. There is simply no way to know whether such 
OOO concepts as vicarious causation or the fourfold structure of 
the object may prove useful to science in the future. But that is 
not even the point. The point is that there is no good reason to 
hold that each kind of object should be reserved for one specific 
discipline. We know that artists, art critics, art historians, and 
philosophers of art all deal with art, and that they do so in differ-
ent ways, though this does not exclude a good deal of commu-
nicative overlap between them. As made clear in Immaterialism, 
which Mulhall also seems to have read, that book develops an 
ontology rather than a history of the Dutch East India Company, 
and there is nothing vague about what this means. The historian 
is concerned with figuring out what really happened as well as 
the actual causal relationships between various factors, and thus 
attempts to increase our knowledge about what occurred. The 
ontologist, by contrast, is less concerned with what happened 
then with the basic parameters of all the things that might have 
happened. The framework for these possibilities is what I call 
“symbiosis,” which is not a “neologism” as Mulhall says, but is 
simply borrowed from the evolutionary theory of Lynn Mar-
gulis.5 Unlike the historian, the ontologist tries to downplay the 
details of what really happened, so as to turn away from the 
numerous historical details of the Dutch East India Company 
toward the five or six of its transformations that really mattered. 
It is not hard to see how this might prove useful to the historian: 
by drawing greater attention to the distinction between impor-
tant and unimportant events, by encouraging a more robust 
sense of the impermeability of the chief historical actors to most 
aspects of their environment, by enhancing our attention to the 
fact that historical objects tend to reach mature form fairly early 
in their lifespan, and by affirming that historical objects are uni-
fied rather than multiple (contra the widely admired method of 




Annemarie Mol).6 None of this is hypothetical. I phrased my 
arguments in Immaterialism explicitly against actor-network-
theory, and explored the very real consequences for historians 
that result.
Mulhall’s second worry about my definition of objects is that 
it turns out to be not very different from what it opposes. After 
all, it could turn out that the things I think are real objects are 
ultimately reducible after all. To give an example of my own, a 
OOO-inspired sociologist might write a study treating the gener-
ation known as Millennials as an object, but then future demo-
graphic studies show conclusively that there are two distinctive 
generations blended together under that name, and therefore 
Millennials never really existed. While it is true that something 
like this could easily happen, Mulhall draws needlessly severe 
conclusions: “the real range and variety of object-oriented on-
tology is always hostage to its’ opponents ability to make good 
on their aspirations […] Being a reductionist and being a pro-
ponent of OOO are thus perfectly compatible: the sole distin-
guishing feature of OOO turns out to be nothing of the kind.” 
In one of just two truly condescending moments in Mulhall’s 
review, he depicts my argument as boiling down to a triviality:
What we’re left with is the following principle: don’t assume 
in advance that the unitary phenomena that appear to popu-
late any given domain of reality are reducible, but don’t as-
sume in advance that they’re not. In other words, don’t let 
your assumptions get in the way of seeing what is really there. 
Good advice, Polonius, but hardly a radical breakthrough.
A real knee-slapper, that one! The problem is that my expositions 
of undermining, overmining, and duomining all make the same 
point in advance. Many reductions are justified. I am perfectly 
happy to undermine “morning star” and “evening star” into the 
single planet Venus, and equally happy to overmine “witch” 
6 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003).
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into a number of coincidental events not caused by some evil 
black-magicking woman who must be burnt at the stake. Be-
ing cautious about what we reduce and non-reduce is a prudent 
principle indeed, and one not as universally followed as Mulhall 
seems to assume. However, the OOO approach to reduction does 
not just amount to saying, “Boris Johnson real, Sherlock Holmes 
unreal.” What is original in OOO does not consist in its aware-
ness that we are fallible in our reductions and non-reductions, 
but in its theory of the nature of whatever is taken to be non-
reducible. For even if a reductionist admits that Boris Johnson 
exists, they will still treat him by reducing him downward (to 
his background, history, DNA) and upward (to the commotions 
he has caused, the effects he has on various possible Tory coali-
tions). But this is precisely what an object-oriented ontologist 
will not do. In short, reduction is not just about whether or not 
we think something exists, but about what we conclude from 
our view that it does exist. 
After giving a brief account of my fourfold ontology of ob-
jects and qualities, Mulhall notes that this ontology “also gen-
erates two other, more richly elaborated, metaphysical propos-
als that are worth dwelling on here,” which is not to say that 
he agrees with them. “The first,” he tells us, “results from the 
apparently innocuous claim that a truly realistic ontology must 
not privilege relations between real objects and subjects over 
relations between real objects.” In passing, I would hardly say 
that my claim is “innocuous,” since it strikes at the very basis 
of Modern Onto-Taxonomy, which is precisely why OOO has 
been so controversial. It troubles me, for instance, that the usual 
definition of realism is “belief in a reality outside the mind.” This 
already concedes too much to the idealist or correlationist posi-
tion, since it implies that we are first secure in our minds and 
that we then somehow make the leap outside our minds. But the 
mind is not the only thing with an outside, nor is it even the first 
thing with an outside, and therefore we ought to redefine real-
ism in terms of there being a reality outside any relation. Mul-
hall makes the common argument that this puts me dangerously 
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close to panpsychism, though he is well aware that I distinguish 
this from what I call polypsychism.
The second result of OOO covered by Mulhall is the discus-
sion of metaphor and aesthetics provoked by my interpretation 
of José Ortega y Gasset.7 Mulhall is right to say that in the OOO 
theory of metaphor developed from Ortega’s own, one term oc-
cupies the object-pole while the other provides the qualities, 
and the combination of the two creates a paradoxical combina-
tion, as in Ortega’s example “the cypress is like the ghost of a 
dead flame.” Mulhall’s sole error here comes on a point of detail: 
namely, he says “since Harman (unlike Ortega) thinks the real 
cypress is necessarily inaccessible,” although Ortega too treats 
the real cypress as an “executant” reality untranslatable into any 
image. As Mulhall notes, from the inaccessibility of the meta-
phorical cypress, I conclude that the reader herself must step 
in theatrically and perform the absent object by fusing with the 
qualities of the flame. This compelled performance, I argue, ex-
plains the great power of aesthetics by contrast with literal lan-
guage and everyday experience.
This leads Mulhall to say that “it’s amazing how quickly we’ve 
moved from an anodyne reminder that we should check our on-
tological privileging to an enthusiastic investment in polypsy-
chism and in art as a metaphysically revelatory metaphorical 
theatricality.” Here Mulhall is in such a hurry to make a witty 
remark that he utters two falsehoods en route. First, we saw that 
the supposedly “anodyne” view of OOO on objects resulted solely 
from Mulhall’s inadequate claim that the reductionist and I both 
basically proceed according to the same methodology, which is 
not the case: for even when the reductionist agrees with me that 
a given object really exists, he will still conceive of it in reduc-
tionist terms whereas I will not. And second, the only “quick” 
transition from the definition of the object to the theories of 
polypsychism and metaphor is in Mulhall’s review itself, with its 
7 José Ortega y Gasset, “An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface,” in Phe-




necessarily compressed account. There is no such quickness in 
my book, and certainly not the wild leaps of logic that Mulhall’s 
ribbing demeanor in this passage implies.
In any case, Mulhall does not agree with my handling of ei-
ther the polypsychist theme or the metaphorical one. As for the 
first, he rightly notes that 
Harman’s polypsychism rests on a refusal to privilege sub-
ject-object relations over object-object relations […]. But 
one could believe that object-object relations are all real, 
genuinely existent phenomena […] and also believe that 
the two types of encounter are very different in kind, and 
in particular that subject-object encounters have ontological 
possibilities involving sense and intellect that object-object 
encounters lack.
This is strange, since I too believe that subject-object encounters 
“have ontological possibilities involving sense and intellect” that 
cannot be found in object-object encounters, though I would 
disagree if by “ontological” he means that this difference ought 
to be built into the foundation of ontology. Never have I argued 
that rocks and grains of dust think, dream, plan for the future, 
repress forbidden wishes, or have access to other higher cogni-
tive functions. Indeed, this is one of the reasons I am leery of 
the term “panpsychism”: as soon as you use this word, everyone 
quickly assumes that you want to eliminate all differences be-
tween humans and inanimate objects. What I attempt instead 
is to find the lowest common denominator between both kinds 
of objects, and this can be found in the fact that both of them 
relate, and that relations are never directly with the other object 
but only with a sensual translation of it. When I touch a cotton 
ball I only encounter a limited range of its features, and the same 
is true of the flame that burns that cotton. Like Mulhall himself, 
I see no reason to argue that the cotton is capable of the same 
range of complex subtleties as humans are when we feel cotton. 
But neither is there good reason to ontologize the difference be-
tween humans and cotton by saying that the rift is so deep and 
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poignant that there are two and only two kinds of things in the 
universe, (a) human thought and (b) everything else. On this 
score, Mulhall is just another Modern Onto-Taxonomist.
His objection to my aesthetic theory is somewhat less to the 
point. After asking whether I think the real object is accessible 
or not, he gives a clear summary of my argument. Unfortunate-
ly, he lists the steps of that argument with an air of impatient 
incredulity, as if to suggest an impossible tangle of rushed con-
tradictions: “First, [Harman] tells us that the real cypress cannot 
be accessible to us because it’s real; then that the subject, which 
is a real object, is always genuinely and truly present in aesthetic 
experience, and so can substitute for the absent real cypress; and 
then that the only real object involved in such experiences is not 
the subject but the newly amalgamated object of which it is a 
part.” Yes, Mulhall gets me right, but I fail to see why he detects a 
contradiction in any of this. The real cypress is withdrawn; I, the 
reader, as a different real object stand in for it; finally, this results 
in a new real object through my performing the flame-qualities 
that had been ascribed by the metaphor to the cypress. Mul-
hall got it right the first time without much difficulty, despite his 
vaudeville gesticulations of someone being asked to perform a 
ridiculous and impossible task by a chaotic author. 
Apparently, Mulhall’s question is how there can be any phi-
losophy if we are simply erecting new objects on top of old 
ones — as my theatrical model suggests — rather than gaining 
knowledge of pre-existent ones. The answer is that, while I do 
think there is knowledge of pre-existent objects through the 
modes of undermining, overmining, and duomining, I do not 
agree that philosophy or art are forms of knowledge. This is easy 
enough to see in the case of art, where no one becomes angry 
when the artist doesn’t just come out and tell us what they meant 
to say, since everyone knows there are many possible readings 
of the art object and it is not equivalent to any of them. It is only 
in connection with philosophy that people tend to become angry 
about my model, since they want philosophy to be an extension 
of that marvelous magnificent miraculous pursuit called “sci-
ence,” and if philosophy produces no knowledge then it cannot 
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be a science. To this I respond that it is not a science. Above all, 
philosophy is philosophia, a desire that never attains its object. 
As to whether or not the objects “pre-exist” the philosopher’s 
own performance of philosophy, we have some reason for doubt 
thanks to the insights of existentialist and para-existentialist 
thinkers such as Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Lacan, for 
all of whom philosophy presupposes an act and not just a theo-
retical content that unveils a pre-existent outside world. This 
focus on the act is what Alain Badiou calls “anti-philosophy,” 
and given that Badiou himself tries to combine a philosophy of 
truth with a philosophy of human fidelity to truth, his work can 
be read as the fusion of philosophy and anti-philosophy.8 Ulti-
mately, I think some form of such fusion is inescapable. Just as 
Max Scheler shifts the unit of ethics from the autonomous hu-
man to a hybrid made up of humans and the objects they love, 
Badiou shifts the unit of truth from a fact outside the mind to 
a hybrid made up of an event and a human commitment to it.9 
That is why I do not worry much about the consequences of my 
theatrical model of beauty, which can easily be expanded into a 
theatrical model of truth.
Unfortunately, Mulhall chooses to prolong the trope that 
I jump ceaselessly from one point to another: “Such unclari-
ties return us to the larger puzzle of how we got from a qui-
etist conception of an object as whatever resists reductionism 
to the claim that there are exactly two kinds of object and two 
kinds of quality that yield precisely four distinct but internally 
related rifts that together generate the flat, pluralist ontology 
of everyday life.” To repeat, the idea that objects are defined 
by OOO merely as “whatever resists reductionism” — without 
positive characteristics — is nothing more than Mulhall’s own 
insufficient reading of the situation. We recall as well his mis-
8 Alain Badiou, Lacan: Anti-Philosophy 3, ed. Kenneth Reinhard, trans. Su-
san Spitzer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Graham Harman, 
“Alain Badiou, Lacan: Anti-Philosophy 3,” Notre Dame Philosophical Re-
views, May 27, 2019, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/lacan-anti-philosophy-3/.
9 Max Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” in Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David 
R. Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1992), 98–135.
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taken claim that the reductionist and the OOO anti-reductionist 
end up in the same position. Quite apart from all this, Mulhall 
does not really seem very “puzzled” by the fourfold structure, 
which throughout his article he continually gets right without 
much effort. I suspect that most readers have the same good 
luck with it, since even the hostile Wolfendale does. As Mul-
hall puts it, “the crucial motivation is Harman’s belief that we 
can properly acknowledge the reality of real objects only if we 
deny their accessibility to human subjects; for this is what leads 
him to introduce his second category of sensual objects, and to 
define them as necessarily veiling real objects. But why should 
the accessibility of objects threaten their reality?” To answer the 
final question first, to have access to a thing is to relate to it, and 
our relation to anything is by definition not the thing itself. A 
relation has two terms, whereas the thing itself is just one, and 
to identify my perception of a lemon with the lemon itself is 
like identifying water with hydrogen. Admittedly, there is a dif-
ference between my relation to the lemon (two terms) and the 
lemon as it appears to me in this relation (one term). But this 
apparent lemon is not the same as the real lemon that exists in 
the world, because the real lemon is sour and acidic, and the 
apparent lemon is neither. At best, one could argue for a certain 
correspondence or connection between the two rather than an 
identity, though William James — like Henri Bergson in Matter 
and Memory — makes a failed attempt to treat the image of a 
dog as if it were identical to the real dog in the world.10 
The issue will return at the end of Mulhall’s article, when he 
accuses me of setting too high a bar for knowledge. We can deal 
with this later, after first noting that his own bar for knowledge 
is much too low. For here is what he means by the interplay of 
the inaccessible and the accessible:
10 William James, “A World of Pure Experience,” in Essays in Radical Empiri-
cism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), section II; Henri Berg-
son, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer 
(Mineola: Dover, 2004); Graham Harman, “Object-Oriented Philosophy vs. 
Radical Empiricism,” in Bells and Whistles: More Speculative Realism (Win-
chester: Zero Books, 2013).
345
mulhall
We think that the apple on my desk continues to exist when 
I’m not perceiving it; that I may misperceive some of its at-
tributes under certain conditions, and that others may or 
may not be in a position to correct me; that no matter how 
much knowledge of it we acquire, there may be more to dis-
cover; that our best current theory of its nature may turn out 
to be wrong, either in small details or large […]; and even 
that some aspects of reality might resist our understanding 
indefinitely.
He concludes that all of this “looks like a pretty robust acknowl-
edgement of the autonomy and independence of real objects,” 
but that unlike the OOO version of autonomy, this less exact-
ing one has the advantage of permitting us to “sometimes grasp 
their real properties and nature.” For “at least some of our rep-
resentations of the apple are accurate at least some of the time,” 
and “Harman never explains why this kind of sober acknowl-
edgment of our finitude as knowers […] is such a threat to its 
independent reality.”
I would say instead that knowledge of a thing is no threat 
to its reality at all, because a thing and knowledge of it are of 
two completely separate orders, in a sense more important than 
Mulhall’s distinction between the apple on my desk when I’m 
looking and when I’m not looking. If he had pushed just a bit 
further, he would have repeated Quentin Meillassoux’s distinc-
tion between an ancestral or arche-apple prior to the emergence 
of all consciousness and the apple for us here and now. None-
theless, autonomy does not just refer to the existence of a thing 
when I’m not looking at it, but to its existence when I am look-
ing. Mulhall is aware that this is my position, since he cites a 
passage from Object-Oriented Ontology in which I make this 
very point:
Any real orange or lemon, as I perceive it, is a vast oversim-
plification of the real citrus objects in the world that are sub-
mitted to rough translation by the human senses and human 
brain. […] All of the objects we experience are merely fic-
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tions: simplified models of the far more complex objects that 
continue to exist when I turn my head away from them, not 
to mention when I sleep or die.11
Unfortunately, this is the occasion for Mulhall’s second con-
descending remark. He pulls out his flute and plays a familiar 
academic tune: “My Opponent Is So Mixed Up That I Hardly 
Know Where to Begin.” Mulhall’s own lyrics to the song run 
as follows: “So many dubious ideas are compressed into these 
remarks that it’s hard to know where to start [unpacking] them.” 
Despite the “many” dubious ideas Mulhall claims to find in the 
passage above, by my count he gives just four. The first dubious 
idea is that by pointing to the simplifications contained in our 
experience of a lemon, I omit to mention that when we perceive 
a lemon we still get some things right about it, and therefore 
am seemingly committed to the “bizarre idea that anything less 
than an absolutely complete representation of an object must 
absolutely misrepresent it.” The second dubious idea is that I call 
our perception of a lemon “fictional,” despite the fact that the 
obviously fictional Sherlock Holmes corresponds to nothing in 
the world, while the lemon-perception does. Here Mulhall com-
ments as follows: “Harman’s policy of treating ‘simplified-trans-
lated-distorted-false-fictional’ as a chain of synonyms conflates 
importantly distinct ideas, and thereby implicates the respect-
able ideas towards the beginning of the chain with the flaws we 
associate with those towards the end.” The third dubious idea 
is that by mentioning the human senses and brain in the pas-
sage above, I “implicitly privilege the case of material objects, 
rather than maintaining the assumption of ontological plurality 
to which [I claim] to adhere.” But “for the phenomenologists 
Harman most respects, the assumption that modelling or repre-
senting is our most basic relation to the world is a distinctively 
modern fallacy. And more generally, erecting metaphysics on 
the basis of physics […] is a version of the scientism that Har-
11 Graham Harman, “A New Theory of Everything,” in Object-Oriented Ontol-
ogy: A New Theory of Everything (London: Pelican, 2018), 34.
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man begins his book by denouncing.” The fourth and final dubi-
ous idea is that there seems to be a performative contradiction 
in my claims, since I “treat [my] theory as a truthful account 
of the reality of human perception, when by [my] own lights it 
must be entirely fictional.” This leads him to speculate that I was 
secretly influenced by Nietzsche’s famous essay “On Truth and 
Lying in the Extra-Moral Sense.”12 (For the record, I was not.)
Let’s take the purportedly dubious points in reverse order. 
The idea that there is a performative contradiction in any phi-
losophy that does not admit of direct access to truth stems from 
the assumption that this claim must itself pose as a direct access 
to truth. Yet this merely begs the question. Although Mulhall 
praises Heidegger, at my expense, for actually giving specific 
analyses of the ontology of equipment despite his view that Be-
ing hides itself, others are not so kind to the German thinker. 
It is not uncommon, for instance, to hear people say that the 
concealment of Being openly contradicts Heidegger’s ability 
to write a book about it at all. But this critique misfires, since 
Heidegger does not claim that his tool-analysis takes the form 
of a direct presentation of truth, but takes care to say that the 
analysis is hermeneutic in character and is undertaken from a 
specific, historically rooted moment. In short, the rationalist as-
sumption that the denial of truth must present itself as a truth 
is just another version of the correlationist argument that the 
inapparent must appear in order for us to talk about it. But the 
fact that we talk about something does not prove that it appears 
directly to us. I could say “Mulhall will face consequences for his 
review of my book,” without that being anywhere near a direct 
inventory of such consequences, much as when Vito Corleone 
in The Godfather speaks of making someone “an offer he can’t 
refuse.” Thus it is simply false that OOO is merely fictional in the 
sense of having no relation to reality at all. Insofar as it is “fic-
tional,” a term I do use in the passage cited by Mulhall, this sim-
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in Frie-
drich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, trans. Sander L. Gilman, Carole 
Blair, and David J. Parent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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ply means there is no isomorphy, no identity of form between 
reality and anything we say about it. It is not the case that any 
system of statements needs to be grounded on an initial axiom 
of direct contact with reality.
The third dubious idea is simply a misunderstanding on Mul-
hall’s part. The fact that the passage he cites speaks of the work-
ings of the brain and the senses is merely an ad hoc example I 
chose and does not reflect a grounding of OOO in scientism. At 
least this accusation is a new one! But I could just as easily have 
spoken of two rocks colliding in outer space and encountering 
distorted versions of each other. In that case there would have 
been no accusation of scientism, and Mulhall would quickly 
have changed his tune and called me a wild panpsychist instead. 
He turns phenomenology against me, noting that I “admire” it, 
while citing this school’s denial that there is a real thing-in-itself 
that the phenomena can never reach. Yes, phenomenology has a 
non-representationalist conception of truth, but I have tried to 
show that the price of this conception is idealism. To offer a real-
ist and representationalist model instead, as I do, has nothing to 
do with scientistic materialism. There are good reasons that no 
one ever accused me of such a thing before Mulhall did.
The second dubious idea was related to Mulhall’s complaint 
that I use the words “simplified,” “translated,” “distorted,” “false,” 
and “fictional” as synonyms, thereby occluding important dif-
ferences of meaning between all these terms. I would say, first, 
that I favor precise differentiation of the meaning of terms only 
in cases where there is good reason to do so. Otherwise, need-
less distinction between words is not only pedantic but de-
prives the writer of synonyms — an important stylistic resource 
for preventing fatigue in the reader. That is to say, simplified, 
translated, distorted, false, and fictional are not functioning as 
technical terms in the passage cited by Mulhall. Or rather, they 
are all functioning as one and the same technical term, just as 
when a single god is described by thousands of honorific titles. 
If the situation involved an actual discussion of the ontology of 
fictional characters, then I would have said something like this: 
“By real person, I mean the following… By fictional character, 
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I mean the following… .” But truth be told, Mulhall seems less 
bothered by the purported confusion of terms than by the sim-
ple fact that I treat the real object as utterly different in kind 
from any manifestation of it, whether in fiction or in theory. 
And this brings us to the final point of supposed dubiety.
The first dubious idea, and the most important of all, was 
the view Mulhall rightly ascribes to me, the “bizarre idea that 
anything less than an absolutely complete representation of an 
object must absolutely misrepresent it.” My idea is actually even 
more bizarre than that, for as Mulhall already knows, I happen 
to think that even a complete representation of an object would 
absolutely misrepresent it. He zeroes in on this issue in the pe-
nultimate paragraph of his review:
[T]he picture shaping Harman’s thinking only needs to be 
plainly articulated for its peculiarity to become apparent. His 
conviction about the inherent inaccessibility of reality seems 
ultimately to rest on assuming that genuine knowledge of 
an object would have to become wholly and fully identical 
with that object: fusing with it, actually realizing the theat-
rical method-acting aspiration that he claims is internal to 
the experience of metaphor […]. This is a strangely idealist 
assumption for a putatively realist ontology, and one which 
would abolish the independent reality of subject and object 
if it were realized.
Here Mulhall basically gets the theory right, though are there 
significant problems with his portrayal of it. By no means do I 
think that genuine knowledge of an object would require fusing 
with it and becoming identical with it. My point, instead, is that 
even the best possible knowledge of a thing would not be such 
a fusion, since it would still be separated from that thing by an 
unbridgeable gulf. To say so is not some empty game of defining 
“thing” and “knowledge” in deliberately incommensurate ways 
without meaningful effect. Instead, it is ultimately meant as an 
assault on the classical opposition between form and matter. 
Namely, those such as Meillassoux who think the primary quali-
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ties of a thing are accessed by mathematizing it can say all they 
like that they are not Pythagoreans, that mathematics is merely a 
set of meaningless signs that index a reality outside mathemati-
cal formulation, and so forth. But at the end of the day, their 
view of the difference between a lemon and perfect knowledge 
of the lemon is that the former “inheres in dead matter” and 
the latter does not. In short, the lemon-form can in principle be 
transported from the lemon into my mind, even if various falli-
bilist provisos are added about the never-ending task of science 
or (as with Edmund Husserl) the unfulfillability of intentional 
acts. The OOO model, instead, is that there is no such thing as 
matter, but only forms and more forms everywhere. The differ-
ence between 100 real Thalers and 100 imaginary ones is not just 
a difference “of position” but a difference of form, one stemming 
from the fact that even if their outward visual look is utterly 
identical, the real and the imaginary Thalers are composed of 
different parts and different causal backstories that result in en-
tirely different objects. Here a new strategy for dealing with the 
ontological argument also suggests itself. But in any case, OOO 
has never opposed knowledge, which is the obsession of Mul-
hall and other moderns who like to see themselves as the good 
neighbors of science. By contrast, OOO sees itself as a closer 
neighbor of aesthetics and Socratic philosophia, and these dis-
ciplines do not pursue knowledge, but forms that can never be 
converted into knowledge.
This leads us to a second and related error in the passage 
cited above. When Mulhall says I demand of knowledge that it 
“actually [realize] the theatrical method-acting aspiration that 
[I claim] is internal to the experience of metaphor,” he is wrong 
on two counts. First, the theatrical model pertains to aesthetics 
and not to knowledge, which always remains literal. And sec-
ond, the theatrical fusion with an object in metaphor — with a 
cypress, for example — is not some sort of “becoming one” with 
it, but a temporary identification with it solely for the purpose 
of fusing with its flame-qualities. In aesthetics I do not fuse with 
a pre-existent object, but impersonate such an object in order to 
create an entirely different one.
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From these points it is also clear why Mulhall is wrong to ac-
cuse me of “a strangely idealist assumption for a putatively real-
ist ontology […] one which would abolish the independent real-
ity of subject and object if it were realized.” For it is not the case 
that I treat knowledge as a way of fusing with its object. And 
even in the aesthetic realm, there is no fusion of beholder with 
artwork. The work is the work, and the beholding of the work 
contains the work as one of its elements, just as water contains 
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